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ABSTRACT 
African countries are faced with the daunting task of providing a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for their natural resources. This is at both the 
international and domestic level. The statement is particularly true for emerging 
African oil producing countries. Related to the above, it can be argued that 
production quotas, subsidies, and corruption continue to hinder the full 
liberalisation of the oil sector globally, and in Africa. Also, these three areas are 
the genesis of some of the prominent issues in the discussions of trade in energy 
goods. Although Africa is substantially endowed with natural resources like 
crude oil, it remains at the bottom of the development pecking order; 
accordingly, it has to get centrally involved in the debate on the regulation of 
international trade in oil to encourage development and to benefit from the 
resource. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are the most relevant organisations in the collective 
regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and the control of 
corruption in the oil sector. Both organisations, directly for the former, and 
indirectly for the latter, deal with trade between nations. OPEC‘s mandate is 
established in the OPEC Statute, while the mandate of the WTO is found in 
various multilateral and plurilateral agreements. However, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (GATT), the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) are the most relevant. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is 
only discussed where relevant. This is because the treaty is based on the WTO 
framework. Also, several provisions in the WTO agreements are not fully 
discussed in the ECT. 
OPEC which deals with regulation of oil production and to some extent oil 
prices in member countries has an effect on trade of the commodity. The role of 
the WTO however, is more direct as it regulates international trade of various 
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goods and services. Thus this thesis investigates how the above legal 
frameworks regulate production quotas, subsidies, and corruption in the oil 
sector. The results of the foregoing investigation are then applied to African 
countries, such as, Nigeria, Angola (members of both the WTO and OPEC) and 
Ghana, an emerging African oil producing country, to assess the impact of these 
international rules on the countries‘ legal regimes.  
Ghana has recently developed its crude oil sector. The success of the nascent oil 
sector of this country may depend on the conception or improvement of a 
comprehensive legal framework, to regulate international trade in oil. It is 
apparent that without an effective legal framework to regulate international 
trade in oil, the discovery of oil in Ghana, may not make any long term positive 
impact on the current economic conditions. Ghana is a member of the WTO; 
however, it is yet to join OPEC, despite growing debate on its membership in the 
organisation.  
KEY WORDS 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
‘Nous entrons dans l’avenir à reculons.’1 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the research, gives a statement of the research 
problem, sets out the scope of the research, and its objectives and methodology, and 
outlines the chapters of the thesis. The chapter also provides an introduction to the 
legal framework and mandate of the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) as well as the mandate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
in the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption in 
the oil sector. 
The research is motivated by the need to harmonise trade rules and create equity in 
world trade. Furthermore, the need to encourage further liberalisation of the oil 
sector is also one of the objectives of this research. Generally, the WTO has actively 
encouraged the liberalisation of international trade.2 It should be noted that OPEC is 
not part of the WTO framework; however, most of the OPEC members are members 
of the WTO.3 Nonetheless, some of the provisions of OPEC‘s legal framework may 
                                                 
1
  The above quotation is attributed to Paul Avery. Translated to English, the statement means that we enter the 
future walking backwards. This chapter provides a basis for the detailed analysis in the later chapters. It is 
impossible to discuss the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption without 
understanding the history and conception of both the WTO and OPEC. See Guzzini S Realism in 
International Relations and International Political Economy, the Continuing Story of a Death Foretold 
(1998) 15 (hereafter Guzzini S 1998). 
2
  Lowenfeld A F International Economic Law 2 ed (2008) 74-75 (hereafter Lowenfeld A F 2008). See also 
Bagwell K & Staiger R W ‗Economic Theory and the Interpretation of GATT/WTO (2003) 16‘ available at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~rstaiger/econ.theory.gatt.wto.pdf (accessed 07 March 2013) (hereafter Bagwell K 
& Staiger R 2003). See also Schott J J ‗Challenges Facing the World Trade Organisation‘ available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/chapterspreview /66/1iie2350.pdf (accessed 07 March 2013). 
3
  Angola, Ecuador, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and, Venezuela are members 
of both the WTO and OPEC. Additionally Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and, Libya are all observers at the WTO and 
are in the process of accession with the WTO. See Worika I L ‗Production, Management, OPEC and the 
WTO‘ Pauwelyn J (ed) Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment (2010) 
89 (hereafter Worika I L 2010). 
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not be compatible with the basic provisions of the WTO legal framework.4 The core 
discussion of international trade measures affecting trade in oil is premised on the 
WTO legal framework which is more inclusive, and is then compared to the OPEC 
Statute. African countries, especially Nigeria and Angola which are members of both 
organisations are relied upon as examples.5 
In addition, Ghana which joined the WTO on 1 January 1995 is used as an example 
of emerging African oil producing countries (WTO member countries) that may be 
considering OPEC membership.6 Unlike most African countries, Ghana is a vigilant 
member of the WTO and has been involved in the dispute settlement process.7 
African oil producing countries need to deal with the duality of regulation and the 
challenges within the legal frameworks of both organisations. African oil producing 
countries will only benefit from the organisations if the scope and application of the 
organisations‘ legal frameworks are harmonised. Ghana is currently considering 
whether or not it should join OPEC.8 However, that country‘s oil production is still 
low and it may not qualify.9 
It should also be noted that non-OPEC oil producing countries have managed to 
perform exceptionally well in the management of their oil resources.10 This may 
induce Ghana to refrain from joining OPEC. Commentators in Ghana argue that 
OPEC may not benefit oil production there due to production quotas and the fact 
                                                 
4
  See chapter 1 sections 1.4.2 and 1.5. See also chapter 3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 for a detailed 
discussion. 
5
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
6
  WTO ‗Ghana and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto. org/english/thewtoe/countries_e/ghana e.htm 
(accessed 08 June 2012). See also chapter 6 generally for a detailed discussion of Ghana. 
7
  Ghana was a third party in the Bananas dispute. The other African countries that were involved include: 
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. It should be noted that very many African countries were 
beneficiaries of preferential treatment under the European Communities and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
partnership; however, they chose to watch the progress of the dispute from the side-lines. See European 
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Appellate Body Report) [1997] 
WT/DS27/AB/R 3.  
8
  Ghana Oil and Gas ‗Ghana Unlikely to Join OPEC on Commencement of Production‘ available at 
http://ghanaoilonline.org/2011/01/ghana-unlikely-to-join-opec-on-commencement-of-production/ (accessed 
21 May 2013).  
9
  Ghana Oil and Gas ‗Ghana Unlikely to Join OPEC on Commencement of Production‘ available at 
http://ghanaoilonline.org/2011/01/ghana-unlikely-to-join-opec-on-commencement-of-production/ (accessed 
21 May 2013). 
10
  Sankey P et al ‗The End of the Oil Age 2011 and Beyond: A Reality Check‘ available at http://bioage. 
typepad.com/files/1223fm-05.pdf (accessed 21 May 2013). 
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that Ghana, like Nigeria and Angola, is less developed than many of the OPEC states 
and needs to maximise revenue from its oil sector.11 
OPEC greatly affects the quantity of oil produced in member countries and to this 
end influences international oil prices.12 Prior to the formation of OPEC, oil trade 
outside the United States, China, present-day Russia, and Canada was dominated by 
international oil companies.13 The host governments in the oil producing countries 
merely acted as vendors of licences and concessions to the international oil 
companies.14 The host governments only benefitted in terms of royalties and taxes.15 
These governments were not involved in production or setting of crude oil prices.16 
OPEC changed this trend and empowered the host governments of its member 
states to get involved in production and the setting of oil prices. It is argued in this 
thesis that some OPEC practices, such as production quotas and oil consumption 
subsidies, may violate WTO rules.17 It is also argued that OPEC has failed to control 
corruption in the member states.  
Production quotas that are made to protect oil prices, affect the stability of global oil 
prices. OPEC production quotas encourage volatility of oil prices.18 This volatility is 
exacerbated by the fact that production limits that are set are often violated by the 
members.19 Related to production quotas and protection of prices, oil consumption 
subsidies are provided for some petroleum products. 20  These subsidies usually 
                                                 
11
  Ethe O ‗Is OPEC Good for Ghana‘ available at http://www.africanews.com/site/Is_OPEC_good_for_ 
Ghana/list_messages/28599 (accessed 21 May 2013). It is worth noting that Ghana has recently borrowed 
money from the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID). However this relationship is unlikely to 
affect or encourage Ghana‘s membership to OPEC. OPEC and the OFID have distinct mandates. Suffice it to 
note that OPEC‘s strict membership requirements restrict membership. See also Republic of Ghana, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development ‗Minister Leads Delegation to IMF/World Bank Meeting‘ available 
at http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=news/220911 (accessed 07 March 2013). 
12
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. 
13
  Fattouh B An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System (2011) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 14 
(hereafter Fattouh B 2011). 
14
  Fattouh B (2011) 14. 
15
  Fattouh B (2011) 14. 
16
  Fattouh B (2011) 14. 
17
  Cottier T et al ‗Energy in WTO law and policy‘ Cottier T & Delimatsis P (eds) The Prospects of 
International Trade Regulation from Fragmentation to Coherence (2011) 220 (hereafter Cottier T et al 
2011). 
18
  Parra F Oil Politics A Modern History of Petroleum (2010) 336-337 (hereafter Parra F 2010). 
19
  Parra F (2010) 337. 
20
  See chapter 1 section 1.5 and chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
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target the poor.21 It can be argued that the revenue received as a result of production 
restriction, may be used to support oil consumption subsidy programs.22 This is 
especially true for the oil producing countries. This creates a direct link between the 
two practices. Similarly, it can also be argued that production quotas maintained to 
protect appropriate oil prices, also have a direct link to corruption in oil producing 
countries whose major source of revenue is oil exports. 23  To this end, OPEC 
production restrictions are related to oil consumption subsidy programs and 
corruption. In sum, it is argued that the collective regulation of these three areas will 
encourage further liberalisation of the trade in oil. This is also one of the major 
reasons why these three areas are the focus of this study. The next section explains 
the title of the thesis as well as the common concepts used in the thesis and also sets 
out limitations. The section below does not attempt to define all terms used and only 
focuses on those that are relevant to delineate the scope of the thesis. 
1.1.1 Explanation of the Title and Limitations of the Thesis 
OPEC and the WTO are the major international organisations that are potentially 
involved in the regulation of oil trade. 24  It suffices, therefore, that a study on 
                                                 
21
  It has been estimated that in practice only about 8 % of fossil fuel subsidies reach the poor for whom they 
are intended. See IEA et al ‗Joint report by IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank on fossil-fuel and other 
energy subsidies: An update of the G20 Pittsburgh and Toronto Commitments 6‘ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/49006998.pdf (accessed 24 May 2013).  
22
  Empirical studies reveal that oil consumption subsidies are made to cater to the demands of consumers. This 
position is self-explanatory even in the absence of empirical studies. On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that production quotas are made to cater for both producers and consumers. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that oil consumption subsidies are used by OPEC members to protect their consumers from the high 
global oil prices. Thus it can be argued that revenue received from the high crude oil prices is used to 
subsidise oil consumption in the OPEC countries. See Hochman G & Zilberman D The Political Economy of 
OPEC (2011) Energy Bioscience Institute University of California Berkeley 2-3 (hereafter Hochman G & 
Zilberman D 2011a). See also See Hochman G & Zilberman D OPEC and Cheap Fuel Policies (2011) 
Energy Biosciences Institute and the USDA Economic Research Services 2 (hereafter Hochman G & 
Zilberman D 2011b). 
23
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.3 and 4.5. 
24
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3, chapter 3 sections 3.2 and 3.4 and chapter 4 section 4.4. It can also be 
argued that the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) which is based on WTO rules and deals exclusively with 
energy trade is an appropriate treaty. However, under Annex W of the ECT certain provisions in the WTO 
agreements are excluded from trade in energy goods. This includes provisions on application of dispute 
settlement procedures in Art 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and Art 
6 on serious prejudice which affects the effectiveness of Art 5 on actionable subsidies. Further the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is also excluded. Also, Art 29 (2) (as amended) of the ECT 
refers to applying WTO rules as they are applied to trade in energy goods by the WTO. This is vague as the 
WTO has not applied these rules such as Art XI of the GATT to certain energy goods for example crude oil. 
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production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption in African oil 
producing countries should examine the laws and institutions of these two 
organisations.25 Other organisations, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
also exist.26 However, these have not been very active in influencing oil policy and 
trade in the oil producing countries.27 Additionally, the author acknowledges the 
fact that production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption affect the 
upstream and downstream oil sectors. However, these are some of the issues that 
arise out of both organisations potentially regulating international trade in oil. Thus 
the thesis is not restricted to either the upstream oil sector or the downstream oil 
sector. 
Production quotas are the main instrument used by OPEC to stabilise oil prices.28 
These quotas affect the amount of oil that is produced and exported and also 
influence global oil prices. As such, the discussion of production restriction or 
production quotas focuses on crude oil as opposed to refined oil. It is argued in the 
thesis that production quotas are inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) provisions on export restrictions. The focus on crude oil as 
opposed to refined oil requires a detailed discussion of whether crude oil is a good 
for purposes of the GATT.29  
‗Oil consumption subsidies‘ refer to financial contributions made by the various 
countries (oil producing and non-oil producing) towards reducing the price of oil 
                                                 
25
  The above reason also forms the basis for the classification of the research as a comparative study. See 
generally chapter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5. 
26
  The organisation was formed to respond to the 1973/4 oil crisis. It is mainly composed of oil consuming 
states that seek to guarantee oil supply among other objectives. See IEA ‗History‘ available at 
http://www.iea.org/aboutus/history/ (accessed 07 November 2012).  
27
  Although the IEA has a working relationship with OPEC, the problem of rent allocation between producing 
countries and consuming countries as well as the difference in the interests of the two organisations is a 
major challenge to harmonisation of the policies of the organisations. This affects the ability of the IEA to 
influence policy in OPEC member states. See generally Mabro R A Dialogue Between Oil Producers and 
Consumers: The Why and the How (1991) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (hereafter Mabro R 1991). 
See also Luciani G ‗Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East‘ available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~gluciani/pdfs/ Chapter%20in% 20Fawcett.pdf (accessed 21 May 2013). It can be 
argued that the above problems may be overcome at the WTO as the organisation deals with various 
commodities and is not limited to oil. Accordingly, it is an appropriate forum for making concessions and 
compromises.  
28
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
29
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
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products for domestic consumption.30  These subsidies sometimes create adverse 
effects for the oil sectors of other oil producing countries.31 In this regard it can be 
argued that oil consumption subsides may be in contravention of provisions in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).32 Oil Consumption 
Subsidies in this thesis are based on the difference between average end-user prices 
paid by consumers and the full supply price. 33  This may denote a financial 
contribution made by a particular country. The definition of subsidies under the 
SCM Agreement is relied upon in this thesis.34  
Corruption in the OPEC member states has been identified as a major challenge.35 
Corruption in the oil dependent states has been attributed to a high level of 
government involvement in the sector. 36  OPEC does not have specific rules on 
corruption. The WTO, on the other hand, has an Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA), which can be used to control corruption. However, the GPA has 
not been very effective.37 
For purposes of this thesis, production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and 
control of corruption are identified as the key areas. Therefore, reference to 
‗international trade in oil‘ refers to the regulation of the above areas. It should be 
noted that other areas such as internal taxes and transit of energy and energy related 
services also have an effect on global trade in oil. However, these are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.38 
                                                 
30
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 and chapter 4 section 4.4.2. The discussion of oil consumption subsidies in this 
thesis focuses on such subsidies in oil producing countries. 
31
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 and chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
32
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 and chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
33
  See IEA ‗Fossil-fuel subsidies – Methodology and Assumptions‘ available at http://www.iea.org/ 
publications/worldenergyoutlook/resources/energysubsidies/methodologyforcalculatingsubsidies/ (accessed 
12 April 2013). It should be noted that OPEC is not comfortable with this definition and prefers that the 
benchmark price should be the cost of oil production. See IEA et al Analysis of the Scope of Energy 
Subsidies and Suggestions for the G-20 Initiative (2010) 13-14 (hereafter IEA et al 2010a). 
34
  See Art 1 of the SCM Agreement. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
35
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4 and chapter 4 sections 4.4.3 and 4.5. 
36
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.3 and 4.5. 
37
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
38
  Yanovich A ‗WTO Rules and the Energy Sector‘ Selivanova Y (ed) Regulation of Energy in International 
Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (2012) 11 and 29 (hereafter Yanovich A 2012). 
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Regulation is broadly understood as a system that facilitates or restricts certain 
behaviour.39 In some cases, commentators have categorised regulation as red tape, 
which only creates obstacles to economic activity.40 This may be true, especially for 
the oil sector. It has been noted that the oil sector in Africa will in the near future be 
greatly supported by indigenous private oil companies.41 These, like all other private 
companies will essentially be driven by profit motives and they may consider 
regulation to be bureaucratic red tape. This in most cases does not advance the 
interests of the citizens42 of the countries where oil resources are located.43 On a 
positive note, some authors have defined regulation as economic regulation.44 That is, 
legislative and administrative controls that govern economic activity. 45  This 
definition is more balanced and takes into account the needs of both private oil 
companies and the citizens. The regulation of economic activity can benefit both the 
private entities and the citizens of an oil producing country. 
The research endeavours to keep the focus of the study on Africa, and, in addition to 
providing African examples, a specific African case study is undertaken in chapter 
six. Although the challenges experienced by oil producing countries in the 
regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and control of corruption 
                                                 
39
  Baldwin R et al Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice 2 ed (2012) 3 (hereafter Baldwin 
R et al 2012). 
40
  Baldwin R et al (2012) 1. 
41
  Nigeria and Angola have indicated that they will increase local participation in the oil sector. Local 
participation may include the participation of local private oil companies. See Global Witness Rigged? The 
Scramble for Africa‘s Oil, Gas and Minerals (2012) 8 (hereafter Global Witness 2012).  
42
  Citizens in this context refer solely to natural persons and not juristic persons. 
43
  Private oil companies may favour limited regulation to exploit oil resources at the lowest costs. Thus the 
citizens may lose revenue and also face externalities such as environmental degradation. 
44
  It is argued that economic regulation is meant to benefit politically effective groups. The theory of economic 
regulation is premised on the broad theory of demand and supply. Thus the state will use regulation to 
provide benefits to particular groups. For the citizens, these benefits may include regulations to enhance 
taxes from the private oil companies. On the other hand, regulation may be used to limit entry of private oil 
companies to protect the existing companies. Thus regulation in this case can achieve both objectives. See 
Posner R A Theories of Economic Regulation (1974) National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper Series No. 41 1, 14-15 and 19 (hereafter Posner R A 1974). See also generally Stigler G ‗The theory 
of economic regulation‘ (1971) 2 Bell J. Econ & Management Sci 2.1 (hereafter Stigler G 1971). The 
economic theory of regulation has been criticised by some authors. It has been argued that the theory has 
limitations and is related to the public interest theory of regulation. Further, it has been argued that 
regulations are not always made in the public interest. Commentators also argue that the private interest 
ambit of the economic theory of regulation presupposes that regulators always regulate for private interests, 
which is not entirely true. For a detailed discussion see generally Ogus A ‗W(h)ither the Economic Theory 
of Regulation? What Economic Theory of Regulation?‘ Jordana J & Levi-Faur D (eds) The Politics of 
Regulation Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (2004) (hereafter Ogus A 2004). 
45
  Posner R A (1974) 1. 
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are not limited to Africa, an analysis of these key areas without delineating the scope 
of the study would be too ambitious. 
1.2 The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
1.2.1 A Brief History  
The birth of OPEC is attributed to a conference held in Baghdad, Iraq, between 10 
and 14 September 1960.46 The conference revolutionalised oil trade and introduced a 
new organisation. OPEC officially47 came into existence, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Kuwait, Iraq and Venezuela as the founding members. 48  OPEC was formed in 
retaliation against the domination of international oil companies and a cartel-type 
arrangement created by some state governments in the United States of America.49 
‗Since its birth in 1960, our Organisation has been characterized by a clarity of 
objectives. It envisaged a central objective to which it diligently stuck for more than 
ten years. That objective revolved around the concept that oil prices are an integral 
part of the basic national interests of member countries and that their decisions to 
                                                 
46
  Danielsen A L The Evolution of OPEC (1982) 4 (hereafter Danielsen A L 1982). The OPEC statute differs 
from the foregoing text on the dates of formation, the text indicates 9 -14 September 1960 as the dates when 
OPEC was formed. See also Wälde T W ‗Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries‘ Istituto Della 
Enciclopedia Italiana and Fondata Da Giovanni Treccani S.p.A. Encyclopaedia of Hydrocarbons 
International Law (2007) 560 (hereafter Wälde T W 2007). The text indicates 10
 
-14 September 1960 as the 
correct dates for the formation of OPEC. The date indicated in the Statute and affirmed by Wälde T W (2007) 
is the most appropriate date. See also Behr P ‗Energy Nationalism Do Petrostates Threaten Global Energy 
Security?‘ Kassie G et al (eds) International Issues in Social Work and Social Welfare Selections from CQ 
Researcher (2010) 242 (hereafter Behr P 2010). 
47
  The term ‗officially‘ is used with regard to 1960, as OPEC‘s formation is said to go back to several meetings 
held between the major oil producing countries at the time. In 1947, exploratory meetings were held between 
the Venezuelans and the Iranians. Venezuelan officials also toured the Middle East in 1949 and an Arab 
Petroleum Congress was held in Cairo in 1959. See Hallwood P & Sinclair S Oil, Debt and Development – 
OPEC in the Third World (1981) 42 (hereafter Hallwood P & Sinclair S 1981). 
48
  It should be noted that other members were subsequently admitted as full members. These included; Qatar, 
Libya, Indonesia, UAE, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon. See Danielsen A L (1982) 4.  
49
  The domination of international oil companies, commonly known as the seven sisters has been described as 
an international corporate cartel. The following companies dominated oil trade in the Middle East prior to 
the formation of OPEC; Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Socal, Gulf, Shell, and BP. The cartel type arrangement in 
the United States was known as market demand prorationing. This was a quota and allocation system used to 
limit production in the United States and maintain prices from 1935 to 1970. See Hallwood P & Sinclair S 
(1981) 6-7.  
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change them are their legitimate right and one which ought not to be left in the 
hands of foreign oil companies alone.‘50 
Despite the creation of OPEC in the 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that the effect of 
OPEC was felt in oil trade.51 It is worth noting at this stage that OPEC‘s intervention 
and success might have affected the cartel-type arrangement in the USA and 
contributed to the demise of market demand prorationing in 1970.52 At the same 
time, production cuts by some OPEC members and the oil embargo on the USA led 
to an oil shortage and increased global oil prices.53 Similarly, these actions also 
affected the cartel-type arrangement that was maintained by the international oil 
companies. 
‗By the early 1970s the OPEC members could show a united front against the, by 
then disunited, international oil companies, reversing the situation of only a few 
years earlier.‘54 
Negotiations and the resulting agreements signed between 1971 and 1973, between 
OPEC members and the international oil companies successfully raised the posted 
prices.55 The success of OPEC members can be explained by the uniform voice, 
developed from having organised themselves under one organisation.56 However, 
                                                 
50
  Jaidah A M An Appraisal of OPEC Oil Policies – Energy Resources and Policies of the Middle East and 
North Africa (1983) 48 (hereafter Jaidah A M 1983). 
51
  Hallwood P & Sinclair S (1981) 42. 
52
  As a result of oil price suppression by the United States and its support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, 
some Arab OPEC members imposed an oil embargo on the United States. Some OPEC member states also 
instituted a production cut. See Hallwood P & Sinclair S (1981) 6-7. See also Behr P (2010) 242.  
53
  See Behr P (2010) 242 for a detailed discussion of OPEC policies in the 1970s. 
54
  Hallwood P & Sinclair S (1981) 42. 
55
  The increase in posted prices is credited to the Tehran Agreement, the Tripoli Agreement and the Geneva 
Accords. See Hallwood P & Sinclair S (1981) 43. Posted prices are the announced price of oil reflecting the 
market development of crude oil and crude oil products. Prior to the 1970s posted prices were manipulated 
and administered by the international oil companies and did not truly reflect the market development of 
crude oil. See OPEC ‗Definitions‘ available at http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Stati 
stical%20Bulletin/interactive/2009/FileZ/definition.htm (accessed 4 July 2011). See also Fattouh B (2011) 
15. Despite the failure of the negotiations in September 1973, the posted prices were increased by the six 
Gulf member states of OPEC. See also Yergin D (1991) The Prize. The Quest for Oil, Money and Power and 
Fattouh B The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing System: A Critical Assessment 
in: Mabro R. (ed.) Oil in the Twenty-First Century: Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities (2006) all cited in 
Brémond V et al ‗Does OPEC still exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation‘ (2011) Journal of Energy 
Economics (03) 10 1-2 (hereafter Brémond V et al 2011). The posted price period is said to have originated 
with the international oil companies, which sought to have a stable low price to limit the income tax paid to 
the oil exporting countries irrespective of the prevailing market conditions. 
56
  Hallwood P & Sinclair S (1981) 43. 
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this success was curtailed by the Iranian oil-workers strike, which halted oil 
production in Iran in 1978.57 The foregoing state of affairs was compounded by the 
refusal of OPEC members to sell oil on the spot market; this increased oil prices on 
the spot market.58 Thus the 1970s although initially successful, ended on a low note. 
Further, the growing success of OPEC in raising prices and imposing its influence on 
oil trade was adversely affected by the declining prices and low demand that 
characterised the oil trade in the 1980s.59 The low prices at the time have been 
imputed to increased oil production in the non-OPEC countries, and low demand 
due to energy conservation efforts in the USA, Europe, and Japan. 60  OPEC 
responded by introducing a group production ceiling divided between the members 
and also by providing a reference basket for pricing.61 The above measures and the 
slight increase in oil prices, towards the end of the decade, helped member countries 
to recover from the effects of the early 1980s.62 
The 1990s did not experience pricing problems as serious as those witnessed in the 
1980s.63 However, political instability in the Middle East caused some price volatility 
in the early 1990s.64 The attack on Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 precipitated a major price 
rise from US $ 15 per barrel in May 1990 to over US $ 40 per barrel at the end of 
                                                 
57
  Parra F (2010) 220. 
58
  Parra F (2010) 229. 
59
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opecweb/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). See also Sammi M V ‗OPEC: Past, Present, and Future‘ Shojai S (ed) The New Global Oil Market: 
Understanding Energy Issues in the World Economy (1995) 86 (hereafter Sammi M V 1995). The text cites 
sharp price fluctuations and excess oil supplies as some of the issues that affected OPEC in the 1980s.  
60
  Behr P (2010) 242. 
61
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). See also Brémond V et al (2011) 1. The foregoing text indicates that a new price mechanism was 
established in the mid-1980s; this was a market related price as opposed to an administered price. Thus there 
were various pricing systems between the 1970s and the 1980s, that is, the posted price, official price, 
buyback price, the administered price by OPEC and the market-related price, which prevails today. See 
Fattouh B (2011) 11-16. See also Parra F (2010) 289 for a detailed discussion of the quota allocation in the 
1980s and the price mechanism. See also Skeet I OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics (1989) 
217 (hereafter Skeet I 1989). 
62
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). 
63
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). It should be noted that weak prices still persisted in the decade; prices at some point went as low as 
the prices of the mid 1980s. However, the decade was much more stable than the 1980s. 
64
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). 
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1990.65 It should be noted that the above attack was finally quelled by the USA and 
the United Nations coalition forces, which forced Iraq out of Kuwait.66 This allowed 
the prices to settle but only for a while.67 Ecuador also suspended its membership of 
the organisation in 1992.68 
At the turn of the century, oil prices rose from US $ 10 to US $ 30 per barrel, OPEC 
responded by introducing a price band mechanism to stabilise prices.69 This new 
mechanism took long to improve the situation and was only fairly efficient in 2002.70 
On 14 September 2000, OPEC celebrated its 40th anniversary.71 Currently, OPEC is 
struggling with volatile crude oil prices. 72  It is apparent from the foregoing 
discussion that OPEC has focused and continues to focus on maintaining the best 
possible price for crude oil. This is mainly achieved through production regulation. 
OPEC‘s mandate is largely responsible for the trend discussed above. While this is 
important, the regulation of international oil trade especially for Africa goes beyond 
the struggle to maintain an appropriate price. Other related issues such as oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption are relevant.  
                                                 
65
  Euclid A ‗OPEC‘s Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World‘s Dependence on Oil‘ 
Middle East Journal (2004) (58) 3 424 (hereafter Euclid A 2004). See also Parra F (2010) 305. 
66
  Euclid A (2004) 425 
67
  Euclid A (2004) 425. 
68
  See OPEC ‗Ecuador Facts and Figures‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opecweb/en/about us/ 148.htm 
(accessed 24 May 2013). Ecuador returned to the organisation in 2007. See also The New York Times 
‗Ecuador Set to Leave OPEC‘ available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/18/business/ecuador-set-to-
leave-opec.html (accessed 24 May 2013). Ecuador suspended its membership because of the annual United 
States $ 2 million membership fee and the Organisation‘s refusal to raise the country‘s production quota 
from 320,000 barrels a day. Mr. Andres Barreiro Vivas, the country‘s energy minister at the time, stated that 
the above conditions were affecting the country‘s economy. 
69
  Horn M ‗OPEC‘s optimal crude oil price‘ Energy Policy (2004) (32) 12 269 (hereafter Horn M 2004). The 
price band mechanism involves setting of a price range between US $ 22 to US $ 28 per barrel and using that 
price range to regulate production. 
70
  Horn M (2004) 269. 
71
  OPEC ‗Annual Statistical Bulletin (2000)‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_ 
project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2000.pdf (accessed 24 May 2013). 
72
  Wearden G ‗Oil Prices Volatile as OPEC Talks Down Shortage Fears‘ available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/business/2011/mar/08/oil-prices-volatile-iran-opec-production (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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1.2.2 The OPEC Mandate 
As indicated in section 1.2.1, OPEC‘s mandate has always focused on ensuring that 
its members get a satisfactory price for their oil.73 Art 2 (A)-(C) of the OPEC Statute 
provides the mandate of the organisation. 
‗The principal aim of the Organi[s]ation shall be the coordination and unification of 
the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means 
for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 
The Organi[s]ation shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabili[s]ation of 
prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and 
unnecessary fluctuations. 
Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to 
the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, 
economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return 
on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.‘74 
The economies of the OPEC members are diverse: some countries, like Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates, have flourishing economies, while other economies, 
especially those of the African members for example, Nigeria and Angola are still 
growing.75 This makes it very difficult to harmonise the petroleum policies of the 
members. OPEC members depend on oil trade to run their economies and thus their 
petroleum policies have to be in accord with their broad economic policies. The 
above challenge is highlighted by among other examples, the 1990 dispute between 
Iraq and Kuwait which was largely driven by OPEC‘s failure to accommodate the 
                                                 
73
  This does not mean that OPEC directly fixes the prices for oil; this was the position in the past. Currently 
OPEC members can only limit oil production. This in turn indirectly affects the price of oil. The prices are 
now set by movements on the different petroleum exchanges. These include: the New York Mercantile 
Exchange, the International Petroleum Exchange and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange. The 
New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex) orchestrated the plan to put OPEC out of the price setting arena. 
See Wälde T W (2007) 563 for a detailed discussion. See also Goodman L M The Asylum The Renegades 
who Hijacked the World’s Oil Market (2011) 71-72 and 92-93 (hereafter Goodman L M 2011).  
74
  The OPEC Statute Art 2. 
75
  See The World Bank ‗Data-Saudi Arabia‘ available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/saudi-arabia 
(accessed 24 May 2013). See also The World Bank ‗Data- United Arab Emirates‘ available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-arab-emirates (accessed 24 May 2013). See also The World Bank 
‗Data-Nigeria‘ available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria (accessed 24 May 2013). See also The 
World Bank ‗Data-Angola‘ available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/angola (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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individual oil production policies of the two countries.76 Be that as it may, OPEC has 
existed since the 1960s and has managed to overcome the various challenges that 
have threatened its existence. This indicates that the organisation has been successful 
in maintaining relative harmony in the petroleum policies of its members. 
The stabilisation of oil prices on the international oil markets is by no means a simple 
endeavor. Currently the control of crude oil prices has been wrestled from the firm 
grip of OPEC.77 The movement of oil prices is controlled to a very large extent by the 
major petroleum exchanges.78 OPEC can only indirectly influence prices by setting a 
production ceiling for its members. 79  Thus to date OPEC has not been very 
successful in controlling the volatility of crude oil prices.80 The apparent failure to 
effectively stabilise prices on international oil markets does not imply that OPEC 
does not affect the price of oil. It still does so through controlling supply by its 
member countries. 
OPEC exercises its mandate through resolutions.81 The choice of resolutions as a tool 
for creating obligations is to protect and emphasise the sovereignty of the member 
states.82 It has been noted that these resolutions have the force of law, as they are 
made in terms of provisions in the OPEC Statute.83 It can also be argued that these 
resolutions can be characterised as soft law. 84  An issue that requires further 
investigation is the strength of the obligations created thereunder.85 
The OPEC mandate shows that its main interest is price stabilisation. The need to 
control prices is tied to ensuring a steady income for member states. It is doubtful 
whether OPEC is really interested in ensuring a steady supply of petroleum to 
                                                 
76
  Parra F (2010) 295-297. 
77
  Goodman L M (2011) 92-93. 
78
  Wälde T W (2007) 563. 
79
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). 
80
  Wearden G ‗Oil Prices Volatile as OPEC Talks Down Shortage Fears‘ available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/business/2011/mar/08/oil-prices-volatile-iran-opec-production (accessed 24 May 2013). 
81
  See OPEC Statute Art 11 (C). 
82
  Stoehr L ‗OPEC as a Legal Entity‘ (1979) Fordham International Law Journal Vol 3 Issue 1 95 (hereafter 
Stoehr L 1979). 
83
  Stoehr L (1979) 95. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.1 on resolutions creating legitimate expectations and soft 
law. 
84
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
85
  This issue is discussed in chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
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consuming countries. This can only be done where the organisation is assured of an 
appropriate price for its members‘ crude oil. Recently relations between the IEA and 
OPEC have been strained due to the IEA releasing its emergency oil stocks onto the 
market without the approval of OPEC.86  This indicates that the interests of the 
consuming states are not the major focus of OPEC. 
OPEC‘s stated mandate is challenging and not easy to fulfil. However, the continued 
existence of OPEC reveals that the organisation is relevant in protecting the interests 
of members and to a small extent the setting of world crude oil prices. Nevertheless, 
many African oil producing countries cannot meet the membership requirements of 
the organisation.87 This makes OPEC an exclusive club for certain countries that 
meet its membership criteria, despite the fact that African oil producing countries 
that are non-OPEC members are also affected by OPEC‘s actions, which usually arise 
from the mandate of the organisation. 
Additionally, there are indications that Art 2 (B) of the OPEC Statute contravenes Art 
XI (I) of the GATT 1994.88 OPEC has established a production ceiling. This can be 
classified as production quotas for its members.89 It has also been noted that OPEC 
has failed to manage oil consumption subsidies and corruption in its member 
states.90 Article 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute provides that the organisation should 
                                                 
86
  The IEA released 60 million barrels from the emergency stocks of its member countries. The IEA justified 
the release citing a shortage in oil supply due to the ongoing oil supply disruptions from Libya. OPEC was 
of the opinion that the release would adversely affect oil prices. See OPEC Bulletin Industry and Nature in 
Balance EU-OPEC (2011) Dialogue: 8
th
 Ministerial Meeting (XLII) 10 (hereafter OPEC Bulletin 2011). 
87
  Article 7 of the OPEC Statute sets out the membership requirements. The major requirement is being a 
substantial net exporter of crude petroleum. 
88
  See Lautenberg F R Busting Up The Cartel: The WTO Case against OPEC (2004) A Report from the Office 
of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg 1-2 (hereafter Lautenberg F R 2004). See also De Fazio P ‗DeFazio Urges 
President to Stand Up to OPEC Price Gouging‘ available at http://www.defazio. house.gov/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=712&Itemid=70 (accessed 01 November 2012). See also 
Marceau G ‗The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate‘ Pauwelyn J (ed) Global Challenges at 
the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment (2010) 27 (hereafter Marceau G 2010 a). The control 
of the amount of oil produced in OPEC member states amounts to use of quotas which is prohibited under 
WTO law. See also Guerra A J The World Trade Organisation and Oil (2001) Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies 29 (hereafter Guerra A J 2001). The author discusses GATT Art XI and its possible contravention by 
OPEC member states. Additionally, the taxes paid in the OPEC member countries by the companies engaged 
in oil production are usually very low and it has been argued that these may amount to prohibited subsidies 
under WTO law. See also Wälde T W (2007) 568. See also chapter 3 sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
89
  The production quotas are built into the price band mechanism, which is used to regulate production of oil in 
the member countries. See Horn M (2004) 269.  
90
  On average, the percentile rank for control of corruption in 2012 for OPEC member states was only 34%. 
This is largely due to a majority of the members having a percentile rank below 50%. See Transparency 
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safeguard the members‘ interests.91  This can be interpreted as the basis for oil 
consumption subsidies maintained in OPEC member states. 92  Nonetheless, this 
provision can be used to control corruption in the OPEC member states. 93 
Production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption may affect countries, 
such as Angola and Nigeria, which have concurrent membership of both OPEC and 
the WTO. Similarly, countries such as Ghana that are considering OPEC 
membership find themselves in a challenging position, with regard to their 
commitments under the WTO framework. 
1.2.3 The Relationship between OPEC and African Countries 
The relationship between OPEC and Africa is often analysed by looking at OPEC‘s 
African member countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola. However, other 
African countries, such as, Chad, Gabon, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Ghana, currently contribute to oil production.94 These countries that are 
non-OPEC members also contribute to the stability of the price of oil. Many of the 
above have not joined OPEC because they are not substantial net exporters of oil,95 
while others have been barred by the prohibitive membership fees.96 Also, the fact 
that OPEC limits production of oil has kept some countries out.97 The relationship 
                                                                                                                                                        
International ‗Corruption Perceptions Index 2012‘ available at http://www.Trans 
parency.org/cpi2012/results (accessed 24 May 2013).  
91
  Article 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
92
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
93
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
94
  Bahgat G ‗Africa‘s oil potential and implications‘ 2007 OPEC Review 96 (hereafter Bahgat G 2007). Sudan 
has been invited to OPEC meetings as an observer but it is not a member. See Royal Norwegian Embassy in 
Abuja ‗Norway Helps Prepare Ghana for the Oil Age‘ available at http://www.emb-
norway.com.ng/News_and_events/development/Norway_Ghana_oil_cooperation/ (accessed 24 May 2013). 
95
  Article 7 of the OPEC Statute requires prospective members to be substantial net exporters of oil.  
96
  See Lesova P ‗Indonesia Considers Whether to Leave OPEC Cartel A Net Oil Importer, Indonesia has 
Different Interests from OPEC, Analysts Say‘ available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ indonesia-
considers-whether-to-leave-opec-cartel (accessed 24 May 2013). Ecuador suspended its membership 
between 1992 and 2007 due to the high membership fees. 
97
  See Sudan Tribune ‗Sudan is Considering Joining OPEC Oil Cartel: Official‘ available at 
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33544 (accessed 24 May 2013). It is possible the subsequent 
secession of South Sudan from Sudan affected Sudan‘s proposed membership of OPEC. Most of Sudan‘s oil 
reserves are now located in South Sudan, a sovereign state. See De Waal A ‗Sudan and South Sudan in 2013: 
Rise or Fall Together‘ available at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn. com/2012/12/20/sudan-and-south-
sudan-in-2013-rise-or-fall-together/ (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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between OPEC and non-OPEC African oil producing countries has been largely 
silent. 
On the contrary, it has been noted that OPEC‘s relationship with other oil producing 
countries, such as Russia, Norway, and Mexico, has been cordial.98 It can be argued 
that such relationships are crucial for OPEC as both Russia and Norway are big oil 
producing countries, compared to the African oil producing countries that are non-
OPEC members. Since 2005, OPEC has started to work closely with the European 
Union and this co-operation has been cited as helping both parties understand their 
energy challenges.99 This has not been the case with Africa. Although Angola joined 
OPEC in 2007,100 the author is of the opinion that this is not indicative of a close 
relationship between African oil producing countries and OPEC. It can be argued 
that Angola only replaced Gabon which suspended its membership of OPEC in 
1994.101  
The relationship between OPEC and African countries can also be viewed from an 
aid perspective. In this regard, a brief evaluation of the OPEC Fund for International 
Development (OFID) is necessary. Some commentators are of the opinion that close 
ties exist between the OFID and Africa.102 The OFID has also implemented a trade 
finance facility to support international trade in developing countries.103 The effects 
of the OFID on international trade in Africa are certainly positive. 
                                                 
98
  Desta G M ‗The GATT/WTO system and international trade in petroleum: an overview‘ (2003) 21 J. Energy 
& Nat. Resources L. 387 (hereafter Desta G M 2003). 
99
  OPEC Bulletin (2011) 6. 
100
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 17 
August 2011). 
101
  See OPEC ‗Brief History‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm (accessed 17 
August 2011). 
102
  Aissi S ‗African Development and the Role of the OPEC Fund‘ Shihata F I (ed) The OPEC Fund for 
International Development The Formative Years (1983) 74 (hereafter Aissi S 1983). See also OFID ‗OFID 
Extends Second Grant in Humanitarian Assistance for Famine Victims in Ethiopia and Kenya‘ available at 
http://www.ofid.org/NewsPress/tabid/87/articleid/1559/Default.aspx?dnnprintmode=true&mid=426&Skin 
Src=[G]Skins%2F_default%2FNo+Skin&ContainerSrc=[G]Containers%2F_default%2FNo+Container 
(accessed 08 March 2013). See also OFID ‗OFID Approved Emergency Assistance Grant for Famine 
Victims in Somalia‘ available at http://www.ofid.org/NewsPress/tabid/87/ArticleId/ 1558/OFID-approves-
emergency-assistance-grant-for-famine-victims-in-Somalia.aspx (accessed 08 March 2013). The above are 
examples of grants that OFID has recently extended to African countries. 
103
  See OFID ‗Trade Finance Facility‘ available at http://www.ofid.org/PROJECTSOPERATIONS/Trade 
FinanceFacility.aspx (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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OPEC‘s relationship with African oil producing countries, both OPEC members and 
non-OPEC members, thus has both positive and negative implications. Even though 
many African countries may benefit from the OFID, they are faced with some of the 
negative effects of OPEC‘s control of oil production in its member states. This affects 
the price of oil which keeps fluctuating depending on the production quotas 
authorised by OPEC. This in turn affects the economic planning of these countries.  
1.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
1.3.1 A Brief History 
The history of the WTO dates back to 1945 after the Second World War.104 The 
intention at the time had been to create a trade institution similar to the Bretton 
Woods institutions, that is, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).105 The organisation that had been contemplated by about 50 countries at the 
time was the International Trade Organisation (ITO). 106  This organisation was 
supposed to be a specialised agency of the United Nations.107 Unfortunately, the 
                                                 
104
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011) 
See also Van den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2008) 78 (hereafter Van den Bossche P 2008). The history of the WTO can be traced back to 
1945 when the United States invited its allies to enter into negotiations to conclude a multilateral agreement 
on trade in goods. See also WTO ‗World Trade Organisation Analytical Index Guide to GATT Law and 
Practice‘ (2012) 3 available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp _e/gatt_ai_e/intro_e.pdf (accessed 
25 May 2013). See also generally Wilkinson R The WTO Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade (2006) 
(hereafter Wilkinson R 2006). See also Krueger A O ‗Introduction‘ Krueger A O (ed) The WTO as an 
International Organization (2000) 3 (hereafter Krueger A O 2000). 
105
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011). 
See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 78  
106
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011). 
See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. 
107
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011). 
See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. 
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organisation never came into being as the charter upon which it was based was too 
ambitious.108  
However, prior to the ITO, several countries with the intention of fast-tracking trade 
liberalisation had been negotiating an agreement to reduce and bind customs tariffs: 
the GATT.109 To circumvent the requirements for a change in national laws before 
the adoption of the GATT, countries that had negotiated the Agreement also 
negotiated a Protocol of Provisional Application.110 The GATT was signed in 1947 
and came into force in 1948.111 The Protocol of Provisional Application was the basis 
upon which the GATT 1947 came into being.112 The GATT was adopted by the 
contracting countries and it commenced the regulation of international trade.113 
The GATT 1947 was successful in the reduction of tariffs on trade in goods.114 The 
first five negotiating rounds also focused on the reduction of tariffs and built on the 
success of the GATT. The various negotiating rounds, namely, Geneva 1947, Annecy 
1949, Torquay 1951, Geneva 1956, and Dillon 1960-1, were quite successful in this 
regard.115 However, non-tariff barriers to trade were also emerging as a serious 
threat to international trade. Thus from the Kennedy Round, 1964 to 1967, the Tokyo 
Round 1973 to 1979 through to the Uruguay Round 1986 to 1994, the negotiations 
                                                 
108
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011). 
See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. 
109
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. 
110
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 79. 
111
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. It had been contemplated by the participating countries that the GATT would 
be attached to the ITO charter; however negotiators were aware that it was not possible to wait for the ITO 
charter to bring the GATT into effect. Thus the GATT was adopted without the ITO charter. The Protocol of 
Provisional Application was applicable to part II of the GATT. Parts I and III were to be adopted without the 
protocol exceptions. See Jackson J H The World Trading System Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations (1997) 40 (hereafter Jackson J H 1997) for a detailed discussion. 
112
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011) 
The tariff negotiations started in 1945 and the countries that participated in the tariff negotiations were also 
part of the negotiations to establish the ITO. The ITO charter was concluded in 1948 but it was never ratified 
by the various countries, thus it was never established. See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 78-79. 
113
  See WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2011). 
114
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 80. 
115
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 81. 
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focused on non-tariff barriers.116 The Uruguay Round also gave birth to the WTO, a 
new organisation that was charged with administering the different international 
trade agreements including the GATT 1947.117 Currently, WTO negotiations have 
stalled with the protracted Doha Round.118  
1.3.2 The WTO Mandate 
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO provides the mandate of the 
organisation.119 The Marrakesh Agreement consists of various agreements that are 
included in the Annexes. The multilateral agreements contained in Annexes 1-3, are 
equally binding on the WTO members. 120  However, the plurilateral agreements 
contained in Annex 4 are only binding on the members that have accepted them.121 
Articles II and III of the Marrakesh Agreement provide the functions of the 
organisation. Article II (1) sums up the mandate of the organisation as follows: 
‗The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its members in matters related to the agreements and 
associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.‘122 
The mandate makes the WTO the premier organisation in the regulation of trade 
among its members. The agreements that are particularly important in this thesis are: 
                                                 
116
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 81. See also WTO ‗UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: BASICS-The GATT years: 
from Havana to Marrakesh‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_ e/tif_ e/fact4_e.htm 
(accessed 26 September 2011). 
117
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 84. The GATT 1947 is now part of the GATT 1994. See World Trade 
Organisation The Legal Texts The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations-
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (2002) 4 (hereafter World Trade 
Organisation 2002). The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in this thesis is hereafter the 
Marrakesh Agreement and in some cases the WTO Agreement. 
118
  Sally R Whither the WTO? A Progress Report on the Doha Round (2003) CATO Institute No. 23 2 
(hereafter Sally R 2003). See also Sallie J & Watson K W Regulatory Protectionism A Hidden Threat to 
Free Trade (2013) CATO Institute No. 723 10 (hereafter Sallie J & Watson K W 2013). 
119
  World Trade Organisation (2002) 4. 
120
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 44. See also Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Appellate Body 
Report) [1997] WT/DS22/AB/R 12. The Appellate Body emphasised the single undertaking nature of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. This is especially true for the Multilateral Agreements  
121
  Article II of the Marrakesh Agreement. Currently only two plurilateral Agreements are in existence, the 
Agreement on trade in Civil Aircraft and the GPA. See also World Trade Organisation (2002) 383. 
122
  Article II (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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the GATT, the SCM Agreement and the GPA.123 All WTO members are bound by 
both the GATT and the SCM which are multilateral Agreements.124 The GPA is a 
plurilateral agreement and is only binding on accepting members.125 Currently none 
of the African members of the WTO is a party to the GPA.126 However, the GPA may 
be a useful tool against corruption in the oil sector in Africa. 
1.4 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
The GATT regulates trade in goods by the WTO members. It is argued in this thesis 
that oil before and after refinement can be considered a good subject to the GATT. 
This section discusses some of the reasons for the classification of oil as a good under 
the GATT. The discussion of trade in energy services is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.127 
1.4.1 Classification of Crude Oil as a Good 
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions through quotas and related measures is 
provided for in Art XI of the GATT. Article XI only applies to trade in goods. It is 
therefore important to investigate whether oil, especially crude oil is a good for 
purposes of the GATT. It can be argued that OPEC member states, the majority of 
                                                 
123
  These Agreements cover the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and the control of 
corruption. These are the key areas that are examined in this thesis. 
124
  World Trade Organisation (2002) 4. 
125
  See WTO ‗The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)‘ available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm (accessed 27 May 2013). 
126
  See WTO ‗Parties and Observers to the GPA‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 27 May 2013). 
127
  In the past some countries have requested that the WTO engage oil producing countries and commence the 
liberalization of trade in energy services. See Permanent Delegation of the European Commission to the 
International Organisations in Geneva ‗Collective Request in Energy Services‘ available at 
http://www.ifg.org/pdf/collective-request-in-energy-services.pdf  (accessed 07 November 2013). See also 
World Trade Organisation Communication from Canada Initial Negotiating Proposal on Oil and Gas 
Services (2001) S/CSS/W/58. 
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which are also WTO member states, appear to contravene Art XI of the GATT.128 
This has adverse effects on the international trade in oil in Africa.129  
A counter narrative suggests that OPEC production quotas fall beyond the scope of 
practices regulated under Art XI.130 This argument is mainly founded on the premise 
that OPEC production quotas affect oil in situ, and that therefore, crude oil is not a 
good that can be regulated at that stage of production. Additional support for this 
position is based on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Nonetheless, the author argues to the contrary. Based on the reasons given below, it 
can be argued that oil, including crude oil at the stage of production and in some 
                                                 
128
  Angola, Ecuador, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and, Venezuela are members 
of both the WTO and OPEC. Additionally Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and, Libya are all observers at the WTO and 
are in the process of accession with the WTO. See Worika I L (2010) 89. 
129
  Angola and Nigeria are members of both the WTO and OPEC while Algeria and Libya are observers at the 
WTO. See Worika I L (2010) 89. In the event that the above provision of the GATT is challenged, the above 
African oil exporting countries will be found to be in contravention of their obligations under Article XI (I) 
of the GATT. 
130
  World Trade Organisation World Trade Report 2010 Trade in Natural Resources (2010) WTO Secretariat 
166 (hereafter World Trade Organisation 2010). In this report it is argued that the language of Art XI 
regulates export restrictions and not production limitations. See also Desta M G ‗Legal Issues of OPEC 
Production Management Practices: An Overview‘ Werner J & Ali A H (eds) A Liber Amicorum: Thomas 
Wälde - Law Beyond Conventional Thought (2009) 19-20 (hereafter Desta M G 2009). The learned author 
rescinds his earlier position discussed below, and states that by its nature, Art XI (I) of the GATT requires 
that the following factors are met, that is, there is a product, the product is ready for exportation, and, the 
product is already destined for another contracting party. Accordingly, OPEC production quotas which target 
crude oil before production do not qualify as export quotas. See also Cossy M ‗Energy Trade and WTO 
Rules: [Reflections] on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Export Restrictions and Freedom of Transit‘ 
Herrmann C & Terhechte J P (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL), Vol. 3 
(2012) 290-291 (hereafter Cossy M 2012). The author argues that the principles of state sovereignty over 
natural resources do not permit the regulation of OPEC production quotas by the WTO. See also Desta M G 
Legal Issues of OPEC Production Management Practices under WTO Law and the Antitrust Law of non-
OPEC Countries (2010) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 28 No 4 450-451 (hereafter Desta 
M G 2010). See also Broome S A ‗Conflicting obligations for oil exporting nations?: Satisfying membership 
requirements of both OPEC and the WTO‘ (2006) The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev Vol 38-2 418-417 (hereafter 
Broome S A 2006). See also Worika I L (2010) 90. The learned author argues that OPEC production 
management policies should be distinguished from production quotas and export restrictions. See also 
Ehring L & Chianale G F ‗Export Restrictions in the Field of Energy‘ Selivanova Y (ed) Regulation of 
Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (2012) 134-135 (hereafter Ehring L 
& Chianale G F 2012). These learned authors argue that OPEC production quotas equally affect oil for 
domestic consumption and oil for export. See also Cottier T Towards a Framework Agreement on Energy 
(2013) Workshop on the Role of Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy Policy, Session 4 4 (hereafter 
Cottier T 2013). The learned author indicates that OPEC production control practices are outside the scope 
of the WTO Agreements. See also Selivanova Y ‗Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and 
Investment‘ Goldthau A & Witte J M (eds) Global Energy Governance The New Rules of the Game (2010) 
50 (hereafter Selivanova Y 2010). Selivanova Y argues that the WTO covers trade in energy goods. 
However, she further argues that due to the fact that WTO rules are biased towards market access, they do 
not fully cover supply side issues such as export restrictions. 
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cases before extraction, is a good and should be regulated by the WTO.131 The latter 
position has been supported by only a few authors.132  
The arguments in support of regulation of oil as a good are divided into five 
thematic areas: the WTO jurisprudence on natural resources in the natural state; 
arguments regarding national sovereignty; tradeability of crude oil before extraction; 
the application of OPEC production quotas; and the Harmonised Code System 
classification for oil. It is submitted by the author that these themes strongly indicate 
that oil is a good for purposes of the GATT. Accordingly, OPEC production quotas 
are within the ambit of practices that are regulated under Art XI (1) of the GATT. 
(a) The WTO Jurisprudence on Natural Resources in their Natural State 
The WTO dispute settlement body through its organs has handled a number of 
disputes on natural resources. An examination of these disputes and the 
interpretation of the various WTO agreements with regard to natural resources is 
therefore relevant. In discussing the jurisprudence of the WTO the author does not 
make an attempt to discuss all the decisions that relate to natural resources. 
However, relevant decisions on oil, minerals, and other natural resources are 
examined.  
Prior to the appellate body decision in the China-Raw Materials decision, 133 
commentators had observed that the decision would set the tone for export 
                                                 
131
  Detailed arguments on the regulation of export restrictions under the GATT are made in chapter 3 section 
3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
132
  Desta M G ‗The GATT/WTO system and international trade in petroleum: an overview‘ (2003) Journal of 
Energy & Natural Resources Law Vol 21 No 4 394-397 (hereafter Desta M G 2003). However, the learned 
author has since argued against this position. See also Botha L How do the Current WTO Disciplines Apply 
to the Trade of Energy Goods and Services? (2009) A Discussion Paper Commissioned by USAID Southern 
Africa Global Competitiveness Hub 11 (hereafter Botha L 2009). The author argues that defacto OPEC 
production quotas are GATT inconsistent as they amount to export restrictions. See also Lautenberg F R 
(2004) 1-2. See also De Fazio P ‗DeFazio Urges President to Stand Up to OPEC Price Gouging‘ available at 
http://www.defazio.house.gov/index. php?option =com_content&task =view&id=712&Itemid=70 (accessed 
01 November 2012). See also Marceau G (2010 a) 27. The learned author opines that challenges in accessing 
oil supplies due to licensing restrictions may be inconsistent with Art XI of the GATT. However, the above 
author only reports the observations of some WTO members and does not appear to provide her own opinion. 
See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade Agreements, Petroleum and Energy 
Policies (2000) Executive Summary UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9 2 (hereafter United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 2000). See also Selivanova Y The WTO and Energy WTO Rules and Agreements 
of Relevance to the Energy Sector (2007) ICTSD Programme on Trade and Environment 15-16 (hereafter 
Selivanova Y 2007). The author observes that restrictions on the export of energy goods may contravene Art 
XI of GATT. However, the argument is not made on the basis of oil production quotas. 
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restrictions on natural resources and energy products.134 In this case China did not 
deny that it had restricted the export of refractory-grade bauxite.135 It was argued 
that the restriction was temporary and therefore protected under Art XI (2) of the 
GATT. 136  The argument was rejected by the appellate body. 137  The issue as to 
whether refractory-grade bauxite was a good did not arise as it was never contested. 
The restrictions did not directly affect the production of bauxite; they were imposed 
on the export of the raw material.138 To this end, the decision does not shed sufficient 
light on whether crude oil in its natural state is a good subject to GATT rules. 
Similarly, in the United States-Superfund case,139 the contention of the complainants 
was premised on the taxes levied on petroleum.140 The dispute dealt with exported 
petroleum. Again, the argument as to whether the WTO could regulate crude oil in 
its natural state did not arise. The United States-Gasoline dispute also dealt with 
petroleum after refinement and did not consider crude oil in its natural state.141 The 
European Communities-Asbestos dispute considered restrictions on the import of 
asbestos. 142  Accordingly, the dispute did not address the question of natural 
resources in their natural state. Although all the above disputes are founded on 
natural resources, the issues in all these disputes arise out of restriction on export 
and import and therefore do not address production restriction. Nonetheless, the 
disputes indicate that trade in processed natural resources is subject to the GATT 
and WTO rules. 
                                                                                                                                                        
133
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R. 
134
  Cossy M (2012) 289. See also Marceau G ‗The WTO in the emerging energy governance debate‘ (2010) 
Global Trade and Customs Journal Vol 5 Issue 3 88 (hereafter Marceau G 2010 b). 
135
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R 127. 
136
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R 127. 
137
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R 133. 
138
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R. 
139
  See United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Panel Report) [1987] (L/6175 - 
34S/136). 
140
  See United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Panel Report) [1987] (L/6175 - 
34S/136) 2. 
141
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R. 
142
  See European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (Appellate 
Body Report) [2001] WT/DS135/AB/R 1. 
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Be that as it may, the appellate body of the WTO has expressed its opinion on the 
issue at hand. Although the subject matter of the relevant dispute is not oil or 
mineral resources, the dispute is helpful in guiding the debate on regulation of 
natural resources and crude oil in the natural state. In the United States-Lumber IV 
dispute, the appellate body addressed the issue of whether fungible goods, such as 
unfelled trees, can be considered to be goods for purposes of the SCM Agreement.143 
The appellate body held that the term ‗goods‘ for purposes of the SCM Agreement, 
includes immovable goods and fungible goods.144 However, the appellate body also 
noted that the definition of goods under the GATT is different as that Agreement 
exclusively regulates imported and exported goods.145  
It is respectfully submitted that the distinction between the definition of ‗goods‘ in 
the SCM and the GATT does not hold.146 Crude oil is a fungible good in its natural 
state, and can be traded as such. It should be noted that the WTO regulates trade and, 
as such, commodities that are traded by members are regulated. Unfelled trees were 
the subject of the above dispute because they are considered goods under the WTO 
framework. To this end, an attempt by the appellate body to distinguish between 
goods under the GATT and the SCM is confusing and impractical.147 Although the 
                                                 
143
  See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
From Canada (Appellate Body Report) [2004] WT/DS257/AB/R Para 68. 
144
  See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
From Canada (Appellate Body Report) [2004] WT/DS257/AB/R Paras 58-60, 62-63 and 66. 
145
  See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
From Canada (Appellate Body Report) [2004] WT/DS257/AB/R Para 63. 
146
  The author respectfully disagrees with the reasoning of the appellate body. First, the preamble of the GATT 
1947 clearly indicates the intention of the parties to the Agreement. The Agreement was made to develop the 
full use of the resources of the world and to expand the production and exchange of goods. Although the 
appellate body did not expressly indicate the particular annex of the WTO Agreement, the context and the 
previous paragraphs of the decision indicate that they were referring to the GATT. The GATT is not limited 
to imported and exported goods or exchange. As indicated in the preamble, it also extends to production; 
production is related to exchange. Secondly, the appellate body relied on the distinction between the terms 
‗goods‘ in the SCM Agreement and ‗products‘ in some provisions of the GATT. However, these terms are 
used interchangeably in the GATT. The Preamble and other provisions such as Art V refer to goods while 
Arts, I, II, III, and XI among others refer to products. The GATT does not explain the distinction. Further, 
the preparatory notes of the GATT 1947 also use both terms. See United Nations Report of the First Session 
of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (1946) generally 
(hereafter United Nations 1946). See also United Nations Report of the Drafting Committee of the 
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (1947) generally 
(hereafter United Nations 1947). For a contrary opinion, see Cossy M (2012) 285. Also the SCM is one of 
the various multilateral agreements on trade in goods under Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement. This 
Annex also covers the GATT. 
147
  The SCM Agreement was negotiated to expand on the regulations for subsidies not to depart from the 
provisions contained in the GATT 1947. See Lowenfeld A F (2008) 217-238. 
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WTO/GATT case law is not binding, this decision suggests that natural resources in 
their natural state can be regulated by the WTO. Similarly, it can be argued that 
crude oil in its natural state is a good and can be regulated by the GATT. 
(b) Arguments Regarding National Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
Commentators have suggested that the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources does not permit the classification of crude oil in situ as a good.148 
Basically, the principle posits that states should use their natural resources as they 
deem fit.149  It has been argued that this principle has attained the character of 
customary international law.150 While the relevance of the principle is conceded, this 
argument is not sufficient to justify the view that crude oil is not a good for purposes 
of the GATT.  
A careful review of the principle reveals that the sovereignty of states over their 
natural resources should be exercised with due regard to other international law 
obligations.151 In light of the above, after 1995, countries voluntarily signed and 
ratified the Marrakesh Agreement and its Annexures. By doing so, the member 
states acknowledged a restriction on the sovereignty of their states with regard to 
international trade. This position is clearly illustrated in the preparatory notes that 
led up to the GATT 1947.152 Accordingly, it can be argued that crude oil in its natural 
                                                 
148
  Worika I L (2010) 291. See also Marceau G (2010 b) 88. 
149
  Desta G M (2010) 454 citing Schrijver N Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties 
(1997).  
150
  Desta G M (2010) 454. See also Hofbauer J A The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and Its Modern Implications (unpublished LL.M thesis Faculty of Law University of Iceland, 
2009) 3-4 (hereafter Hofbauer J A 2009). The author provides a detailed history of the numerous United 
Nations resolutions that led to Resolution 1803, which forms the basis of the principle. The author also 
highlights international cases where the principle has been applied.  
151
  Preamble, Art. 1, Paras 5-7, United Nations General Assembly – Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, Dec. 14, 1962, 17 UN – GAOR, Supp. No. 17, p. 15, UN Doc. A/5217. See also 
Schrijver N Sovereignty over Natural Resources Balancing Rights and Duties (1997) 2 (hereafter Schrijver 
N 1997). In the foregoing text, the author argues that in the age of globalisation and increasing international 
co-operation, permanent state sovereignty over natural resources appears to be diminishing. See also 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Environmental Principles and Concepts (1995) 
OECD/GD(95) 124 para 21 9 (hereafter Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 1995). 
It has been observed that due to the fact that natural resources are pivotal to the survival of humankind, the 
principle of permanent sovereignty is now alive to the foregoing status quo. See also Barnes R Property 
Rights and Natural Resources (2009) 232 (hereafter Barnes R 2009). See also Art 18(1) of the ECT. 
152
  United Nations (1946) Section C Art 1 (k) 12. It had been proposed by some members that export 
restrictions should be permitted for the preservation of scarce natural resources even if there were no 
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state is a good and that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources is not absolute. 
(c) Tradeability of Oil Before Extraction 
Crude oil in situ is tradeable based on the fact that at the appraisal stage the volume 
of crude oil in a particular oil well is ascertainable.153 It has been noted that at this 
stage the volumes are accurate to a large extent; information generated at this stage 
is used to indicate proved reserves.154 Furthermore, proved reserves have an effect 
on the oil contracts that are executed before extraction of the oil. Oil contracts 
executed before extraction of the resource render oil in situ tradeable. This position is 
also illustrated by financing agreements which indicate that crude oil before 
extraction has a loan value. 155  As indicated below, concession agreements and 
production sharing agreements (PSAs) deal with crude oil before extraction. Thus it 
can be argued that oil before extraction is a tradeable commodity and should be 
subject to the GATT. 
‗In modern concession agreements, the oil company usually retains ownership of any 
oil that is produced, and is thus free to sell it at the world price. In a PSA, ownership 
of the oil is split between the IOC and the host State (or its national oil company). In 
                                                                                                                                                        
restrictions on domestic consumption. This position was heavily criticised on the ground that it could unduly 
restrict access to raw materials. 
153
  Appraisal of an oil well takes place after a discovery has been made. At this stage, the discovery is evaluated 
using seismic 2D/3D data. The volume of the well is accurately considered and the thickness of the crude 
evaluated. At this stage, the production capacity of a well is determined. See generally Imaduddin M 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Process (2008) BAPEX BUET (hereafter Imaduddin 
M 2008). See also Faculty of Engineering Chulalongkorn University ‗Petroleum Economics Overview of 
Petroleum Exploration and Production 14‘ available at www.mining. 
eng.chula.ac.th/CU_ETM/OverviewE&P.pdf (accessed 05 November 2012). See also Environmental 
Management in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production ‗Overview of the Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production Process 7‘ available at www.etechinternational.org/newpdfs /lessImpact/Att Aoverview.pdf 
(accessed 05 November 2012).  
154
  Proved reserves are quantities of crude oil that are determined by geologists and engineers with reasonable 
certainty. Although there are various methods of proving reserves, all methods indicate that there has to be 
high level of accuracy. See Watkins G C ‗Oil scarcity: what have the past three decades revealed‘ (2006) 
Energy Policy 34 509 (hereafter Watkins G C 2006). See also British Petroleum Energy in Focus (2004) 
Statistical Review of World Energy 4 (hereafter British Petroleum 2004). See also Society of Petroleum 
Engineers Oil and Gas Reserves Committee Comparison of Selected Reserves and Resource Classifications 
and Associated Definitions (2005) Mapping Sub Committee Final Report 31-32 (hereafter Society of 
Petroleum Engineers 2005). 
155
  Rain J W The American Experience in Oil and Gas Financing (2004) Thompson & Knight 6 (hereafter Rain 
J W 2004). See also Fattouh B North African Oil and Foreign Investment in Changing Market Conditions 
(2008) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies WPM 37 7 (hereafter Fattouh B 2008).  
 
 
 
 
Chapter1: Introduction and Background 
27 
 
the service contract, ownership remains with the host State or its national oil 
company.‘156 
It has been argued with regard to tradeability of natural resources, that tradeability 
of goods and tradeability of production licences should be distinguished.157 Some 
commentators have argued that a state permit to exploit natural resources does not 
confer possession rights on the party exploiting the natural resource.158 However, as 
discussed above, in most concession agreements, the party permitted to exploit the 
natural resources usually gets a right of possession to some of the natural resources 
or oil produced. This is especially true for modern concession agreements and 
PSAs.159 
(d) The Application of OPEC Production Quotas 
Even if it is conceded that crude oil in situ is not a good, it can be argued that OPEC 
quotas target crude oil at the production stage (after extraction), which subjects the 
commodity to WTO/GATT rules. Strictly defined, ‗crude oil production‘ includes 
the separation of crude oil from condensates, gas and other materials.160  OPEC 
defines crude oil to exclude condensates;161 this indicates that OPEC quotas only 
affect crude oil at the point of separation.162 By definition, OPEC oil production 
quotas should be applied at the point of separation, which is part of the production 
                                                 
156
  Brinsmead S ‗Oil Concession Contracts and the Problem of Hold-Up (2007) 19‘ available at http://www. 
dundee.ac.uk/ cepmlp/journal/html/Vol17/article17_11.php (accessed 22 March 2012) (hereafter Brinsmead 
S 2007) citing Barrows G Worldwide Concession Contracts And Petroleum Legislation (1983) 1. 
157
  See Desta M ‗To What Extent are WTO Rules Relevant to Trade in Natural Resources?‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_desta_e.htmm (accessed 27 May 
2013). 
158
  See Desta M ‗To What Extent are WTO Rules Relevant to Trade in Natural Resources?‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_desta_e.htmm (accessed 27 May 
2013) 
159
  Brinsmead S (2007) 19 
160
  The above definition is based on the definition of crude oil by various entities, such as, the United States 
Energy Information Administration ‗Glossary - Crude Oil‘ available at http://www.eia. 
gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm (accessed 27 May 2013). Crude Oil is defined as a mixture of hydrocarbons 
that exist in the liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure 
after passing through surface separating facilities. See also OPEC ‗Definitions Crude Oil‘ available at 
http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/2009 /FileZ/definition.htm 
(accessed 27 May 2013). 
161
  Sandrea R ‗OPEC‘s next challenge-rethinking their quota system‘ (2003) Oil & Gas Journal Vol 101.29 1 
(hereafter Sandrea R 2003). See also De Sousa L ‗OPEC Quotas and Crude Oil Production The Oil Drum‘ 
available at www.theoildrum.com/node/7363 (accessed 05 November 2012). 
162
  See OPEC ‗Definitions Crude Oil‘ available at http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20 
Bulletin/interactive/2009/FileZ/definition.htm (accessed 27 May 2013). 
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stage. Unlike the previous arguments, it can be argued that at this stage, crude oil 
has been extracted and what is left of the process is separation. Crude oil at this stage 
can no longer be defined as oil in situ. It is an identifiable commodity and can be 
traded. On the basis of this observation, oil can be subject to the GATT. 
(e) The Harmonised System Code Classification for Oil 
Oil has a Harmonised System Code (HS Code) classification. The ordinary meaning 
of the term ‗good‘ refers to a commodity that is tradeable.163 However, the definition 
of ‗goods‘ in WTO jurisprudence refers to such commodities listed under the HS 
Code and indicated in the members‘ schedule of concessions.164  This Code was 
developed by the World Customs Organisation.165 This classification is used for 
purposes of setting tariffs and indicating members‘ products that are subject to 
GATT commitments.166 This definition of ‗goods‘ is not expressly provided in the 
GATT.167 It is indeed understandable why this definition was excluded. It is quite 
difficult to determine what commodities should be subjected to GATT rules as new 
products are released every day. Comparatively, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) which attempts to define services creates more challenges than 
solutions to understanding covered services.168 
                                                 
163
  ‗Goods‘ are defined as merchandise or possessions. See Oxford Dictionaries ‗Good‘ available at 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/good (accessed 27 May 2013). 
164
  See Chapter 27 of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Code) which classifies 
natural mineral fuels and other energy goods. The code has been relied upon in various WTO disputes in the 
interpretation of like products under Arts I and III of GATT. This presence of natural mineral fuels in the 
classification, as one of the commodities is an indicator that oil is covered under the WTO disciplines. See 
Botha L (2009) 3 and 4. See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 351-356 on WTO disputes that have applied the 
HS Code. See also Smith F & Woods L ‗A distinction without a difference: exploring the boundary between 
goods and services in the World Trade Organi[s]ation and the European Union‘ (2005) Columbia Journal of 
European Law 12-1 19-20 (hereafter Smith F & Woods L 2005). 
165
  See World Customs Organisation ‗Overview - What is the Harmoni[s]ed System (HS)?‘ available at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview.aspx (accessed 29 May 2013). 
166
  See World Customs Organisation ‗HS Multi-Purposes Tool‘ available at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/ 
topics/nomenclature/overview/hs-multi-purposes-tool.aspx (accessed 29 May 2013). See also WTO 
‗GOODS SCHEDULES Members‘ Commitments‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
schedules_e/goods_sched ules_e.htm (accessed 29 May 2013). 
167
  See Smith F & Woods L (2005) 17.  
168
  See Art I (3) (b) of the GATS which defines ‗services‘ as services in any sector except services supplied in 
the exercise of government authority. See also GATS Art XXVIII (b). The definition is ambiguous and only 
excludes government services. It does not state which services are covered. Thus a definition of ‗goods‘ 
would create a similar ambiguity. 
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Crude oil obtained from bituminous minerals has an HS Code classification, that is, 
2709.169 A good under the WTO/GATT legal framework is a commodity that is 
classified as a good in the HS Code and has been indicated in the members‘ schedule 
of concessions as subject to GATT regulations.170 Therefore, oil, subject to the WTO 
members‘ schedules of concessions, is within the realm of the GATT.  
Related to the foregoing discussion, an analysis was conducted based on the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to define ‗goods‘.171 The analysis proposed a test 
to determine the circumstances under which natural resources will be treated as 
goods under the WTO.172 Natural resources have to comply with the following 
conditions:  
 
‗1) they are listed as goods in the Member States‘ Schedules of Concessions on goods;  
2) they are tradable (i.e., they have monetary value); and  
3) they have reached a level of processing specified by the HS Nomenclature in 
relation to specific natural-resource-based good.‘173  
                                                 
169
  See Harmonised System Code ‗HS Code List‘ available at http://www.hscodelist.com/bbs/board.php? 
bo_table=HScode&sca=27 (accessed 29 May 2013). 
170
  The three African countries that are the focus of this research all list crude oil in their schedules of 
concessions. Angola lists crude oil (270900) in its schedule of concessions, with a maximum ad valorem 
duty of 20. See Angola‘s schedule of concessions 2012, on file with the author. Nigeria lists crude oil 
(270900) in its schedule of concessions, with a maximum ad valorem duty of 5. See Nigeria‘s schedule of 
concessions 2012, on file with the author. Ghana lists crude oil (270900) in its schedule of concessions, with 
a maximum ad valorem duty of 0. It also indicates that crude oil is 100 percent duty free. See Ghana‘s 
schedule of concessions 2012, on file with the author. See also WTO ‗GOODS SCHEDULES Members‘ 
Commitments‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/ schedules_e/goods_sched ules_e.htm 
(accessed 29 May 2013).  
171
  See Desta M ‗To what extent are WTO rules relevant to trade in natural resources?‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_desta_e.htm (accessed 29 May 
2013). The use of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to interpret WTO agreements should be 
approached with caution. As noted by one of the leading international trade law scholars, some of the WTO 
members are not signatories and others have not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
However, it has been argued that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can be characterised as 
international customary law. To this end, the above arguments on the definition of goods under the WTO, 
based on the provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties are only persuasive. See Jackson J 
H ‗Process and procedure in WTO dispute settlement‘ (2009) 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J.236-237 (hereafter 
Jackson J H 2009). 
172
  See Desta M ‗To what extent are WTO rules relevant to trade in natural resources?‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_desta_e.htm (accessed 29 May 
2013). 
173
  See Desta M ‗To what extent are WTO rules relevant to trade in natural resources?‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_desta_e.htm (accessed 29 May 
2013). 
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Nigeria, Angola and Ghana which are the case studies in this thesis, provide for 
petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous mineral crude, in their schedules 
of concessions. Thus the first condition is satisfied in respect of these countries. The 
second condition has also been discussed under tradeability of oil before extraction. 
Finally, oil defined in the HS Code as petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, oil, may also be traded after extraction but before refinement. 
The HS Code recognises this fact and thus classifies oil as a tradeable good. The 
above discussion strongly suggests that oil is a tradeable good and is subject to 
international trade regulation by the WTO/GATT. This is true for oil before 
extraction and after extraction from the oil wells, but before refinement. 
In light of the foregoing, some provisions of the WTO legal framework stand out 
with regard to possible violations by OPEC member states that are also WTO 
members. These provisions are Art XI (on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions) 
of the GATT and Arts 3 and 5 (on prohibited and actionable subsidies under the 
SCM Agreement). The GPA is also discussed as it is a relevant tool in ensuring 
transparency and controlling corruption. It can be argued that measures adopted in 
OPEC countries that contravene these provisions, affect the liberalisation of oil trade.  
1.4.2 Article XI of the GATT 
It has been argued by some commentators that the production quotas maintained by 
OPEC fall outside the ambit of Art XI (I) of the GATT, and therefore do not violate 
the provision.174 However, in Japan- Trade in Semiconductors,175 a dispute that was 
decided under the GATT framework, the panel stated as follows: 
‗Article XI (1), unlike other provisions of the General Agreement, did not refer to 
laws or regulations, but more broadly to measures. This wording indicated clearly 
that any measure instituted or maintained by a contracting party which restricted the 
                                                 
174
 Broome S A (2006) 415. A detailed discussion of Art XI is undertaken in chapter 3 section 3.4.1 of the thesis. 
Also, the North American Free Trade Area Agreement (NAFTA) which has specific provisions on trade in 
energy goods founded on the GATT, prohibits quantitative restrictions in Art 603. Of course, this blanket 
prohibition is subject to various exceptions and reservations. 
175
  See Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors (Panel Report) [1988] (L/6309 - 35S/116) 28. 
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exportation or sale for export of products was covered by this provision, irrespective 
of the legal status of the measure.‘176 
It can be argued that production quotas maintained by OPEC member countries 
restrict the sale for export of oil, as only a certain amount of oil is available for sale 
and export. 177  The measures undertaken by OPEC member states restrict oil 
production and supply and affect and impair the benefits accruing to other WTO 
members, including African oil producing countries that are not OPEC members.178 
The panel in Japanese-Measures on Imports of Leather stated thus: 
‗In any event, the Panel wished to stress that the existence of a quantitative 
restriction should be presumed to cause nullification or impairment not only because 
of any effect it had had on the volume of trade but also for other reasons e.g., it 
would lead to increased transaction costs and would create uncertainties which 
could affect investment plans.‘179 
The measures effected by OPEC member states in the quest to comply with their 
OPEC Statute obligations lead to uncertainties in the investment plans of non-OPEC 
oil producing countries.  
There is further support for the view that the production quotas maintained by 
OPEC member states fall within the category of export restrictions. The 1950 Report 
of the Working Party on the use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and 
Commercial Purposes is particularly relevant in this regard.180 Some of the export 
restrictions that are inconsistent with the GATT and do not fall under the exceptions 
include, export restrictions used by a contracting party to avoid price competition 
                                                 
176
  See Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors (Panel Report) [1988] (L/6309 - 35S/116) 28. 
177
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
178
  Non-OPEC countries are coerced into a global oil price system that is partly dependent on production quotas 
maintained by OPEC. 
179
  See Report of the Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Panel Report) [1984] (L/5623 - 
31S/94) 14. 
180
  WTO ‗Analytical Index of the GATT Article XI General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions‘ available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art11_e.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2013) citing the 
Report of the Working Party on the use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial Purposes 
(1950) GATT/CP.4/33, republished as ―The Use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial 
Purposes,‖ Sales No. GATT/1950-3. 
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among exporters.181 Production quotas are used to enforce the OPEC objectives. The 
main objective of the organisation, as discussed above, is to control the price of oil on 
the world market. OPEC production quotas are therefore used to avoid price 
competition. 
Article XX of the GATT, which is the general exceptions clause provides some 
justification for the use of production quotas by WTO members.182 However, this is 
also subject to debate as the chapeau of the clause prohibits measures which 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail.183  
1.5 The SCM Agreement 
Subsidies to the oil and gas sector distort markets in other oil producing countries. 
OPEC member countries and some major oil producing countries have been accused 
of granting subsidies for oil and gas production and consumption.184  It can be 
argued that these subsidies contravene Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement. 185 Art 1 
of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as a financial contribution by government 
or a public body that confers a benefit on a specific enterprise or industry or group of 
                                                 
181
  WTO ‗Analytical Index of the GATT Article XI General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art11_e.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2013) citing the Report 
of the Working Party on the use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial Purposes (1950) 
GATT/CP.4/33, republished as ―The Use of Quantitative Restrictions for Protective and Commercial 
Purposes,‖ Sales No. GATT/1950-3. 
182
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
183
  Article XX (g) of the GATT allows countries to implement measures that relate to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. It can be argued that crude oil is an exhaustible natural resource. However, the 
production quotas result into discrimination of other oil producing countries that are non OPEC members, 
thus this is inconsistent with the chapeau of Art XX. See also Desta G M (2003) 397, who argues that OPEC 
production quotas are justified by Art XX (g). The author respectfully disagrees with this line of argument as 
the chapeau of Art XX as indicated above, places certain limitations on this argument. The argument is 
further developed in chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
184
  Iran is one of the countries that have been implicated for heavily subsidising its energy consumption. Mexico 
and the United Arab Emirates have been implicated as well. These countries have now undertaken measures 
to reform and phase out these subsidies. See IEA et al The Scope of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in 2009 and a 
Roadmap for Phasing out Fossil-Fuel Subsidies (2010) 24 (hereafter IEA et al 2010b). See also generally 
Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a). 
185
  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1994 Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A of the Marrakesh 
Agreement (hereafter referred to as the SCM Agreement). Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement provide for 
prohibited and actionable subsidies. 
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enterprises.186 Further, Art 2 is also relevant, as it defines ‗specificity‘.187 Subsidies 
that are specific to certain industries may be actionable.188 Actionable subsidies are 
those that cause injury to the domestic industry of another member.189 Thus the 
nascent economies of some African oil producing countries have been affected by the 
subsidies granted by OPEC countries to their oil companies and consumers.190 This 
may amount to a violation of the rules on subsidies under the SCM Agreement. On 
the other hand, the requirement of specificity does not apply to prohibited subsidies 
under Art 3 of the SCM.191 Thus where oil consumption subsidies are contingent on 
the use of domestic over imported oil, they may be considered prohibited 
subsidies.192 
1.6 Corruption and the GPA 
Corruption is rife in the oil sector in Africa.193 The WTO does not directly address 
the problem of corruption. The GPA which can control corruption in government 
procurement is in place, but this is a plurilateral agreement which does not apply to 
all contracting parties.194 This presents a big challenge to the WTO legal framework 
and the regulation of international oil trade. That said, the statement below explains 
the relationship between corruption and government procurement. 
‗Given that firms (domestic and foreign) want to secure lucrative government 
contracts, and that some officials may be motivated by personal self interest as well 
                                                 
186
  See Art 1 of the SCM Agreement. See also Botha L (2009) 13.  
187
  See Art 2 of the SCM Agreement. The provision has been interpreted to include de facto specificity which 
might be attributed to granting disproportionately large amounts of the subsidy to particular groups and 
predominant use of the subsidy by a select group. See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
188
  See Art 5 of the SCM Agreement. See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
189
  See Art 5 of the SCM Agreement. 
190
  See Business Day Online ‗Subsidy Removal Cripples Fuel Smuggling Across Nigerian Borders‘ available at 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index. php/news/76-hot-topic/31798-subsidy-remo val-cripples-fuel-
smuggling-across-nigerian-borders (accessed 16 October 2012). 
191
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
192
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
193
  It is worth noting that corruption has been part of the oil industry in Africa as far back as the scramble for 
African oil in about 1957. See Clarke D Africa: Crude Continent The Struggle for Africa’s Oil Prize (2010) 
70 (hereafter Clarke D 2010).  
194
  See Eigen P ‗There will be no Development with Corrupt Governance-and WTO is the Natural Universal 
Guardian Against Corruption (2002) World Trade Organisation Symposium‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/paper_peter_eigen.pdf (accessed 21 October 2011). 
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as by promoting the public interest, it should come as no surprise that corruption 
and collusion are a feature of government procurement.‘195 
Further, the proliferation of national oil companies makes the discussion of 
corruption and government procurement in the international oil trade relevant.196  
The WTO legal framework does not address the challenge of crude oil price 
stabilisation. OPEC has the legal framework to address this challenge. Nevertheless, 
the OPEC legal framework may be inconsistent with some of the basic provisions of 
the WTO legal framework. The two legal frameworks have gaps that have to be 
addressed to create an effective framework for the regulation of international oil 
trade. This is particularly important for emerging African oil producing countries 
whose development hinges on effective governance and regulation of international 
oil trade.  
1.7 Oil Production and Trade in Africa 
A discussion of oil production and trade in all African oil producing countries 
would be very broad, mainly because of the number of countries involved. 
Accordingly, this thesis focuses on oil production and trade in particular African oil 
producing countries, such as Nigeria, Angola and Ghana. Nigeria and Angola are 
members of both the WTO and OPEC,197 while Ghana has recently commenced 
commercial oil production and is a member of the WTO.198 Ghana is not a member 
of OPEC. Nigeria and Angola are used as examples in discussing the duality of 
regulations on international trade in oil.199 On the other hand, Ghana is discussed as 
                                                 
195
  Evenett S.J & Hoekman B (eds) The WTO and Government Procurement. Critical Perspectives on the 
Global Trading System and the WTO (2006) xix (hereafter Evenett S.J & Hoekman B (eds) 2006). 
196
  Stevens P National Oil Companies: Good or Bad? - A Literature Survey (2003) National Oil Companies 
Workshop presentation, World Bank 4 (hereafter Stevens P 2003). 
197
  See Worika I L (2010) 89. 
198
  See WTO ‗Ghana and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/ghana_e. 
htm (accessed 29 May 2013). See Voice of America ‗Ghana Begins Commercial Oil Production Wednesday‘ 
available at http://www.voanews.com/content/ghana-begins-commercial-oil-production-wednesday--
111891959/157053.html (accessed 29 May 2013). Ghana commenced commercial oil production in 
considerably large quantities in 2010. See also chapter 6 section 6.1.2. It should also be noted that prior to 
2010, Ghana had produced oil from the Saltpond area. However, production from this area was minimal. 
199
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. 
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the major case study, to determine whether the duality of regulations on 
international trade in oil, would affect an emerging African oil producing country.200 
The choice of Ghana as the main case study for the research is also motivated by the 
fact that the thesis and publications therefrom, can help Ghana make an informed 
decision on its decision to join OPEC. Ghana is located in West Africa. It shares 
borders with Cote d‘voire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the east, 
and the Atlantic Ocean to the south.201 In 2007, Ghana discovered commercially 
viable deposits of crude in an area currently referred to as the Jubilee oil fields.202 
The fields are reported to be able to produce about 120,000 barrels of oil per day.203 
The Ghanaian government expected to gain about US $ 400 million in revenue from 
crude oil in 2011.204 It is apparent that the economy of Ghana is bound to improve.205 
However, this economic improvement can only be sustained if the international 
trade in oil is properly regulated.  
Efficient regulation of the international trade in oil will ensure that Ghana 
adequately exploits its comparative advantage in the production of crude oil. Ghana 
currently has various laws regulating the oil sector. 206  These laws include the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 1984, the Petroleum Commission Act 2011, and the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act 2011 among others.207 Currently, Ghana is in the process 
                                                 
200
  See generally chapter 6 of the thesis. 
201
  See Infoplease ‗Ghana‘ available at www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107584.html (accessed 9 March 2012). 
202
  See Ghana Energy Summit ‗Ghana: The New Land of Opportunity for Oil and Gas Investment‘ available at 
http://maritimehubafrica.com/uploads/news_attachment/Report_Ghana _Oil_Opportu nities.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2013). See also BBC News Africa ‗Ghana Oil Begins Pumping for First Time‘ available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11996983 (accessed 28 September 2011). Ghana‘s oil reserves are 
estimated at about 3 billion barrels of oil. For a general discussion of discovery of crude oil in Ghana see 
MacCaskie T C ‗The United States, Ghana and oil: global and local perspectives‘ (2008) Afr Aff (Lond) 107 
428 (hereafter MacCaskie T C 2008). See also Clarke D (2010) 183. 
203
  See Ghana Energy Summit ‗Ghana: The New Land of Opportunity for Oil and Gas Investment‘ available at 
http://maritimehubafrica.com/uploads/news_attachment/Report_Ghana _Oil_Opportunitie s.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2013). 
204
  See Ghana Energy Summit ‗Ghana: The New Land of Opportunity for Oil and Gas Investment‘ available at 
http://maritimehubafrica.com/uploads/news_attachment/Report_Ghana _Oil_Opportunit ies.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2013). 
205
  It was reported that the gross domestic product of Ghana would rise from about 5 percent to 20 percent in the 
first few years of production. See Green M ‗Crude realities; Can Ghana Escape Africa's Oil Curse?‘ 
Financial Times London 28 August 2008. 7.  
206
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
207
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
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of enacting oil legislation, viz, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill 2011 
which will repeal the existing Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1984. 208 
Some of these laws provide for the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies and corruption. An examination of Ghana‘s legal framework and the 
policy instruments regarding production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
corruption is undertaken in chapter six of the thesis.  
1.8 The Research Questions 
The questions that are the focus of this thesis are: Firstly, whether there is a duality 
of legal regimes presented by OPEC and the WTO in the regulation of international 
trade in oil. Secondly, does the duality of legal regimes affect the regulation of 
production quotas, subsidies, and corruption in African oil producing countries? 
Broadly, the above questions seek to provide an answer to whether OPEC and WTO 
regulations affect the liberalisation of the international trade in oil. 
1.9 Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this research is to provide answers to the following concerns, so that, 
depending on the results, African solutions for African problems can be crafted to 
improve the international trade in oil in Africa: 
1. Is the WTO institutional and legal framework sufficient for the 
regulation of production quotas, subsidies and corruption in African 
oil producing countries? 
2. Is the OPEC institutional and legal framework sufficient for the 
regulation of production quotas, subsidies and corruption in African 
oil producing countries? 
                                                 
208
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
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3. What is the legal framework for the regulation of oil trade in Ghana 
and how does it relate to OPEC and the WTO and the regulation of the 
stated key areas? 
4. What are the solutions to the shortcomings, if any, in the OPEC and 
WTO legal frameworks for the regulation of the stated key areas in the 
international trade in oil? 
1.10 Significance of the Research 
The research contributes to the broad discussion on international trade and 
energy.209 The thesis focuses on the regulation of production quotas, subsidies and 
corruption.210 The apparent disharmony in the regulation of the three stated key 
areas is present in many oil producing countries that are members of both OPEC and 
the WTO.211 These key areas are interrelated.212 OPEC and the WTO approach them 
differently.213 Nonetheless, a further explanation of why these particular areas are 
examined in the thesis is necessary.  
It has been noted that the WTO objectives are meant to open export markets and 
limit import restrictions or domestic distortions, such as subsidies.214 In this regard, 
production quotas, subsidies and corruption affect export markets and cause 
domestic distortions in trade. The effect on export markets is twofold. First, the 
amount of oil available to the export markets is restricted. Second, in some cases 
subsidies may encourage smuggling to the export markets. This may undermine the 
domestic production of oil in these export markets. The domestic distortions are 
                                                 
209
  See World Trade Organisation (2010) 166. See also Desta M G (2003) 394-397. See also Desta M G (2009) 
19-20, Cossy M (2012) 290-291, Broome S A (2006) 418 and Worika I L (2010) 90. 
210
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
211
  Angola, Ecuador, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and, Venezuela are members 
of both the WTO and OPEC. Additionally Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and, Libya are all observers at the WTO and 
are in the process of accession with the WTO. See Worika I L (2010) 89. 
212
  Pauwelyn J ‗Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment: An Introduction‘ 
Pauwelyn J (ed) Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment (2010) 2 
(hereafter Pauwelyn J 2010). 
213
  See chapter 5 section 5.4. 
214
  Pauwelyn J (2010) 2. 
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more direct and evident where production quotas, subsidies, and corruption are 
practiced.  
The main case study around which this research is structured makes it particularly 
relevant. Ghana is yet to join OPEC; this provides a unique opportunity to study the 
legal framework of an oil producing country that is a non-OPEC member. 215 
Additionally, the case study provides a platform to examine whether the key areas 
are sufficiently regulated in the non-OPEC member states. The research also 
identifies challenges to the WTO legal framework and provides practical solutions 
for them.  
1.11 Methodology 
The research is primarily based on an analysis of relevant primary and secondary 
literature.216  A review of the literature on OPEC and the WTO, as well as the 
regulation of international oil production and trade in Africa has been undertaken. 
The author has relied on various methods to illustrate the arguments in the thesis. In 
some instances, statistics and data from various sources have been used, while in 
other cases, specific examples are applied. Both these methods have challenges; often 
statistics are wrought with generalisations, which are of course necessary to collate 
figures from different sources.217 Similarly, specific examples seem to create the 
impression that the same behavior is relevant to another set of facts.218 This is not 
always true. Even so, illustrations are necessary. The author is aware of the above 
challenges. In addition to the above, the author undertook a field trip to Ghana and 
held informal discussions with various government officials in Ghana‘s oil sector. 
These officials requested that their names be withheld. Thus notes of these 
discussions are on file with the author and where such information has been relied 
upon, the source is indicated as ‗notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil 
sector.‘ 
                                                 
215
  See chapter 6 generally. 
216
  The study can be classified as a desktop study. The thesis relies on published articles, treaties, legislative 
enactments, textbooks, reported cases and reports on OPEC and the WTO and oil regulation generally.  
217
  Jackson J H (1997) 28.  
218
  Jackson J H (1997) 28. 
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The study compares the WTO and OPEC legal systems as regards the regulation of 
production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption in oil producing 
countries. Therefore it entails a comparative legal enquiry. Comparative legal studies 
have been defined as the comparison of legal systems to among other things 
understand the different systems. 219  Comparative legal studies include an 
investigation of historical and philosophical issues relating to law, and crafting 
responses to improve legal regimes. 220  One of the fundamental objectives of 
comparative legal studies is international harmonisation and unification of laws.221 
To this end, the thesis aspires to find common ground between the OPEC framework 
and the WTO legal system. Establishing commonalities in this regard will improve 
the regulation of the three key areas mentioned above. The thesis also reveals the 
divergences and advances solutions for harmonisation. 
A successful comparative study includes: a clear framework of what is being 
compared, a succinct understanding of the purposes of the comparison, and, a grasp 
of the techniques of comparison. 222  An indication has been provided of the 
organisations and the specific areas that are the subject of this study,223 as well as the 
purpose of the comparison to be undertaken.224 With regard to techniques, there are 
various methodological approaches to comparative legal studies including: the 
historical method, the functional approach, legal harmonisation and unification, 
methods of reviewing customary law, economic analysis, law and cultural method, 
and the convergence approach. 225  The thesis in the main applies the historical, 
functional, and harmonisation and unification methods of comparative legal studies.  
                                                 
219
  Okeke C N Methodological Approaches to Comparative Legal Studies in Africa (2012) The Centre for 
Comparative Law in Africa University of Cape Town 1 (hereafter Okeke C N 2012). 
220
  Okeke C N (2012) 1. 
221
  McDougal M S ‗The comparative study of law for policy purposes: value clarification as an instrument of 
democratic world order‘ (1952) Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2475 26 (hereafter McDougal M S 1952). 
222
  McDougal M S (1952) 29-30. See also Okeke C N (2012) 12. 
223
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
224
  See chapter 1 generally. 
225
  Okeke C N (2012) 12-19 citing Glendon M A et al Comparative Legal Traditions (2007) 6, 11. The 
Historical method involves the study of the history of laws. It has been noted that ‗comparative law without 
the history of the law is an impossible task.‘ The history of both OPEC and the WTO and their respective 
agreements is discussed in chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3. Further, the functional approach to comparative 
law seeks to investigate the problems and rules in different legal systems and how these rules solve problems 
in their respective legal systems. This method has been identified as the major theory of comparative legal 
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It can be argued, and rightly so, that due to the nature of the legal regimes of the 
organisations, especially the OPEC legal regime, the study cannot properly be 
construed as a comparative study.226 Nonetheless, a broad comparison of practices, 
rules and problems in the two systems is undertaken and against this background, 
the study is referred to as a comparative legal study.  
1.12 Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter One: Introduction and Background. The chapter provides the background 
to the research, a statement of the research problem, scope of the research, its 
objectives and its methodology. The chapter also indicates why OPEC and the WTO 
are the focus of this research and provides motivation for the use of Ghana as the 
main case study.  
Chapter Two: Conceptualising the International Trade in Oil in Africa. The chapter 
briefly discusses the relevant economic, international organisation and international 
law theories that inform the international trade in oil in Africa. This chapter 
examines the classical and neoclassical economic theories of international trade, the 
liberal and realist theories of international organisation, and the international law 
theories that explain the implementation of international treaty obligations. This 
chapter sets a basis for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Three: The WTO and the International Trade in Oil. The chapter contains a 
history of the evolution of oil trade in the GATT/WTO legal framework. It also 
                                                                                                                                                        
studies. The approach is particularly relevant to this study as the WTO and the OPEC member states appear 
to have similar problems. As noted in the background, member states in both systems have continued to rely 
on production quotas, maintain oil consumption subsidies, and permit corruption in oil related transactions. 
The functional theory is not without shortcomings in this study. While the WTO has rules to regulate the 
above disciplines, OPEC rules are not expressly stated in the Statute. It is currently argued that legal 
harmonisation and unification are not only an objective of comparative legal studies. Harmonisation and 
unification are now considered to constitute the methodology of comparative legal studies. This approach to 
comparative legal analysis is relevant to this study which investigates treaties that are relevant in the 
regulation of international trade in oil. The treaties that led to the creation of OPEC and the WTO were 
negotiated with the objective of achieving harmony in international trade. However, the WTO agreements 
are more comprehensive than the OPEC Statute which only regulates a single commodity. The two sets of 
Agreements therefore appear to advance disharmony within the field of international trade. 
226
  Although the distinct systems have similar problems, as discussed above, one of the systems has express 
rules regulating production quotas, subsidies, and government procurement and corruption while the other 
(OPEC) lacks such express rules. 
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discusses the institutional framework of the WTO. The chapter provides an analysis 
of the GATT provisions on production quotas, a review of the SCM Agreement, and 
a discussion of corruption under the GPA. The examination of the relevant 
provisions of the WTO legal framework and the above mentioned areas is focused 
on Africa. 
Chapter Four: OPEC and the Regulation of the International Trade in Oil. The 
chapter commences with a discussion of the OPEC institutional framework. The 
chapter addresses the price stabilisation tools of OPEC, particularly production 
quotas. The chapter also discusses subsidies in OPEC member states and evaluates 
the effectiveness of the OPEC legal framework in addressing the corruption problem 
in African oil producing countries. African examples, notably Nigeria and Angola 
are relied upon in the discussion. 
Chapter Five: Comparison between the WTO and OPEC. This chapter investigates 
the relationship between these two organisations. The comparison analyses the 
institutional frameworks and the relevant legal frameworks of the organisations. The 
chapter highlights the distinctions between these organisations with regard to the 
regulation of production quotas, subsidies and corruption. This chapter sets a 
platform for the application of the key legal arguments to oil production in Ghana as 
an African case study. 
Chapter Six: Crude Oil Production and Trade in Ghana. This chapter builds on the 
discussion in the earlier chapters and supplements the discussion on production 
quotas, subsidies and corruption. The discussion in this chapter presents a view of 
an oil producing country that is not an OPEC member. The discussion is guided by 
the policy and legal framework regulating the oil sector in Ghana.  
Chapter Seven: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter 
provides a conclusion to the thesis. Additionally, the chapter draws on the discourse 
in the previous chapters and provides practical recommendations for improvement 
of an effective institutional and legal framework for the international trade in oil in 
Africa. 
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1.13 Conclusion 
The importance of a comprehensive legal framework to regulate the international 
trade in oil cannot be overstated. As has been indicated, there are two main legal 
frameworks that affect international trade in oil, viz; the OPEC legal framework and 
the WTO legal framework. The OPEC legal framework mainly revolves around the 
stabilisation of oil prices for its member states. The legal framework of the WTO is 
broad. However, for purposes of this thesis, the provisions on production quotas, 
subsidies and government procurement and corruption are the most relevant. The 
discussion reveals that the legal frameworks of the two organisations are distinct.  
Ghana represents an African oil producing country in the early stages of the 
development of its oil sector. While it is a member of the WTO, it is not a member of 
OPEC. However, OPEC practices impact on the oil trade of non-OPEC members. 
Ghana has laws regulating its oil sector. However, these laws may not be alive to the 
challenges identified in the international trade of oil. Nigeria and Angola which are 
members of both organisations have to advocate for harmonisation of the rules in the 
international trade of oil. The next section discusses the theories that inform the 
international trade in oil in Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUALISING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN OIL IN 
AFRICA 
 ‘Shall I answer briefly, or at length?’1  
2.1. Introduction  
The globalisation of trade continues to rise astronomically.2  This applies to the 
export of oil and other natural resources.3 Despite having a small market share, oil 
exports from Africa to other regions of the world have continued growing.4 With 
reference to Africa‘s increasing share of global oil trade, this chapter examines the 
major theories that inform the international trade in oil.5 The international trade in 
oil is mainly analysed from the export/supply side. It is important to understand 
these theories as they explain the roles and objectives of the two organisations that 
                                                 
1
  Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) was one of the prominent neoclassical economists. When he was 
asked a particularly difficult question at his final oral examination at Oxford University, he posed the above 
question. This question is relevant to this chapter as there is an abundance of theories on international trade. 
However, the chapter is limited to the primary theories that form the foundation for other theories. It is 
important to state at the outset that the chapter does not attempt to discuss all theories of international trade. 
In the same light, economic theories of international trade and international organisation theories are quite 
complex and the discussion herein is merely an overview of these theories. See Appleyard D & Field A J 
International Economics Trade Theory and Policy (1995) 60 (hereafter Appleyard D & Field A J 1995). See 
also Armstrong D et al International Organisation in World Politics (2004) 11 (hereafter Armstrong D et al 
2004). 
2
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 6. In 1948, world exports of goods amounted to US $ 58 billion. This figure has 
substantially risen and global export of goods in 2010 amounted to about US $ 14 851 billion. See WTO 
‗International trade statistics 2011‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_ e/its 
2011_e/its2011_e.pdf (accessed 18 August 2012). 
3
  In 2010, Global exports of fuel and other mineral resources amounted to US $ 3 062 billion. WTO 
‗International trade statistics 2011‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011 
_e/its2011_e.pdf (accessed 18 August 2012). 
4
  This applies to the period between 2005 and 2010. On average oil exports from Africa grew by about 0.2%. 
Africa has the third largest oil reserves and this is bound to increase with recent oil discoveries in Ghana and 
Uganda. Thus its market share will also increase as production increases. See WTO ‗International trade 
statistics 2011‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011 _e/its2011_e.pdf (accessed 18 
August 2012). See also African Development Bank Group Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production in Africa 
and the Global Market Situation (2010) Commodities Brief Vol 1 Issue 4 1 (hereafter African Development 
Bank Group 2010). 
5
  The main economic theories that are discussed are the classical and neoclassical theories. While it is 
acknowledged that there are alternative economic theories of international trade, these are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The above theories of international trade comprehensively illustrate the characteristics of 
international trade. See Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 19 and 59. 
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are involved in the international trade in oil. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
was formed to consolidate and enhance the gains of trade liberalisation, while the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was primarily formed to 
ensure that member states receive profitable returns from their oil resources.6 It can 
therefore be argued that while the WTO pursues a liberalist ideology, OPEC pursues 
a trade restrictive agenda. 7  This chapter analyses the classical and neoclassical 
economic theories with a view to understanding the broad economic framework of 
the two organisations. It also seeks to establish an appropriate theoretical framework 
for the regulation of the international trade in oil in Africa. 
Related to the above economic theories, the chapter provides a summary of the basic 
theories of international organisation. These theories explain the rationales behind 
the formation of the WTO and OPEC. The chapter does not attempt to discuss all the 
theories of international organisation. Accordingly, only liberal and neoliberal 
theories as well as realist and neorealist theories of international organisation and 
some of their variants are discussed. 
In addition to the economic and international organisation theories of international 
trade, an appraisal of some of the legal theories that affect the adoption of 
international trade agreements is also undertaken.8 To this end, the chapter discusses 
the international law theories of monism and dualism.9 This is helpful in evaluating 
the implementation of international legal obligations, especially WTO and OPEC 
obligations, in domestic legal regimes.  
                                                 
6
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2.2 and 1.3.2. 
7
  Trade restrictive practices by OPEC include production quotas that limit oil production and export. Oil 
consumption subsidies can also be said to be trade restrictive as they distort the international trade in oil. See 
chapter 3 section 3.4. 
8
  Various legal theories indeed apply to the international trade discipline. However, the focus of the thesis is 
on the regulation of the international trade in oil in Africa. The discussion in this regard is limited to theories 
that affect the implementation of international obligations on international trade in oil in the domestic legal 
framework. As such, the relevant theories that are discussed are monism and dualism. See Cranston R A 
Theory for International Commercial Law? (2006) Congreso Internacional de Derecho Mercantil 2 (hereafter 
Cranston R A 2006). 
9
  Dugard J International Law A South African Perspective 4 ed (2013) 42 (hereafter Dugard J 2013). See also 
Starke J G ‗Monism and dualism in the theory of international law‘ 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 66 (1936) 67 
(hereafter Starke J G 1936). The author is aware of a third theory which disputes the legality of international 
law. However, that theory is outside the scope of this inquiry owing to the fact the WTO and OPEC legal 
frameworks have been generally accepted as binding on the member states. 
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The increasing visibility of Africa in the production and trade of crude oil merits a 
comprehensive discussion of the relevant economic and legal theories that are 
related to oil production and trade in Africa. This discussion is meant to guide 
appropriate responses to the regulation of the international trade in oil in Africa.  
The chapter commences with a discussion of the classical economic theory and how 
it relates to both the WTO and OPEC. This section also reflects on this theory and the 
international trade in oil in Africa. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the 
neoclassical economic theory. The subsequent sections of the chapter engage with 
the discourse on the theory of international organisation and legal theories on the 
implementation of international trade obligations. An appropriate normative 
marriage between the economic, international organisation and legal theories is also 
proposed in the chapter.10  
2.2 Economic Theories of International Trade 
Various economic theories and frameworks have been used to explain international 
oil trade. Some of the prominent theories and frameworks that have been relied 
upon include: the theory of exhaustible resources, the free-rider problem and game 
theory. 11  These are important but have certain limitations which inform their 
exclusion in this chapter. The theory of exhaustible resources is relevant in 
explaining the basis for oil production and oil prices. However, the theory is 
constrained by data challenges and the fact that the price of oil has not been in 
tandem with the theory.12 The free-rider problem is primarily based on the public 
                                                 
10
  The term ‗normative marriage‘ is used to refer to the marriage of standards from the economic, international 
organisation and legal fields.  
11
  Benchekroun H & Withagen C The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources: A Complete 
Characterization (2011) Department of Economics, CIREQ. McGill University and Department of Spatial 
Economics, VU University Amsterdam 2 (hereafter Benchekroun H & Withagen C 2011). See also Dwivedi 
D N Microeconomics Theory & Applications (2006) 569 (hereafter Dwivedi D N 2006). See also Herath G 
Game Theory Applications in Natural Resource Management Review of Evidence, Problems and Potential 
(2006) The 6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice 2 (hereafter Herath G 2006). 
12
  Chermak J M & Patrick R H A Microeconometric Test of the Theory of Exhaustible Resources (1999) 
Department of Economics University of New Mexico and Faculty of Management Rutgers University 2 
(hereafter Chermak J M & Patrick R H 1999). See also Hamilton J D Oil Prices, Exhaustible Resources, and 
Economic Growth (2011) Department of Economics University of California, San Diego 3-5 (hereafter 
Hamilton J D 2011). 
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goods theory. Public goods are defined to possess the following characteristics: 
collective consumption, non-rival consumption and non-exclusion.13 Crude oil and 
refined oil do not possess these characteristics, thus they cannot be defined as public 
goods. To this end, application of the free-rider theory to the international trade of 
oil is challenging. 14  Additionally, both non-cooperative and cooperative game 
theories are informed by strategies to achieve benefit from a common good.15 This is 
similar to the more practical theories on international organisation and how these 
affect the international trade in oil.16 Thus due to space constraints, the international 
organisation theories are discussed as opposed to game theory.  
2.2.1 The Classical Theory-An Introduction 
The classical theory of international trade is generally attributed to early economic 
writers who criticised the mercantilist theory of international trade.17 A detailed 
discussion of mercantilism and how it affected international trade is beyond the 
scope of this study. Nonetheless, the major tenets of the theory are discussed to 
provide a background for the discourse on the classical theory of international trade.  
It has been noted by various authors that mercantilism cannot be classified as a 
formal school of economic thought.18 Accordingly, it is defined as a collection of 
economic thoughts that were prominent in Europe between 1500 and 1750.19 The 
most significant theme of mercantilism was the need to maintain a positive balance 
                                                 
13
  Dwivedi D N (2006) 567. 
14
  The free-rider problem has been noted in cartels. Multinational oil companies have been accused of 
benefitting from OPEC production quotas. However, due to the fact that the free-rider problem is based on 
public goods, it is not applied to OPEC in this thesis. See Bejesky R ‗Geopolitics, oil law reform, and 
commodity market expectations‘ (2011) Oklahoma Law Review Vol. 63 No 2 234 (hereafter Bejesky R 
2011). 
15
  Hang P D K Essays in Game Theory and Natural Resource Management (unpublished Doctoral Thesis 
Tilburg University 2003) 3 (hereafter Hang P D K 2003). 
16
  See chapter 2 section 2.3. 
17
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 19. 
18
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 19. Adam Smith described a system similar to mercantilism to refer to trade 
ideology that emphasised the importance of a positive balance of trade. See Viner J Studies in the Theory of 
International Trade (1960) 3 (hereafter Viner J 1960). See also Smith A The Wealth of Nations 5 ed 
annotated by Cannan E (2003) 543 (hereafter Smith A 2003). 
19
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 19. 
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of trade.20 This involved ensuring that the volume of exports by merchants was 
greater than the volume of imports.21 It was informed by the need to restrict the 
amount of precious metal (specie) leaving the state.22 A high volume of exports 
allowed states to obtain precious metal from other states. The wealth of a state was 
measured by the amount of precious metal it had in its reserves and not the 
productivity of the state.23 The theory therefore advocated trade restriction. 
Currently, OPEC relies on production quotas as the tool of choice for price 
stabilisation. 24  Additionally, OPEC has been criticised for failing to regulate oil 
consumption subsidies in the member states.25 This situation points to the use or 
encouragement of the use of tools that perpetuate trade restriction. To this end, 
OPEC identifies with the mercantilist theory through its perpetuation of trade 
restriction. 
On the contrary, the WTO was formed to discourage trade restriction. The history of 
the WTO can be traced to the end of the Second World War.26 Some authors have 
advanced trade restriction as one of the fundamental reasons that led to the Second 
World War.27 The countries that pioneered the talks for an international organisation 
to regulate trade were motivated by the legacy and negative effects of trade 
                                                 
20
  The positive balance of trade was not always limited to commodities, and various authors at the time noted 
that the balance of trade should include non-commodity items, such as payment of foreign loans. See 
Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 20. See also Viner J (1960) 6-13. The idea of a positive balance of trade 
was advanced by Mun England's Treasure by Forraign Trade, or The Ballance of our Forraign Trade is the 
Rule of our Treasure (1664). See Streb J M Hume‘s Specie-Flow Mechanism and the 16th Century Price 
Revolution (2010) Universidad del Cema 5 (hereafter Streb J M 2010).  
21
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 20. 
22
  Mercantilists assumed that international trade was a zero sum game and that only one country would benefit 
from trade. This was one of the reasons for criticism of the theory by classical economists. See Appleyard D 
& Field A J (1995) 19. See also Viner J (1960) 6.  
23
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 20. See also Viner J (1960) 15. 
24
  OPEC Res I.1.3 1960 See OPEC Secretariat ‗OPEC production agreements: a detailed listing‘ 2003 OPEC 
Review 66 (hereafter OPEC Secretariat 2003). 
25
  Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a) 2. 
26
  See chapter 1 section 1.3.1. 
27
  It has been noted that the Great Depression of the 1930s was to a large extent caused and maintained by the 
trade restrictive practices of some countries. The Second World War was caused by among other factors, the 
harsh economic environment attributed to the Great Depression. Thus it can be argued that trade restriction 
was one of the causes of the Second World War. See Eichengreen B & Irwin D A The Slide to Protectionism 
in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? (2009) National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper Series 1 (hereafter Eichengreen B & Irwin D A 2009). See also Matziorinis K ‗The Causes 
of the Great Depression: A Retrospective 11‘ available at www.canbeke conomics.com/research 
_papers/TheGreatDepression_and_Europe.pdf (accessed 16 November 2012). See also Jackson J H (1997) 
13. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
48 
 
restriction.28 The WTO regulates and discourages quotas, subsidies and corruption.29 
To this end, the WTO does not identify with the mercantilist theory. The WTO is 
aware of the economic situation of less developed countries and therefore provision 
has been made to provide flexibilities in the trade rules.30 This allows for the gradual 
elimination of trade restrictive measures without creating economic shocks in the 
less developed countries. The African group in WTO negotiations has increasingly 
asserted itself and is a good forum to engage in discussions on oil trade.31 
Narrowing the discussion to Africa, oil production in Africa is largely open. Africa 
often does not have the capital to undertake oil exploration and production. 32 
Accordingly, the continent relies on foreign oil companies to produce oil. To this 
end, production of oil in Africa is not trade restrictive. This statement is qualified by 
the fact that Africa‘s largest oil producing countries are all OPEC members.33 This 
affects international trade in oil in Africa. 34  The OPEC member states maintain 
production quotas.35 These quotas entrench the monopolistic nature of OPEC and 
restrict international trade in oil. 36  Oil consumption subsidies are also trade 
restrictive as they undermine competition and the market determination of oil 
prices.37 Fuel consumption subsidies cost Nigeria about US $ 7.5 billion in 2010.38 It is 
                                                 
28
  See WTO ‗The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wtoe/whatise/tife/fact4_e.htm (accessed 20 August 2012). 
29
  See chapter 3 section 3.4 for a discussion on the regulation of production quotas, subsides, and corruption in 
the WTO. 
30
  See GATT Arts XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII. These provisions allow African oil producing countries to 
gradually eliminate trade distorting practices. 
31
  Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa The World Trade Organisation - An African Perspective, More than a 
Decade Later (2009) 26 (hereafter Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 2009). 
32
  International oil companies, such as, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Total, Chevron and Texaco, have a huge 
presence in African oil production. They are supported by a large number of small independents that are 
involved in exploration. See Clarke D (2010) 413-424 and 529.  
33
  Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Angola are Africa‘s largest oil producers and also hold the biggest oil reserves in 
Africa. See OPEC ‗OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2011‘ available at http: 
//www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm (accessed 20 August 2012). See also Clarke D (2010) 
87,125,225 and 234. See also OPEC ‗Member Countries Crude Oil Production Allocations‘ available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads /datagraphs/Producti onLevels.pdf 
(accessed 20 August 2012) for data on production allocation by OPEC between 1982 and 2007. 
34
  Oil production and trade are separate processes. It has been noted that there is limited oil trade between 
African states. See African Development Bank and the African Union (2009) 53. 
35
  See OPEC ‗Member Countries Crude Oil Production Allocations‘ available at http://www.opec.org/ opec 
web/static_files_project/media/downloads/datagraphs/Producti onLevels.pdf (accessed 20 August 2012). 
36
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1, for a detailed discussion of production quotas under the OPEC Statute. 
37
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2, for a detailed discussion of oil consumption subsidies. See also IEA at al (2010) 
11. 
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therefore apparent that international trade in oil in Africa is largely trade restrictive 
due to the fact that the largest oil producers are OPEC members and engage in trade 
restrictive practices.39 Although oil production may not be trade restrictive due to 
monetary constraints implicit in the oil production process, oil trade after production 
is trade restrictive due to OPEC practices in the largest oil producing countries in 
Africa. The mercantilist theory encouraged trade restriction. OPEC perpetuates trade 
restrictive practices in some African oil producing countries.  
2.2.2 The Classical Theory-David Hume, Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo 
The above scholars were very influential in guiding the classical theory of 
international trade. Their arguments were founded on the rejection of the 
mercantilist theory of international trade. The major contributions of these scholars 
to the classical theory are discussed below. The classical theorists emphasised the 
wellbeing of the citizens as opposed to the welfare of the monarchy.40 
2.2.2.1 David Hume-The Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism 
David Hume contested the mercantilist view that a nation could continue 
accumulating precious metal or specie without any adverse consequences to its 
competitive position.41 He argued that the continued accumulation of precious metal 
                                                                                                                                                        
38
  Ghana and Cameroon have also been identified as incurring costs in maintaining fuel subsidies. Thus this 
challenge is not limited to OPEC member states. However, since OPEC aims to stabilise oil prices, it can be 
argued that the Organisation should discourage these market distorting practices by its member states such as 
Nigeria. See African Development Bank Group ‗Fuel Subsidies in Africa‘ available at 
http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/fuel-subsidies-in-
africa-8812/ (accessed 20 August 2012).  
39
  Although it can be argued that oil production in Africa is open, trade in oil is trade restrictive, as discussed 
above. 
40
  Jackson J H (1997) 14. 
41
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 22. Hume‘s work was published in Political Discourses (1752).The Price-
Specie-Flow Mechanism was part of his essay ‗On the balance of trade‘. See Streb J M (2010) 2. It has been 
argued that the critique of mercantilism preceded Hume. A theory similar to the Price-Specie-Flow 
mechanism has been attributed to Cantillon R Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, written in 1730 
but only published in 1755. However, his critique of mercantilism is complex and sophisticated. Accordingly, 
Hume‘s work is relied upon in this chapter. See Thornton M Cantillon, Hume and the Rise of Anti-
Mercantilism (2006) Ludwig von Mises Institute 10-13 (hereafter Thornton M 2006). 
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would lead to an increase in money supply as well as prices and wages.42 This 
would ultimately increase imports and reduce exports of the state.43 On the other 
hand, a state that lost precious metal due to a higher volume of imports would 
experience a decrease in money supply.44 This would in turn reduce the prices and 
wages in the state.45 The state would then increase its volume of exports and reduce 
its volume of imports due to low prices and low wages.46  
Thus the mercantilist theory and its emphasis on the accumulation of precious metal 
was not an efficient method of maintaining a positive balance of trade over a long 
period of time. 47  David Hume assumed that changes in money supply always 
affected prices and wages and not output and employment.48 Hume also complained 
about the lack of comprehensive data on balance of payments.49 Thus the Price-
Specie-Flow Mechanism has limitations.50 Hume advocated free trade and argued 
that precious metal could not be controlled by the state over a long period of time.51 
Hume‘s arguments on the Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism support free trade. 52 
Similarly, the WTO advocates free trade. 53  This creates a connection between 
Hume‘s argument and the ethos of the WTO. Hume‘s conception of free trade 
                                                 
42
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. See also Cherunilam F International Economics 5 ed (2008) 123 
(hereafter Cherunilam F 2008). 
43
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. See also Cherunilam F (2008) 123. 
44
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. See also Cherunilam F (2008) 123. 
45
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. See also Cherunilam F (2008) 123. 
46
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. See also Paganelli M P ‗David Hume on monetary policy: a 
retrospective approach‘ (2009) The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (1) 81 (hereafter Paganelli M P 2009). 
47
  It has been argued that accumulating specie leads to inflation and affects the standard of living. See Jackson 
J H (1997) 15.  
48
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. 
49
  Streb J M (2010) 10. 
50
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 23. 
51
  Arnon A David Hume and Classical Monetary Theory (2011) The Thomas Guggenheim Program for the 
History of Economic Thought 13 (hereafter Arnon A 2011). It is worth noting that Hume‘s support of free 
trade was qualified by his opinion on the need to protect infant domestic industries, through taxation of 
similar goods produced by foreign industries. See McGee R W ‗The economic thought of David Hume‘ 
(1989) Hume Studies Volume 15 Number 1 184 (hereafter McGee R W 1989). Further, due to some of 
Hume‘s trade restrictive opinions, he has been described as a moderate protectionist and a philosopher who 
did not advocate for free trade to the extent that economists like Adam Smith did. The author concedes that 
such criticism is founded on the work of Hume. However, Hume‘s Price-Specie-Flow mechanism was 
essentially premised on free trade. See Viner J (1960) 91-92. 
52
  Arnon A (2011) 13. 
53
  See WTO ‗Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says New WTO Secretariat Study‘ available at http: 
//www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm (accessed 20 August 2012). See also Van den Bossche 
P (2008) 15-20, 21-24, for a detailed discussion of the benefits of free trade and the reasons for trade 
restrictive measures. 
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involved minimal government involvement. He argued that the state would not 
maintain a positive balance of trade over time, through accumulating precious metal 
and controlling exports and imports. Despite advocating some protectionist practices 
such as shielding infant domestic industries from competition, his Price-Specie-Flow 
Mechanism was a foundation for the opening up of international trade.  
Unlike the WTO, OPEC restricts trade through the use of production quotas to 
stabilise prices.54 OPEC also ignores oil consumption subsidies in the member states, 
despite indications that these subsidies are market distorting and are also trade 
restrictive.55 OPEC‘s objectives and practices are inconsistent with Hume‘s support 
for free trade. However, as noted above, Hume supported the protection of infant 
industries against competition. To this end, OPEC‘s trade restrictive practices may 
be related to Hume‘s argument.  
Corruption has been attributed to the high degree of government involvement in oil 
economies.56 This is especially true for many of the OPEC member states.57 Thus 
Hume‘s argument for limited government and free trade would not provide an 
appropriate environment for corrupt practices. Nevertheless, the WTO, which 
advocates free trade, has not taken a central role in fighting corruption. 58  The 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) which provides for transparency in 
government procurement does not apply to all members and is of very limited 
application.59 
In accordance with the observation in section 2.2.1, African oil production is open to 
international oil companies.60 However, oil trade in Africa is greatly influenced by 
the trade restrictive policies of OPEC. This is due to the fact that the largest oil 
                                                 
54
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
55
  IEA et al (2010b) 11. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
56
  Montinola G & Jackman R W ‗Sources of corruption: a cross-country study‘ (2002) B.J.Pol.S. 32,158 
(hereafter Montinola G & Jackman R W 2002). 
57
  Montinola G & Jackman R W (2002) 158. See also chapter 4 sections 4.4.3 and 4.5. 
58
  The GATT Art X promotes transparency. However, this is not sufficient for corruption at the point of 
procurement. Corrupt practices may subsist even where trade regulations have been published by member 
states. The GATT anti-corruption framework is limited. See Ala'I P ‗The WTO and the anti-corruption 
movement‘ (2008) Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 6, No. 1 260 (hereafter Ala'I P 
2008). 
59
  GPA Art 1. 
60
  Clarke D (2010) 413-424 and 529. 
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producing countries are also OPEC member states.61 Thus Hume‘s arguments for 
free trade are largely inconsistent with Africa‘s international trade in oil. 
2.2.2.2 Adam Smith –Absolute Advantage 
Adam Smith‘s work, which focuses on absolute advantage and the invisible hand, 
was published in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 
1776.62 Adam Smith rejected the mercantilist notion that a nation‘s wealth was based 
on its accumulation of precious metal. 63  He argued that a nation‘s wealth was 
founded on its productivity, that is, the production of final goods and services.64 He 
further argued that productivity flourished in an environment where people were 
free to pursue their own interests.65 A laissez faire environment was the best way to 
increase a nation‘s wealth.66 Adam Smith‘s concept of laissez faire has often been 
presented as an argument against state involvement in the economy.67 However, he 
was not totally averse to state involvement:68 
‗Smith, indeed, goes back and forth when he expresses his opinion on the state‗s 
functions. To him, the least government is certainly the best, simply because he 
believes that governments are spendthrift, irresponsible, and unproductive. 
Nevertheless, he has a flexible view of government‗s role in promoting general 
welfare through public works and institutions.‘69 
                                                 
61
  Clarke D (2010) 87, 125, 225 and 234. 
62
  Arnon A (2011) 24. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. The invisible hand is also mentioned in 
Adam Smith‘s work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. However, the discussion in this chapter is mainly 
limited to the Wealth of Nations. The invisible hand was also mentioned in Adam Smith‘s History of 
Astronomy. See Minowitz P ‗Adam Smith‘s invisible hands‘ (2004) Econ Journal Watch, Volume 1, 
Number 3 382 (hereafter Minowitz P 2004). See also Kennedy G ‗Adam Smith and the invisible hand: from 
metaphor to myth‘ (2009) Econ Journal Watch Volume 6, Number 2 240 (hereafter Kennedy G 2009). 
Kennedy argues that the invisible hand is only a metaphor and does not amount to anything more than that. 
Nevertheless, the metaphor is relevant in understanding the regulation of international trade through other 
forces like competition and not the state. See also Smith A (2003) 572. 
63
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. 
64
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. 
65
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. See also Minowitz P (2004) 385. See also Kennedy G (2009) 252. 
66
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. 
67
  Nagger T ‗Adam Smith‗s laissez faire‘ (1977) The American Economist Vol. 21 Issue 2 36 (hereafter Nagger 
T 1977). 
68
  Nagger T (1977) 36. 
69
  Nagger T (1977) 36. 
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Adam Smith contended that the proper role of the government was to ensure that 
there were no barriers to trade.70 Related to the arguments on laissez faire, he argued 
that states should specialise and focus production on those commodities where they 
had an absolute advantage.71 That is, a trading partner should produce and export 
commodities where the absolute labour required per-unit of production is less than 
that of the prospective trading partner.72 The explanation that follows places the 
discussion of absolute advantage within the context of international trade in oil. 
Assume that country Y takes one hour to produce a barrel of crude oil and four 
hours to produce a ton of steel, and country X takes two hours to produce a barrel of 
oil and three hours to produce a ton of steel. Thus in country Y one ton of steel will 
exchange for four barrels of oil and in country X one ton of steel will exchange for 
one and a half barrels of oil. Thus country Y has an absolute advantage in the 
production of oil as it takes less time, and country X has an absolute advantage in 
the production of steel as it takes less time to produce. Thus absolute advantage 
motivates countries to trade with others. If the countries were to trade at an 
exchange rate of one ton of steel for three barrels of oil, then country Y would get 
steel for less oil in country X, and country X would get oil for less steel in country 
Y.73 
It should be noted that Adam Smith‘s theory was based on the assumption that the 
labour required to produce the different commodities as well as all other factors, 
were similar in all states.74 This is not the situation in the real world. The theory also 
presupposes that all states have an absolute advantage in the production of certain 
                                                 
70
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. See also Crowder W J ‗Comparative Advantage and the Gains from 
Trade 3-4‘ available at http://www.uta.edu/faculty/crowder/data/Lecture_02_2011.pdf (accessed 14 
November 2012). 
71
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 25. See also Berkshire Encyclopedia of Sustainability: The Business of 
Sustainability ‗Free Trade 239‘ available at http://www.berkshirepublishing.com/assets/pdf/FreeTrade 
_Thrasher.pdf (accessed 14 November 2012).  
72
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 25. It is worth noting at this stage, that although Adam Smith may have 
advocated for trade between nations, he was aware of the challenge of creating an environment of total free 
trade. See Campbell R H et al (eds) Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1981) Vol I and II 536 (hereafter Campbell R H 1981). 
73
  The example used above has been adapted from an illustration of absolute advantage by Adam Smith in 
Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 26. 
74
  See World Economy ‗Absolute Advantage 4‘ available at http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/pdf 
/marrewijk/absolute%20advantage.pdf (accessed 21 August 2012). 
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goods, which is not an accurate description of global trade.75 Nonetheless, the theory 
of absolute advantage highlighted the benefits of free trade and laissez faire. 
The concept of free trade and the rationale thereof, as proposed by Adam Smith, are 
closely related to the objectives of the WTO. Free trade with minimal restrictions is 
the most appropriate environment for international trade. The WTO is at the 
forefront of eliminating trade barriers among states.76 The WTO trade rules relate to 
Adam Smith‘s work in this regard. Art XI of the GATT advocates the elimination of 
quotas.77 This is meant to encourage free trade. Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM regulate 
subsidies.78 These regulations prohibit trade restrictive practices. The GPA generally, 
provides rules that encourage transparency, and thus helps to eliminate corruption.79 
The theory of absolute advantage has limitations and has been criticised by other 
economists.80 Nonetheless, the theory established a basis for international trade. The 
theory indeed shows that there are advantages in trading with other states. 
Similarly, the WTO framework was established to encourage and regulate 
international trade between states. Although Adam Smith to a limited extent 
considered state intervention necessary in the economy, such involvement was 
necessary for the provision of public works and institutions.81 Adam Smith argued 
that the main role of the state was the removal of trade barriers.82 
OPEC relies on production quotas to stabilise prices; however production quotas 
restrict trade. Additionally, OPEC is yet to provide comprehensive regulations for oil 
consumption subsidies and the control of corruption.83 These practices are trade 
restrictive and are irreconcilable with the arguments of Adam Smith on absolute 
advantage, free trade and international trade. 
                                                 
75
  See World Economy ‗Absolute Advantage 4‘ available at http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/pdf 
/marrewijk/absolute%20advantage.pdf (accessed 21 August 2012). 
76
  The various GATT negotiations after 1947 focused on the reduction of tariff barriers to trade. After the 
1960s the negotiations focused on non-tariff barriers. See Van den Bossche (2008) 81. 
77
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
78
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
79
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4 for a detailed discussion. 
80
  See World Economy ‗Absolute Advantage 4‘ available at http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/marrewijk/pdf 
/marrewijk/absolute%20advantage.pdf (accessed 21 August 2012). 
81
  Nagger T (1977) 36. 
82
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 24. 
83
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
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Oil trade in Africa is restricted by OPEC production quotas as well as oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption.84 These key areas require regulation. The 
WTO provides regulation for these three areas; however, the GATT/WTO have been 
shy in the application of these regulations to oil trade generally.85 Regulation of the 
above areas will ensure that the oil trade in Africa produces profitable returns for the 
resource rich countries. 
International trade in all fields should be free of restrictions. However, it has been 
argued that free trade and the western model of trade does not suit Africa,86 and that 
Africa requires gradual introduction of regulations to promote free trade, taking into 
account domestic industries and other factors such as employment.87 As already 
noted the WTO legal framework is alive to this need and provides special and 
differential treatment for the implementation of WTO rules in less developed 
countries. 88  Additionally, it has been noted that absolute advantage encourages 
resource rich developing countries to neglect other commodities.89 Thus a gradual 
introduction of trade rules to trade in oil should ensure that other commodities are 
not neglected. 
                                                 
84
  The biggest oil producing countries in Africa are OPEC members and are subject to OPEC production 
quotas. Corruption in Africa is estimated to cost about US $ 148 billion annually (25% of African GDP). See 
Clarke D (2010) 22, 87, 125, 225 and 234. Fuel subsidies cost Nigeria about US $ 7.5 billion in 2010. See 
African Development Bank Group ‗Fuel Subsidies in Africa‘ available at http://www. 
afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/fuel-subsidies-in-africa-8812/ 
(accessed 20 August 2012).  
85
  See chapter 3 section 3.2 for a detailed discussion. 
86
  See The Guardian ‗Free Trade is not what Africa Needs, Mr. Cameron‘ available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/19/david-cameron-africa-free-trade (accessed 
21 August 2012). See also African Knowledge for Development Networks ‗Africa Trade Forum 2012: 
Boosting Intra-Africa Trade and Establishing the Continental Free Trade Area‘ available at 
http://knowledge.africa-devnet.org/group/aria/page/africa-trade-forum-2012-boosting-intra-africa-trade-
and (accessed 20 May 2013) for a contrary view. 
87
  See The Guardian ‗Free Trade is not what Africa Needs, Mr. Cameron‘ available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/19/david-cameron-africa-free-trade (accessed 
21 August 2012). 
88
  See GATT 1994 Arts XXXVI, XXXVII, and, XXXVIII. 
89
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 39. 
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2.2.2.3 David Ricardo-Comparative Advantage 
David Ricardo built on the theory of absolute advantage.90  He refined absolute 
advantage and his theory of comparative advantage to a large extent advances our 
understanding of the benefits of international trade.91 David Ricardo‘s seminal work 
on comparative advantage was published in The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation (1817).92 It is worth noting that his theory was subject to assumptions and is 
limited in its application.93 
David Ricardo noted that absolute advantage was founded on perfect mobility of 
factors of production in a particular country.94 However, due to the immobility of 
factors of production between different countries, it was possible to have different 
factor prices in different countries and therefore gains from trade due to comparative 
advantage. 95  Accordingly, a country may have an absolute advantage over a 
potential trading partner in more than one commodity. 96  Nevertheless, such 
countries may still engage in international trade because it is cheaper to import a 
particular commodity from a trading partner due to relative cost differences.97 The 
                                                 
90
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29. See also Viner J (1960) 440.  
91
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29. See also Viner J (1960) 442. The theory of comparative advantage and 
its broad use in economics is attributed to David Ricardo. However in 1815, Torrens had proposed a similar 
theory although he did not comprehensively discuss the theory. See Ruffin R J ‗David Ricardo‘s discovery 
of comparative advantage‘ (2002) History of Political Economy (34) (4) 733 (hereafter Ruffin R J 2002). See 
also Jackson J H (1997) 15. 
92
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29. 
93
  See Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29-30 for a detailed discussion of the assumptions. The theory assumed 
that factors of production are mobile between alternative uses within a country and immobile externally 
(between countries). It also assumed that the relative value of a commodity is based solely on its relative 
labour content. Further, that the costs of production are constant. See also Costinot A & Donaldson D 
Ricardo‘s Theory of Comparative Advantage: Old Idea, New Evidence (2012) NBER Working Papers 
17969 1 (hereafter Costinot A & Donaldson D 2012) for a discussion of some of the limitations of 
comparative advantage. See also Tian Y ‗A new idea about Ricardo‘s comparative advantage theory on 
condition of multi-commodity and multi-country‘ (2008) International Journal of Business and Management 
Vol 3 no 12 156 (hereafter Tian Y 2008). Comparative advantage does not explain multi-commodity 
transactions between two countries. 
94
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29-30 Perfect mobility of factors of production implies that the factors are 
completely mobile between alternative uses and the factor prices in the alternative uses are the same. 
95
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29-30. 
96
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 30. 
97
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 30. See also Samuelson P A ‗Where Ricardo and Mill rebut and confirm 
arguments of mainstream economists supporting globali[s]ation‘ (2004) Journal of Economic Perspectives—
Volume 18, Number 3 142 (hereafter Samuelson P A 2004). Samuelson argues that international trade does 
not always produce benefits for trading partners and may harm the economy of one of the partners in the 
long term. This is premised on the fact that technological advancement in one of the trading partner countries 
may lead to production of cheaper goods or services which were previously the comparative advantage of 
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illustration below contextualises comparative advantage within the framework of 
international trade in oil. 
Assume that country Y takes eight hours to produce a barrel of oil and nine hours to 
produce a ton of steel, and country X takes 12 hours to produce a barrel of oil and 10 
hours to produce a ton of steel. Country Y has an absolute advantage in the 
production of both oil and steel. The concept of absolute advantage would 
discourage trade between the two countries. However, country Y is more efficient in 
the production of oil. Although country X has no absolute advantage, it has a smaller 
relative disadvantage in the production of steel, that is, a difference of one hour 
between the countries, compared to a difference of two hours for oil production. 
Therefore before trade, in country Y one barrel of oil will cost 8/9 tons of steel and in 
country X one barrel of oil will cost 1.2 tons of steel. Thus country Y should 
concentrate on the production of oil where it is more efficient and can earn 1.2 tons 
of steel from country X. Country X should concentrate on the production of steel 
since it can earn 1.125 barrels of oil for a ton of steel from country Y.98 
It is apparent from the above example that even where a country has an absolute 
advantage in more than one commodity, it can trade with other countries that have 
relative cost differences for similar products.99 Thus international trade is possible 
even where a country has no absolute advantage. 
David Ricardo‘s theory of comparative advantage succinctly explains the benefits of 
international trade. The WTO is founded on the promotion of international trade. 
The theory of comparative advantage has been identified as one of the principles 
                                                                                                                                                        
the other trading partner. On the contrary, it has been argued that international trade cannot harm the 
economy of the trading partners in the long term. Technological advancement of a trading partner may allow 
that country to produce import competing goods. However, this will over time negatively affect the price of 
the goods and improve the terms of trade for the other trade partner. This argument highlights the numerous 
benefits of comparative advantage and indicates that international trade is not a zero-sum game. See 
Bhagwati J et al ‗The muddles over outsourcing‘ (2004) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 
4 104 (hereafter Bhagwati J et al 2004). 
98
  The example used above has been adapted from an illustration of absolute advantage by David Ricardo in 
Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 31. 
99
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 33. 
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that justify international trade.100 Regulation of trade restrictive practices, such as, 
production quotas, subsidies and corruption, is meant to encourage international 
trade. Due to the special needs of developing countries and less developed countries, 
it is necessary to provide support for international trade in Africa.101 Provisions for 
special and differential treatment strive to harmonise trade regulation and the 
interests of developing countries. 
Despite the provision of special and differential treatment for developing countries 
in the WTO trade rules,102 African member states have not fully benefited from 
international trade.103  This is largely due to the fact that market access for the 
commodities where Africa has a comparative advantage has not been provided.104 
This is especially true for agricultural products.105 Thus there is a need to make the 
WTO trade regime more proactive and aware of the African situation. Rhetoric and 
aid are not sufficient.  
The Doha Round has brought African member states together,106 and they have 
been, and remain, very vocal in the negotiations.107 However, the negotiations are 
lopsided as African member states are currently focusing on agriculture despite the 
fact that the continent is resource rich, and oil has been neglected or diplomatically 
                                                 
100
  See WTO ‗Comparative advantage is dead? Not at all, Lamy tells Paris Economists‘ available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl152_e.htm (accessed 22 August 2012). 
101
  It has been argued that comparative advantage indicates that international trade between industrialised 
countries and developing countries is possible. However, developing countries argue that they usually trade 
at a disadvantage. This has been attributed to the protectionist tendencies of developing countries that hinder 
their specialisation and efficient allocation of resources to areas where they should concentrate production. 
See Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 39.  
102
  See GATT 1994 Arts XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII. See also Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 
(2009) 1. 
103
  International trade in Africa faces a number of challenges. These include political unrest, uncertainty in 
customs policies, corruption and lack of transparency. See Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (2009) 197.  
104
  African countries require preferential market access. However, this has to be provided cautiously as it could 
hurt the global economy. Preferential market access hurts the global economy where it is provided for goods 
where a country has no comparative advantage. See Ianchovichina E et al Unrestricted Market Access for 
Sub-Saharan Africa: How much is it worth and who pays? (2001) C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2820 7-8 
(hereafter Ianchovichina E et al 2001). 
105
  Africa‘s dominant non-oil exports are agricultural products. See Ianchovichina E et al (2001) 8.  
106
  Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (2009) 26. 
107
  Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (2009) 26. 
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excluded from the WTO agenda.108 This may be due to the fact that African oil is 
traded internationally and is not affected by market access challenges.109  
OPEC policies undermine free trade. However, it is in the interest of the OPEC 
member states to trade oil. Thus they engage in international trade in oil where they 
have a comparative advantage. 110  To a large extent comparative advantage has 
encouraged international trade in oil even for OPEC member states. However, this 
trade is affected by the trade restrictive policies of OPEC which eventually affect the 
price of oil on the world market.111 
2.2.2.4 A Summary of the Classical Theory and International Trade in 
Oil in Africa 
The classical theory of international trade provides a framework for international 
trade in oil in Africa. The theory promotes free trade and international trade. 
Further, the theory discourages trade restriction. The mercantilist era which defined 
trade restriction and the self- interest of states was the foundation for the classical 
theory.  
The classical theory rejected the mercantilist notion of trade. David Hume 
highlighted the disadvantages of a positive balance of trade and the accumulation of 
precious metal as the basis for international trade. Such a conception of trade 
rendered trade one sided. International trade under the mercantilist theory would 
only benefit one state at the expense of a trading partner. The WTO discourages 
trade restrictions and to this extent does not identify with the mercantilist conception 
                                                 
108
  Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (2009) 8. 
109
  Oil exports account for a substantial portion of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa. See Ianchovichina E et al 
(2001) 8.  
110
  It has been argued that the United States buys oil on the international oil markets because it is cheaper than 
oil extraction in the United States. See Institute for International Economics ‗Has US Comparative 
Advantage Changed? Does this Affect Sustainability?‘ available at http://www.piie.com/publications 
/chapters preview/47/3iie2644.pdf (accessed 22 August 2012).  
111
  Oil consumption subsidies are mainly implemented through price control regulations. This affects the market 
price of oil in countries that provide these subsidies. It also encourages smuggling of oil which affects prices 
in the neighboring countries that do not provide oil consumption subsidies. See IEA et al (2010b) 7. 
Likewise, production quotas affect the global price of oil. An increase or decrease of production quotas 
affects the quantity of oil on the world market and affects the prices. See Kohl W L ‗OPEC behaviour, 1998-
2001‘ (2002) The Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance 42 210 (hereafter Kohl W L 2002). 
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of international trade. On the other hand, OPEC advances trade restrictive policies 
and is similar to the mercantilist theory in this regard. 
Like David Hume, Adam Smith deconstructed the mercantilist conception of 
international trade. Using free trade and absolute advantage, he advocated 
international trade under a laissez faire system. Similarly, the WTO relates to the 
classical theory and absolute advantage as it promotes international trade and 
discourages trade restrictive policies. OPEC trade restrictive practices depart from 
the classical theory and absolute advantage. OPEC, which has a strong hold on the 
international trade in oil in Africa, promotes trade restriction through the use of 
production quotas and oil consumption subsidies. Free trade policies in Africa have 
to be sensitive to the plethora of challenges that African nations face. Thus the 
policies have to be introduced gradually. 
David Ricardo, like Adam Smith, encourages international trade, but unlike Adam 
Smith, he relies on comparative advantage. David Ricardo demonstrated that states 
can benefit from international trade even where one state has an absolute advantage 
in all tradeable commodities between the trading partners. The relative difference in 
price is an incentive for trade. Thus all countries can benefit from international trade. 
The WTO relates to David Ricardo‘s doctrine of comparative advantage. Although 
OPEC is trade restrictive, comparative advantage explains why OPEC members 
dominate the global oil trade. The next section discusses the neoclassical theory of 
international trade and how it relates to the international trade in oil in Africa. 
2.2.3 The Neoclassical Theory of International Trade 
The neoclassical theory of international trade expands on the discussion of the 
classical theory of international trade. The neoclassical theory attempts to refine the 
classical theory and to relax some of its limitations by providing additional factors, 
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such as technology.112 The neoclassical theory also expands on the demand side 
factors that affect international trade.113  
The discussion of the neoclassical theory of international trade examines: the factor 
proportions analysis of Heckscher-Ohlin,114 the factor price equalisation theory of 
Paul Samuelson,115 economies of scale and demand side factors of Staffan Linder,116 
the technology gap arguments of Michael Posner,117 and finally looks at the position 
of tariffs in the neoclassical trade theory.118 All these contributions have modified the 
classical theory of international trade, and the neoclassical theory has been defined 
as the contemporary foundation of international trade.119 
2.2.3.1 Factor Proportions - Heckscher-Ohlin 
The factor proportions theory of trade was developed by two prominent economists, 
Eli Heckscher (1879-1952) and Bertil Ohlin (1899-1979).120 Bertil Ohlin‘s Interregional 
and International Trade (1933)121 was greatly motivated by the work of his teacher, Eli 
Heckscher.122  
The factor proportions theory provides that different goods require different 
quantities of various factors of production. 123  Further, the theory provides that 
different countries are endowed with different amounts of these factors of 
production. 124  Accordingly, the relative cost of the factors of production in the 
                                                 
112
  See chapter 2 section 2.2.1. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 29-30 for a detailed discussion of 
some of the limitations of the theory of comparative advantage. 
113
  The classical theory of international trade mainly relied on labour as a factor of production. Thus the 
neoclassical theory expands on the supply side factor of labour and also looks at the demand side factors that 
affect consumption. See Appleyard D and Field A J (1995) 59. 
114
  Grimwade N International Trade New Patterns of Trade, Production and Investment (1989) 10 (hereafter 
Grimwade N 1989). See also Van Marrewijk C et al International Economics Theory, Application, and 
Policy (2007) 131 (hereafter Van Marrewijk C et al 2007). 
115
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 93. 
116
  Grimwade N (1989) 16. See also Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 372-373. 
117
  Grimwade N (1989) 19.  
118
  Grimwade N (1989) 24. See also Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 372. 
119
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 72. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 57. 
120
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. 
121
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 130. 
122
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 130. 
123
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. 
124
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. See also Redding S J Empirical Approaches to International Trade (2006) London 
School of Economics and CEPR 2 (hereafter Redding S J 2006). 
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different countries is not the same.125 Following from the comparative advantage 
theory of David Ricardo, the theory states that countries will produce goods in 
which they have a comparative advantage, 126  that is, goods whose factors of 
production are relatively cheap as compared to those of a trading partner.127  
It is worth noting at this stage that the factor proportions theory expands on the 
comparative advantage theory by considering more than one factor of production.128 
Unlike the comparative advantage theory which only considered labour, the factor 
proportion theory also relies on capital as a factor of production.129 Nonetheless, the 
theory is based on certain assumptions and is therefore limited in application.130 
The factor proportions theory improves on the comparative advantage theory. 
Accordingly, the theory further illustrates the advantages of international trade. The 
WTO relates to the theory in this regard. However, the theory assumes that there are 
no barriers to trade.131 This assumption ignores one of the main objectives of the 
WTO, which is to improve international trade and eliminate barriers to trade.132 
Production quotas and oil consumption subsidies are barriers to trade. 133 
Nevertheless, the theory improves on the comparative advantage theory and 
advocates international trade generally. 
                                                 
125
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. See also Redding S J (2006) 2. 
126
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. 
127
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. See also Leamer E E The Heckscher-Ohlin Model in Theory and Practice (1995) 
Princeton Studies in International Finance 1 (hereafter Leamer E E 1995). 
128
  See chapter 2 section 2.2.2.3. See also Grimwade N (1989) 10. See also Redding S J (2006) 2. 
129
  Grimwade N (1989) 10. See also Redding S J (2006) 2. 
130
  Some of the assumptions on which the theory is based are: that there are two factors of production, two 
goods and two countries, that there is no product differentiation, that the proportions of the factors of 
production required to produce a certain good are the same in both countries, that the countries have a 
similar level of technology, that factors of production are mobile within a particular country but immobile 
between countries, etc. See Grimwade N (1989) 11-14. It has been argued that these assumptions do not hold 
in the real world. The theory was subjected to empirical testing by Wassily Leontieff. His results revealed 
that the theory could not explain trade patterns in the real world. However, various explanations, such as, the 
year of his study, that is, 1947, was not representative of general trade patterns. Various countries were 
recovering from the effects of the Second World War. See Rahim S ‗What use is the neoclassical theory of 
international trade?‘ (1999) The Lahore Journal of Economics, Vol 4 No. 1 91-92 (hereafter Rahim S 1999). 
131
  Grimwade N (1989) 11. 
132
  See Art 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. See Art XI of the GATT. See also Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM. 
133
  See Art XI of the GATT. See also Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM. 
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Production quotas are implemented in a trade restrictive manner and affect 
international trade in oil.134 Production quotas affect global oil prices as well as the 
production of other goods.135 In the same light, oil consumption subsidies are not 
expressly regulated by OPEC.136 It appears that OPEC condones oil consumption 
subsidies.137 These subsidies are trade restrictive and affect the international trade in 
oil.138 Although OPEC member states exercise their comparative advantage in the 
production of crude oil,139 they allow and maintain market distorting measures that 
affect trade in oil in other countries. The trade restrictive practices maintained by 
OPEC affect the full liberalisation of global oil trade. It can therefore be argued that 
these trade restrictive practices are barriers to trade. 
International trade in oil in Africa is greatly influenced by OPEC oil production and 
trade policies. To this end, production quotas and oil consumption subsidies abound 
in the large African oil producing countries.140 This is due to the fact that these 
countries are all OPEC member states.141 Trade restrictions affect the benefits and 
gains obtained from international trade. They affect global prices of crude oil as well 
as the revenue that African oil countries receive from their oil resources. OPEC‘s 
trade restrictive practices do not share any common features with the factor 
proportions theory, save for the fact that they constitute barriers to trade. Even then, 
barriers to trade are not recognised by the factor proportions theory. 
                                                 
134
  OPEC does not provide an explicit formula for production quota allocation. See Gault J et al ‗How does 
OPEC allocate quotas?‘(1999) Journal of Energy Finance and Development 4 137 (hereafter Gault J et al 
1999). See also chapter 3 section 3.4.1 and section 3.4.2. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.1 on how OPEC 
production allocations affect the trade policies of other countries. 
135
  Kohl W L (2002) 210. 
136
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.2 and 4.5 for a detailed discussion. 
137
  IEA et al (2010b) 11. 
138
  Bacon R & Kojima M Phasing Out Subsidies Recent Experiences with Fuel in Developing Countries (2006) 
Public Policy for the Private Sector World Bank Oil Gas and Mining Policy Division Note No 310 2 
(hereafter Bacon R & Kojima M 2006). Oil consumption subsidies encourage smuggling and affect oil prices 
in other countries. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
139
  Leamer E E (1995) 1. 
140
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.5. 
141
  Clarke D (2010) 22, 87,125,225 and 234. The biggest oil producing countries in Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, 
Libya and Angola) are OPEC members and are subject to OPEC production quotas. See also OPEC 
‗Member Countries‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (accessed 29 August 
2012).  
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2.2.3.2 Factor Price Equalisation – Paul Samuelson 
The factor price equalisation theory improved on the factor proportions theory of 
Heckscher-Ohlin.142 The theory was developed by Paul Samuelson in 1948.143 The 
theory also benefited from the work of Wolfgang Stopler. 144  These economists 
argued that factor price equalisation may lead to the disappearance of the benefits 
derived from trade between two trading partners.145  
The factor price equalisation theory provides that if all the assumptions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory are maintained, the incentive to trade over the long term 
may be eliminated.146 The opening up of international trade between two trading 
partners with different factor prices and different comparative costs will lead to a 
‗tendency towards‘ the equalisation of factor prices in the different countries and 
will eliminate the incentive to trade.147 
If there are two trading partners, one specialising in the production of capital 
intensive goods and the other having a comparative advantage in the production of 
labour intensive goods, then the demand for capital in the former will lead to a rise 
in the rate of profit compared to the wage rate.148 Similarly, in the latter, the demand 
for labour will lead to a rise in the wage rate compared to the rate of profit. 
Subsequently, the factor prices in the two countries will tend towards equality.149  
The foregoing state of affairs will slowly erode the comparative advantage and the 
incentive to trade between the countries.150 However it has been noted that such a 
point would never be reached in the real world.151 Paul Samuelson has also argued 
                                                 
142
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Samuelson A ‗International trade and the equalisation of factor 
prices‘(1948) The Economic Journal, Vol. 58, No. 230 163 (hereafter Samuelson A 1948). 
143
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. It has been argued the theory was developed in 1949. However, this does not affect 
the substance of the theory or the debate in this chapter. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 128.  
144
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 132. 
145
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. See also Redding S J (2006) 2. 
146
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Samuelson A (1948) 169. 
147
  It has been noted that the term ‗tendency towards‘ is used because the process of price equalisation usually 
does not come to a conclusion. See Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 129. 
See also Samuelson A (1948) 170. 
148
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 129. 
149
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 129. 
150
  Grimwade N (1989) 14. 
151
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. 
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that with more final goods and more factors of production in a more general setting, 
factor prices will not become equal.152 Thus the differences in the factor prices will 
get smaller but will not completely disappear.153 It is important to note that Ohlin 
had argued that there was a tendency for factor rewards to narrow; however, he did 
not completely develop the price equalisation theory.154 
The Stopler-Samuelson theory is an off-shoot of the factor proportions theory.155 It 
relies on the assumption that with two final goods and two factors of production, an 
increase in the price of the final good of one will increase the rewards of the factor of 
production that is relevant in the production of that specific good and reduce the 
rewards of the factor of production for the other good.156 Thus the opening up of 
trade may have adverse effects on certain sectors of the economy.157 If the price of 
the capital intensive goods rises, then the rewards of capital, the factor of 
production, will also increase.158 This will have a negative impact on the other good, 
which might be labour intensive. 159  The rewards of labour (wage rate) will 
depreciate and this will adversely affect persons involved in the production of the 
labour intensive good.160 
Assuming that labour is an abundant resource in a particular country, then such 
country will promote free trade for labour intensive goods. It follows that the owners 
of the abundant resource will be inclined towards free trade, while the owners of the 
scarce resource will be inclined towards trade restriction.161 This is due to the fact 
that free trade will increase the wage rate of the persons involved in the production 
of labour while trade restriction will protect the scarce resource (capital) from losing 
value.162  
                                                 
152
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 93. 
153
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. 
154
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 93. See also Samuelson A (1948) 163. 
155
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 132. 
156
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. See also Appleyard D and Field A J (1995) 132. 
157
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. 
158
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 100. 
159
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 100. 
160
  Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 100. 
161
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 133. 
162
  Appleyard D and Field A J (1995) 133. 
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It is thus interesting to note, that comparative advantage may benefit one trading 
partner more than the other, especially in situations where one of the trading 
partners is the owner of the abundant factor of production. The price equalisation 
theory and the Stopler-Samuelson theory explain trade restriction and trade 
liberalisation in the context of comparative advantage. The theory provides realistic 
limitations to comparative advantage. 
The WTO advocates free trade; this is partly premised on the advantages of 
international trade.163 These advantages are rooted in comparative advantage and 
the fact that trade benefits all partners involved. However, it is also true that while 
free trade has improved some sectors in Africa, it has negatively affected other 
sectors in various African economies.164 Infant industries require a certain level of 
protection.165 It is also noted that despite the enthusiastic push for free trade by the 
West, many of the developed countries continue to protect some of their industries 
and markets. 166  However, as previously noted, market access has not had any 
substantial negative effect on oil trade in Africa.167 This is mainly attributed to the 
fact that oil is a crucial factor in the production of various goods and does not face 
serious market access challenges.168 
OPEC has been criticised for protecting the oil sector in the member countries.169 
This has mainly been achieved through the use of production quotas and oil 
consumption subsidies.170 Production quotas are closely related to the reasons for 
trade restriction advanced by the Stopler-Samuelson theory. Comparative advantage 
                                                 
163
  Van den Bossche (2008) 81. 
164
  Ianchovichina E et al (2001) 7-8. 
165
  This position has been criticised and subsidies have been suggested as an alternative. However, subsidies to 
such industries will only be practical if they are compliant with the SCM Agreement. See Arnon A (2011) 13. 
See also Jackson J H (1997) 24. 
166
  The United States and the European Union have been criticised for subsidising their agricultural sectors to 
the detriment of the agricultural sectors of various African countries. See Trade Law Centre for Southern 
Africa (2009) 7. See also United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Appellate Body Report) [2004] 
WT/DS267/AB/R 289. Benin and Chad joined the dispute as third parties. The Appellate Body held that 
payments to domestic users of United States upland cotton were subsidies contingent on the use of domestic 
over imported goods contrary to Art 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
167
  Ianchovichina E et al (2001) 8. 
168
  Ianchovichina E et al (2001) 8. 
169
  Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a) 2. 
170
  Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a) 2. 
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adversely affects some sectors of the economy.171 However, the oil sector is generally 
not affected by the adverse effects of comparative advantage. 172  Thus the trade 
restriction advanced in the theory is to some extent different from the trade 
restriction maintained by OPEC. Trade restriction in the Stopler-Samuelson theory is 
meant to protect the industries that rely on scarce resources, relative to the resources 
that are required in the production of other goods by a trading partner.  
Trade restrictions under OPEC are meant to control global oil prices. It can be 
argued that the convergence between both types of trade restriction is the 
maintaining of a healthy profit margin from trade. Despite this subtle difference, the 
objective of both types of protectionism is to protect a particular industry.  
2.2.3.3 The Demand Side, Technological Gap, and Tariff Theories 
The previous sections engaged with neoclassical theories of trade that are most 
relevant to the international trade in oil. This section discusses additional 
neoclassical theories. These theories are not as prominent as the previous theories 
discussed in sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2 that form the basis of the neoclassical 
international trade theories. 
The demand side theory of international trade is mainly attributed to Staffan 
Linder. 173  Staffan Linder emphasised the importance of demand side factors of 
international trade in manufactured goods. 174  He noted that while supply side 
factors (resource endowments) were important in the international trade of primary 
products, the trade pattern of manufactured goods was also influenced by demand 
side factors. 175  This theory is pivotal in explaining incentives for trade in 
manufactured goods. However, crude oil is largely a primary good.176 
                                                 
171
  Grimwade N (1989) 15. 
172
  Ianchovichina E et al (2001) 8. 
173
  Grimwade N (1989) 16. 
174
  Grimwade N (1989). 16. See also Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 168. 
175
  Grimwade N (1989) 16. 
176
  See the text of Ad Art XVI of GATT, which defines primary products as; ‗...any product of farm, forest or 
fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily 
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The technological gap theory is closely related to the demand side factors theory of 
Staffan Linder, as it mainly focuses on manufactured goods. 177  The theory is 
attributed to a number of economists; however, Michael Posner was the first scholar 
to incorporate technological differences in explaining patterns of trade.178 The theory 
is also referred to as the imitation lag hypothesis and relaxes the assumption in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory.179 The theory states that trading partners do not always 
have the same level of technology.180 Accordingly, there is a delay in the imitation or 
transfusion of technology from one country to another.181 Thus the country with new 
technology will export the new product before the technology is adopted by other 
producing countries.182  
It is acknowledged that technological advancements have opened up hitherto 
inaccessible oil fields for oil production. Deep sea oil production in Norway and oil 
production in Canada has been possible due to new technology.183 This has helped 
increase oil production outside the OPEC countries.184 However, OPEC still holds 
the world‘s largest oil reserves and to this end advancement in technology is yet to 
substantially affect the oil trade in the OPEC member states.185 It is also unlikely that 
the new technology will be used in oil production in many of the OPEC member 
                                                                                                                                                        
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade.‘ Crude oil can be classified 
as a primary product. 
177
  Grimwade N (1989) 19. 
178
  Grimwade N (1989) 19. 
179
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 163. 
180
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 163. 
181
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 163. 
182
  Appleyard D & Field A J (1995) 164. 
183
  The combined effort of government, academia and the oil companies has enabled the development of new 
technology and encouraged deep sea drilling in Norway. See Norwegian Academy of Technological 
Sciences ‗Norwegian Petroleum Technology a Success Story‘ available at http://www. 
msintef.no/upload/Petroleumsforskning/dokumenter/Forskningsboken en. pdf (accessed 4 September 2012). 
Canada has developed technology that allows it to extract oil in the oil sands. See Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers ‗A Revolution in Heavy Oil Technology‘ available at 
http://www.capp.ca/ENERGYSUPPLY/INNOVATIONSTORIES/WATER/Pages/undergroundCombustion.asp
x (accessed 4 September 2012).  
184
  Non-OPEC countries currently produce about 60% of the world‘s oil. However, it has been noted that oil 
reserves in these countries are quickly diminishing. See Johnson T ‗Non-OPEC Oil Production‘ available at 
http://www.cfr.org/natural-resources-management/non-opec-oil-production/p14554 (accessed 4 September 
2012).  
185
  OPEC holds about 81.33 per cent of proven reserves and the non-OPEC countries hold about 18.67 per cent, 
as per statistical data for 2010. See OPEC ‗OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2011‘available at 
http://www.opec.org/ opecweb/en/datagraphs/330.htm (accessed 20 August 2012). 
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states, apart from those where deep sea oil drilling is necessary or those with heavy 
oil sands.  
The tariff theory examines the restrictions that countries impose to protect their 
domestic markets and industries. 186  Usually tariffs are used to limit imports. 
Accordingly, the relevance of the tariff theory to international trade in oil is not as 
pronounced as to trade in other commodities. African countries have market access 
for their oil exports and generally tariffs on oil are quite low.187 Thus a detailed 
discussion of the tariff theory is beyond the scope of this study. 
2.2.3.4 A Summary of the Neoclassical Theory and International Trade 
in Oil in Africa 
The neoclassical theory of international trade improves and refines the classical 
theory of international trade.188 The neoclassical theory relaxes the assumptions of 
the comparative advantage theory and addresses some of the challenges of the 
comparative advantage theory. 189  The neoclassical theory of international trade 
realistically portrays the international trade in oil in Africa. It provides tangible 
explanations for free trade and international trade and also realistically explains the 
motivation for trade restrictions in international trade. This is also true for the 
international trade in oil in Africa. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory refines the comparative advantage theory.190 It provides 
for more than one factor of production and also assumes that states require different 
quantities of the various factors of production to produce similar goods. 191  The 
theory to a large extent supports international trade and in this regard is similar to 
the characteristics that define the WTO. However, the theory assumes that there are 
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  Grimwade N (1989) 24. See also Van Marrewijk C et al (2007) 157. 
187
  The United States which is one of the world‘s largest oil consumers maintains very low tariffs on petroleum 
and oil imports at about five to ten cents per barrel. Further, tariffs are waived under the African Growth and 
Opportunities Act and the North American Free Trade Agreement. See Nerurkar N US Oil Imports and 
Exports (2012) Congressional Research Service 17 (hereafter Nerurkar N 2012). 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.1. 
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no barriers to trade.192 Trade barriers, such as production quotas, affect the oil trade 
in Africa. This is largely due to the trade restrictive practices of OPEC.193 
The Paul Samuelson theory of price equalisation builds on the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory.194  It explains the depreciation of the incentive to trade between trading 
partners.195 This is attributed to the gradual reduction of factor prices in the different 
countries.196 Notwithstanding the above argument, Paul Samuelson has noted that 
the strongest argument for free trade is that, it promotes higher standards of living 
amongst trading partners.197 
The above theory was further modified by the Stopler-Samuelson theory which to a 
great extent highlights the fact that some sectors of the economy may be adversely 
affected by international trade.198 The theory contextualises trade restriction and 
explains why countries engage in protectionism.199 It should be noted that the type 
of trade restriction that is motivated by the comparative advantage theory is 
different from the type of trade restriction that is maintained by the OPEC member 
states through production quotas. 
The other theories that inform the neoclassical genre are also relevant to the study. 
These include: the demand side theory of Staffan Linder, the technological gap 
theory of Michael Posner and the tariff theory.200 However, these theories mainly 
relate to manufactured goods and the use of tariffs to protect domestic industries.201  
The neoclassical theory of international trade is particularly relevant in explaining 
international trade in oil, as it illustrates the incentives of free trade and the 
advantages of international trade. Additionally, the theory provides some insight 
into why countries engage in trade restrictive practices. Although the type of trade 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.1. See also Grimwade N (1989) 11. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.1. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.2. See also Grimwade N (1989) 14. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.2. See also Grimwade N (1989) 14. 
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  Grimwade N (1989) 14. 
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  Jackson J H (1997) 12 citing Samuelson P Economics (1980) 651.  
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.2. 
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  Grimwade N (1989) 15. 
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  See chapter 2 section 2.2.3.3. 
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restriction maintained by OPEC is different from the trade restriction that arises out 
of comparative advantage, the two are similar as they are both intended to protect a 
particular resource or industry. The neoclassical theory of international trade like the 
classical theory does not substantively explain the cause of rampant corruption in 
the area of international trade in oil. 
2.3 Theories of International Organisation 
This section examines theories that explain the relevance and origin of international 
organisations that are significant to international trade in oil. Similar to the 
discussion in section 2.2, the discussion of the relevant theories is limited to 
mainstream theories that affect international organisations that are prominent in the 
trade in oil. The discussion is relevant as it provides a basis for the examination of 
the role of both the WTO and OPEC in regulating production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption. 202  The WTO is indeed an international 
organisation; however, with regard to OPEC, it is arguable as to whether it is an 
international organisation.203 These two organisations are involved in implementing 
the above economic theories in respect of the international trade in oil.204 Theories of 
international organisation are mainly informed by political factors.205 
In the previous section, the thesis highlighted the theories that inform the benefits of 
and challenges to trade between nations. The benefits of trade between nations have 
encouraged increased trade between nations and fostered globalisation. 206 
                                                 
202
  A detailed analysis of the WTO and OPEC and how they regulate production quotas, oil consumption 
subsides and corruption is discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
203
  See chapter 4 section 4.2 for a detailed discussion of the status of OPEC as an international organisation. See 
also Karns M P & Mingst K A International Organizations The Politics and Processes of Global 
Governance (2004) 7 (hereafter Karns M P & Mingst K A 2004). 
204
  See chapter 2 section 2.2 on economic theories of international trade. 
205
  International relations theories explain international organisation and global governance. Global governance 
was largely motivated by political factors such as the end of the Cold War, and the contested nature of 
sovereignty. See Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 24-25 and 35. International organisation refers to 
interstate arrangements and also relationships between NGOs and non-state actors. See Thompson A & 
Snidal D International Organisation (1999) University of Chicago 692 (hereafter Thompson A & Snidal D 
1999).  
206
  Joseph Stiglitz, a prominent economist, has defined ‗globalisation‘ as the closer integration of the countries 
and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation 
and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, 
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Accordingly, a critical appraisal of globalisation is necessary as it establishes a 
context for the examination of theories relating to the international organisations that 
are involved in international trade in oil.207  
The apparent disharmony between globalisation and state sovereignty is also 
discussed as it provides insights into the theories of international organisation.208 
While increased trade has been attributed to globalisation, various inequalities have 
also been attributed to it.209 This section also examines the negative attributes of 
globalisation and how they inform international organisation theory. 
Globalisation has been supported by economic liberalisation and democracy.210 With 
regard to globalisation and economic liberalisation, it has been argued by some 
scholars that globalisation has highlighted the prominence of the private sector in 
business.211 Nonetheless, the role of the state in business and economic activity is 
also important and this has been the subject of various neoclassical economic 
theories.212 The role of state governments in regulating international trade led to the 
creation of various intergovernmental organisations to regulate and provide norms 
for the conduct of international trade. The formation of the WTO in 1995 and OPEC 
in 1960 was a result of the recognition of the role states have to perform in regulating 
global commerce.213 
There are various challenges to the international regulation of commerce through 
international organisations.214 One of these is the disharmony between individual 
state interests and global interests.215 Thus in some instances, globalisation appears 
                                                                                                                                                        
knowledge, and people across borders. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 3 citing J Stiglitz Globalization and 
its Discontents (2002) 9. See also Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 22. 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 26. 
208
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 25-26. See also Jӧnsson C & Tallberg J ‗Institutional Theory in 
International Relations (2000)‘ available at http://lup.lub.lu.se/ luur/download?func=downloadFile& 
recordOId=534142&fileOId=625444 (accessed 5 September 201 2) (hereafter Jӧnsson C & Tallberg J 
2000). The authors discuss interdependency sovereignty which provides that states can regulate various 
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to compete with state sovereignty. 216  Some international organisations, like the 
WTO, have attempted to resolve this challenge through the use of consensus in 
decision making.217 This encourages negotiation and the different member states 
receive benefits in exchange for compromises in certain sectors of trade. This is the 
ideal situation. However, in most cases for African states, decisions through 
consensus have not always produced the best results. 218  On the other hand, 
international organisations, such as OPEC, rely on voting for procedural matters and 
decisions of the Board of Governors and this encourages non-compliance.219  
2.3.1 Liberalism and Neoliberalism 
This section briefly discusses liberalism and neoliberalism and how these theories 
relate to international organisations. The liberal theory is premised on the 
assumption that human nature is good and that people can improve the moral and 
material conditions of their existence. 220  Liberals hold that injustice, war and 
aggression are a result of corrupt social institutions, and misunderstandings between 
leaders.221 Further, that aggression and war can be eliminated through the collective 
                                                 
216
  Hocking B & McGuire S Trade Politics International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives (1999) 194 
(hereafter Hocking B & McGuire S 1999). See also Jӧnsson C and Tallberg J (2000) 6. In terms of theories 
of international relations, ‗sovereignty‘ is defined as the institutionalisation of public authority within 
mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains. This definition succinctly links sovereignty to the international 
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217
  See chapter 3 sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion of decision making through consensus at the 
WTO. 
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  The protracted Doha Round of WTO negotiations justify the above statement. African countries have come 
together to demand appropriate rules for agriculture, special and differential treatment, etc. This is due to the 
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reached through consensus. See Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiation Institute 
and the Institute for Global Dialogue Compilation of the formal African Proposals to the WTO (2005) 1 
(hereafter Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiation Institute and the Institute for 
Global Dialogue 2005). 
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making at the Board of Governors. See chapter 4 sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the 
decision making processes in OPEC.  
220
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 35. ‗Liberalism‘ has been defined as idealism by some authors. The tenets 
of the two theories of international organisation are similar. They emphasise reason and the good nature of 
humanity. See Guzzini S (1998) 16-17.  
221
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 35. ‗War‘ is defined as a failure of rational communication. See also 
Guzzini S (1998) 17. 
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action of states.222 To this end, liberals advocate the establishing of international 
organisations based on democratic principles.223  
On the other hand, neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism posits that 
disagreements hinder state co-operation.224 However, states can work together with 
the assistance of international organisations. 225  Accordingly, unlike liberals, 
neoliberals are less optimistic about the advantages of co-operation.226  They are 
aware that state co-operation or international organisation can lead to negative 
consequences for some parties. 227  This argument may be founded in the 
circumstances that led to the critique of liberalism after the Second World War and 
the rise of realism at the time.228  
Liberalism and neoliberalism have contributed to the development of other theories 
of international organisation that are closely related to the above primary theories. 
These include: functionalism, international regime theory, and collective goods 
theory.229 Functionalism provides that international organisations and governance 
arise out of the needs of people and the various states.230 It has been noted that 
functionalism explains the creation of many intergovernmental organisations. 231 
Another relevant theory is the international regime theory, which provides for the 
                                                 
222
  Idealists argued that war was caused by a non-democratic environment. Thus it was posited that the 
democratisation of government from the national to the international level could protect the world from 
aggression. This line of argument was founded on the theory that non-democratic diplomatic relations of the 
19
th
 century formed the breeding ground for egoism, nationalism and war. See Karns M P & Mingst K A 
(2004) 35. See also Guzzini S (1998) 17.  
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226
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 39. 
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the international regime theory. 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 40. See also Bennett A L International Organisations Principles and 
Issues 4 ed (1983) 13-14 (hereafter Bennett A L 1983). See also Armstrong D et al (2004) 11. For a detailed 
discussion of functionalism see Alvarez J E International Organi[s]ations as Law-makers (2005) 17-28 
(hereafter Alvarez J E 2005). 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 40. See also Bennett A L (1983) 13. 
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informal norms and rules of behaviour that arise out of international law.232 These 
informal rules may be codified and are classified as regimes.233 International regime 
theory emphasises the role of intergovernmental organisations in shaping and 
maintaining regimes.234 Finally, the collective or public good theory is relevant in 
explaining the creation of international organisations.235 The theory posits that in the 
provision of a common good, it is economically rational for the producers of such 
good to come together instead of fighting against each other.236 However, since the 
decisions of one state affect other states, this might affect certain states‘ economic 
planning and policy. 
The liberal and neoliberal theories of international organisation are helpful in 
understanding the creation of the organisations that are involved in the regulation of 
international trade in oil, viz the WTO and OPEC.237 The WTO was formed to reduce 
barriers to trade and encourage free trade.238 Accordingly the organisation leans 
towards functionalism and to a limited extent the collective good theory, in the event 
that free markets are interpreted as a public good. On the contrary, OPEC was 
formed by states that had a common interest, to ensure that oil production benefitted 
the producing states and that the states received profitable prices for their natural 
resource.239 To this end, the organisation leans towards the collective good theory. 
The analysis in this section is limited to the liberal and neoliberal understanding of 
international organisation. 
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233
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 42. See also Bennett A L (1983) 16-17. See also Armstrong D et al (2004) 
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2.3.2 Realism and Neorealism 
Realism holds that individuals act to fulfil their personal interests.240 Accordingly on 
the international plane, states are the main actors and act to protect their national 
interests.241 Realists theorise that international organisations are only as strong as the 
individual state members.242 Further, that international organisation is often subject 
to manipulation by some state members. 243  Neorealism is related to realism. 244 
However the two theories differ on the importance of the international system in 
explaining international politics. 245  While it is acknowledged that there is no 
authoritative hierarchy in the international system, states have different capabilities 
and this distribution of capabilities or power affects international politics and 
relations. 246  Realists believe that there is very little incentive for states to co-
operate.247 The arguments of the realist school appear to fail in the presence of 
evidence which indicates that very many intergovernmental organisations have been 
formed over the years and very few have been dissolved.248 There are very many 
incentives for states to co-operate. 
Realism and neorealism have influenced the development of other theories. These 
include the hegemonic stability theory and the rational choice theory. 249  The 
hegemonic stability theory is greatly influenced by the liberal collective goods 
theory.250 The theory holds that the global world economy is maintained by the 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 45. See also Guzzini S (1998) 19 citing Carr E H Twenty Years’ Crisis 
(1939). Realists criticised idealism on the basis that the idealists disregarded state interests, politics, and 
practice. For a detailed discussion of realism see Burgstaller M Theories of Compliance with International 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 47-49. See also Guzzini S (1998) 143. See also Armstrong D et al (2004) 
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power of a dominant state.251 It has been noted that an open market economy is a 
public good and that it is maintained by a dominant power which exercises 
economic and political power over other states. 252  Thus where a state has an 
advantage over other states in the production of a valuable commodity, it can 
manipulate other states to commit to an open market economy.253 The rational choice 
theory is based on the assumption that state actions are based on their subjective 
needs.254 Additionally, states also enter into international arrangements so that they 
can predict the behaviour of other states.255 
It can be deduced from the above discussion that both the WTO and OPEC are 
structured around both the hegemonic stability theory and the rational choice 
theory. With regard to the hegemonic stability theory, the creation of the WTO was 
greatly influenced by the USA and the European powers as the dominant states, 
while the creation of OPEC was greatly facilitated by Iraq and Saudi Arabia as the 
dominant producers.256  
It should be noted that while OPEC does not operate a free market, it is a dominant 
producer of oil, and this explains the coalition of some of the world‘s largest oil 
producing countries. 257  Similarly, both the WTO and OPEC have some 
characteristics of the rational choice theory. All member states of these organisations 
acceded to these international arrangements to advance their subjective needs.  
Although the mainstream realist theory is reluctant to acknowledge the importance 
of international arrangements, the variants of realism, such as the hegemonic 
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  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 49. See also Guzzini S (1998) 143 citing Keohane R O ‗The Theory of 
Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,1967-1977‘, in Holtsi O R et al (eds) 
Change in the International System (1980) 131-62. See also Snidal D ‗The limits of hegemonic stability 
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stability theory and the rational choice theory, provide strong support for 
international organisations, especially in international commerce.258  
This section briefly provides the background to the creation of the organisations 
relevant to the international trade in oil in Africa. It highlights the theoretical context 
for the creation of organisations, such as, the WTO and OPEC. Following from the 
above discussion, it is also necessary to examine the implementation of international 
obligations flowing from these organisations. The next section discusses theories on 
implementation of international obligations created by the WTO and OPEC. 
2.4 Implementation of Obligations under International Agreements 
When countries enter into international arrangements and form intergovernmental 
organisations, they are bound by the obligations that arise out of these organisations. 
It is therefore important to examine how these obligations are implemented in the 
individual states. This section provides a background to the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption by both the WTO and OPEC, 
which will be examined in the later chapters. 259  The hierarchy of competing 
international obligations is also discussed as a prelude to the examination of the 
implementation of international obligations created by both the WTO and OPEC.260 
It is now generally accepted that international organisations in many cases are 
sources of international law.261 This is mainly through treaties and state practice that 
is established by these international organisations. International law is unequivocal 
in stating that special rules prevail over general rules,262 lex specialis derogat legi 
generali.263 However, even with the aid of this rule, it is not clear whether WTO 
obligations supersede OPEC obligations.264 It can be argued that WTO rules are lex 
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specialis in the regulation of international trade. Similarly, there is strength in the 
argument that OPEC rules are lex specialis in the regulation of the international 
trade in oil in the member states. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is to some extent instructive in 
resolving the above issue.265 It is trite, that where treaties regulate the same subject 
matter, 266  the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with those of the later treaty. 267  In this case, it would appear that 
provisions contained in the Marrakesh Agreement and the Annexures thereto, are 
the higher norm and that provisions in the OPEC Statute have to comply with the 
Marrakesh Agreement. However, the differences in the two agreements do not 
permit a conclusive answer as to which of the two is the higher norm.268 
In light of the above debate, countries that have concurrent membership of both the 
WTO and OPEC are faced with two conflicting sets of obligations.269 Although there 
is no conclusive answer to the question of the hierarchy of WTO and OPEC 
obligations, the debate seems to lean towards the WTO establishing the higher norm. 
Another question is how the member states implement these international 
obligations in their domestic legal regimes. Monism and dualism are the basic 
doctrines in resolving this question.270 
2.4.1 Monism and Dualism 
Monism holds that international law and municipal law are part of the same 
juridical reality.271 Further, that international law is supreme in relation to municipal 
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Law Review 204 (hereafter Ginsburg T et al 2008). 
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law.272  Accordingly, municipal courts are under an obligation to apply rules of 
international law without necessarily adopting these rules in their domestic legal 
regimes.273 It is now generally accepted that the whole body of international law 
cannot be applied in the domestic context without addressing the peculiarities of the 
domestic legal regime.274 This has introduced the harmonisation theory which is 
closely related to the monist theory.275  
Related to the above, dualism posits that international law and domestic law are 
different.276 The dualist theory relies on distinctions, such as the subjects of the two 
legal regimes,277 the sources of the two legal regimes,278 and the fact that legislation 
is to be obeyed while international law relies on the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.279 Thus dualists argue that international law can only bind states if the 
states adopt international law in their domestic legal regimes. 280  It follows that 
domestic law is superior to international law.281 
It is important to note that the two theories recognise international law as a valid 
legal regime.282 However, the difference rests in the hierarchy between the two sets 
of norms. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is not clear on which of the 
two theories is superior to the other.283 The author believes that an attempt to create 
a hierarchy between the two theories would be too subjective and would undermine 
                                                 
272
  Shaw M N (2003) 50. See also Maniruzzaman A F M ‗State contracts in contemporary international law: 
monist versus dualist controversies‘ (2001) EJIL Vol. 12 No. 2 312 (hereafter Maniruzzaman A F M 2001). 
273
  Dugard J (2013) 42.  
274
  Dugard J (2013) 42. 
275
  Dugard J (2013) 42. 
276
  Shaw M N (2003) 121. See also Dugard J (2013) 42. 
277
  The subjects of domestic law are individuals while the subjects of international law are to a large extent 
states. See Bhuiyan S National Law in WTO Law Effectiveness and Good Governance in the World Trading 
System (2007) 29 (hereafter Bhuiyan S 2007).  
278
  International law arises out of the collective will of states, while domestic law arises out of the will of a 
particular state. See Bhuiyan S (2007) 29.  
279
  Agreements must be carried out in good faith. This is the basis for the enforcement of international 
obligations arising from treaties. See Bhuiyan S (2007) 29. See also Shaw M N (2003) 49.  
280
  Dugard J (2013) 42. See also Bhuiyan S (2007) 29. 
281
  Shaw M N (2003) 121. 
282
  Starke JG (1936) 69. See generally Turley J ‗Dualistic values in the age of international legisprudence‘ 
(1992-1993) 44 Hastings L.J. (hereafter Turley J 1992-1993). 
283
 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
It does not create a hierarchy between international law and domestic law. International treaties are to be 
respected by the states out of good faith. Accordingly, the provision recognises the sovereignty of states. On 
the other hand, Art 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that states cannot invoke 
national laws to justify non-compliance with international obligations. This seems to provide that 
international law is superior to domestic law. See Bhuiyan S (2007) 58-59. 
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the sovereignty of states as well as the element of good faith in the enforcement of 
treaty obligations.284 Nonetheless, it can be argued that based on the authority of Art 
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that states 
cannot invoke municipal law as justification for non-compliance with international 
law obligations, the convention seems to indicate that international law obligations 
are superior to municipal law obligations.285  
2.4.2 The WTO, OPEC and the Monist-Dualist Controversy 
The monist-dualist controversy is state centred and relates to the different methods 
that states adopt to implement international law obligations. Both the WTO 
agreements and OPEC Statute provide for the implementation of their respective 
obligations in domestic legal regimes. The Marrakesh Agreement provides that 
states shall ensure the conformity of their laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with obligations provided in the Agreement and the Annexures. 286 
Similarly, the OPEC Statute provides that states shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligations arising under the Statute.287 It is apparent from the foregoing discussion 
that the Marrakesh Agreement provides a higher standard than the OPEC Statute in 
the implementation of the obligations under the respective treaties. The Marrakesh 
Agreement does not provide for good faith, it seems to focus on conformity. 
The language of the Marrakesh Agreement suggests that WTO obligations are 
superior to domestic legal regimes.288 Additionally, some authors have argued that 
the Marrakesh Agreement seems to impose the direct application of its obligations 
on the member states.289 Accordingly, from a state perspective, this would favour a 
                                                 
284
  This view is founded on the argument of Harris D Cases and Materials on International Law 7 ed (2010) 62 
(hereafter Harris D 2010).  
285
  See Art 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It should be noted that this provision is subject 
to Art 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Nevertheless, Art 46 has been interpreted 
narrowly. See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria Case I.C.J Reports [2002] 430. 
286
  See Art XVI (4) Marrakesh Agreement. 
287
  See Art 3 of the OPEC Statute. 
288
  Bhuiyan S (2007) 58. 
289
  Cottier T & Schefer K N ‗The relationship between World Trade Organi[s]ation law, national and regional 
law‘ (1998) 1 J. Int'l Econ. L. 120 (hereafter Cottier T & Schefer K N 1998). See also Cottier T ‗A Two-Tier 
Approach to WTO Decision-Making‘ Steger D P (ed) Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the 
Twenty-first Century (2009) 48 (hereafter Cottier T 2009). 
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monist approach to implementation of international obligations.290  However, the 
author respectfully disagrees with this position. In terms of implementation, the 
decision primarily rests on the states. Thus states, depending on their domestic 
systems will apply a monist or dualist approach to implement international treaty 
obligations.  
The OPEC Statute is consistent with the language of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.291 States are enjoined to implement international obligations in good 
faith. The provision emphasises the sovereignty of states and permits states to 
implement obligations arising from the Statute with due regard to their sovereignty. 
However, it is also clear that the language of the Statute is weak and this may affect 
the implementation of obligations arising from the treaty. Some authors have noted 
that OPEC resolutions292 are only binding on the member states after they have 
ratified the resolutions.293 This argument is not alive to the fact that some OPEC 
member states are monist and therefore treaty obligations become part of their 
domestic laws without ratification.294 
The discussion on implementation of international obligations reveals that there are 
competing obligations with regard to international trade in oil. It is not clear which 
of these norms is superior to the other.295 However, on the basis of the fact that the 
Marrakesh Agreement is a more recent treaty, it can be said to be the higher norm. 
Additionally, the implementation of competing international obligations in domestic 
                                                 
290
  Cottier T & Schefer K N (1998) 120. 
291
  See Art 26 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
292
  Stoehr L (1979) 94-95. OPEC Resolutions have the same effect as treaties. 
293
  Themaat V V The Challenging Structure of International Economic Law (1981) 177 (hereafter Themaat V V 
1981). 
294
 Angola is an OPEC member state and it is monist. It has however been argued that even in monists countries, 
implementation of international obligations is not easy. See Meerkotter A SALC Litigation Manual Series 
Equal rights for all: Litigating cases of HIV-related discrimination (2011) Southern Africa Litigation Centre 
14 (hereafter Meerkotter A 2011).  
295
  Article 30 (4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties appears to provide guidance on competing 
obligations in international treaties regulating the same subject matter. The provision provides that as 
between state parties to all treaties, the later treaty is applicable. The former treaty will only apply to the 
extent that it is not incompatible with the later treaty. As between state parties to both treaties and state 
parties to one treaty, the treaty that applies to both states shall apply. However, this provision cannot be 
applied to the WTO and OPEC scenario. It can be argued that the WTO has wider application than the 
OPEC Statute and therefore the two do not regulate the same subject matter. Further, it can be argued that 
the WTO GATT 1947 preceded the OPEC Statute of 1962. However, the GATT 1994 incorporated 
provisions of the GATT 1947. This makes the relationship complex and creates a grey area. 
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jurisdictions is provided for in both the Marrakesh Agreement and the OPEC statute. 
It has been argued by some authors296 that the language of the two treaties leans 
towards particular theories on the application of international law in domestic legal 
regimes. However, such arguments appear to ignore the state centred nature of the 
implementation of international treaty obligations.  
Implementation of international obligations is state centred and the implementation 
provisions in either the OPEC Statute or the Marrakesh Agreement do not 
substantially affect the monist-dualist controversy. The next section summarises the 
conceptual framework that defines international trade in oil in Africa. These include: 
economic theories of international trade, theories of international organisation and 
theories that explain implementation of international obligations in domestic legal 
regimes.  
2.5 A Normative Marriage 
The nature of the study cannot be limited to a strict legal analysis.297 International 
trade in oil is informed by an interdisciplinary background, which is mainly 
economics and law. 298  Politics and international organisation also play a 
fundamental role in the discourse. 299  The interdisciplinary nature of natural 
resources trade and governance has been noted by other authors who have preferred 
to describe the phenomenon as the ‗political economy.‘300 This section highlights the 
most relevant theories from the different disciplines and provides a theoretical 
avenue for the discussion in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
296
  Bhuiyan S (2007) 58. See also Themaat V V (1981) 177. 
297
  Some commentators have argued for a normative analysis in studying the WTO. See Birkbeck C D 
‗Reinvigorating Debate on WTO Reform: The Contours of a Functional and Normative Approach to 
Analyzing the WTO System‘ Steger D P Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first 
Century (2009) 28 (hereafter Birkbeck C D 2009). 
298
  Themaat V V (1981) 5-6. See also Hocking B & McGuire S (1999) 3. See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 3. 
299
  Themaat V V (1981) 6. See also Hocking B & McGuire S (1999) 3. 
300
  See Isham J et al ‗The varieties of resource experience: Natural resource export structures and the political 
economy of economic growth‘ (2005) The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 145 (hereafter 
Isham J et al 2005). See also Auty R M & Gelb A H Political Economy of Resource Abundant States (2000) 
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2 (hereafter Auty R M & Gelb A H 2000). 
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The economic theories provide the basis for the international trade in oil. 301 
Accordingly, the most relevant economic theories in this regard deserve to be 
discussed first. The comparative advantage theory of David Ricardo to a great extent 
provides the basis for trade generally.302 This also applies to international trade. This 
makes the theory quite relevant in explaining the role of the WTO generally.303 
However, the comparative advantage theory of international trade has greatly been 
improved upon by other neoclassical theories. These theories currently explain 
international trade in oil in Africa. The Stopler-Samuelson theory explains and fills 
in the gaps in the comparative advantage theory.304 For example, the theory explains 
why trading partners engage in trade restriction.  
Closely related to the neoclassical theories and their conceptualisation of 
international trade in oil, are the theories of international organisation. 305 
International organisation is related to the concept of globalisation and politics.306 
The liberal and neoliberal theories of international organisation which to a great 
extent encourage international organisation and globalisation are the most relevant 
in explaining international trade in oil.307 Functionalism is key to explaining the 
formation of both the WTO and OPEC.308 On the other hand, the collective goods 
theory underpins the formation of OPEC.309 Realism and neorealism also explain 
international organisation around international trade in oil.310 However, realism and 
neorealism are not as strong as the liberal and neoliberal theory in their support for 
international organisation. 
Finally, the implementation of international obligations arising from international 
treaties sums up the discussion on the conceptualisation of international trade in 
                                                 
301
  Economic theory, though not conclusive, helps to provide direction to the policies that inform international 
trade. See Jackson J H (1997) 9.  
302
  See chapter 2 sections 2.2.2.3. 
303
  See chapter 2 sections 2.2.2.3. 
304
  See chapter 2 sections 2.2.3.2. 
305
  See chapter 2 section 2.3. 
306
  See chapter 2 section 2.3. 
307
  See chapter 2 section 2.3.1. 
308
  See chapter 2 section 2.3.1. 
309
  See chapter 2 section 2.3.1. 
310
  See chapter 2 section 2.3.2. 
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oil.311 International organisations have a strong role in the regulation of international 
trade in oil. However, the implementation of obligations from both the WTO and 
OPEC is a state decision.312 The main theories that explain the implementation of 
international law obligations are the monist and dualist theories. 313  Both these 
theories are equally relevant and countries can rely on either to implement 
international law obligations on the regulation of international trade in oil. 314 
However, it also appears that although these theories are relevant, the economic 
theories and the theories of international organisation present more practical reasons 
as to why states opt for international organisations and the implementation of 
international law obligations. Theories on implementation of international law 
obligations are mainly procedural and are not a determinant of what international 
norms states choose to implement. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The chapter has briefly highlighted the relevant theories and ideas that define 
international trade in oil. Where possible, reference has been made to Africa, to place 
the discussion within an African context. International trade and the reasons for 
trade are best explained by the neoclassical international trade theories. These are 
closely related to the theories of international organisation. The liberal and neoliberal 
theories of international organisation support the creation of international 
organisations. To this end, international organisations that are involved in the 
regulation of international trade in oil, viz the WTO and OPEC, are justified by the 
liberal and neoliberal theories of international organisation.  
International obligations arising from these international organisations and their 
treaties and resolutions have to be implemented by the member states. The theories 
of monism and dualism explain the process by which member states implement 
international obligations. It is clear that these theories are all interrelated. This 
                                                 
311
  See chapter 2 section 2.4. 
312
  See chapter 2 section 2.4.2. 
313
  See chapter 2 section 2.4.1. 
314
  See chapter 2 section 2.4.2. 
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multidisciplinary combination provides a basic framework that defines international 
trade in oil in Africa. The next chapter examines the role of the WTO in regulating 
international trade in oil. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN OIL 
 
‘The WTO Agreement, including all its elaborate Annexes, is probably fully 
understood by no nation that has accepted it, including some of the richest and most 
powerful trading nations that are members.’1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the theoretical foundation for the regulation of 
international trade in oil. This chapter builds on that discussion. It starts off with a 
discussion of the history of the regulation of oil trade in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO legal framework. The discussion provides guidance 
on why oil regulation seems silent in the WTO legal framework. Further, the chapter 
provides a discussion of the institutional framework of the WTO. The chapter places 
special emphasis on the organs of the WTO, decision making and the dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the Organisation. The institutional framework is relevant 
in establishing whether the structures of the WTO are appropriate for the regulation 
of international trade in oil.2 The discussion is guided by applicable GATT/WTO 
case law and examples on how African countries and other WTO member states 
utilise the WTO organs. 
                                                 
1
  The above statement describes the complex nature of the Organisation and the agreements of the WTO. This 
chapter is alive to this challenge. The analysis of the WTO system in this chapter does not cover all areas of 
the WTO but is limited to the international trade in oil and the relevant agreements. See Jackson J H The 
World Trade Organisation: Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998) 1 (hereafter Jackson J H 1998). See also 
Jackson J H (1997) 25.  
2
  Some authors have identified the WTO as an institution. However, for purposes of this study, the WTO is 
identified as an organisation and the various administrative organs of the WTO are referred to as institutions. 
See Jackson J H (1997) 31. Thus an examination of the administrative structure is referred to as the 
institutional structure. Authors such as Jackson J H Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of 
International Law (2006) 106 (hereafter Jackson J H 2006), have adopted the later approach. Nevertheless, 
the terms ‗institutions‘, ‗bodies‘ and ‗organs‘ are also used interchangeably to refer to the institutions of the 
WTO in this chapter. 
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Additionally, production quotas, subsidies and corruption are also discussed. 
Further, motivation for the discussion of these particular areas is also provided in 
the chapter. A discussion of these key areas in the legal framework is very important 
in evaluating the ability of the WTO to regulate international trade in oil. The 
discourse on the regulation of these particular areas is guided by jurisprudence 
established from GATT/WTO case law. Due to the dearth of jurisprudence on the 
regulation of the international trade in oil, the chapter relies on general GATT/WTO 
disputes to explain the various WTO agreements that are relevant to the regulation 
of international trade in oil. The discussion also relies on African examples. 
3.2  Development of International Trade in Oil under the GATT/ 
WTO Framework 
There is uncertainty as to the classification of crude oil as a good under the 
GATT/WTO framework. This uncertainty is reflected in the approaches GATT 
contracting parties and WTO members have adopted to potential disputes over oil- 
related matters. This section provides insights to explain why GATT contracting 
parties and WTO member countries have been hesitant to curb some of the trade 
restrictive practices. The section is broad in nature and looks at diverse areas of oil 
trade. It is not limited to the three key areas, that is: production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption. Further, it also in some cases relies on the 
discussion of natural resources and international trade. 
Prior to the GATT 1947, and during the trade negotiations leading to the GATT, 
Europe did not have a flourishing domestic oil sector, thus the levies on the 
importation of crude oil in Europe were relatively low.3 Accordingly, the regulation 
of oil trade was not one of the issues considered to be important at the time.4 This 
partly explains the lack of direct provisions in the GATT regulating the international 
trade in oil.5 However, some authors have argued that the negotiations leading up to 
                                                 
3
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
4
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
5
  Some authors have attributed the lack of direct rules on energy to the fact that at the time the GATT was 
negotiated, trade in energy was the preserve of a few multinational companies. This is true for oil trade 
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the GATT 1947 involved negotiations on natural resources and the regulation of the 
same.6 This is evident in Art XX (g) of GATT. This provision though dealing with 
natural resources generally affects the international trade in oil. 
Elsewhere, the increasing tariffs on the importation of oil were affecting the 
economies of large oil producers and exporters such as Venezuela and Mexico.7 
After the Second World War, the USA which had been a leading oil exporter became 
an oil importer. 8  The Revenue Act passed by the United States changed the 
country‘s policy on oil levies.9 At the time, the USA which imported most of its oil 
from Venezuela, imposed levies on oil at the rate of US $ 0.21 cents per barrel.10 The 
USA reversed its earlier position where oil had been a duty free commodity.11 The 
two countries later signed a treaty of trade reciprocity and modified the above tariffs 
as indicated below.12  
‗For quantities below 5 per cent of domestically refined supply in the preceding year, 
a 50 per cent tariff reduction (from [US] $ 0.21 per [barrel] to [US] $ 0.105 per barrel) 
was allowed; for imports above this amount, the full [US] $ 0.21 per barrel remained. 
Tariffs for gasoline and lube oil remained unchanged.‘ 
This position was further modified by a trade treaty signed between Mexico and the 
USA.13 This treaty reduced oil tariffs by 50 percent and abolished quotas. The treaty 
included a most favored nation (MFN) clause which extended the tariff treatment to 
other countries such as Venezuela.14 It should be noted at this stage that negotiations 
                                                                                                                                                        
which was dominated by the seven sisters before the creation of OPEC. See Cottier T et al Energy in WTO 
Law and Policy (2009) Individual Project No. 6 1 (hereafter Cottier T et al 2009). See also chapter 1 section 
1.2.1. 
6
  The language of Art XX (g) suggests that the contracting parties intended to protect their sovereignty over 
natural resources. It is respectfully submitted that this position is correct. Indeed the provision provides for 
the conservation of natural resources. Thus the GATT contracting parties would have discussed the 
regulation of trade in natural resources. See Broome S A (2006) 423-425.  
7
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
8
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. The United States embarked on a policy drive to regulate oil imports. See generally 
Kellam R O ‗Regulation of oil imports‘ (1961) Duke Law Journal Vol 2 (hereafter Kellam R O 1961).  
9
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
10
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
11
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
12
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
13
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
14
  Guerra A J (2001) 13. 
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on the GATT 1947 had not commenced.15 Due to the absence of a multilateral trade 
framework at this stage, trade treaties to solve international trade issues could only 
be concluded with selected countries. 
After 1947, oil prices continued rising and due to the GATT 1947 and also the need to 
reduce oil prices in major oil consuming states, the tariffs on oil were further 
reduced.16 This curtailed further debate on the regulation of natural resources and 
oil under the GATT. However, the 1950s witnessed a positive change and 
restrictions on the export of raw materials were considered GATT inconsistent by the 
working party on the GATT. 
‗Back in 1950, a GATT Working Party examined the use of export restrictions on raw 
materials ―necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic 
processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held 
below the world price as part of a governmental stabilisation plan‖ (Article XX (I)). 
The group concluded that the Agreement does not permit the imposition of 
restrictions upon the export of a raw material in order to protect or promote a 
domestic industry, whether by affording a price advantage to that industry for the 
purchase of its material, or by reducing the supply of such materials available to 
foreign competitors.‘17 
The above position of the working group, though generally dealing with raw 
materials shows that the GATT/ WTO has remained interested in advancing the 
liberalisation of trade for all goods including natural resources. The above position is 
particularly important in the discussion of natural resources and more specifically 
oil. The GATT /WTO jurisprudence does not provide guidance on whether 
materials under Art XX (I) of GATT include natural resources. However, the author 
submits that the language of Art XX (I) refers to materials used in domestic 
production. To this end, natural resources and oil are used in domestic production 
and may therefore be treated as raw materials.  
                                                 
15
  The negotiations on the regulation of international trade only began in 1945. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 
78. See also Lowenfeld A F (2008) 25. 
16
  Guerra A J (2001) 14. 
17
  Guerra A J (2001) 14 and 15. 
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It is worth noting that as far back as 1955, the GATT had been involved in regulating 
international trade in oil.18 Ceylon, present day Sri Lanka requested a release from its 
obligations under Art XI of the GATT for petroleum products.19 The request was 
made under Art XVIII of GATT on government assistance to economic 
development.20 This request was made despite the fact that the country had not 
included petroleum products in its schedule of concessions. 21  A Working Party 
examined the matter and reported to the contracting parties who adopted the report 
of the Working Party and granted a temporary release.22 
In 1965, the GATT introduced part IV to the GATT. This part deals with trade and 
development. 23  Part IV of the GATT allows less developed countries more 
favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world markets for primary 
products. 24  Further, the developed countries should not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made to allow less developed countries greater market access for 
primary products.25 Part IV of the GATT recognises the fact that less developed 
countries have a limited export base.26 It was premised on the sentiments reflected in 
the statement below: 
‗contracting parties were also tasked with devising measures to stabili[s]e and 
improve conditions in world markets for the primary exports of developing 
                                                 
18
  Desta G M (2003) 388.  
19
  Desta G M (2003) 388 citing GATT Release Granted to Ceylon under Article XVIII regarding Petroleum 
Products Decision of 30 November 1955 BISD 4S/30 37. See also World Trade Organisation Application of 
Article XVIII Section C, of GATT 1947 (2002) WT/COMTD/39/Add.1 7. The measures for which the 
release was granted involved quantitative restrictions on the importation of specified petroleum products. 
20
  Desta G M (2003) 388. 
21
  Desta G M (2003) 388. 
22
  World Trade Organisation Application of Article XVIII Section C, of GATT 1947 (2002) 
WT/COMTD/39/Add.1 7. 
23
  WTO ‗World Trade Organisation Report on Natural Resources (2010) 162‘ available at  http://www. 
wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_e.htm (accessed 21 March 2012) See also World Trade 
Organisation Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference (2001) WT/GC/W/442. 
24
  See Art XXXVI (4) of GATT. See also the text of Ad Art XVI Section B (2) of GATT which defines 
primary products as; ‗...any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which 
has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in 
international trade.‘ This indicates that even in 1965, the GATT dealt with the regulation of trade in natural 
resources. 
25
  See Art XXXVI (8) of GATT. 
26
  See Art XXXVI (4) of GATT. 
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countries in order to enable them to attain ―stable, equitable and remunerative 
prices‖, and to provide them with expanding resources for economic development.‘27 
Primary products have been defined to refer to processed goods ready for trading.28 
Crude oil can be traded in various forms, before extraction, once extracted from the 
ground and after it has been refined.29 Thus it may be argued that crude oil after 
extraction can be treated as a primary good. It is interesting to note that the GATT 
may have envisaged the regulation of trade in natural resources and oil. 
The mandatory oil imports programme of the USA, between 1959 and 1973, had the 
effect of limiting the amount of oil that was imported into the USA.30 Despite the fact 
the USA was a member of the GATT at the time, no complaint was made against it 
for this import restriction. The USA justified the restriction arguing that importation 
of oil from politically unpredictable suppliers would compromise its national 
security.31 It is submitted that due to the political and economic power of the USA 
other GATT contracting parties might have shied away from challenging this 
measure. It has also been argued that the measure by the USA was meant to protect 
its domestic oil industry.32 The imposition of import restrictions to protect domestic 
industries is GATT inconsistent yet this measure was never challenged.33 
In 1986, several countries led by Canada challenged taxes imposed on imported 
crude oil and petroleum products by the USA under the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorisation Act of 1986.34 The said taxes were higher than the taxes levied 
on similar goods that were produced in the USA.35 The dispute indicates that the 
GATT was centrally involved in the regulation of oil trade. Despite the fact that the 
                                                 
27
  WTO ‗World Trade Organisation Report on Natural Resources (2010) 163‘ available at http://www. 
wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_e.htm (accessed 21 March 2012). 
28
  See text of Ad Art XVI Section B (2) of GATT. 
29
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.1. 
30
  Zillman D. N ‗Energy trade and national security exception to the GATT‘ (1994) 12 J. Energy & Nat. 
Resources L. 122 (hereafter Zillman D N 1994) citing Presidential Proclamation No 3279, 12 March 1959. 
The United States also banned the export of Alaskan oil. 
31
  Zillman D N (1994) 122.  
32
  Zillman D N (1994) 122. 
33
  See Article XI of GATT. 
34
  United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, (Panel Report) [1987] L/6175, BISD 
34S/136 (also referred to as the Superfund case). 1 
35
  United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Panel Report) [1987] L/6175, BISD 
34S/136 1. 
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dispute mainly focused on taxes, the taxes were levied on crude oil and petroleum 
products. The GATT panel found that the contested taxes impaired the benefits 
accruing to the different petroleum producing countries that were exporting crude 
oil and petroleum products to the USA.36  This was a bold step forward in the 
regulation of oil trade. It is interesting to note that some OPEC member states made 
submissions to the panel and strongly objected to the taxes that had been imposed 
by the USA.37 
However, in the 1990s the USA continued to maintain a ban on the export of oil 
transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline.38 Export of this oil could only be 
made subject to presidential exceptions.39 The USA maintained the ban on the basis 
of political and environmental concerns.40 It has also been noted by Zillman, that the 
ban was initiated because the USA had experienced strong resistance in building an 
800-mile pipeline through environmentally sensitive terrain.41 This export ban was 
not contested by the GATT contracting parties. However, in 1996, the ban was lifted 
and some oil was exported to foreign countries. Nonetheless between 2004 and 2011, 
no oil from Alaska was exported.42 The restriction on the export of Alaska oil is, on 
                                                 
36
  United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Panel Report) [1987] L/6175, BISD 
34S/136 16. 
37
  Nigeria and Kuwait made submissions to the panel. See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain 
Imported Substances (Panel Report) [1987] L/6175, BISD 34S/136 2. 
38
  The trans-Alaska Pipeline Authori[s]ation Act of 1973 opened up the Alaska oil fields but banned the export 
of oil produced in these oil fields. This oil has potential market in Japan, Korea and North East Asia due to 
proximity. The ban created an artificial supply of cheap oil on the United States west coast and affected the 
import of oil from other producing countries as they could not compete. It has been stated that export of this 
oil to these countries would only cost about 50 cents per barrel. See Zillman D N (1994) 122. See also Van 
Vactor S A ‗Time to End the Alaskan Oil Export Ban‘ available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
227.html (accessed 28 March 2012). 
39
  The pipeline was constructed during the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s and was intended to make the 
United States energy independent. See Zillman D N (1994) 122. See also Van Vactor S A ‗Time to End the 
Alaskan Oil Export Ban‘ available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-227.html (accessed 28 March 2012). 
40
  The political concerns were advanced by the United States Maritime industry, which would have exclusive 
rights to transport the oil between United States Ports, after it had reached Valdez in Alaska. Under the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, cargoes transported between United States Ports had to be transported by 
United States-flag vessels. The maritime industry which stood to benefit, argued that banning export would 
enhance national security and create jobs. Congress adopted the legislation banning export, to challenge the 
OPEC oil embargo at the time. See Zillman D N (1994) 122. See also Van Vactor S A ‗Time to End the 
Alaskan Oil Export Ban‘ available at http://www. cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-227.html (accessed 28 March 2012) 
for a detailed discussion. 
41
  Zillman D N (1994) 122. 
42
  See EIA ‗How Much Oil is Produced in Alaska and Where Does it Go?‘ available at http:/ 
/www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=35&t=6 (accessed 28 April 2013). 
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the face of it contrary to the provisions of Art XI of GATT. Nonetheless, WTO 
member states have not challenged the USA measures. 
In 2006, Mandelson, the top trade negotiator for the European Union, called for a 
new round of trade talks.43 He reiterated the need to subject international trade in oil 
to the same trade rules as other goods.44 It has been stated by Sakmar that the call is 
not misconceived.45 International trade in oil like other goods is subject to WTO 
trade rules, however, countries have opted, due to political and economic reasons, to 
exclude oil from GATT/ WTO regulation.46 This is evident in some of the cases 
described above.47 
Currently, the WTO Doha Round is on-going.48 It has been noted that oil exporting 
countries did not join the GATT or the Doha negotiations as issues relating to oil 
production and oil trade were not on the agenda.49 However, currently, some OPEC 
members have joined the WTO and are involved in the Doha negotiations.50 Saudi 
Arabia which is one of the major powers in OPEC has recently joined the WTO.51 
Prior to Saudi Arabia joining the WTO, some commentators had opined that the 
WTO lacked rules on trade in oil and that the organisation had nothing to offer the 
                                                 
43
  Sakmar S L ‗Bringing energy trade into the WTO: the historical context, current status, and potential 
implications for the Middle East region‘ (2008) 18 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 89 (hereafter Sakmar S L 2008) 
citing Champion M & Juliane von Reppert B Politics & Economics: EU Trade Chief Poses WTO Rules in 
Energy Sector WALL ST. J, June 23, 2006, at A6. 
44
  The call to subject international trade in oil to trade rules under the GATT was premised on the escalating 
global oil prices. See Sakmar S L (2008) 89.  
45
  Sakmar S L (2008) 89. 
46
  Sakmar S L (2008) 90. 
47
  See above discussion on the mandatory oil Imports programme and the ban on export of oil transported 
through the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 
48
  UNCTAD ‗The Trade /Energy Interface and the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations (2002) 1‘ available at 
http://r0.unctad.org/ghg/download/other/kuwait_seminar_2.pdf (accessed 19 September 2012). 
49
  UNCTAD ‗The Trade /Energy Interface and the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations (2002) 1‘ available at 
http://r0.unctad.org/ghg/download/other/kuwait_seminar_2.pdf (accessed 19 September 2012). See also 
chapter 3 section 3.2 for a further discussion on the history of petroleum/oil regulation under the 
GATT/WTO. 
50
  Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arabs Emirates and Venezuela are now WTO members. See 
Desta G M (2003) 528. See also WTO ‗Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the WTO‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm (accessed 19 September 2012). 
51
  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia joined WTO in 2005. See WTO ‗Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the WTO‘ 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm (accessed 19 September 
2012). 
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country.52 Of course Saudi Arabia went on to join the WTO and issues regarding its 
oil trade policies were examined during the accession.53 Nonetheless, it is still not 
clear what impact the Doha Round will have on the regulation of production quotas, 
oil consumption subsidies, and control of corruption. However, some authors have 
noted that issues on energy negotiation during the Doha Round should involve 
OPEC and the IEA which is composed of some of the largest oil importing 
countries.54 This will allow the WTO and these two organisations to deal with the 
regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption.  
Initially, the Doha agenda contained provisions on ‗hardcore‘ cartels.55 It has been 
argued that the intention of the provisions on cartels was meant to tackle the OPEC 
dilemma.56  However, some authors and the WTO noted that the provisions on 
‗hardcore‘ cartels were meant to affect private enterprises and not states.57  This 
position cannot be clarified as the discussions were later shelved. The Doha Round 
clearly demonstrates the lack of consensus in the WTO as the organisation expands 
its membership.58 Critical issues that affect international trade in oil have since been 
dropped from the Doha agenda due to lack of consensus. Issues such as the 
interaction between trade and competition policy, which were meant to initiate 
debate on transparency and ‗hardcore‘ cartels have since been dropped from the 
Doha agenda.59 Likewise, transparency in government procurement has also been 
                                                 
52
  Milthorp P & Christy D ‗Energy Issues in Selected WTO Accessions‘ Selivanova Y (ed) Regulation of 
Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (2012) 259 (hereafter Milthorp P & 
Christy D 2012). 
53
  Issues such as dual pricing were discussed during the accession of Saudi Arabia. See Milthorp P & Christy D 
(2012) 271. 
54
  Martin W & Mattoo A Unfinished Business? The WTO‘s Doha Agenda (2011) The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 410 (hereafter Martin W and Mattoo A 2011). 
55
  Panagariya A Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis (2002) Department of 
Economics, University of Maryland 17 (hereafter Panagariya A 2002). A ‗hardcore‘ cartel is a formal cartel. 
See WTO ‗Doha Declaration Explained‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm# investment (accessed 19 September 2012). 
56
  Panagariya A (2002) 17. 
57
  Rezzouk M The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Competition and The World Trade 
Organization. Might a WTO Agreement on Competition Constitute a Threat to OPEC? (2003) UNCTAD 
Series on Questions of Competition Law and Policy 34-36 (hereafter Rezzouk M 2003).  
58
  It can be argued that the increasing number of OPEC member states in the WTO has stifled debate on the 
regulation of international trade in oil. 
59
 See WTO ‗Doha Declaration Explained‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ 
dohaexplained_e.htm# investment (accessed 19 September 2012). 
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dropped from the agenda.60 However, discussions on subsidies continue in the Rules 
Negotiating Group. 61  While discussions on subsidies have been maintained, 
progress in the Doha Round has been slow. 62  It is apparent from the above 
discussion that issues on OPEC production quotas, which may have been discussed 
under ‗hardcore‘ cartels, may not see the light of day. Additionally, the issue of 
transparency in government procurement has been shelved and it may take another 
round of negotiations to address this issue. The status of the Doha Round with 
regard to international trade in oil raises a complex question as to whether the WTO 
is an appropriate framework for the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption.  
Currently, Africa has positioned itself as a major player in the WTO system. This is 
evident in the Doha Round where Africa has come out strongly to advocate trade 
terms focused on development of the continent.63 African countries have noted that 
some of the WTO trade provisions and the trade policies of WTO member states, like 
the USA, do not advance the interests of African countries.64 The African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted by the USA to allow African countries 
greater market access, has been criticised.65 However, this criticism should be guided 
and should take note of the advantages Africa stands to gain from the improvement 
                                                 
60
  See WTO ‗Doha Declaration Explained‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_ 
e/dohaexplained_e.htm# investment (accessed 19 September 2012). Even though transparency in 
government procurement did not gain momentum under the Doha Round, the parties to the GPA have 
recently agreed to further improve the agreement. See WTO ‗Historic Deal Reached on Government 
Procurement‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news11_e/gpro_15dec11_e.htm (accessed 07 
May 2013). 
61
  See WTO ‗Doha Declaration Explained‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda 
_e/dohaexplained_e.htm# investment (accessed 19 September 2012). 
62
  Wold C et al ‗Leveraging climate change benefits through the World Trade Organi[s]ation: are fossil fuel 
subsidies actionable?‘(2012) Georgetown Journal of International Law Vol 43 No. 3 639 (hereafter Wold C 
et al 2012). 
63
  Montague D From Cotton to Petroleum: African Economic Viability and Global Priorities (2003) Policy 
Brief for the Globalization Research Center – Africa 1 (hereafter Montague D 2003). Currently African 
countries are organised under different groups and are advocating for reform of WTO rules under the Doha 
round. These groups include: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), African Group and the G-90. 
See WTO ‗Groups in the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda _e/negotiating 
_groups_e.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 
64
  African countries are mainly interested in improving rules regulating agriculture and non-agricultural market 
access. See Montague D (2003) 5. See also Kessie E & Addo K African Countries and the WTO 
Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (2008) ICTSD 5 (hereafter Kessie E & Addo K 2008). 
65
  Montague D (2003) 5. 
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of international trade in oil. The excerpt below portrays the negative sentiments 
exhibited by the African countries towards the AGOA: 
‗...despite the fact that African economies derive 70% of their income from 
agriculture, in 2002, 75% of AGOA imports were of petroleum products.66 Three 
hundred billion dollars a year spent on agricultural subsidies by Northern countries 
entrenches the system that restricts developing countries to mining sector raw 
material export at the expense of agricultural development.‘67 
‗AGOA does little to support African agriculture and instead concreti[s]es a system 
geared towards oil and strategic mineral production.‘68 
The above position is misconceived to the extent that it questions Africa‘s ability to 
reap from the oil sector. Africa should utilise the AGOA provisions in so far as they 
allow greater market access for African oil.  
With regard to the Doha Round, African oil producing countries should advocate 
the regulation of subsidies in the oil sector to improve trade in oil. 69  African 
countries should also utilise the dispute settlement mechanism to challenge 
production quotas.70 This will make the sector more lucrative and will substantially 
reduce corruption and encourage development in African oil producing countries. 
Additionally, the regulation of the above areas, especially subsidies and production 
quotas, will allow African oil producing countries greater market access. 71 
Nevertheless, it is conceded that the development of the oil sector in Africa should 
                                                 
66
  Montague D (2003) 4 citing US Department of Commerce report, US Africa Trade Profile March 2003. 
67
  Montague D (2003) 4. 
68
  Montague D (2003) 5. 
69
  Especially since rules negotiations under the Doha round include the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. See WTO ‗The Rules Negotiations‘ available at http://www.wto. org/ 
english/tratope/rulesneg_e/rulesneg_e.htm (accessed 27 April 2013). 
70
  It has been noted that African WTO member countries have not utilised the dispute settlement process. This 
has been attributed to various factors including the fact that African countries enjoy a small share of global 
trade. See generally Kessie E & Addo K (2008). Even then, it is only prudent that the small share is jealously 
protected. 
71
  The removal of subsidies in the oil sector will allow all oil producing countries to compete fairly. The price 
of oil in many countries will be dictated by market forces. Thus African countries will be able to produce 
and sell oil at competitive prices. The removal or regulation of production quotas maintained by OPEC 
member states will increase the amount of oil available for sell, thus African oil producing countries will 
have more oil to supply to the market. These adjustments will greatly enhance the market access of African 
oil producing countries. 
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not be done at the expense of development of Agriculture in Africa, especially in 
African countries that are resource poor.  
The brief discussion above indicates that in the 1950s and 1960s, the GATT 
contracting parties diligently engaged in the regulation of oil trade and other natural 
resources. However, the 1970s to date indicate lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
GATT contracting parties to regulate oil trade. Some WTO member countries have 
continued to engage in GATT inconsistent practices in dealing with their oil sector. 
Countries such as the United States have engaged in GATT inconsistent practices 
and justified the same using security and political reasons. Discussions on the 
international trade of oil under the Doha round have been at best, ambivalent. The 
foregoing discussion also shows that Africa, despite the fact that it is a resource rich 
continent and has witnessed an increasing volume of crude oil discoveries, has 
remained silent on the relationship between oil and the GATT/WTO framework. 
Currently, some countries are proposing that oil like other goods be subjected to 
GATT provisions and are encouraging debate on the relationship between the WTO 
and the oil sector.72 However, African countries maintain that focus on the oil sector 
is misguided and the debate should focus on Agriculture. This position reflects a 
lack of commitment on the part of African countries to fast track development in 
Africa. Natural resources and oil also contribute to the income of African countries 
and should both be given ample attention.  
Most African oil producing countries are WTO member states.73 The WTO is thus a 
convenient and available forum to guide the regulation of international trade in oil 
especially with regard to subsidies, production quotas and corruption in Africa. The 
WTO has institutions which are key in the implementation of the agreements that 
                                                 
72
  Sakmar S L (2008) 89. 
73
  Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, South Africa, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan 
are the African oil and gas producing countries. See African Petroleum Producers Association ‗Member 
Countries‘ available at http://www.appa.int/en/pmbres/pmc.htm (accessed 28 April 2013). It should be noted 
that apart from Algeria, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan and Sudan, all the African oil producing 
countries are members of the WTO. Further Algeria, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan are all observers 
and are negotiating membership of the WTO. See WTO ‗Members and Observers‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed 28 April 2013). 
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regulate the above mentioned areas. A brief discussion of these institutions is 
essential in understanding the specific agreements and the areas that are regulated.74 
3.3 Institutional Framework of the WTO 
A discussion of the institutional framework of the WTO is relevant and provides a 
basis for the examination of the relationship between international trade in oil and 
the various organs of the WTO. The institutional framework highlights the 
relationship between the various organs and the regulation of subsidies, production 
quotas, and corruption in the oil sector in Africa. This section analyses the role of the 
Ministerial Conference, the various roles of the General Council, the relevant 
committees of the WTO and the council for trade in goods. The chapter also analyses 
the dispute settlement mechanisms, and the decision making processes in the 
organisation. A diagrammatic representation of the institutional structure of the 
WTO is provided below.  
The discussion of the institutional structure of the WTO does not include the 
Secretariat. The Secretariat has its origins in the Interim Commission for the ITO.75 It 
was created to prepare the ground for the ITO; it mainly serves a support role for the 
other institutions of the WTO.76  
                                                 
74
  For a detailed discussion of the WTO organs see Van den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organisation Texts, Cases and Materials (2005) 119 -135 (hereafter Van den Bossche P 2005). 
75
  Jackson J H (1997) 42. 
76
  The authors discuss the limited powers of the Secretariat and the Director-General, who is the head of the 
Secretariat. The Director-General is described as a broker as opposed to a decision- maker. See Jackson J H 
(1997) 42. See also Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M The Political Economy of the World Trading System 
The WTO and Beyond 2 ed (2001) 54 (hereafter Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M 2001).  
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Figure 3.1 Institutional Framework of the WTO 
 
Source: WTO ‗Organi[s]ation Chart‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_ e/analytic 
index_ e/wto_agree_02_e.htm (accessed 24 April 2012). 
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3.3.1 The Ministerial Conference, Decision Making and Functions 
A) The Ministerial Conference and Decision Making 
The Ministerial Conference is one of the organs that should be at the helm of 
directing and guiding the international trade in oil. This organ makes decisions that 
affect all members and adopts authoritative interpretations of the WTO 
agreements.77 Some of the provisions that regulate this body are yet to be tested and 
the organ has been silent on international trade in oil. However, the provisions 
discussed below illustrate the potential that the Ministerial Conference has in 
regulating international trade in oil.  
Article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement generally provides for the institutional 
structure of the WTO.78 Art IV (1) provides for the Ministerial Conference. The body 
is composed of representatives of all the members and is supposed to meet at least 
once every 2 years.79 The Ministerial Conference performs the functions of the WTO 
and has the authority to take decisions on all matters under the multilateral trade 
agreements, if requested by a member.80 The above discussion indicates that the 
body has the potential of impacting on WTO inconsistent practices that affect 
international trade in oil, especially production quotas and subsidies that are 
regulated in multilateral agreements. However, the meetings of the body are too few 
and this affects the mandate of the body.  
Some scholars have rightly defined the Ministerial Conference as the top-most organ 
of the WTO.81 It is composed of minister-level representatives from all member 
countries.82 The Ministerial Conference has convened eight times since the formation 
                                                 
77
  See Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also Jackson J H (1997) 64. See also Hoekman B M & 
Kostecki M M (2001) 50. 
78
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 117. 
79
  See Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also Jackson J H (2006) 106. 
80
  See Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also Hoekman B ‗The WTO: Functions and Basic 
Principles‘ Hoekman B et al (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO A Handbook (2002) 47 (hereafter 
Hoekman B 2002). 
81
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 120.  
82
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 120. 
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of the WTO in 1995. 83  The composition of the Ministerial Conference permits 
member countries to make decisions that are informed by political and economic 
considerations of the members. The regulation of international trade in oil requires 
political will of the member states. To this end, the organ is an appropriate avenue 
for commencing debate on the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies and corruption in the oil sector. 
The Ministerial Conference performs an oversight function and has decision making 
powers under the multilateral agreements of the WTO.84 The Ministerial Conference 
has general powers under Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement and has more 
specific powers provided in the multilateral agreements. 85  Some scholars and 
international trade practitioners have argued as to whether the powers under the 
above provision lay down political or legal commitments.86 However, the language 
of Art IV (1) is clear. The commitments are legal.87 The clause provides as follows; 
‗…The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to take decisions on all 
matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested by a 
Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decision-making in this 
Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement.‘88  
In light of the above provision, and the observation that the provision provides legal 
obligations, the Ministerial Conference is a suitable organ for undertaking debate 
and eventually decisions on the legality of production quotas and oil consumption 
subsidies in the oil sector. 
The Ministerial Conference can only exercise its powers in accordance with the 
decision making powers under the Marrakesh Agreement and other relevant 
                                                 
83
  Singapore 1996, Geneva 1998, Seattle 1999, Doha 2001, Cancun 2003, Hong Kong 2003, Geneva 2009 and 
Geneva 2011. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 120. See also WTO ‗Ministerial Conferences‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (accessed 28 April 2013). 
84
  See Deree C ‗WTO Leadership and Reform: The Need for a Ministerial Conference‘ available at  
  http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2952 (accessed 24 April 2012). See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 
120. 
85
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 120. 
86
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 120 citing Pieter-Jan Kuijper the former Director of the WTO Legal Affairs 
Division. 
87
  Van den Bossche P (2005) 123. 
88
  See Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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multilateral trade agreements. Related to the above, Art IX of the Marrakesh 
Agreement provides for decision-making under the GATT/WTO.89 Decision-making 
by the WTO is usually done through consensus.90 Decisions reached by consensus 
are those, where no member present at the meeting where the decision is taken, 
formally objects to the decision.91 Art IX (1) does not make a distinction between 
political or legal matters. The provision applies to all decisions.  
It can be argued that decisions made through consensus have to be respected by all 
members since all those present at the meeting are involved in the decision making 
process.92 However, due to the complexity of international trade rules, members may 
agree to particular positions without understanding the implications of these 
decisions for their domestic trade policies.93 Similarly, decisions on the elimination of 
production quotas and oil consumption subsidies may be made by members without 
realising the political and economic impact of these decisions on the domestic 
policies of the state. Therefore it is important that decisions on the above areas are 
comprehensively discussed to ensure that all members understand the effects. 
An example of the decision making power of the Ministerial Conference is provided 
below. At the 8th Ministerial Conference in Geneva, a number of decisions were 
taken by the body.94 The Ministerial Conference agreed and directed that members 
should not initiate complaints under Art XXIII 1(b) and (c) of GATT 1994.95 It was 
also decided that members should maintain the current practice of not imposing 
                                                 
89
  See Art IX (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement provides for decision making by consensus. Where a decision 
cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At a meeting of the 
Ministerial Conference or General Council, each member shall have one vote. The WTO framework also 
provides for unanimity in situations where the principle provisions of the covered agreements such as non-
discrimination have to be amended. See Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 57. 
90
  See Art IX (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement.. Members have to engage in bargaining and consultation before 
consensus is reached, this is often not highlighted. See Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 56. 
91
  Footnote 1 to Art IX of Marrakesh Agreement. 
92
  That said, consensus has its limitations. It should be noted that decision making through consensus is not 
available to members who are absent when decisions are taken. This in some way affects the legitimacy of 
these decisions. Additionally, this type of decision making also constrains the efficiency of the WTO as 
some members though present may prevent progress. See Jackson J H (2006) 50.  
93
  Decisions through consensus have limitations and yet the other decision making options in the GATT are 
ignored. See Steger D ‗Why Institutional Reform of the WTO Is Necessary‘ Steger D P (ed) Redesigning the 
World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century (2009) 16 (hereafter Steger D 2009). The green room 
process to arrive at consensus is preferred to the voting procedures in the GATT. See Cottier T (2009) 47. 
94
  See WTO ‗Official documents of the Geneva Ministerial‘ available at http://www.wto.org/ english 
/thewtoe/minist_e/min11_e/official_doc_e.htm#adopted (accessed 11 May 2012). 
95
  World Trade Organisation (2011) TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints WT/L/842. 
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customs duties on electronic transmission until the next session in 2013.96 As argued 
above, such decisions are legally binding.  
It is debatable as to whether the failure to comply with the above decisions can be a 
ground to initiate proceedings under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).97 However, Appendix 1 of the DSU 
provides that the Marrakesh Agreement is a covered Agreement. It can therefore be 
argued that disputes under Art IX (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement may be subject to 
DSU proceedings. This makes the decision making powers of the Ministerial 
Conference particularly relevant to the regulation of international trade in oil. In the 
event that members agree to eliminate production quotas and oil consumption 
subsidies, non-compliance with such decisions can be a ground for legal action. 
B) Adopting Authoritative Interpretations 
Further, Art IX (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of the Marrakesh Agreement and the multilateral trade agreements.98 
It is submitted that this power to adopt interpretations of WTO agreements is a legal 
commitment and not a political commitment. The adoption of interpretations is 
performed by the highest organ of the WTO.99 The interpretations adopted by the 
Ministerial Conference are binding on all members.100 Some authors have stated that 
the provision on adopting authoritative interpretations has not been used 
sufficiently by the WTO.101 However, there is evidence of decisions made by the 
appellate body affirming the power of the Ministerial Conference to adopt 
authoritative interpretations. Adoption of authoritative interpretations of the WTO 
agreements puts the organ in a key position to guide international trade in oil. The 
                                                 
96
  World Trade Organisation (2011) Work Programme on Electronic Commerce WT/L/843. 
97
  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Annex 2 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement (DSU). 
98
  See Art IX (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
99
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 142. 
100
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 142. 
101
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 142. See also Ehlermann C & Ehring L ‗The authoritative interpretation under 
article IX:2 of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organi[s]ation: current law, practice and possible 
improvements‘ (2005) Journal of International Economic Law 8(4), 803–824 (hereafter Ehlermann C & 
Ehring L 2005). 
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discussion below illustrates the mandate of the Ministerial Conference under Art IX 
(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, 102  the appellate body disagreed with the panel‘s 
findings that panel decisions adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are 
conclusive and constitute subsequent practice103 as understood under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.104 This decision confirms the position that the 
power to adopt authoritative interpretations is a preserve of the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council. The appellate body made the following 
observation: 
‗We do not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a panel 
report, intended that their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is contemplated under 
GATT 1994. There is specific cause for this conclusion in the WTO Agreement. 
Article IX: 2 of the WTO Agreement provides: ‗The Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this 
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements‘. Article IX: 2 provides further 
that such decisions ―shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members.‖ The 
fact that such an ―exclusive authority‖ in interpreting the treaty has been established 
so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such 
authority does not exist by implication or by inadvertence elsewhere.‘105 
C) Waiving Obligations 
The Ministerial Conference also has powers to waive obligations imposed on a 
member by the Marrakesh Agreement or any of the multilateral trade agreements.106 
Generally, the decision to grant a waiver has to be taken by at least three-fourths of 
                                                 
102
  See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and 
WT/DS11/AB/R 13. 
103
  Subsequent Practice is defined as a ―concordant, common and consistent‖ sequence of acts or 
pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties 
[to a treaty] regarding its interpretation. See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and WT/DS11/AB/R 13. 
104
  See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and 
WT/DS11/AB/R 13. 
105
  See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and 
WT/DS11/AB/R 13. 
106
  See Art IX (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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the members unless otherwise provided.107 The waivers are granted in exceptional 
circumstances and the Ministerial Conference has to state the exceptional 
circumstances justifying the decision and the terms and conditions governing the 
application of the waiver.108  
In practice waivers are not granted by a three-fourths majority but rather by 
consensus.109 Article IX (3) does not have substantive rules on the grant of waivers. 
The Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 has expanded the rules on grant of waivers 
under the GATT.110 The request for a waiver or an extension of a waiver has to 
describe the measures which the member proposes to take, the specific policy 
objectives the member seeks to pursue, and, how GATT obligations inhibit these 
policy objectives.111 
Over the years a number of waivers have been granted by the Ministerial 
Conference. The most prominent waiver, which is relevant to international trade in 
natural resources, is the waiver granted to Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and the 
United States. 112  The waiver which was granted in 2003 and extended in 2006 
prohibits trade in blood diamonds.113 The waiver was adopted as a result of the 
Kimberly process.114 Members have been exempted from MFN commitments with 
regard to the trade in diamonds with countries that are not part of the initiative.115  
It is clear from the above discussion that waivers have been granted with regard to 
regulation of the international trade of natural resources. This provision provides 
                                                 
107
  See Art IX (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
108
  See Art IX (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
109
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 148. See also The General Council (1995) Decision-Making Procedures Under 
Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement adopted on 15 November 1995 WT/GC/M/8 and WT/L/93 Para 
1. See also Feichtner I ‗The waiver power of the WTO: opening the WTO for political debate on the 
reconciliation of competing interests‘(2009) The European Journal of International Law Vol. 20 No. 3 619 
(hereafter Feichtner I 2009). 
110
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. 
111
  See Art 1 of the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
112
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. 
113
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. 
114
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. 
115
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. 
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flexibility for members to retain control of oil related policies. Oil dependent 
member states can rely on the above provision to seek waivers to pursue policies 
that are essential for their economic needs where necessary. However, the process of 
granting waivers is quite strict and is protected from abuse. Thus although member 
states may seek waivers to allow policies that protect their domestic interests, these 
waivers have to comply with the rules. 
Besides the powers and functions discussed above, there are other specific powers of 
the Ministerial Conference which include, appointment of the Director General and 
setting out the powers, duties, conditions of service and the terms of office of the 
Director General, 116  the power to adopt regulations governing the duties and 
conditions of service of the staff of the Secretariat, 117  the power to adopt 
amendments to the WTO Agreement, 118 and the authority to approve accessions to 
the WTO.119 The Ministerial Conference has the potential to regulate production 
quotas and oil consumption subsidies which are matters covered in multilateral 
agreements. 
3.3.2 The General Council, Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the 
Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) 
The role of the General Council is provided in Art IV (2) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement. The General Council is composed of ambassador-level diplomats and 
meets once every 2 months.120 The General Council has the authority to act on behalf 
                                                 
116
  See Art VI (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
117
  See Art VI (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. The power has previously been exercised by the Ministerial 
Conference when a decision was taken at Marrakesh relating to the necessary organisational and financial 
consequences that would flow form the establishment of the WTO including staffing of Secretariat. See 
Footer M E An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the WTO (2006) 46-47 (hereafter Footer M E 2006). 
118
  See Art X of the Marrakesh Agreement. This power was exercised in 2005, when the TRIPS Agreement was 
amended. Nonetheless, the amendments are yet to come into effect as they have not been accepted by all the 
members. The amendment relates to the conditions for the grant of a compulsory licence for the production 
of essential medicines. See WTO ‗Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (15 May 2012). See also Van den Bossche P 
(2008) 144. 
119
  See Art XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
120
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. See Rules of Procedure of the General Council WT/L/161. See also WTO 
‗WTO General Council‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc _e/gcounc e. htm (14 May 
2012). 
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of the Ministerial Conference which is supposed to meet once every 2 years.121 The 
General Council also acts as the DSB and the TPRB.122 Art IV (2), (3) and (4) of the 
Marrakesh Agreement provide as follows; 
‗2. There shall be a General Council composed of representatives of all the Members, 
which shall meet as appropriate. In the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial 
Conference, its functions shall be conducted by the General Council. The General 
Council shall also carry out the functions assigned to it by this Agreement. The 
General Council shall establish its rules of procedure and approve the rules of 
procedure for the Committees provided for in paragraph 7. 
3. The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities 
of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. The Dispute Settlement Body may have its own chairman and shall 
establish such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for the fulfilment of those 
responsibilities. 
4. The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities 
of the Trade Policy Review Body provided for in the [Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism] TPRM. The Trade Policy Review Body may have its own chairman and 
shall establish such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for the fulfilment of 
those responsibilities.‘123 
It is interesting to note that the General Council exercises powers of the Ministerial 
Conference when the latter is not in session. The General Council unlike the 
Ministerial Conference meets often. Additionally the composition of the General 
Council also provides legitimacy to the decisions of the body. Ambassador-level 
representatives like ministers provide political legitimacy to the General Council. 
This makes the organ relevant in the regulation of international trade in oil. 
Decisions on the oil sector require political will and this is can be harnessed in the 
General Council. The General Council has other functions provided in the 
Marrakesh Agreement.  
                                                 
121
  WTO ‗WTO General Council‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc _e/gcounc e. htm 
(14 May 2012). See also Jackson J H (1997) 63. 
122
  See Art IV (3) and (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also Van den Bossche P (2008) 122. 
123
  See Art IV (2), (3) and (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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It has been noted by some authors that even when the Ministerial Conference is in 
session, it handles other matters and the specific powers of the Ministerial 
Conference are exercised by the General Council.124 Thus most of the specific powers 
cited in section 3.3.1 above, are actually exercised by the General Council.125 The 
General Council has appointed all the five Directors General of the WTO.126 The 
power to grant waivers and the authority to approve accessions is also exercised by 
both the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. 127  The above powers 
exercised by the General Council revert to the Ministerial Conference when it is in 
session.128 These powers rarely revert to the Ministerial Conference as it handles 
other matters when it convenes.129 
The specific powers of the General Council provided in the Marrakesh Agreement 
and other multilateral agreements include; Art VII (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement 
which provides that the General Council shall adopt the financial regulations and 
the annual budget estimate by a two-thirds majority comprising more than half of 
the WTO members. The budget of the WTO is modest and is indicative of the limited 
scope of activities that are handled by the Secretariat.130 The budget for the WTO in 
2012 was estimated to be CHF 196,003,900.131 Pursuant to Art VII (1) and Article VII 
(2), the Director General presents the annual budget estimate and financial statement 
of the WTO, to the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration. The 
Committee reviews the budget and makes recommendations to the General 
Council.132 The Committee is also enjoined to propose financial regulations to the 
General Council.133  
                                                 
124
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 122 citing Kuijper P J ‗Some Institutional Issues Presently Before the WTO‘ 
Kennedy D & Southwick J (eds) , The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of 
Robert E. Hudec (2002) 83. 
125
  Footer M E (2006) 47. 
126
  Footer M E (2006) 47. 
127
  Footer M E (2006) 47. 
128
  Footer M E (2006) 49. 
129
  See Van den Bossche P (2008) 120.  
130
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 162. 
131
  See WTO ‗WTO Secretariat budget for 2012‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ e/secre_ 
e/budget_e.htm (accessed 15 May 2012). 
132
  See Art VII (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
133
  See Art VII (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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Unlike the powers of the Ministerial Conference that are performed by the General 
Council, the powers under Art VII (3) appear to be focused on formalising decisions 
made by other organs of the WTO. 
Article V (1) and (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement provide that the General Council 
shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with 
intergovernmental organisations and for cooperation and consultation with non-
governmental organisations concerned with matters related to the WTO.134  This 
provision is very important in the regulation of international trade in oil. The 
regulation of international trade in oil requires the cooperation of both the exporting 
countries and the consuming countries. Thus the General Council is an appropriate 
forum for the commencement of cooperation between members (and their respective 
intergovernmental organisations, such as OPEC) with regard to international trade 
in oil. 135  The General Council has granted a number of intergovernmental 
organisations observer status to some of its meetings. 
‗The General Council has allowed some intergovernmental organizations to observe 
its meetings. In 1995 and 1996, the General Council accorded ad hoc observer status 
to seven international intergovernmental organizations, including: the United 
Nations, UNCTAD, IMF, the World Bank, FAO, WIPO, and the OECD. 
Subsequently, the IMF and the World Bank were granted permanent observer status 
in General Council meetings by the terms of their respective cooperation agreements. 
In its meetings of 7 February 1997, the General Council granted permanent observer 
status to the United Nations, UNCTAD, FAO, WIPO, and the OECD. In the General 
Council meeting of 10 December 1997, the ITC, as a joint technical cooperation 
agency between the WTO and UNCTAD, was ―invited, as appropriate, to attend 
meetings of those WTO bodies it wished to attend without having to submit a 
request for observer status‖.‘136 
The above discussion demonstrates the potential of the General Council in building 
linkages between states and other actors. The regulation of international trade in oil 
                                                 
134
 See Art V(1) and (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
135
  It should be noted that this kind of cooperation is yet to be seen at the WTO. 
136
  See WTO ‗Interpretation and Application of Art V‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/res 
_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_03_e.htm (accessed 29 April 2013). 
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can benefit from such linkages as all relevant organisations will have a platform to 
discuss international trade in oil.  
The General Council established its rules of procedure as required under the WTO 
Agreement.137 General Council meetings are convened by the Director General and 
prior notice is given for the meetings. 138  The Agenda for the meetings are 
communicated at the time the notices for the meetings are sent to the members.139 
Decision-making in the meetings is made in accordance with Art IX of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.140 The meetings of the General Council are held in private.141 
This has attracted a substantial amount of criticism. Meetings held behind closed 
doors lack transparency.142 However, given the decision making rules of the WTO 
where decisions are made through consensus after negotiations,143 the negotiations 
may reveal national secrets that may generate unnecessary public criticism.  
The General Council provides an appropriate platform for driving WTO policy 
especially when the Ministerial Conference is not in session. This is an example of 
the institutional strength of the WTO. International trade in oil can benefit from such 
institutions which provide continuous engagement with key trade matters.  
3.3.2.1 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
The General Council also acts as the DSB.144 The DSB administers the rules and 
procedures contained in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
                                                 
137
  Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council 
WT/L/161 25 July 1996. 
138
  Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General 
Council WT/L/161 25 July 1996. 
139
  Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General 
Council WT/L/161 25 July 1996. 
140
  Decisions are made through consensus. Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial 
Conference and Meetings of the General Council WT/L/161 25 July 1996. 
141
  Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General 
Council WT/L/161 25 July 1996. 
142
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 122. 
143
  See Art IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
144
  See Art IV (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. It is worth noting that the DSB has its own Chairman and the 
Chairman of the General Council is not the chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body. See Art 1 (2) of the 
DSU. 
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Settlement of Disputes (DSU).145 The DSB has been described as an alter ego of the 
General Council.146 The preceding discussion examines the functions of the DSB. The 
importance of the DSU to the multilateral trading system is based on the 
pervasiveness of trade conflict which in most cases leads to political conflict.147 
Conflict in the oil sector is rife and a formal dispute settlement mechanism is 
necessary to ensure stable oil trade.148 
Article 2(1) of the DSU provides the mandate and the guidelines for the DSB. The 
DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate body reports, 
maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and 
authorise suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered 
agreements. 149  The DSB makes its decisions under the DSU through reverse 
consensus.150 It should be noted, that recommendations and rulings of the DSB have 
to be consistent with rights and obligations under the DSU and the covered 
agreements.151 Further, the provisions of the DSU are without prejudice to the rights 
of members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered 
agreement.152 
In line with the discussion in section 3.3.1 above, authoritative interpretation by the 
Ministerial Conference is a distinct procedure and is not part of the dispute 
settlement process under the DSU.153 The presence of the DSB within the structures 
of the WTO makes the organisation suitable for the regulation of international trade 
in oil. Members have a forum to resolve disputes in an amicable manner. The 
                                                 
145
  See Art 2 (1) of the DSU. See also Jackson J H (2006) 152-159. 
146
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 235. 
147
 Jackson J H (1997) 13 citing Hawkins H U.S. Department of State, Commercial Policy Series 74 (1994) 3. 
148
  Euclid A (2004) 424. 
149
  See Art 2 (1) of the DSU. With respect to disputes under plurilateral trade agreements, only the parties to the 
agreement may participate in the decision. See Bhuiyan S (2007) 89 for a detailed discussion. See also 
Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 76-77. 
150
  Consensus in this regard is negative or reverse consensus. The decisions of the DSB are deemed to have 
been adopted by the body unless there are objections by one of the members. See Art 2 (4) of the DSU.  
151
  See Art 3 (4) of the DSU. The above provision may seem to suggest that international law rules have no 
place in the resolution of disputes under the DSU. However, the DSU in fact envisages situations where 
recourse may be made to international law principles. See Art 3 (2) of the DSU. See also Bhuiyan S (2007) 
93-98. 
152
  See Art 3 (9) of the DSU. 
153
  See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and 
WT/DS11/AB/R 13. 
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discussion below provides a broad analysis of the elaborate dispute settlement 
procedure of the WTO. 
The section provides a broad overview of the dispute settlement process. The 
dispute settlement process has various rules. Nonetheless, the discourse in the 
section below does not cover all the intricacies of the dispute settlement process. It is 
a broad overview meant to highlight the strength and weaknesses of the process and 
the benefits that oil producing countries can derive from the process. As noted in the 
introduction to the chapter, case law on the regulation of international trade in oil is 
limited. Accordingly, other cases that explain the relevant issues in the dispute 
settlement process are relied upon. 
A) An Overview of the Dispute Settlement Process-Panel Proceedings 
The first stage in the dispute settlement process is notification and consultations.154 
The aggrieved member seeks consultation with the member state which has 
deprived it of its benefits under the GATT or any of the covered agreements.155 
Consultations have to be notified to the DSB and the relevant councils and 
committees by the member requesting consultation.156 The member, to whom the 
request is made, has to respond to the aggrieved member within 10 days after the 
date of receipt of the request.157 Consultations have to commence within 30 days 
after receipt of the notice.158 
With regard to matters of urgency and in particular perishable goods, the 
consultations have to be held within 10 days after receipt of the request and the 
matter has to be concluded within 20 days after receipt of the request for 
consultations.159 If the matter is not settled within 60 days after the date of request 
for consultations was received by the offending member, then the party who made 
                                                 
154
  See Art 4 (2) of the DSU. See also Bhuiyan S (2007) 89. 
155
  Lowenfeld A F (2008) 162. 
156
  See Art 4 (4) of the DSU. 
157
  See Art 4 (3) of the DSU. The parties may agree to vary the period within which the response is to be made. 
Pursuant to Article 4 (11) of the DSU other interested members may apply to join the consultations, if they 
have a substantial interest in the matter. 
158
  See Art 4 (3) of the DSU. If the consultations do not commence in 30 days, the requesting member may 
directly apply for the establishment of a panel. 
159
  See Art 4 (8) of the DSU. 
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the request may apply for the establishment of a panel.160 The appellate body has 
emphasised the importance of consultations. However, the appellate body has also 
recognised that the DSU envisages situations where matters may be heard by the 
panel without going through consultation. In Mexico-Corn Syrup,161 the appellate 
body discussed the above issue extensively. 
‗…We agree with Mexico on the importance of consultations. Through consultations, 
parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many cases, reach a 
mutually agreed solution in accordance with the explicit preference expressed in 
Article 3.7 of the DSU. Moreover, even where no such agreed solution is reached, 
consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of 
the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to 
complaining and responding parties, as well as to third parties and to the dispute 
settlement system as a whole.162 
‗…as a general matter, consultations are a prerequisite to panel proceedings. 
However, this general proposition is subject to certain limitations. … 
Article 4.3 of the DSU relates the responding party‘s conduct towards consultations 
to the complaining party‘s right to request the establishment of a panel. When the 
responding party does not respond to a request for consultations, or declines to enter 
into consultations, the complaining party may dispense with consultations and 
proceed to request the establishment of a panel. In such a case, the responding party, 
by its own conduct, relinquishes the potential benefits that could be derived from 
those consultations.‘ 163 
Consultations allow parties to pursue alternative methods of resolving the dispute. 
This makes the dispute settlement process attractive. The international trade in oil 
can benefit from such a dispute settlement system. 
                                                 
160
  See Art 4 (7) of the DSU. 
161
  See Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
(Appellate Body Report) [2001] WT/DS132/AB/RW 18. 
162
  See Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
(Appellate Body Report) [2001] WT/DS132/AB/RW 18. 
163
  See Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
(Appellate Body Report) [2001] WT/DS132/AB/RW 20. 
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The second stage of the dispute settlement process is establishment of a panel. This 
is done pursuant to Art 4 (7) and Art 6 of the DSU. The panel should be established 
at the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as 
an item on the DSB Agenda.164 The DSB may decline to establish the panel where 
consensus is reached not to establish the panel.165 The request for the establishment 
of a panel has to be made in writing. 166  The request should indicate whether 
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief 
summary of the legal basis of the complaint.167 The panel‘s terms of reference should 
also be set out in the request.168 The working procedures of the panel are contained 
in Appendix 3 of the DSU.169 The panel may decide to follow other procedures after 
consulting members.170 
Panels are composed of well-qualified governmental and or non-governmental 
individuals, academics who have taught or published in the area of international 
trade, persons who have served as representatives of members or contracting parties 
to GATT or on any committee, council or covered agreement, and, persons who have 
served on or presented a case to a panel.171 Article 6 of the DSU has been the subject 
of some disputes. In Australia-Automotive Leather the panel interpreted Article 6 with 
regard to the establishment of multiple panels in one dispute.172 The qualifications of 
panellists are another highlight in the dispute settlement process of the WTO. Thus 
oil-related disputes can be resolved by experts. 
The third stage in the dispute settlement process is proceedings before the panel.173 
The panel normally consists of three persons appointed by the Secretariat.174 The 
                                                 
164
  The DSB meets as often as necessary to carry out its functions. In practice it meets at least once a month and 
convenes other special meetings to discuss matters arising. See Art 6 (1) of the DSU. See also Van den 
Bossche P (2008) 237.  
165
  See Art 6 (1) of the DSU. 
166
  See Art 6 (2) of the DSU. 
167
  See Art 6 (2) of the DSU. 
168
  See Art 7 of the DSU. 
169
  See Art 12 of the DSU. 
170
  See Art 12 of the DSU. 
171
  See Art 8 of the DSU. 
172
 See Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (Panel Report) [1999] 
WT/DS126/R 98. 
173
  Lowenfeld A. F (2008) 163. 
174
  See Art 8 (5) of the DSU. 
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proceedings of the panel are confidential and only the parties can attend the 
proceedings.175 The names of the panellists are usually taken from an indicative list 
maintained by the Secretariat.176 Parties to the dispute are presented with names and 
they should not oppose the nominations except for compelling reasons.177 Where the 
parties cannot agree on the composition of the panel, the Director General in 
consultation with the chairman of the DSB and the chairman of the relevant council 
or committee appoints the panellists.178  
The parties to the dispute should be given ample time to prepare their 
submissions. 179  These parties have to make written submissions. 180  The oral 
submissions of the parties are made during the substantive meetings of the panel.181 
The panel usually fixes the timetable for the panel process within one week after the 
terms of reference have been agreed upon.182 Appendix three of the DSU provides 
the proposed timetable for panel decisions. 183  Related to the above arguments, 
especially the procedure of the panel discussed above, the appellate body in 
Argentina — Textiles and Apparel,184 has also noted that the working procedures in 
Appendix three of the DSU are not cast in stone and that the working procedures 
can be varied after consultation with the parties. 
The entire process described above should not take more than 6 months, and in cases 
of urgency, the process from the date of setting terms of reference to issuance of the 
final report should not take more than 3 months.185 The final report of the panel is 
adopted by the DSB within 60 days of circulation of the final report.186 The adoption 
is done through reverse consensus.187 Parties cannot block the adoption of the report 
                                                 
175
  Lowenfeld A. F (2008) 163. See also Art 14 of the DSU. 
176
  See Art 8 (4) of the DUS. 
177
  See Art 8 (6) of the DSU. 
178
  See Art 8 (7) of the DSU. 
179
  See Art 8 (4) of the DSU. 
180
  See Art 8 (6) of the DSU. 
181
  See Rules 5-9 of Appendix 3 Working Procedures, DSU. 
182
  See Art 12 (12) of the DSU. 
183
  See Rule 12 of Appendix 3 of the DSU.  
184
  See Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (Appellate 
Body Report) [1998] WT/DS56/AB/R 29. 
185
  See Art 12 (8) of the DSU. 
186
  See Art 16 (4) of the DSU. 
187
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 236. 
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unless all the members decide not to adopt the report.188 The panel proceedings are 
often quick and this is another feature of the dispute settlement process that would 
benefit the oil sector and the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies and corruption. 
B) The Appeal Process 
The fourth stage of the dispute settlement process is the appeal process. 189  The 
dispute settlement process of the WTO is comprehensive and allows parties to 
appeal the decisions of a panel. This gives members opportunity to resolve disputes 
amicably. The appeal process would allow members to obtain redress for oil-related 
disputes. Article 16 of the DSU provides that where a party to a dispute formally 
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal the report of the panel, the panel report 
shall not be adopted until the appeal is concluded. The appeal of the panel report is 
limited to issues of law in the panel report and the legal interpretation developed by 
the panel.190 
The appellate body is composed of seven persons, three of whom adjudicate a 
particular dispute.191 The members of the appellate body serve in rotation.192 The 
DSB appoints persons to serve on the appellate body and its members serve a term 
of 4 years.193 The members can only be reappointed once.194 Only parties to the 
dispute can appeal a panel decision.195 The appeal process should not exceed 60 days 
                                                 
188
 This provision has been heralded as one of the areas where the WTO has improved on the GATT framework. 
A single member can no longer block the adoption of a panel report. See Article 16 (4) of the DSU. See also 
Jackson J H (1997) 125. See also Jackson J H (2006) 144. See also Palmeter D The WTO as a Legal System 
Essays on International Trade Law and Policy (2004) 329 (hereafter Palmeter D 2004).  
189
  For further reading on the WTO appellate process see Joergens K J ‗True appellate procedure or only a two-
stage process? A comparative view of the appellate body under the WTO dispute settlement understanding‘ 
(1998-1999) 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus 219-227 (hereafter Joergens K J 1998-1999). 
190
  See Art 17 (6) of the DSU. 
191
  See Art 17 (1) of the DSU. 
192
  See Art 17 (1) of the DSU. The members of the appellate body have to be have demonstrated expertise in 
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreement. Members of the Appellate Body 
should not be affiliated to any government. See Art 17 (3) of the DSU. 
193
  See Art 17 (2) of the DSU. 
194
  See Art 17 (2) of the DSU. 
195
  Third parties cannot appeal a panel decision, but where they have notified the DSB that they have substantial 
interest in the matter, they can submit written submissions and can be heard by the appellate body. See Art 
17 (4) of the DSU.  
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from the date a party notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal, to the circulation of 
the final report of the appellate body.196  
In cases where the appeal process takes more than 60 days, the appellate body 
should inform the DSB, in writing, of the reasons for the delay together with an 
estimate of the period within which its report will be submitted.197 Nonetheless, the 
appeal process cannot take more than 90 days.198 The working procedures of the 
appellate body are drawn by the appellate body in consultation with chairman of the 
DSB and the Director General.199 The procedures are then communicated to the 
members.200 The proceedings of the appellate body are confidential.201 In US — Lead 
and Bismuth, the appellate body recognised the broad powers of the appellate body 
to adopt its own working procedures as long as the same are consistent with the 
DSU.202  
Further, the appellate body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions of the panel.203 The appellate body reports are adopted through reverse 
consensus.204Article 19 of the DSU provides that where the appellate body finds that 
a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it should recommend that the 
member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. The 
appellate body ensures that justice is achieved in the dispute settlement process. 
Thus international trade in oil can benefit from such a dispute settlement system. 
Generally Africa has not been active in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
including appellate proceedings.205 Thus although the platform may be available, 
African member states have not sufficiently utilised it.  
                                                 
196
  See Art 17 (5) of the DSU. 
197
  See Art 17 (5) of the DSU. 
198
  See Art 17 (5) of the DSU. 
199
  See Art 17 (9) of the DSU. 
200
  See Art 17 (9) of the DSU. 
201
  See Art 17 (10) of the DSU. 
202
 See United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (Appellate Body Report) [2000] WT/DS138/AB/R 14. 
203
  See Art 17 (10) of the DSU. 
204
  See Art 17 (10) of the DSU. 
205
  Mosoti V ‗In our own image, not theirs: damages as an antidote to the remedial deficiencies in the WTO 
dispute settlement process; a view from Sub-Saharan Africa‘ (2001) 19 B.U. Int'l L.J.232 (hereafter Mosoti 
V 2001). 
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C) Surveillance, Implementation of Decisions and Remedies 
The final stage of the dispute settlement process is surveillance of implementation of 
recommendations and rulings as well as remedies for non-compliance with 
recommendations of the panel and appellate body.206 Parties who fail to comply with 
the recommendations of the panel or appellate body may be subjected to 
compensation or suspension of concessions. 207  These remedies should be 
proportional to the level of impairment suffered by the complaining member.208 The 
appellate body has expressed itself on the issue of proportional remedies. In US — 
Cotton Yarn, the appellate body held that remedies had to be commensurate with the 
injury suffered.209 
The DSB and the procedures discussed above indicate that the resolution of disputes 
at the WTO is to a large extent transparent. This is necessary in the settlement of 
disputes regarding international trade in oil. In the past some oil producing 
countries have experienced conflicts over oil fields.210 Due to the lack of transparent 
dispute settlement procedures, the disputes have or may be resolved through 
violence and aggression. It is necessary to point out that most of the oil conflicts arise 
from matters that are not regulated under the Marrakesh Agreement and the other 
covered agreements. Thus such disputes cannot be resolved under the DSU. 
However, disputes arising out of production quotas and oil consumption subsidies 
may be viable for redress under the DSU. 
                                                 
206
  See Arts 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
207
  See Art 22 of the DSU. Article 24 of the DSU provides that the above remedies should be used with restraint 
against Least- Developing Countries. 
208
  See Art 22 (4) of the DSU. 
209
  See United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan (Appellate 
Body Report) [2001] WT/DS192/AB/R 37. 
210
  See Euclid A (2004) 424 on the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo may experience conflict due to oil exploration on Lake Albert. Lake Albert is shared by both 
countries. However it is submitted that disputes over oil fields are not within the mandate of the DSU. See 
De Kock P & Sturman K The Power of Oil: Charting Uganda‘s Transition to a Petro-State (2012) SAIIA 
Governance of Africa‘s Resources Programme 54 (hereafter De Kock P & Sturman K 2012).  
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3.3.2.2 The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) 
The General Council also acts as the TPRB.211 The TRPB implements the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM).212 The TPRM is meant to improve members‘ adherence 
to the rules and commitments under the multilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements.213  It helps members better understand trade policies and improves 
transparency.214 The TPRM provides that trade policies and practices of all members 
shall be subject to review.215 Members are also enjoined to provide regular reports 
describing their trade policies and practices.216 The TPRM encourages transparency 
in international trade.217 This makes the TPRB particularly relevant to international 
trade in oil. The organ will perform an important role in ensuring that members 
understand trade policies and how they affect their oil-based economies. The organ 
will also ensure that oil producing countries exercise transparency in the conduct of 
oil trade: 
‗Individuals and companies involved in trade have to know as much as possible 
about the conditions of trade. It is therefore fundamentally important that 
regulations and policies are transparent.‘218  
The trade policy reviews are helpful in identifying trends and providing solutions to 
problems that restrict international trade and trade in natural resources. The 
statement below justifies the above reason. Reports of the organ are instrumental in 
shaping international trade policy on natural resources. The regulation of 
international trade by the WTO will allow the organ perform a similar role in oil 
trade. An example of content of the reports of the organ and its observations on 
natural resources trade is provided below: 
                                                 
211
  See Art IV (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
212
  See Art IV (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
213
  See Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Rule A (i). 
214
  See Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Rule A (i) and Rule B. 
215
 The frequency of reviews will depend on the members‘ share of world trade in a recent representative period. 
See Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Rule C.  
216
  See Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Rule D. 
217
  Although the TPRM does not enforce compliance with WTO regulations, it creates informal avenues for 
peer review and encourages transparency. These informal avenues promote compliance with WTO 
regulations. See Bhuiyan S (2007) 74. 
218
  World Trade Organisation Understanding the WTO (2008) 53 (hereafter World Trade Organisation 2008). 
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‗Available evidence suggests that there is a strong incidence of export taxes on 
natural resources relative to other sectors. According to the WTO‘s Trade Policy 
Reviews (TPRs), export taxes on natural resources appear twice as likely as export 
taxes in other sectors. In fact, natural resource sectors account for fully [sic] one-third 
of all export taxes – although they represent less than a quarter of total tradable 
sectors.‘219 
3.3.3 The Council for Trade in Goods, Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, and the Government Procurement 
Committee 
All the councils and committees of the WTO are generally supervised by the General 
Council.220 In practice, the committees have a moderate level of independence due to 
the technical nature of their work.221  
3.3.3.1 The Council for Trade in Goods 
The Council for Trade in Goods is particularly important as it is charged with 
ensuring that the GATT is implemented. 222  The language of the Marrakesh 
Agreement is clear in this regard and emphasises the importance of the Council for 
Trade in Goods. 
‗There shall be a Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Services and a 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Council for TRIPS‖), which shall operate under the general 
guidance of the General Council. The Council for Trade in Goods shall oversee the 
functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A. The Council for 
Trade in Services shall oversee the functioning of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (hereinafter referred to as ―GATS‖). The Council for TRIPS shall oversee the 
                                                 
219
  The statement deals with export taxes on natural resources. This includes taxes on oil. See WTO World 
Trade Report 2010 Trade in Natural Resource (2010) 116 (hereafter World Trade Organisation 2010). 
220
  Article IV (5) of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that the specialised councils shall operate under the 
general guidance of the General Council. 
221
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 126. 
222
  See Art IV (5) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The WTO and International Trade in Oil 
 
122 
 
functioning of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―Agreement on TRIPS‖). These Councils shall 
carry out the functions assigned to them by their respective agreements and by the 
General Council. They shall establish their respective rules of procedure subject to 
the approval of the General Council. Membership in these Councils shall be open to 
representatives of all Members. These Councils shall meet as necessary to carry out 
their functions.‘223 
The Council for Trade in Goods is the most prominent of the three councils. This 
may be due to the fact that the regulation of trade in goods is the oldest mandate of 
the GATT, dating back to 1947. As mentioned above, these councils act within the 
broad framework of the General Council. Nonetheless, the independence of the 
Council for Trade in Goods and the other councils is manifest in the above provision. 
The Councils are enjoined to carry out functions assigned to them in their respective 
agreements and also functions assigned to them by the General Council. Further, the 
Councils establish their rules of procedure. Although this is subject to the General 
Council, it indicates the leverage that has been afforded to the councils under the 
Marrakesh Agreement. The Council for Trade in Goods ensures that the GATT is 
implemented. Thus since the GATT contains provisions on the regulation of 
production quotas, the organ will be relevant in implementing the provisions on 
quota restrictions in the oil producing countries.224 Further like all other councils, the 
Council for Trade in Goods has the power to create subsidiary bodies.225The Council 
for trade has established the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
3.3.3.2 Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Article 24 of the SCM established a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.226 The Committee performs functions that are assigned to it under the 
Agreement as well as by the members. The functions of the committee and relevant 
provisions of the SCM Agreement are further discussed in section 3.4.3 of this 
                                                 
223
  See Art IV (5) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
224
  See Art XI of GATT. 
225
  See Art IV (6) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
226
  See Art 24 of the SCM Agreement. 
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chapter. Be that as it may, the Committee plays a central role in regulating subsidies 
and ensuring that subsidies in international trade are eliminated. The committee 
particularly supervises the notification of subsidies under Art 25 of the SCM 
Agreement.227 
It has been noted that subsidies are some of the issues that affect international trade 
in oil. OPEC member states have been accused of granting subsidies to their 
domestic consumers. 228  In addition to the cost incurred in maintaining oil 
consumption subsidies,229 these subsidies affect the price of oil. Thus the Committee 
could play a central role in supervising oil consumption subsidies. 
3.3.3.3 Committee on Government Procurement 
This Committee is not supervised by the Council for Trade in Goods. It is established 
by a plurilateral agreement, the GPA. Article XXI of the GPA states that the 
committee shall be made up of representatives from the parties to the Agreement. 
The parties to the GPA assign the responsibilities of the Committee.230  
Corruption in government entities is one of the issues that affect international trade 
in oil in Africa. 231  The Committee can be very relevant if the agreement is 
multilateral. Currently the GPA is plurilateral and applies to only 41 member 
states.232 That includes the 27 States that comprise the European Union.233  Thus 
although the Committee has the potential of promoting transparency in international 
trade in oil, like the GPA, its impact is limited. It should also be noted that currently 
African members of the WTO have not embraced the GPA.234 
                                                 
227
  See Art 25 of the SCM Agreement. 
228
  IEA et al (2010b) 24. See also generally Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a). 
229
  Lang K The First Year of the G-20 Commitment on Fossil-Fuel Subsidies: A commentary on lessons learned 
and the path forward (2011) The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) 10 (hereafter Lang K 2011). 
230
  See Art XXI (1) of the GPA. 
231
 See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
232
  See WTO ‗Parties and Observers to the GPA‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _e/gpro 
c_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 04 June 2012). 
233
  See WTO ‗Parties and Observers to the GPA‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _e/gpro 
c_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 04 June 2012). 
234
  Mosoti V ‗The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: a necessary evil in the legal strategy for 
development in the poor world?‘ 2004 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.596-597 (hereafter Mosoti V 2004). 
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The above organs, that is the Ministerial Conference, the General Council in all its 
manifestations, the special Councils, and the Committees are relevant in ensuring 
the implementation of the WTO legal framework. The organs are especially relevant 
in enforcing the legal framework with regard to international trade in oil. The 
Ministerial Conference does not meet often and this may affect the efficiency of the 
organ. However, the General Council which has a similar mandate keeps the 
organisation running. The DSB is an important body and it may be an important 
platform for the resolution of issues affecting international trade in oil. The above 
statement however is qualified with regard to Africa where for various reasons, the 
dispute settlement mechanism has not been sufficiently utilised. The Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures will play a crucial role in the regulation of 
oil consumption subsidies, if the members of the WTO are keen on regulating these 
subsidies. Finally, although the Committee on Government Procurement has 
potential in improving transparency and eliminating corruption in international oil 
trade, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement and this affects the impact of the 
Committee. It is however evident that the WTO, to a great extent has a credible 
institutional framework that can positively impact on the regulation of international 
trade in oil in Africa. 
The following section builds on the above discussion by looking at the main legal 
arguments with regard to international trade in oil, that is, production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption under the GPA. It is necessary to examine the 
legal framework and its ability to regulate international trade in oil. 
3.4 Relevant Legal Framework of the WTO 
Article II (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement summarises the relevant legal framework 
of the WTO. It states that agreements and associated legal instruments included in 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (the multilateral trade agreements) are integral parts of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and are binding on all members. 235  The above provision 
                                                 
235
  See Art II (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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envisages the above agreements as the major sources of WTO law.236 Article II (3) 
provides for plurilateral agreements as additional sources of law.237 The plurilateral 
agreements are only binding on those members that have accepted them. 
Accordingly, the GPA can only be a source of law where a member has accepted the 
application of the agreement.238 
The above are not contested sources of law.239 However, authors note that there are 
other sources of law, which do not provide for specific enforceable rights and 
obligations.240 These sources include WTO dispute settlement reports,241 acts of WTO 
bodies, agreements concluded in the context of the WTO, customary international 
law,242 general principles of law, other international agreements, subsequent practice 
of WTO members, 243  teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and the 
negotiating history of the WTO agreements.244 
Article 3 (2) of the DSU provides inter alia that members recognise that the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO serves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
members under the covered agreements. 245  It also provides that the dispute 
                                                 
236
  The term ‗sources of law‘ in this context mainly refers to laws that regulate production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption in oil trade. However, before discussing the above key areas, this 
section discusses WTO sources of law generally. See Mavroidis P C ‗No outsourcing of law? WTO law as 
practiced by WTO courts‘ (2008) The American Journal of International Law Vol. 102 No. 3 421-474 
(hereafter Mavroidis P C 2008). The author in the above article defines sources of law as laws that WTO 
member are obligated to observe due to their membership. 
237
  See Art II (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
238
  See Annex 4 to the Marrakesh Agreement.  
239
  The agreements and annexes are the principal sources of law. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 53.  
240
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 42. See also generally Palmeter D (2004).  
241
 The generally-accepted view under GATT 1947 was that the conclusions and recommendations in an 
adopted panel report bound the parties to the dispute in that particular case, but subsequent panels did not 
feel legally bound by the details and reasoning of a previous panel report. This position subsists in the WTO 
legal framework See European Economic Community - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, (Panel 
Report) [1989] BISD 36S/93 para 12.1.  
242
  The appellate body stressed the need to achieve such clarification by reference to the fundamental rule of 
treaty interpretation set out in Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It also stressed 
that this general rule of interpretation had attained the status of a rule of customary or general international 
law. See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) 
[1996] WT/DS2/AB/R 16.  
243
  It should be noted that single isolated acts do not constitute subsequent practice. As such in Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R, and WT/DS11/AB/R 13, it 
was held that panel reports adopted by the DSB do not constitute subsequent practice. It is the sequence of 
acts that establish subsequent practice. 
244
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 42. 
245
  See Art 3 (2) of the DSU. 
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settlement system serves to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.246  
In line with the above provisions, Art 3 (2) of the DSU establishes a hierarchy in the 
sources of law.247 The principal source of law is the WTO agreements. These are 
equivalent to particular international conventions establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting parties. The above provisions also highlight the 
existence of secondary sources of law which are relevant in interpreting the principal 
sources of law. The most relevant sources of law in this regard are the GATT, the 
SCM Agreement and the GPA. These Agreements are key in the regulation of 
international trade in oil.248 The above Agreements are discussed in light of possible 
violations of WTO obligations by WTO members that are also OPEC member states. 
3.4.1 GATT Article XI -Production Quotas 
Generally quantitative restrictions including production quotas are harmful to 
international trade.249 It has also been noted that government criteria for establishing 
quantitative restrictions are susceptible to abuse and can breed corruption.250 Article 
XI of GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions and provides as follows: 
‗No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product 
of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export 
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.‘251 
Production quotas maintained by OPEC take the form of export restrictions.252 It can 
be argued that production restrictions are different from export restrictions and 
                                                 
246
  See Art 3 (2) of the DSU. 
247
  See Palmeter D & Mavroidis P C ‗The WTO legal system: Sources of law‘ (1998) The American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 92 No. 3 398-413 (hereafter Palmeter D & Mavroidis P C 1998). 
248
  See Guerra A J (2001) 14. See also Broome S A (2006) 415. See also Botha L (2009) 3 and 4. See also Desta 
G M (2003) 388. See also Desta G M (2010) 499. See generally Cottier et al (2009). 
249
  Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 155. 
250
  Jackson J H (1997) 153. 
251
  See Art XI (1) of the GATT. 
252
  Broome S A (2006) 416. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The WTO and International Trade in Oil 
 
127 
 
therefore that OPEC production quotas do not fall within the ambit of Art XI.253 
However, as noted in chapter one, production quotas affect the amount of oil 
available for export and can therefore be considered an export restriction.254 It has 
been argued by some commentators that OPEC production quotas are both 
production and export restrictions and that this puts these restrictions beyond the 
regulation of Art XI of the GATT.255 However, there is no indication in the GATT 
that Art XI was enacted to regulate only export restrictions, and to exclude 
production restrictions that affect export. Unfortunately, the DSB has not had the 
opportunity to pronounce itself on this matter.256  Nonetheless, there are several 
disputes that discuss the provision generally and are instructive on the issue. For 
example, in Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of 
Finished Leather the panel noted thus: 
‗...the disciplines of Article XI:1 extend to restrictions of a de facto nature. It is also 
readily apparent that Resolution 2235, if indeed it makes effective a restriction, fits in 
the broad residual category, specifically mentioned in Article XI:1, of ‗‘other 
measures‘‘.‘257 
This panel decision is very important as it indicates that the panel will investigate 
restrictions of a de facto nature. It is the submission of the author that OPEC 
production quotas are restrictions of a de facto nature. Additionally, as discussed in 
chapter one, it is irrelevant whether the measure restricting export is legally binding 
or mandatory.258 The position on the legal status of the restrictive measure has been 
clarified by a GATT panel: 
‗The Panel then examined the contention of the Japanese Government that the 
measures complained of were not restrictions within the meaning of Article XI:1 
because they were not legally binding or mandatory. In this respect the Panel noted 
that Article XI:1, unlike other provisions of the General Agreement, did not refer to 
                                                 
253
  Desta G M (2010) 450. 
254
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.2. 
255
  Ehring L & Chianale G F (2012) 134-135. 
256
  Generally, the WTO has not been very successful in eliminating quotas. See Jackson J H (1997) 153. 
257
  See Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, (Panel 
Report) [2000] WT/DS155/R 117. 
258
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.2. 
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laws or regulations but more broadly to measures. This wording indicated clearly 
that any measure instituted or maintained by a contracting party which restricted the 
exportation or sale for export of products was covered by this provision, irrespective 
of the legal status of the measure.‘259 
The above position is relevant given the status of OPEC production quotas. It can be 
argued that these production quotas are not legally binding and that members 
sometimes dispense with these quotas. However, as indicated above the nature and 
legal status of the measure is not one of the considerations in deciding whether Art 
XI (1) has been violated. Article XI (1) of the GATT 1994 retained the same provision 
as that in the GATT 1947. Thus cases, such as the one above, that were decided 
under the GATT 1947 are relevant to this discussion.  
Further, OPEC countries that are also WTO members have not followed the proper 
procedures to waive their obligations under the GATT. In Japanese Measures on 
Imports of Leather,260 the panel held as follows: 
‗The Panel noted that Article XI: 1 prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions. It 
recognized that situations might exist in which the maintenance of such restrictions 
would be justified under the relevant GATT provisions. It noted, however, that Japan 
had not invoked any provision of the General Agreement to justify the maintenance 
of the import restrictions on leather. The Panel decided that in such circumstances it 
was not for it to establish whether the present measures would be justified under any 
GATT provision or provisions. The Panel considered that the special historical, 
cultural and socio-economic circumstances referred to by Japan could not be taken 
into account by it in this context since its terms of reference were to examine the 
matter "in the light of the relevant GATT provisions" and these provisions did not 
provide such a justification for import restrictions. It noted that a panel report 
adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 1983 had, in a similar situation, 
concluded "that [such matters] did not come within the purview of Articles XI and 
XIII of the GATT and ... lay outside its consideration". The Panel therefore found that 
                                                 
259
  See Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors (Panel Report) [1988] (L/6309 - 35S/116) 28. 
260
  See Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Panel Report) [1984] (L/5623 - 31S/94) 12. 
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the Japanese import restrictions at issue, made effective through quotas and import 
licenses, contravened Article XI:1.‘261 
The above dispute, although dealing with import restrictions shows that socio-
economic circumstances do not provide exceptions to obligations under Art XI of the 
GATT. Further, that where a WTO member fails to comply with Art XI, justification 
for non-compliance has to be provided by such party. The justification should rely 
on GATT provisions. Thus the justification for OPEC production quotas, which is 
stabilisation of crude oil prices, does not pass the test established above. 
The burden of proof regarding disputes over compliance with Art XI is on the party 
making the assertion. Thus if a party alleges that Art XI has been violated, such a 
party has to provide proof. In India — Quantitative Restrictions,262 the appellate body 
confirmed the panel decision that the burden of proof was on the USA which was 
the complainant. This indicates that WTO members that choose to challenge OPEC 
production quotas will have to prove the assertion that the quotas are inconsistent 
with Art XI of the GATT.  
It appears from the above discussion that a broad construction of Art XI of the GATT 
renders OPEC production quotas GATT inconsistent. OPEC member countries that 
are also WTO members, such as Nigeria and Angola, may therefore be found to be in 
violation of Art XI of the GATT. 
It has been argued by some authors that because OPEC production quotas affect oil 
in situ, the commodity is outside the realm of WTO/GATT regulation.263 Further 
that if the commodity is subject to WTO regulation then OPEC member countries 
can rely on the exceptions in the GATT.264 The argument on oil in situ has been dealt 
with in chapter one.265 To this end, a critical examination of the general exceptions 
clause in the GATT is required.  
                                                 
261
  See Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Panel Report) [1984] (L/5623 - 31S/94) 12. 
262
  See India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (Appellate 
Body Report) [1999] WT/DS90/AB/R 31-32. 
263
  Broome S A (2006) 419. See also Desta G M (2010) 455. See also the discussion on oil as a good in the first 
part of chapter 1 section 1.4.1. 
264
  Broome S A (2006) 419. 
265
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.1. 
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3.4.2 GATT Art XX Exceptions  
Article XX of the GATT provides a general exception to Art XI.266 The provision 
permits quantitative restrictions in specific instances. The provision provides a broad 
range of exceptions. However Arts XX (g) and XX (h) are the most relevant to this 
discussion. The relevant clauses state as follows; 
‗Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
… (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity 
agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
and not disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved.  
The exception provided for in this subparagraph extends to any commodity 
agreement which conforms to the principles approved by the Economic and Social 
Council in its resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March 1947.‘267 
Article XX has a peculiar method of interpretation. The measure at issue has to fit 
within one of the exceptions in the subparagraphs and then also conform to the 
requirements in the chapeau. This position was confirmed by the appellate body in 
US-Gasoline.268 
‗In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the 
measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular 
exceptions — paragraphs (a) to (j) — listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the 
                                                 
266
  See Art XX of the GATT. 
267
  See Art XX (g), (h) and Ad Art XX Subparagraph (h) of the GATT. 
268
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 22. 
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requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other 
words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of characterization of the 
measure under XX (g); second, further appraisal of the same measure under the 
introductory clauses of Article XX.‘269 
The above method of interpretation has been adopted in discussing the above 
exceptions. Article XX (g) provides for an exception to GATT obligations, where a 
member state invokes measures relating to the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production. The wording of this subparagraph is particularly 
important. This subparagraph has three major elements.270 These are: relating to; 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources; and made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production.271  
The first element, which is ‗relating to‘ was discussed in Canada-Herring and 
Salmon.272 The panel held that the measure had to be primarily aimed at conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources.273 OPEC production quotas are not primarily aimed 
at conservation of exhaustible natural resources but rather price stabilisation.274 With 
regard to the second element, the mandate of OPEC is price stabilisation and not 
conservation of the environment.275 Thus the exception cannot be invoked to justify 
OPEC production quotas. The last element of this subparagraph is very important, 
                                                 
269
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 22. 
270
  Some authors note that Art XX (g) has a three tier structure. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 634.  
271
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 634. 
272
  See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Panel Report) [1988] 
(L/6268 - 35S/98) 12. 
273
  See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Panel Report) [1988] 
(L/6268 - 35S/98) 12. 
274
  See discussion of OPEC mandate in chapter 1 section 1.2.2. It can be argued that the appellate body in 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) [1998] 
WT/DS58/AB/R 53 provided a broader interpretation of the phrase ‗relating to.‘ The test required in this 
case was that the measure must be reasonably related to the end pursued. Thus OPEC member states may 
argue that conservation of an exhaustible natural resource is reasonably related to the production quotas. The 
author is alive to this possibility and this justifies the analysis of the other parts of Art XX (g). 
275
  See discussion of OPEC mandate in chapter 1 section 1.2.2. It is conceded that crude oil is an exhaustible 
natural resource. However, production quotas are not intended to conserve crude oil but rather to influence 
global oil prices. Conservation of crude oil can be undertaken under other less restrictive measures such as 
investing in alternative energy sources and increasing taxes on oil production. These measures do not violate 
Art XI. See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body 
Report) [1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 51-54. 
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and that is, ‗made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production.‘276 OPEC production quotas apply to production generally. There is no 
distinction between production of oil for export and domestic consumption. 
However, the last element has been interpreted to mean ‗together with‘ the first and 
second elements. Thus since the OPEC production quotas are not primarily aimed at 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, the exception does not apply.  
This above discussion clearly indicates that restrictions on domestic production are 
GATT inconsistent. This strongly supports the argument that OPEC production 
quotas violate Art XI of the GATT. In the event that they pass the three-tier test in 
Art XX (g), it is unlikely that the quotas will conform to the requirements of the 
chapeau. In US-Gasoline277 it was held as follows: 
‗The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or 
its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. 
It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose and object of the 
introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of ‗abuse of the 
exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX].‘ This insight drawn from the 
drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is animated by the 
principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal 
right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of 
the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those 
exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling 
within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to 
the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other 
parties concerned.‘278 
                                                 
276
  The appellate body has interpreted the term ‗in conjunction‘ to mean together with or jointly with. See 
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 20. 
277
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 22. 
278
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 22. 
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Justification of OPEC production quotas under Art XX (g) of GATT should not be 
used to violate obligations and rights under Art XI.279 The argument that production 
quotas are intended to conserve an exhaustible natural resource when the OPEC 
statute clearly stipulates that the mandate of the organisation is price stabilisation 
amounts to abuse of Art XX (g).280 The rights of other WTO members that are not 
OPEC members under Art XI are defeated by arguments that OPEC production 
quotas are meant to conserve an exhaustible natural resource. OPEC quotas are 
therefore inconsistent with the requirements in the chapeau of Art XX. 
The exception under Art XX (h) caters for intergovernmental commodity 
agreements.281 In 1993, the Group on Environmental Measures and International 
Trade requested for a note on the above agreements.282 This note explores all the 
important aspects of this provision. It was reported by the GATT Secretariat at the 
time that no commodity agreement had been formally brought to its attention.283 
Thus even though OPEC was already in existence, the OPEC statute had not been 
notified to the WTO as a commodity agreement. Intergovernmental commodity 
agreements have their origin in the Havana charter and were supposed to be open to 
all members.284  
‗There is no single definition of an international commodity agreement. However, 
criteria have encompassed, inter alia, that they be international in scope with 
representation from both producers and consumers, covering a substantial 
proportion of world trade in the commodity, and in the form of a legally binding 
international treaty. International commodity agreements generally entail that 
governments of producer countries and importing countries have agreed to take 
common steps concerning the production and trade of a specific commodity.‘285 
                                                 
279
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4 for a further discussion on the chapeau and production quotas. 
280
  See Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. 
281
  Article XX (h) of the GATT. 
282
  GATT Secretariat Trade Provisions Contained in Existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements Vis-à-vis 
GATT Principles and Provisions Article XX (h) (1993) Group on Environmental Measures and   
International Trade TRE/W/17 1 (hereafter GATT Secretariat 1993). 
283
  GATT Secretariat (1993) 1. 
284
  GATT Secretariat (1993) 1. 
285
  GATT Secretariat (1993) 5. 
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It is quite clear from the above discussion that the OPEC statute cannot be regarded 
as an intergovernmental commodity agreement. It does not have representation 
from the consumers and the governments of importing countries were not consulted. 
Thus Art XX (h) cannot be relied upon by OPEC member states. Nonetheless, the 
application of intergovernmental commodity agreements appears to be changing. 
The Doha Draft Modalities for Agriculture provide that intergovernmental 
commodity agreements between ‗producing countries‘ should be recognised under 
Art XX(h) of GATT.286 However, these draft modalities are not binding and since 
2008, no progress has been achieved on this front. It is also noted that the chapeau of 
Art XX as discussed above does not condone OPEC production quotas.287 
OPEC production quotas cannot therefore be justified under Art XX (g) and (h) of 
the GATT. This is mainly based on the fact that these quotas are intended for price 
stabilisation. Further, OPEC is not recognised as an intergovernmental commodity 
agreement at the WTO. Accordingly, OPEC productions quotas are inconsistent with 
Art XI of the GATT. Due to the fact that OPEC production quotas fail to satisfy 
requirements under Art XX (g) and (h) of the GATT, a detailed inquiry into the 
chapeau is unnecessary.288  
3.4.3 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures- SCM Agreement 
In 2008, the International Energy Association (IEA) revealed that fossil fuel subsidies 
to consumers amounted to about US $ 557 billion.289 Oil consumption subsidies are 
                                                 
286
  The Doha Draft Modalities for Agriculture TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 para 100.  
287
  See discussion above on the chapeau. See also United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS2/AB/R 22. 
288
  For a discussion of the chapeau and production quotas, see chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
289
  OPEC disagreed with this estimate as it was based on the price gap approach. The price gap is the difference 
between a reference price and the actual retail (end-use) price. For net importing countries, reference prices 
were based on the import parity price: the price of a product at the nearest international hub adjusted for 
quality differences plus the cost of freight and insurance to the importing country, plus the cost of internal 
distribution and marketing and any value-added tax (VAT). For net exporting countries, reference prices 
were based on the export parity price: the price of a product at the nearest international hub adjusted for 
quality difference, minus the cost of freight and insurance back to the exporting country, plus the cost of 
internal distribution and marketing and any VAT. OPEC is of the view that subsidy estimates in oil rich 
countries should be based on the cost of production. See IEA et al (2010a) 15-16. See also Cottier et al (2009) 
11. 
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the highest contributors to fossil fuel subsidies globally.290 The 2010 World Energy 
Outlook Report indicates that oil consumption subsidies are highest in the OPEC 
member states.291 Oil consumption subsidies are part of the broader category of 
fossil fuel consumption subsidies. 292  Oil consumption subsidies are mainly 
implemented through price control regulations.293  
The G-20 leaders recognised that inefficient fossil fuel subsidies encourage wasteful 
consumption, distort markets, impede investment in clean energy sources and 
undermine efforts to deal with climate change.294 However, it has been noted that 
the task of eliminating subsidies relating to fossil fuel is not an easy endeavor.295 
Apart from oil consumption subsidies, many oil producing countries also provide 
production subsidies. It should be noted that no systematic effort has been made in 
reporting and quantifying production subsidies for fossil fuels. 296  This does not 
mean that these subsidies do not exist. However, due to the above challenge, the 
discussion of petroleum or fossil fuel subsidies in this regard is limited to oil 
consumption subsidies in OPEC member states. 
Subsidies as understood in the WTO legal framework are defined in chapter one of 
this thesis. 297  The major elements arising from the definition of a subsidy are 
                                                 
290
  Between 2007 and 2009, oil consumption subsidies were in the range of USD 100 to 300 billion annually. 
See IEA et al (2010b) 18. 
291
  See Tanaka N ‗World Energy Outlook 2010‘ available at http://www.energy.eu/publications /weo _2010-
China.pdf (accessed 07 June 2012). It should be noted that oil consumption subsidies are different from dual 
pricing. Dual pricing is where the domestic price of a good is lower than the export price. There are 
instances where dual pricing may be considered a subsidy. However due to the lack of data on export and 
domestic prices of oil in different African oil producing countries, the issue of dual pricing is beyond the 
scope of the discussion. See Yanovich A (2012) 21 for a detailed discussion. See also Pogoretskyy V 
‗Energy Dual Pricing in International Trade: Subsidies and Anti-dumping Perspectives‘ Selivanova Y (ed) 
Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (2012) 199-211. 
292
  See Tanaka N ‗World Energy Outlook 2010‘ available at http://www.energy.eu/publications /weo _2010-
China.pdf (accessed 07 June 2012). 
293
  IEA et al (2010b) 6. 
294
  G-20 Leaders‘ statement: The Pittsburgh Summit. (2009) Pittsburgh, PA, 24–25. 
295
  Lang K (2011) 8. 
296
 Fossil fuel production subsidies have been estimated at about US $ 100 billion per year. IEA et al (2010a) 15. 
See also GSI (Global Subsidies Initiative) (2010), ‗Defining Fossil-Fuel Subsidies for the G-20: Which 
Approach is Best,‘ Global Subsidies Initiative of the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
cited in IEA et al (2010b) 14. 
297
  Article 1 (1.1) (a) (1) of the SCM Agreement, defines a subsidy as a financial contribution by government or 
a public body that confers a benefit to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises. See chapter 1 
sections 1.1.1 and 1.5. This definition raises two important questions. That is; cost to the government and 
benefit to a particular industry. It has been argued that the emphasis of the definition should focus on benefit 
as opposed to cost. It has been succinctly illustrated by Jackson J H (1997) 295, that governments can 
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financial contribution, by government or a public body and conferring a benefit.298 It 
is worth noting that government revenue that is foregone is also a financial 
contribution. 299  Revenue foregone does not apply where domestic laws exempt 
particular products from taxation. For example, it cannot be argued that because 
Nigeria chose to exempt petroleum products from value added tax (VAT), the 
government had made a financial contribution under Art 1 of the SCM 
Agreement. 300  However, where the Nigerian government transfers funds to a 
government program to reduce the cost of petroleum products for select groups in 
society, that may amount to a financial contribution within the meaning of Arts 1 
(1.1) (a) (1) (iv) of the SCM Agreement. 301 In the Nigerian case, the population 
benefit from low oil prices at the pump. Persons that are involved in various 
businesses, especially the transport industry and the producers of petroleum 
products take advantage of such subsidies.302 It can also be argued that oil producers 
in Nigeria indirectly benefit from the subsidy due to the available market for oil 
created by the low subsidised prices. 
It is argued in this thesis that oil consumption subsidies may be found to be 
inconsistent with Art 3 (1) (b) of the SCM Agreement. The provision states as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                                        
maintain subsidies without incurring costs. Thus the analysis of what amounts to a subsidy should focus on 
benefit. See also chapter 6 section 6.2.4 for further discussion on subsidies. 
298
  Van den Bossche P (2005) 555.  
299
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) (ii) of the SCM Agreement. The revenue foregone depends on the taxation rules of the 
WTO member; if the tax rules provide that a good should be taxed then it should be taxed. If the tax is 
foregone contrary to the taxation rules then that amounts to a financial contribution. See Van den Bossche P 
(2005) 556. 
300
  See Economic Confidential ‗Subsidy-Govt Grants Waiver for Oil Importing Companies-FIRS‘ available at 
http://economicconfidential.net/new/financial/tax-matters/897-subsidy-govt-grants-waiver-for-oil-importing-
companies-firs (accessed 30 April 2013). 
301
  Financial contribution does not have to be direct. It may take the form of a government practice involving 
the transfer of funds. See Van den Bossche P (2005) 556. The Nigeria subsidy program involves the 
Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (a government body) making subsidy payments to 
marketers of petroleum products, to reduce the ex-pump cost of petroleum products. The subsidies ultimately 
benefit petroleum consumers. See The Sun ‗Nigeria saves N1.9trn in oil subsidy payment last year – 
PPPRA‘ available at http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover /nigeria-saves-n1-9trn-in-oil-subsidy-payment-
last-year-pppra/ (accessed 30 April 2013). 
302
  It has been noted that one of the policy goals of Nigeria‘s fuel subsidy is to improve the transport system. It 
can be argued that due to the above consideration, persons involved in the transport industry will greatly 
benefit from the subsidy. However, the transport industry is a service sector and the SCM Agreement may 
not apply. See Onwe O J ‗Economic Implications of Petroleum Policies in Nigeria: An Overview‘ (2012) 
American International Journal of Contemporary Research Vol. 2 No. 5 64 (hereafter Onwe O J 2012). 
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‗3(1) Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, 
within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited... 
... (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods.‘303 
The language of the above provision was been interpreted by the appellate body. 
The term ‗contingent‘ was interpreted to refer to subsidies contingent in both law 
and fact.304 Thus oil consumption subsidies offered by OPEC member states may 
violate Art 3 (1) (b) of the SCM Agreement. This is so irrespective of the fact that the 
subsidies are provided in the law or are offered as a matter of fact. In Canada-Autos305 
the appellate body held thus: 
‗Finally, we believe that a finding that Article 3.1(b) extends only to contingency ‗in 
law‘ upon the use of domestic over imported goods would be contrary to the object 
and purpose of the SCM Agreement because it would make circumvention of 
obligations by Members too easy. …For all these reasons, we believe that the Panel 
erred in finding that Article 3.1(b) does not extend to subsidies contingent ‗in fact‘ 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods. We, therefore, reverse the Panel‘s 
broad conclusion that ‗Article 3.1(b) extends only to contingency in law.‘306 
As noted above, OPEC member states heavily subsidise oil consumption.307 Thus it 
can be argued that where such subsidies induce consumers to buy and use locally 
produced oil as opposed to imported oil, such subsidies will be held to be 
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.308 Such subsidies may affect the markets of 
other oil producing countries especially the emerging oil producers in Africa. The 
                                                 
303
  See Art 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
304
  See Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Appellate Body Report) [2000] 
WT/DS139/AB/R WT/DS142/AB/R 47. 
305
  See Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Appellate Body Report) [2000] 
WT/DS139/AB/R WT/DS142/AB/R 47. 
306
  See Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Appellate Body Report) [2000] 
WT/DS139/AB/R WT/DS142/AB/R 47. 
307
  The term ‗fossil fuel‘ in this regard mainly refers to oil. See Tanaka N ‗World Energy Outlook 2010‘ 
available at http://www.energy.eu/publications /weo _2010-China.pdf (accessed 07 June 2012).  
308
 It can be argued that such oil consumption subsidies that in effect also benefit domestic oil producers are 
protected under Art III (8) (a) of the GATT. Even then such subsidies are actionable. Article III (8) (a) of the 
GATT provides for payments made exclusively to producers. In this case the contested subsidies are not 
directly and exclusively paid to oil producers. See Sykes A O The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (2003) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 186 19 (hereafter 
Sykes A O 2003). 
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subsidies discussed above are prohibited under the SCM Agreement.309 According to 
Art 4 (7) of the SCM Agreement if a panel finds that a measure is a prohibited 
subsidy, the subsidising member has to withdraw the measure without delay.310 The 
SCM Agreement provides additional procedures for the resolution of disputes 
involving subsidies. 311  However, in Nigeria the subsidies do not encourage 
consumption of domestic over imported oil. The country mainly depends on 
imported oil products due to a low oil refining capacity.312 
Prohibited subsidies such as those discussed above, are deemed to be specific and do 
not have to undergo the test of specificity in Art 2 of the SCM Agreement.313 It 
should be noted that all other subsidies can only be regarded as inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement if they are specific to a particular industry.314 The above position 
has been clarified by a WTO panel: 
‗As with any analysis under the SCM Agreement, the first issue to be resolved is 
whether the measures in question are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 that 
are specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within 
the meaning of Article 2 [sic].‘315 
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement provides principles to be applied in defining 
specificity for purposes of Art 1. Although the provision provides express rules to 
determine specificity, it also provides for de facto specificity.316 For example where 
the subsidy is in fact predominantly used by certain enterprises, even though it 
might be available to all.317 In this regard, it can be argued that oil consumption 
                                                 
309
  See Art 3 of the SCM Agreement. 
310
  See Art 4 (7) of the SCM Agreement. 
311
  See Art 4 of the SCM Agreement.  
312
  See Reegle ‗Nigeria (2012) Energy Reliance‘ available at http://www.reegle.info/policy-and-regulatory-
overviews/NG (accessed 30 April 2013). 
313
  See Art 2 (3) of the SCM Agreement. 
314
  See Arts 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
315
  See Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Panel Reporting) [1998] WT/DS54/R 
WT/DS55/R WT/DS59/R WT/DS64/R 370. 
316
  See Art 2 (c) of the SCM Agreement. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Dispute Settlement World Trade Organisation Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (2003) 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.15 14. See also Jackson J H (1997) 297. 
317
  See Art 2 (c) of the SCM Agreement. See also Jackson J H (1997) 297. See also Holmer A F & Bello J H 
‗The U.S.- Canada Lumber Agreement: past as prologue‘ (1987) International Lawyer 21 1185 (hereafter 
Holmer A F & Bello J H 1987). 
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subsidies in Nigeria in fact benefit persons involved in the transport industry, who 
rely on the subsidised oil as well as the domestic oil producers who are guaranteed a 
market for their commodity.318  However, it should be noted that the transport 
industry is a services sector and therefore is beyond the scope of the SCM 
Agreement. The specificity of the oil consumption subsidy to the domestic oil 
producers is also questionable. The oil consumption subsidy applies to all oil 
products in Nigeria, that is imported and domestically produced oil products.319 
Article 5 of the SCM Agreement provides for actionable subsidies.320 These will be 
challenged where the subsidies cause adverse effects to the domestic industry of 
another member.321 The subsidies should affect like products.322 Oil consumption 
subsidies affect the domestic oil industries of other countries.323 The Nigerian oil 
subsidy program encouraged oil smuggling to Cameroon.324 At the beginning of 
2012, the smuggling reduced as the government started cutting back on the 
subsidies.325 It should be noted that actionable subsidies will attract countervailing 
measures if they cause material injury or serious prejudice.326 Accordingly, a detailed 
examination of oil consumption subsidies and material injury is pertinent to the 
above discussion. However, due to the lack of credible data on the volumes of 
subsidised oil imports and prices of oil in Cameroon, such an analysis has not been 
undertaken and it cannot be said with certainty that Nigerian oil consumption 
subsidies have caused material injury to the oil producing industry in Cameroon. 
                                                 
318
  Onwe O J (2012) 64. 
319
  Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency Revised Guidelines for the Administration of Petroleum 
Support Fund (PSF) (2009) Part III Principle 1.  
320
  See Art 5 of the SCM Agreement.  
321
  See Art 5 (a) of the SCM Agreement. See also Van den Bossche P (2005) 569. 
322
  Petroleum consumed in the different countries is the same and has similar characteristics. See Van den 
Bossche P (2005) 568 for a discussion on ‗likeness.‘ 
323
  Domestic industry refers to domestic producers as a whole of the like product. See Art 16 (1) of the SCM 
Agreement. In this case the domestic industry in Cameroon would be producers of oil products. 
324
  It is estimated that fuel smuggled from Nigeria accounts for about 30% of the petroleum consumed in 
Cameroon. This affects the oil producers in Cameroon as the country is also an oil producing country. See 
Cameroon ‗General Facts‘ available at http://www.finpro.fi/documents/10304/ee3bdcdc-1247-428b-9f70-
58ad5375c01d (accessed 16 October 2012). See also Reuters ‗Nigeria Investigates $4 bln Fuel Subsidy 
Fraud‘ available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/nigeria-fuel-scam-idUSL 6E8C 
J3TH20120119 (accessed 30 April 2013). See also Jackson J H (1997) 294. 
325
  The high incidence of smuggling may imply that the cheap oil from Nigeria was affecting the price of oil in 
Cameroon. See Business Day ‗Subsidy Removal Cripples Fuel Smuggling Across Nigerian Borders‘ 
available at http://www.businessdayonline. com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/31798-subsidy-removal-
cripples-fuel-smuggling-across-nigerian-borders (accessed 30 April 2013). 
326
  Jackson J H (1997) 294. 
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The SCM Agreement also provides redress for violations under Arts 3 and 5.327 
These include: withdrawal of the subsidy for prohibited subsidies, and either 
removal of adverse effects, or withdrawal of the subsidy, for actionable subsidies.328 
If neither of these remedies is acceptable to the infringing country, the complainant 
may impose countervailing measures.329 The SCM Agreement has rules that may be 
interpreted to cover oil consumption subsidies. It is evident that oil consumption 
subsidies and the manner in which they are provided in some African oil producing 
countries, might be interpreted as a financial contribution. These subsidies may in 
some cases be found inconsistent with provisions on prohibited subsidies. However, 
it is difficult to prove that these subsidies encourage the use of domestic over 
imported oil. Therefore it cannot be said that they are prohibited. With regard to 
actionable subsidies, there are challenges with regard to determining whether these 
subsidies are specific to a particular enterprise. Also, there is little proof that these 
subsidies cause material injury to other member states that are oil producing 
countries. 
3.4.4 The GPA and Corruption 
During the ITO negotiations, the USA proposed that governmental purchases and 
contracts should be treated like other measures relating to trade in goods and be 
subject to national treatment and MFN treatment.330 This proposal was rejected by 
other states because it would have affected their legislation which provided 
preference to domestically produced goods. 331  In December 1977, the GATT 
secretariat prepared a draft document for negotiations on government 
procurement.332 The draft was prepared after the Organisation for Economic Co-
                                                 
327
  Palmeter D (2004) 346. 
328
  See Arts 4 (7) and 7 (8) of the SCM Agreement. 
329
  See Arts 4 (10) and 7 (9) of the SCM Agreement. 
330
  Blank A & Marceau G ‗The history of the government procurement negotiations since 1945‘ (1996) Public 
Procurement Law Review 5 1 (hereafter Blank A & Marceau G 1996). See also Guimarães de Lima e Silva 
V ‗The revision of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: to what extent might it contribute to 
the expansion of current membership?‘ (2008) Public Procurement Law Review Issue 2 62 (hereafter 
Guimarães de Lima e Silva V 2008). 
331
  Blank A & Marceau G (1996) 77. 
332
  GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group ―Non-Tariff Measures‖ Sub-Group ―Government 
Procurement‖ Summing-up by the Chairman MTN/NTM/42 1978. 
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operation and Development (OECD) draft instrument on government purchasing 
policies, procedures and practices was presented to the GATT.333 
The draft Integrated text for negotiations on government procurement led to 
negotiations which resulted into the GPA after the Tokyo round and came into force 
in 1981.334 Further negotiations resulted into a new GPA which came into force in 
1996.335 Parties to the GPA continued negotiations and in 2012, the Committee on 
Government Procurement adopted the results of the negotiations. 336  The 
negotiations were meant to make the GPA simpler and more appealing to WTO 
members.337 Article I (1) of the GPA states that it applies to any law, regulation, 
procedure or practice regarding any procurement by entities covered by the 
agreement.338 As noted in section 3.3.3.3 above, the GPA is plurilateral and only 
applies to particular members.339 
Corruption has been defined as an illegal payment to a public organisation or 
agent.340 The above definition has shortcomings as it appears to disregard activities 
other than illegal payments that may motivate public officials to refrain from making 
decisions or to influence decisions to benefit particular groups. Transparency 
International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.341 
This definition is broad and covers all forms of inducements that may motivate the 
abuse of public office.342 It has been noted by some authors that due to the methods 
                                                 
333
  Blank A & Marceau G (1996) 97. 
334
  Blank A & Marceau G (1996) 102. 
335
  Agreement on Government Procurement Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement (GPA). 
336
  Adoption of the Results of the Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Following their Verification and Review, as Required by the Ministerial Decision of 15 
December 2011 (GPA/112), Paragraph 5GPA/113 2 April 2012. 
337
  Guimarães de Lima e Silva V (2008) 66. 
338
  See Art I (1) of the GPA. 
339
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.3.3. See also Hoekman B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 378. 
340
  Mehrara M et al ‗The corruption and income distribution in OPEC and OECD Countries: a comparative 
study‘ (2011) Int. J. Eco. Res 2(6) 51 (hereafter Mehrara M et al 2011). 
341
  See Transparency International ‗What is the Corruption Perceptions Index‘ available at http://cpi. 
transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail/ (accessed 07 June 2012). 
342
  The above definition has been criticised as being too restrictive as it does not consider the international 
dimension of corruption. However, the criticism lacks a strong foundation. Although transparency 
international investigates corruption in individual states as opposed to cross-border corruption, the method of 
investigation does not affect its definition of corruption. Besides, the definition can be expanded to include 
cross-border corruption. The criticism also appears weak in light of the fact that events that facilitate cross-
border corruption happen in particular jurisdictions. The only strong point of the above criticism is the fact 
that the definition appears to disregard the persons who induce corruption, the persons who pay to influence 
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of collection and disposal of revenue in OPEC member states, the incidence of 
corruption is high: 
‗Most crucially for our purposes, in every OPEC state, the government acquires, 
owns and disposes of all oil revenues. Substituting for direct taxation, these revenues 
insulate political leaders from political demands and obligations and provide them 
with an unconstrained freedom to manoeuvre that is rare elsewhere. Indeed, the 
opportunities for rent-seeking thus generated are of a distinctively high scale. Thus, a 
well-placed analyst writes that these revenues are used to ‗secure political peace, if 
not loyalty, ensure public employment as the first option, distribute patronage when 
effective and coopt the opposition whenever possible.‘343 
Disposal of oil revenue in OPEC member states and procurement are related. 
Disposal of revenue will in some cases lead to procurement. The GPA is a 
moderately reliable tool in curbing corruption at the stage of revenue disposal.344 
The GPA provides for tendering procedures and qualification of suppliers.345 These 
provisions enable a peer review mechanism that allows other states to challenge 
illegal tendering processes. The Committee on Government Procurement provides 
additional support as it supervises implementation of this Agreement. The 
provisions on tendering and qualification of suppliers are very relevant to the oil 
sector and greatly reduce corruption. However, this Agreement is plurilateral and 
has limited application. 
‗Each Party shall ensure that the tendering procedures of its entities are applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner and are consistent with the provisions contained in 
Articles VII through XVI.‘346 
There is no jurisprudence on the above provision from the WTO.347 Nonetheless, the 
language is clear. The provision ensures that trade restrictive practices are 
                                                                                                                                                        
public officials. See Shaxson N Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse (2007) Royal Institute of 
International Affairs Vol 38 No.6 Africa and Security 1126 and 1130 (hereafter Shaxson N 2007).  
343
  Montinola G & Jackman R W (2002) 158. 
344
  It has been argued that the GPA can be a helpful tool in reducing corruption and rent seeking. See Hoekman 
B M & Kostecki M M (2001) 380.  
345
  See Arts VII and VIII of the GPA. 
346
  See Art VII of the GPA. 
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eliminated from procurement and that transparency reigns in the procurement 
process.348 It is worth noting that the GPA has flexibilities that allow developing and 
less developed countries to waive some of the obligations.349 However this is done 
within the GPA framework and in a manner that does not encourage corruption. The 
GPA has not been widely applied due to provisions that allow member states to 
apply the agreement only to particular entities.350  This allows member states to 
circumvent obligations in the GPA. The above reason informed the panel‘s decision 
in Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement: 
‗In light of our findings in Section VII, above, we conclude that the entities which 
have been conducting procurement for the IIA project are not covered entities under 
Korea's Appendix I of the GPA and are not otherwise covered by Korea's obligations 
under the GPA.‘351 
The GPA has the potential of promoting transparency and reducing corruption in 
international trade in all sectors, including international trade in oil. However, the 
plurilateral nature of the agreement and its application only to particular entities, 
affects its impact. The author is aware that other provisions such as Art X of the 
GATT also address transparency.352 However, the discussion of transparency in the 
GATT is broad and not specific to procurement; thus it is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The WTO rules apply to international trade in oil. It is apparent that the indifferent 
attitude of the organisation to the regulation of international trade in oil and other 
                                                                                                                                                        
347
  Debate on transparency and corruption at the WTO is really low to the extent that some commentators have 
erroneously noted that issues of corruption in the multilateral negotiations ‗are not even a glimmer in the 
eye[s] of multilateral trade negotiators. ‘ See Steger D (2009) 16-17. 
348
  See Art XVII of the GPA. See also Evenett S J ‗Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement‘ 
Hoekman B et al (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO A Handbook (2002) 420 (hereafter Evenett S J 
2002). The GPA discourages corruption and rent seeking among government officials. 
349
  See Art V of the GPA. 
350
  See Art I of the GPA. 
351
  See Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement (Panel Report) [2000] WT/DS163/R 191. 
352
  See generally Ala‘I P ‗From the Periphery to the Centre? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on 
Transparency and Good Governance‘ Steger D P Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-
first Century (2009) (hereafter Ala‘I P 2009). 
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oil related disputes might be explained by lack of political will on the part of WTO 
members. African countries appear to be silent on international trade in oil despite 
the increasing proven oil reserves on the continent. 
The Ministerial Conference, the General Council and all its alter egos and the special 
councils and committees ensure that the various agreements of the WTO are 
implemented. African oil producing countries can benefit from these institutions 
especially the DSB. The organs can also ensure that illegal and trade restrictive 
practices are eliminated from the international trade in oil. Nonetheless, some of the 
oil related disputes are not covered in the WTO agreements and this may create 
challenges for the DSB in resolving such disputes. Decision making in the WTO and 
the different organs of the organisation is inclusive and allows for the participation 
of all members. Based on the composition of the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council, these bodies have the political legitimacy to transform international 
trade rules to effectively regulate international trade in oil. The institutional 
framework to regulate international trade in oil is sufficient and can be effective if 
the WTO legal framework is improved to specifically apply to international trade in 
oil. 
The legal framework of the WTO is comprehensive and covers a broad range of 
areas in international trade. There are rules to regulate production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies, and corruption. Nonetheless, these rules can be improved to 
apply directly to international trade in oil. Article XI of the GATT on the regulation 
on quantitative restrictions is a possible avenue for investigating the compliance of 
OPEC production quotas with GATT obligations. The discussion of the SCM 
Agreement and its rules on prohibited and actionable subsidies also indicates that oil 
consumption subsidies may be inconsistent with WTO obligations. However, the 
SCM Agreement has challenges especially with regard to the determination of 
specificity of oil consumption subsidies and the determination of material injury to 
other oil producing member states. This is the position in some African oil 
producing countries such as Nigeria. The GPA has challenges and may not be an 
appropriate tool for the control of corruption in the international trade in oil. The 
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GPA is plurilateral and none of the African oil producing WTO members are parties 
to it. The WTO legal framework has to be improved to cater for trade restrictive 
practices in international trade of oil. 
The next chapter examines the institutional and legal framework of OPEC. Building 
on the discussion in this chapter, chapter four investigates whether the OPEC Statute 
is an appropriate instrument for the regulation of international trade in oil. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ORGANISATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES (OPEC) AND THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN OIL 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter three examined the institutional and legal framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), particularly, how production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and corruption are regulated by the organisation. This chapter adopts a 
similar framework and examines the regulation of the above areas and the 
institutions within OPEC that are relevant to the regulation of these key areas. The 
chapter also discusses non-WTO alternatives to OPEC regulation of the above key 
areas. These alternatives are discussed in the context of Nigeria and Angola due to 
the fact that OPEC lacks express rules to regulate subsidies and control corruption.1 
The above discussion is relevant to the discourse as it highlights the existence of 
other legal and extralegal interventions that are available for the regulation of issues 
such as corruption in the oil sector, which are not sufficiently addressed by the 
OPEC Statute. 
OPEC countries produce about 40 percent of the world‘s oil and hold about 80 
percent of the world‘s proven oil reserves.2 The above statistics indicate that OPEC is 
and will continue to have a vested interest in the production and the international 
trade in oil. Nonetheless, as discussed in the first and third chapters OPEC relies on 
production quotas as a tool for stabilisation of oil prices. 3  These quotas are 
inconsistent with Art XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 
                                                 
1
  These African countries are members of both the WTO and OPEC. See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
2
  See Institute for the Analysis of Global Security ‗The Geopolitics of Oil‘ available at www.iags.org/ 
geopolitics.html (accessed 12 July 2012). 
3
  See chapter 1 section 1.2.2. 
4
  Production quotas maintained by OPEC take the form of export restrictions. See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2. 
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They also affect the liberalisation of international trade in oil.5 This chapter critically 
examines the justification for these quotas under the OPEC Statute. 
Chapter three also discussed oil consumption subsidies and their relationship to the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). 6  Oil 
consumption subsidies in the OPEC member states appear to be provided as a 
matter of practice and are not directly regulated by the OPEC Statute.7 Nevertheless, 
oil consumption subsidies may be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. However, 
there are challenges with regards to determination of specificity of these subsidies 
and whether they cause material injury to the domestic oil industries of other 
member countries.8 Building on the discussion in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
examines the implication of oil consumption subsidies on international trade in oil 
and the justification for oil consumption subsidies under the OPEC Statute. 
Corruption and the lack of transparency continue to affect the oil sector in many 
countries.9 The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) provides a solution to 
this problem as it sets rules for government procurement.10 However, the Agreement 
has challenges.11 In comparison, the OPEC Statute does not directly provide for the 
                                                 
5
  Production quotas restrict price competition among the OPEC member states. It has been argued by some 
authors that OPEC has not been very successful in eliminating price competition. This has been attributed to 
OPEC members cheating on their production allocations. However, OPEC member states control a large 
percentage of oil production and trade and thus their policies on production restriction still have an effect on 
global oil prices. See Zycher B ‗The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics OPEC‘ available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/OPEC.html (accessed 26 April 2013). It has also been argued that trade 
restrictive practices such as quotas discourage innovation and only encourage rent seeking. Thus trade 
restriction is an enabling environment for corruption. See Looney R ‗Profiles of corruption in the Middle 
East‘ (2005) Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol XXVIII No. 4 8 (hereafter Looney R 
2005). 
6
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
7
  Article 2 of the OPEC Statute provides the mandate of the organisation. It does not expressly provide for the 
subsidisation of oil consumption. However, the provision states that one of the principal aims of the 
organisation is to safeguard the individual and collective interests of the members. Politically, subsidisation 
of oil consumption builds political capital. Thus it can be argued that oil consumption subsidies are 
indirectly provided for in the OPEC Statute under Art 2. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3.  
8
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
9
  Oil and gas and mining are the most corrupt industries according to a corruption index published by 
transparency international. See Clean Technica ‗Oil and Gas Industry Leads Global Corruption Index: US 
More Corrupt than Qatar‘ available at http://cleantechnica.com/2011/05/07/oil-and-gas-industry-leads-
global-corruption-index-us-more-corrupt-than-qatar/ (accessed 12 July 2012). 
10
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
11
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: OPEC and International Trade in Oil 
 
148 
 
regulation of corruption. However, empirical studies have revealed that trade 
restrictive policies such as quotas and subsidies encourage corruption.12 
The discussion of production quotas, subsidies and corruption in this chapter is 
undertaken together with the institutions that are established to implement the 
OPEC Statute. That is, the Conference, the Board of Governors (the Board), and the 
Secretariat.13 An examination of the institutions and the various roles they perform is 
relevant as it sets ground for the discussion of the legal framework on production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption.  
The discourse in the chapter commences with a discussion of the various 
preliminary issues related to the nature of OPEC as an organisation. It is necessary to 
unpack these issues so as to understand the mandate of the organisation. Secondly, 
the chapter provides a detailed analysis of the roles of the various organs or 
institutions in the OPEC Statute, and then focuses on the investigation of the legal 
framework of OPEC and the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and corruption. African examples are relied upon in the discourse. Finally, 
the chapter examines non-WTO alternatives to OPEC regulation in some African oil 
producing countries.  
4.2  Understanding the Nature of OPEC and the Regulation of Oil 
Production 
This section examines preliminary issues that are relevant to understanding the 
nature of OPEC and its mandate. The section reveals one major theme, that OPEC is 
an exclusive club for net oil exporting and producing countries whose main interest 
is price control.  
Article 7 of the OPEC Statute is relevant to the above discussion.14  One of the 
membership requirements of the organisation is that a prospective member should 
                                                 
12
  See Dutt P ‗Trade Protection and Bureaucratic Corruption: An Empirical Investigation‘ available at 
http://faculty.insead.edu/dutt/Research/corruption_trade05.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013). 
13
  See chapter 3 of the OPEC Statute. 
14
  See Art 7 (C) of the OPEC Statute. 
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be a substantial net exporter of crude oil with similar interests to those of other 
members.15 The name of the organisation and the above provision seem to suggest 
that all countries that export oil may join the organisation. Thus it can be argued that 
countries like South Africa that have refineries, and which export oil products may 
seem like potential members. However, these countries do not have similar interests 
as those of the OPEC members because they do not produce crude oil.  
Another topical issue which should be highlighted at the outset is whether OPEC 
operates as a cartel.16 Some scholars have described OPEC as a profit maximising 
cartel.17 A profit maximising cartel is defined as an organised group of producers 
formed to obtain higher prices by restricting production or dividing the market.18 
This is achieved through restricting supply and controlling production of crude oil.19 
While it is debatable as to whether OPEC is a cartel, it is evident that OPEC restricts 
production and limits supply.20 As such, the organisation may be described as a 
profit maximising cartel. 
The other issue which is relevant to the discussion is whether OPEC is a commodity 
organisation. In 2005, OPEC‘s director for research, Dr. Shihab, described the 
organisation as having its roots in a commodity organisation.21 He further noted that 
                                                 
15
  See Art 7 (C) of the OPEC Statute. 
16
  The office of fair trading in the United Kingdom has defined a cartel as an agreement between businesses not 
to compete with each other. The agreement is usually secret, verbal and often informal. This definition 
ignores international organisations that are legally set up to discourage competition. Some scholars have 
divided up cartels into different categories and have provided for state run export cartels. These, they say, are 
motivated by both political and economic factors and are distinct from private international profit 
maximising cartels. The latter definition, state run export cartels, appears to include organisations such as 
OPEC. See Office of Fair Trading ‗What is a Cartel?‘ available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/ comp 
etition-act-and-cartels/ cartels/what-cartel#.UXriGVKQndk (accessed 26 April 2013). See also Evenett S J 
et al International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s (2001) Economic Department Working 
Series 1-1 3 (hereafter Evenett S J et al 2001). The reasons that have been advanced to exclude OPEC from 
classification as a cartel include; the fact that production quotas were not introduced at the onset and only 
appeared in 1983, that the Organisation lacks a monitoring system to ensure compliance with quotas. Further, 
that the Organisation does not have a mechanism to ensure that countries do not violate the quotas. See 
Alhajji A F & Huettner D ‗OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison‘ (2000) Energy Policy 28 1151 
(hereafter Alhajji A F & Huettner D 2000). See also Griffin J M & Xiong W ‗The incentive to cheat: an 
empirical analysis of OPEC‘ (1997) 40 J.L & Econ 289 (hereafter Griffin J M & Xiong W 1997).  
17
  Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000) 1151-1152. 
18
  Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000) 1152. 
19
  Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000) 1152. 
20
  Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000). See also generally, Griffin J M & Xiong W (1997). See also chapter 1 
section 1.2.2. 
21
  See OPEC ‗Oil and Development: The Role of OPEC: A Historical Perspective and Outlook to the Future‘ 
available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/894.htm (accessed 19 July 2012). 
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OPEC is largely a single-commodity organisation. 22  However, a commodity 
organisation is composed of both producers and consumers.23 This is true for tin, 
coffee, cocoa, sugar, and wheat.24 The foregoing discussion is consistent with the 
debate in chapter three which indicates that the OPEC Statute is not recognised as a 
commodity agreement under the WTO framework.25 However reference to OPEC as 
a commodity organisation may be motivated by the fact the organisation regulates 
the production of crude oil, which is a commodity.  
Related to the discussion in the introductory paragraphs of this section is the price 
stabilisation role of OPEC. Despite the fact that OPEC does not directly set the price 
of oil, its production quotas affect the price of oil on the world market.26 OPEC fixes 
production quotas with the intention of influencing the price of oil on the world 
market. The oil price collapse of 1998-1999 illustrates the above argument.27  
‗When OPEC oil ministers met in Jakarta, November 26-December 1 1997, with the 
Brent oil price at [US] $ 20/barrel, they decided to increase their output ceiling from 
25 to 27.5 million barrels/day.28  
Two years later the Jakarta meeting was termed ―one of the biggest mistakes in 
OPEC history‖ by the Venezuelan Energy Minister Ali Rodriguez (MEES, April 3 
2000). By not foreseeing the decline in Asian oil demand precipitated by the currency 
and banking crises in the fall of 1997, as compounded by other factors, OPEC had 
contributed to an oversupply in the oil market in 1998 and a collapse in oil prices 
which caused major damage to OPEC economies.‘29 
The discussion in this section shows that OPEC is interested in dictating the price of 
oil. Evidence from the wording of the OPEC Statute in Arts 4 and 7, indicates the 
                                                 
22
  See OPEC ‗Oil and Development: The Role of OPEC: A Historical Perspective and Outlook to the Future‘ 
available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/894.htm (accessed 19 July 2012). 
23
  This distinguishes commodity agreements or organisations from cartels. See Themaat V V (1981) 89. OPEC 
which was negotiated outside the framework of the Havana Charter or the principles of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development is not a commodity organisation. See Khan K The Law and 
Organisation of International Commodity Agreements (1982) 9 (hereafter Khan K 1982). 
24
  Themaat V V (1981) 88. 
25
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2. See also GATT Secretariat (1993) 1 
26
  See chapter 1 section 1.2.2 for a detailed discussion. 
27
  Mtsiva V C (ed) Oil and Natural Gas Issues and Policies (2003) 11 (hereafter Mtsiva V C (ed) 2003). 
28
  Kohl W L (2002) 210. 
29
  Kohl W L (2002) 211. 
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role of price stabilisation. Further, the membership requirements also directly point 
to this mandate. The classification of OPEC as a cartel, and sometimes, albeit 
erroneously as a commodity organisation also highlights the price control mandate 
of the organisation.  
4.2.1 International Legal Status of OPEC 
Another preliminary discussion is the debate on the international legal status of the 
organisation.30 This debate is relevant in analysing the impact and the role of OPEC‘s 
institutions. The functions and powers of the institutions, including enforcement of 
production quota decisions are affected by the legal status of the organisation.  
Investigating the international legal status of an organisation is mainly informed by 
two approaches.31 These are: the inductive approach and the objective approach.32 It 
has been argued under the inductive approach, that OPEC has international legal 
personality.33 The author concurs with this argument because the OPEC Statute 
recognises the international legal personality of the Organsiation. Under the 
objective approach, the Reparation case 34  established the criteria for determining 
international legal personality. That is, the organisation must be more than a center 
that regulates state conduct, it should have an infrastructure, it should perform 
special tasks, and it should have a life of its own. OPEC satisfies all the above 
                                                 
30
  Lashbrooke E C ‗Suits against international organisations in federal court: OPEC, a case study‘(1982) 12 
Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 308-316 (hereafter Lashbrooke E C 1982). 
31
  Lashbrooke E C (1982) 306. 
32
  The inductive approach requires that the organisations‘ governing documents either expressly or impliedly 
indicate that an organisation has international legal personality. The objective approach on the other hand 
relies on the structure of the organisation and the principles of international law to evaluate whether an 
organisation has international legal personality. See Lashbrooke E C (1982) 306 citing Rama M, 
International Legal Personality and lmplied Powers of International Organizations (1970) 44 BRIT. Y. B. 
INT'L L. 111, 112.  
33
  This is based on the fact that OPEC‘s governing documents impliedly confer international legal personality 
on the Organisation. The inductive approach relies on third party states accepting the status of the 
organisation as having international legal personality. That said, some countries like the USA do not 
recognise OPEC as an international organisation and this casts some doubt on the argument. See Lashbrooke 
E C (1982) 306 and 312 for a detailed discussion. See also International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers V The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 694 F. 2d 1354 (9
th
 Cir 1981) for 
further reading. 
34
  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] I.C.J. 174 cited in Lashbrooke E 
C (1982) 310. 
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conditions and to this end can be regarded as having international legal 
personality.35  
Article 2 of the text of the draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organisations defines an international organisation as an organisation established by 
a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own 
international legal personality. 36  OPEC has been identified as an international 
organisation with international legal personality.37 In order to cover organisations 
established by states on the international plane without a treaty, Art 2 above refers, 
as an alternative to treaties, to any ‗other instrument governed by international law.‘ 
This wording is intended to include instruments such as resolutions adopted by an 
international organisation or by a conference of states. Examples of international 
organisations that have been so established include the Pan American Institute of 
Geography and History (PAIGH), and OPEC.38 
The OPEC headquarters agreement is further proof that the organisation indeed has 
international legal personality.39  This agreement recognises OPEC‘s status as an 
international organisation under Austrian law.40 Generally, headquarter agreements 
provide immunity to international organisations. 41  Such immunity is recognised 
under international law. 42  The above agreement and the recognition of the 
agreement by Austria provide further evidence for the classification of OPEC as an 
international organisation with international legal personality. Additionally, OPEC 
                                                 
35
  See Lashbrooke E C (1982) 310 for a detailed discussion. See also Ajomo M A ‗An appraisal of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ (1977-1978) 13 Tex. Int’l L. J. Vol 13: 11 26 
(hereafter Ajomo M A 1977-1978). 
36
  United Nations Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-third session (26 April–3 June and 4 
July–12 August 2011) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-sixth session Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10) 
52 (hereafter United Nations Report Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10) 2011). 
37
  United Nations Report Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10) (2011) 73. 
38
  United Nations Report Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10) (2011) 73. 
39
  Headquarters Agreement between Austria and OPEC 1974 as amended Volume 2098, I-36477. 
40
  Austrian Official Gazette BGBL 382/74 of 11 July 1974 and BGBL 379/85 of 13 September 1985. See also 
Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf  (accessed 27 April 2013). 
41
  See Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
42
  See Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
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has been identified as an intergovernmental organisation; such organisations are 
recognised subjects of international law.43 The institutions of OPEC are founded in 
an international organisation with legal personality; as such the institutions either 
expressly or impliedly exercise real power. 
This section provides evidence of the fact that OPEC has international legal capacity. 
As such, OPEC‘s institutions are vested with real power and have legal capacity. The 
next section discusses the institutional framework of OPEC and evaluates the 
capacity of these institutions to regulate production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and government procurement-related corruption. 
4.3 OPEC Institutions and the Regulation of International Trade in Oil  
OPEC has three major institutions that are involved in the implementation of the 
OPEC Statute. These are: the Conference, the Board of Governors, and the 
Secretariat.44 These institutions are actively involved in the regulation of production 
quotas, which is the main method through which OPEC ensures the coordination 
and unification of petroleum policies of the member states.45 These institutions are 
the foundation of the legal structure of OPEC which is discussed in the next section 
of this chapter. The figure below illustrates the linkages between the various 
institutions of OPEC. 
                                                 
43
  Karns M P & Mingst K A (2004) 7. 
44
  See Art 9 of the OPEC Statute. 
45
  See chapter 1 section 1.2.2. 
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Figure 4.1 Institutional Framework of OPEC 
 
Source: OPEC ‗Organi[s]ation Organigram‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_ 
project/ media/ downloads/about_us/OPECOrganigram0413.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). The Secretariat is 
represented by the office of the Secretary General. See discussion in chapter 4 section 4.3.3. 
This section also examines the decision making processes of the institutions and the 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Further, an analysis of the impact of the OPEC 
Economic Commission and the Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee has been 
undertaken. 46  These institutions are instrumental in price stabilisation and 
monitoring of compliance with production quotas. The potential of the above 
institutions to regulate oil consumption subsidies and corruption is also discussed. 
4.3.1 The Conference 
The Conference is the supreme organ of OPEC.47 It is made up of delegations from 
the member states, which are normally headed by ministers in charge of oil, mines, 
and energy.48 Meetings of the Conference require a quorum of at least three quarters 
of the full members and each of the delegations is entitled to one vote. 49  The 
Conference meets at least twice a year.50 The decisions of the Conference other than 
decisions on procedural matters require the unanimous agreement of all full 
                                                 
46
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.4. 
47
  See Art 10 of the OPEC Statute. 
48
  Due to the composition of this body, its membership varies and depends on the persons holding particular 
offices in the member states. This is bound to create challenges with regard to consistency. See Art 11 (A) of 
the OPEC Statute.  
49
  See Art 11 (B) and (C) of the OPEC Statute. See also Art 7 of the OPEC Statute for a distinction between 
full and associate membership. 
50
  See Art 12 of the OPEC Statute. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: OPEC and International Trade in Oil 
 
155 
 
members.51 Conference resolutions usually become effective after 30 days from the 
date of the meeting or after such a period as the Conference may determine, unless 
the members notify the Secretariat to the contrary.52 
The OPEC Statute vests the Conference with very broad powers. Article 2 of the 
Statute provides the principal aims of the organisation. These include: the 
coordination and unification of petroleum policies of member countries.53 Article 15 
of the Statute places this duty primarily on the Conference.54 The Conference is 
charged with formulating the general policy of the organisation.55 A reconciliation of 
the above provisions reveals that the general policy of the organisation has to be 
structured along the principal mandate of the organisation. Suffice it to note that the 
discussion of petroleum policies and measures to stabilise petroleum prices is 
usually the agenda of OPEC Conference meetings.56 The choice of tools used by the 
Conference to stabilise petroleum prices is one of the focus areas discussed in this 
chapter. Production quotas are the tool of choice used by the OPEC Conference to 
stabilise prices.57 As noted in chapter three of the thesis, production quotas are 
inconsistent with the GATT. 58  Further discussion of the OPEC Statute and 
production quotas is undertaken in the next section of the chapter. 
As noted in the above discussion there is a relationship between Art 2 and Art 15 of 
the OPEC Statute. Article 2 provides for the coordination and unification of 
petroleum policies of the member states. This provision is closely linked to Art 15 
which states that the Conference is supposed to formulate the general policy of the 
organisation. To this end, the policies formulated by the Conference have to be 
                                                 
51
  Where a full member is absent, the resolutions are considered effective unless the member notifies its dissent 
to the secretariat at least 10 days prior to the publication of the resolution. See Art 11 (C) of the OPEC 
Statute. 
52
  See Art 11 (C) of the OPEC Statute. 
53
  See Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
54
  See Art 15 (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
55
  See Art 15 (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
56
  See Treccani ‗Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
57
  See Treccani ‗Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
58
  See Art XI of the GATT. See chapter 3 of sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
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consistent with Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. Thus the use of production quotas to 
stabilise oil prices is initiated by the Conference. 
As discussed in the third chapter, oil consumption subsidies are most prominent in 
the OPEC member states. 59  This can be attributed to the policies of the OPEC 
member states. Generally, fossil fuel subsidies distort markets and create barriers to 
clean energy investment. 60  Additionally, these subsidies hasten the decline of 
exports and reduce export earnings over the long term.61 Between 2007 and 2010, 
global oil consumption subsidies cost over US $ 100 billion annually.62 It is therefore 
surprising that the OPEC Conference appears to have acquiesced to the continued 
use of oil consumption subsidies in its member states.  
There is an urgent need to reduce these subsidies in the member states as a reduction 
in these subsidies will maximise profits from oil trade, and help wean OPEC 
member states off production quotas as a tool for profit maximisation. As noted in 
this section, the OPEC Statute does not directly regulate oil consumption subsidies. 
However, the Conference plays a role in unifying petroleum policies of the member 
states. Thus the Conference can rely on its mandate to harmonise member country 
policies on oil consumption subsidies. This will provide a platform to craft an 
organisational policy to regulate oil consumption subsidies. 
Corruption in the OPEC member states remains a big challenge.63 Despite this fact, 
the OPEC Statute is silent on transparency and corruption although it advocates the 
                                                 
59
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
60
  See IEA ‗IEA Analysis of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies‘ available at http://www.world energyoutlook.org/ 
media/weowebsite/energysubsidies/ff_subsidies_slides.pdf (23 July 2012). 
61
  See IEA ‗IEA Analysis of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies‘ available at http://www.world energyoutlook.org/ 
media/weowebsite/energysubsidies/ff_subsidies_slides.pdf (23 July 2012). 
62
  See IEA ‗IEA Analysis of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies‘ available at http://www.world energyoutlook.org 
/media/weowebsite/energysubsidies/ff_subsidies_slides.pdf (23 July 2012). 
63
  On average, Transparency International corruption perception index shows that the score for corruption in 
2011 for OPEC member states was between 0 and 4.9. This data indicates that OPEC has not been very 
successful in combating corruption in its member states. See Transparency International ‗Corruption 
Perception Index‘ available at http://www.Transparency.org/cpi2011/results (accessed 27 April 2013). 
Pleskov I argues that a more oil dominated economy does not lead to corruption. This position is subject to 
debate, the figures above highlight a failure to control corruption in the OPEC member states. While it can 
be argued that there are other factors that affect transparency and encourage corruption, oil is the biggest 
source of revenue in the OPEC member states. Consequently, misuse of government funds is greatly related 
to revenue from oil sales. See Pleskov I ‗Determinants of Corruption in OPEC and Eurozone Countries: 
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protection of the best interests of the producing countries to protect a steady income 
from petroleum.64 Article 15 of the OPEC Statute provides that the Conference ought 
to direct general policy of the organisation. Thus the Conference should make 
policies to encourage transparency and to reduce corruption. Similar to the 
regulation of oil consumption subsidies, the legal framework is not clear on the 
control of corruption. However, the various member states have domestic 
mechanisms to control corruption.65 The Conference should rely on these domestic 
interventions to create a policy on control of corruption and to encourage 
transparency. 
4.3.2 The Board of Governors 
The Board of Governors (hereafter the Board) is charged with implementing 
decisions of the Conference. 66  The Board has been compared to the board of 
governors of a commercial entity.67 The Board is composed of governors nominated 
by the member states and confirmed by the Conference.68 All members have to be 
represented at Board meetings; however a quorum of two thirds is required to hold 
board meetings.69 Each governor of the Board is entitled to only one vote.70 A simple 
majority of governors attending is required to make Board decisions.71 The Board is 
supposed to meet at least twice a year, although it can also hold extraordinary 
meetings.72 
As noted above, the Board plays a very important function, which is implementation 
of Conference decisions. Thus decisions on production quotas have to be 
implemented by the Board. The Board is also important as it will have to implement 
                                                                                                                                                        
Does Religion Make a Difference?‘ available at http://business.pages.tcnj. edu/files/2011 /07/Plesko 
v.thesis.pdf (23 July 2012).  
64
  See OPEC Statute Art 2 (C). 
65
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
66
  See Art 20 (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
67
  See OPEC ‗Ábout OPEC‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/178.htm (acce ssed 23 
July 2012). 
68
  See Art 17 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
69
  See Art 17 (B) of the OPEC Statute. 
70
  See Art 17 (D) of the OPEC Statute. 
71
  See Art 17 (D) of the OPEC Statute. 
72
  See Arts 18 (A) and (B) of the OPEC Statute. 
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decisions on oil consumption subsidies and corruption when direct rules are made 
by the Conference. The Board also prepares the agenda for the Conference.73 This is 
equally important as it makes the Board an important organ in driving the policy of 
the organisation. Policies to regulate oil consumption subsidies and corruption can 
be brought to the attention of the Conference through the Board. 
4.3.3 The Secretariat 
Originally the Secretariat did not exist as a separate entity.74  The duties of the 
Secretariat were performed by the Board.75 The chairman of the Board also acted as 
the Secretary General. 76 As the office of the Secretary General became more 
demanding, a separate entity was created under the 1965 OPEC Statute.77 Until 1969, 
the OPEC Statute was silent on the qualifications required for the position of 
Secretary General.78 However, these gaps in the OPEC Statute have now been filled 
through Conference resolutions.79 
Article 25 provides for the Secretariat; the organ carries out executive functions of 
the organisation under the supervision of the Board.80 The Secretary General is the 
authourised legal representative of the organisation. 81  Article 29 of the Statute 
provides that the Secretary General organises and administers the work of the 
organisation.82 This is similar to the implementation role of the Board.83 Thus the 
offices of the Secretary General and the Secretariat have a fundamental role to play 
in the implementation of production quotas. As noted earlier, due to the practice of 
cheating on production quotas in OPEC countries, it can be argued that the 
                                                 
73
  See Art 20 (9) of the OPEC Statute. 
74
  OPEC Res. II.6 (1961), the organisation was composed of the Conference and Board of Governors. See 
Stoehr L (1979) 98. 
75
  Stoehr L (1979) 98. 
76
  Stoehr L (1979) 98. 
77
  Stoehr L (1979) 98. 
78
  Ajomo M A (1977-1978) 19. 
79
  OPEC Resoution XX 117. See Art 28 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
80
  See Art 25.of the OPEC Statute  
81
  See Art 27 of the OPEC Statute. 
82
  See Art 29 of the OPEC Statute.  
83
  See Art 20 (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
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Secretariat and the Board have not been very effective in implementing production 
quotas. 
Article 32 of the OPEC Statute provides for the different organs that work with the 
Secretariat. 84  These departments also highlight some of the functions of the 
Secretariat. These include: the division for research, the administration and human 
resource department, the public relations and information department.85 
The division for research conducts research programs and ought to place particular 
emphasis on energy and related matters.86 This division should be a good starting 
point for a discourse on oil consumption subsidies and corruption as there are no 
direct rules to regulate these key areas.  
Related to the foregoing argument, Art 33 of the OPEC Statute also provides the 
functions of the administration and human resource departments.87 One of these 
functions is ensuring that the organisation is aware of policy changes in the 
international petroleum industry, which might affect the organisation. 88  This 
department can be a good entry point in discussing a way forward on the regulation 
of oil consumption subsidies and corruption in the oil sector. The issue of oil 
consumption subsidies and the burden they impose on the global economy has been 
acknowledged by several European countries.89 Against this background, it can be 
argued that the challenge of oil consumption subsidies is a policy challenge affecting 
the international oil sector. Nonetheless, OPEC and in particular the administration 
and human resource department, has not directed substantial effort to reform this 
area. The same is true for corruption and transparency in the oil sector. 
The public relations and information department is charged with disseminating 
news of general interest regarding the organisation and the member countries on 
                                                 
84
  See Art 32 of the OPEC Statute. 
85
  See Art 33 (A) (1) of the OPEC Statute on the functions of the division for research. 
86
  See Art 33 (A) (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
87
  See Art 33 (B) (3) of the OPEC Statute. 
88
  See Art 33 (B) (3) of the OPEC Statute. 
89
  See BBC News ‗IEA calls for cuts to 'wasteful' fossil fuel subsidies‘ available at http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/business-15167748 (accessed 20 March 2013). See also Radler M ‗IEA, OECD call for fossil 
fuel subsidy reforms‘ available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2011/10/iea-oecd-call-for-fuel-subsidy-
reforms.html (accessed 20 March 2013). 
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energy and related matters.90 Oil consumption subsidies and production quotas may 
be inconsistent with the WTO legal regime.91 Thus OPEC member states that are also 
WTO members should be aware of these inconsistencies. Likewise, corruption is a 
critical issue in some OPEC member states; this has to be addressed by the 
organisation.92 The above department is relevant in achieving these objectives. 
Accordingly, the Secretariat and the above departments are pivotal in ensuring that 
production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption are discussed by the 
OPEC member states. OPEC also has subsidiary organs that complement the 
functions and roles of the above institutions. These include: the OPEC Economic 
Commission and the Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee.  
4.3.4 Subsidiary Organs 
The OPEC Economic Commission and the Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee are 
classified as subsidiary organs because they operate within the broad framework of 
the above institutions. The Economic Commission is a specialised body operating 
within the framework of the Secretariat and the Conference. 93  The Ministerial 
Monitoring sub-Committee is also a specialised organ of OPEC and was formed in 
1993 at the 10th meeting of the Ministerial Monitoring Committee.94 Article 36 of the 
OPEC Statute permits the Conference to establish specialised organs.95 These organs 
operate within the general framework of the Secretariat.96 
                                                 
90
  See Art 33 (C) (2) of the OPEC Statute. 
91
  Oil consumption subsidies will only be found to be inconsistent where specificity can be established for 
purposes of actionable subsidies. Similarly, with regard to actionable subsidies, inconsistency with the SCM 
Agreement will only occur where there is proof that domestic oil is preferred over imported oil. See chapter 
3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.3. 
92
  See Transparency International ‗Corruption Perception Index‘ available at http://www.Transparency.org 
/cpi2011/results (accessed 27 April 2013) 
93
  See OPEC Ábout OPEC‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opecweb/en/press_room/178.htm (accessed 24 
July 2012). See also Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at 
http://www.treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altrearee/TecnologiaeScienzeapplicate/enciclopedi 
a/inglese/inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
94
  See Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www. 
treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_Scienze_applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/
inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
95
  See Art 36 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
96
  See Art 36 (B) of the OPEC Statute. 
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4.3.4.1 The OPEC Economic Commission 
In 1964 the Economic Commission was established at the seventh conference of the 
organisation.97 The fundamental objectives of the Economic Commission are: 
‗[to] Examine the position of petroleum prices on a permanent basis; Study all 
economic and other factors that may in any way affect petroleum prices and price 
structure significantly; Submit to OPEC countries reports on the position of 
petroleum prices, including relevant economic factors and current status of the 
Commission's recommendations.‘98 
The Economic Commission promotes stability in the international oil market. 99 
Currently OPEC relies on production quotas to influence world oil prices.100 Thus 
the Economic Commission is centrally involved in the review and generation of 
these production quotas. The Economic Commission is therefore one of the organs 
that entrench production quotas in the OPEC regulatory framework.  
4.3.4.2 The Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee 
The Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee was formed to monitor oil production 
and exports in member countries. 101  The sub-committee exercises a supervisory 
function and ensures that countries comply with the quota allocations. This organ 
like the Economic Commission entrenches production quotas in the OPEC 
regulatory framework. Although the Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee exercises 
a monitoring function, the OPEC Statute does not provide for a formal dispute 
settlement mechanism or a strong enforcement regime. 102  Thus the Ministerial 
                                                 
97
  Ajomo M A (1977-1978) 23. 
98
  Vafai J ‗Production control in the petroleum industry: a critical analysis‘ (1971) Santa Clara Law Review 
Vol 11 No 2 192 (hereafter Vafai J 1971). 
99
  See OPEC ‗About OPEC‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/178.htm (accessed 24 
July 2012). 
100
  See generally chapter 1 section 1.2.2. 
101
  See OPEC ‗About OPEC‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/178.htm (accessed 24 
July 2012). See also Treccani ‗Organi[s]ation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at 
http://www.treccani.it/export/sites/default/Portale/sito/altre_aree/Tecnologia_e_ Scienze_ 
applicate/enciclopedia/inglese/inglese_vol_4/559-574_x10.7x_ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
102
  The organisation had intended to create an intergovernmental court. However, this was never realized. 
OPEC established the Ministerial Monitoring Committee to check violations of OPEC decisions. However, 
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Monitoring sub-committee has to watch all its members closely to ensure that they 
maintain their quotas. In a way, the organ‘s hands are tied as it can do very little in 
the event of non-compliance with the quota allocations. 
The discussion above shows that OPEC is an international organisation with legal 
personality.103 The institutions of the organisation have power to make decisions 
concerning petroleum policies of the member states. Generally, OPEC institutions 
make policy and implement petroleum policies of the organisation. The institutions 
also ensure that members comply with production quotas. The issue of production 
quotas, though an area of concern is attended by cheating which affects the role of 
the institutions. The unsuccessful regulation of production quotas by the institutions 
or organs of OPEC may create a strong entry point for the elimination of these 
quotas and compliance with WTO obligations under Art XI of the GATT on export 
restrictions.104 
OPEC institutions, especially the Secretariat, present very many avenues for the 
discussion and eventual regulation of oil consumption subsidies and corruption. 
However, these have not been attended to as they fall outside the scope of OPEC‘s 
principal objective, which is price stability. The next section examines OPEC‘s legal 
framework for the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
corruption. 
4.4 OPEC’s Legal Framework 
OPEC‘s legal framework is provided in the OPEC Statute, the resolutions and 
policies that are enacted by the various OPEC institutions. Due to lack of a formal 
                                                                                                                                                        
the monitors are sent to the member states for short periods of time and they do not certify exports. Thus the 
incentive to cheat on quotas is a challenge to the organisation. Other similar organisations such as the Tin 
Council have enforcement and punishment mechanisms; failure to comply with production quotas is 
penalized by a lower quota for the next quarter. Although, the punishment mechanism is not a dispute 
settlement process, the punishment mechanism is a strong deterrence tool. The lack of a dispute settlement 
process in OPEC puts the organisation at risk of conflicts created by cheating. The presence of such conflicts 
is a good entry point to initiate discussions on the removal of production quotas. See See Stoehr L (1979) 
104. See also Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000) 1154. See also Desta G M (2003) 527. 
103
  See chapter 4 section 4.2.1. 
104
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
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dispute settlement mechanism, there are no judicial precedents that have interpreted 
provisions in the OPEC Statute.105 However, Art 2 of the OPEC Statute provides a 
broad mandate for the organisation.106 OPEC‘s legal framework is premised on Art 2. 
It should be noted that despite the fundamental nature of Art 2, the provision does 
not comprehensively define the areas that are subject to OPEC regulation: 
‗The principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and unification of 
the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means 
for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.‘107 
Article 2 of the OPEC Statute does not explicitly provide for the regulation of 
production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption in the member states. 
Nevertheless, the mandate to regulate these focus areas can be implied from the 
provisions discussed in this section. Article 11(C) on the mandate of members to 
make decisions during Conference meetings is also relevant.108 
4.4.1 Production Quotas 
Production quotas have been part of the OPEC legal framework since 1960.109 The 
first resolution of OPEC urged members to create a system for price stabilisation 
through the restriction of production. 110  However, a more recent history of 
production quotas can be traced back to the 1980s.111 OPEC introduced a production 
ceiling for its member states in 1982.112 Production was capped at 18 million barrels 
per day.113  
                                                 
105
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.4.2. 
106
  See Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. 
107
  See Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
108
  See Arts 2 and 11 (C) of OPEC Statute. 
109
  OPEC Res I.1.3 1960. See Iran Petro ‗Agreement Concerning the Creation of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries‘ available at http://www.iranpetrotech.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/UN6363-
OPEC.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
110
  OPEC Res I.1.3 1960. See OPEC Secretariat (2003) 66.  
111
  Alhajji A F & Huettner D (2000) 1153. 
112
  The decision to introduce a production ceiling was made at the 63rd (Extraordinary) Meeting of the OPEC 
Conference on 19–20 March 1982. See OPEC Secretariat (2003) 67. 
113
  OPEC Secretariat (2003) 67. 
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Production quotas are created through Conference resolutions supported by Art 2 of 
the OPEC Statute.114 Conference resolutions are made through negotiations at OPEC 
Conference meetings.115 As a result of the above negotiations, resolutions are made, 
which form the basis for production agreements. Accordingly, a thorough discussion 
of the legal status of Conference resolutions, especially the inconsistency between 
Art 11 (B) and (C) is necessary.116 The Art 11 inconsistency affects the binding nature 
of OPEC Conference resolutions. 
Second, it is also important that the legality of production quotas is examined. 
Between 1982 and 1990, OPEC was overwhelmed by excessive supply, thus member 
countries with high per capita incomes accepted low quotas while those with low 
per capita incomes were given high quotas.117 Post 1990, OPEC has been faced with a 
low surplus production capacity and production quotas have been allocated on the 
basis of individual state capacity as opposed to economic and political factors.118 One 
of the challenges faced by OPEC‘s quota system is the lack of an explicit formula for 
quota allocation.119 OPEC has attempted to create such a formula but has been 
unsuccessful.120 The above challenge together with the inconsistency in Art 11 of the 
OPEC Statute, affect the legality of production quotas. The legal status of production 
quotas in this chapter is limited to the OPEC statute and not the WTO. It has also 
been argued that the fixing of production quotas is inconsistent with the member 
states‘ sovereign rights to regulate the exploitation of their natural resources.121 In 
this regard a review of state sovereignty and natural resource regulation is also 
relevant. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that two critical issues affect the legality of 
OPEC production quotas. These issues are: the binding nature of OPEC Conference 
                                                 
114
  See Art 2 (A) and Art 11 of the OPEC Statute. 
115
  OPEC Secretariat (2003) 68. 
116
  See Art 11 of the OPEC Statute. 
117
  Gault J et al (1999) 138. 
118
  The factors influencing quota allocation are not clearly defined. See Gault J et al (1999) 138. 
119
  Gault J et al (1999) 137. 
120
  Gault J et al (1999) 137 citing Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 13 October 1986, pp. A3-
A4. 
121
  OPEC Secretariat (2003) 68. 
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resolutions and the relationship between production quotas and the sovereign right 
of member states to regulate the exploitation of their natural resources. 
A. Binding Nature of OPEC Conference Resolutions 
Decisions of the Conference, the supreme organ of OPEC are made through 
resolutions at Conference meetings.122Apart from decisions on procedural matters all 
other decisions have to be made through unanimous agreement of the full 
members.123 The term ‗unanimous‘ refers to a situation where two or more people 
are fully in agreement with regard to an opinion, decision or vote held or carried by 
all parties involved. 124  However, the term is not defined in the OPEC statute. 
Nonetheless, decision making through unanimity is a common practice in 
international organisations.125 
The nature of decision making at Conference meetings is through negotiation and 
resolutions. The quorum required to convene meetings is three quarters of all 
members.126 The provision on quorum for Conference meetings refers to members 
while the provision on decision making refers to full members. 127  Currently all 
OPEC members are full members, thus the inconsistency in the language of Art 11 (B) 
and (C) may not present any challenges. 128  The above notwithstanding, the 
provisions and the legality of the resolutions are bound to be contested when OPEC 
admits associate members. While the associate members are expected to participate 
in OPEC meetings, as per the provision on quorum, they are only allowed to vote on 
procedural matters. This renders the resolutions of the Conference arbitrary. A 
                                                 
122
  See discussion of Conference meetings in chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
123
  The OPEC Statute creates a distinction between founder members, full members and associate members. 
Article 11 (C) of the OPEC statute. See also Art 7 of the OPEC Statute  
124
  See Oxford Dictionaries ‗Unanimous‘ available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english 
/unanimous (accessed 27 July 2012). 
125
  Themaat V V (1981) 42. 
126
  See Art 11 (B) of the OPEC Statute. 
127
  The OPEC statute provides that whenever the term member refers to full member unless the context 
indicates the contrary. See Art 7 (F) of the OPEC Statute. It cannot be argued that Art 11 (B) was meant to 
exclude associate members and only refers to full members. Such an argument would indicate that it was 
never intended that associate members attend meetings of the OPEC Conference. Thus the context of Article 
11 (B) indicates that it refers to all members. 
128
  OPEC has five founder member states and all the other states are full members. See Treccani ‗Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‘ available at http://www.treccani.it/export/sites/default/ 
Portale/sito/altre_aree/TecnologiaeScienzeapplicate/enciclopedia/inglese/inglesevol4/559-574x10.7x_ 
ing.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 
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further lacuna in the OPEC Statute is the lack of a provision on whether Conference 
resolutions affect associate members. In the event that such resolutions have no 
effect on associate members, then the above contradiction is redundant and OPEC 
resolutions may not be considered to be arbitrary. 
Following from the above discussion, it appears that OPEC resolutions bind full 
members that make the resolutions, but have no legal effect on the associate 
members that are not allowed to vote on these decisions.129 These resolutions may 
also be classified as unilateral declarations.130 That is, they can be enforced by the 
associate members against the full members. However, the full members may not be 
able to enforce the resolutions unless the associate members implement the 
resolutions. Production quotas arrived at through resolutions of the Conference may 
therefore not be enforceable against associate members. 
Further, Art 11 (C) of the OPEC Statute provides that Conference resolutions become 
effective 30 days after the date on which the Conference meeting is held or after such 
period as indicated by the Conference.131 In the event of the absence of a full member, 
the resolutions become effective after 30 days, unless the absent member 
communicates its decision to the contrary, at least 10 days before the publication of 
the decision by the Secretariat.132 The language of the OPEC Statute indicates that the 
resolutions are legally binding. The use of the term ‗effective‘ denotes the binding 
nature of these resolutions. However, it can be argued that these resolutions are 
mere recommendations and are not binding on the member states as there is no 
formal enforcement mechanism in the OPEC Statute.133 It should be noted that these 
decisions are still relevant as they can and they do contribute to the creation of 
                                                 
129
  See Themaat V V (1981) 42 for a detailed discussion of binding decisions and recommendations or policy 
directives with a weak or no legal effect. 
130
  See Norway V. Denmark [1933] P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 53, 71. See also Australia & New Zealand V. France 
[1974] I.C.J. 253, 457. 
131
  See Art 11 (C) of the OPEC Statute. 
132
  See Art 11 (C) of the OPEC Statute. 
133
  Some commentators have argued that decisions that have a weak legal effect are not binding. See Themaat V 
V (1981) 42. See also discussion in chapter 4 section 4.3.4.2 on the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the 
OPEC Statute.  
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legitimate expectations which may be recognised as soft law.134 Accordingly, it can 
be argued that production quotas fixed through resolutions of the Conference are 
not legally binding on all members, especially the associate members. However, 
these resolutions may also be categorised as soft law. 
B. State Sovereignty and OPEC Production Quotas  
The relationship between sovereign rights of OPEC member states and production 
quotas is relevant to this discussion. In 1962, the United Nations reiterated the right 
of states to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.135 The resolution 
established a custom that allows states to manage their natural resources.136 It has 
been argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
now recognised in international law.137 Although the declaration was made against 
the background of investors exploiting host states,138 the principle is applicable to 
the relations between OPEC and its member states. Production quotas may interfere 
with state sovereignty where they inhibit member states from realising the benefits 
of their oil resources and regulating oil production. This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that OPEC lacks an explicit formula for the determination of production 
quotas. 139  However, as noted in chapter one, the principle of permanent state 
sovereignty over natural resources is not absolute. 140  OPEC member states 
voluntarily joined the organisation and are therefore bound by its rules.  
                                                 
134
  Abbott K W & Snidal D ‗Hard and soft law in international governance‘ (2000) International Organization 
54 3 423 (hereafter Abbott K W & Snidal D 2000) for a detailed discussion of soft law. Soft law may be 
created where a state internationalises an area of exclusive state competence through negotiation and 
subsequent agreement by way of treaties or international agreements. In this case legitimate expectations 
may be created on the basis of such treaty or international agreement. See Wesierski T G ‗A framework for 
understanding "Soft Law"‘ (1984) McGill Law Journal Vol 30 58-59 (hereafter Wesierski T G 1984). See 
also Schreuer C & Kriebaum U ‗At What Time Must Legtimate Expectations Exist?‘ Werner J and Ali A H 
(eds) A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Wälde Law Beyond Conventional Thought (2009) 265 (hereafter Schreuer 
C & Kriebaum U 2009).  
135
  Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, 
U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). 
136
  Desta G M (2010) 454. 
137
  Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Dem Rep Congo V Uganda) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports [2005] 
p77 Para 244. 
138
  Vielleville D E & Vasani B S ‗Sovereignty over natural resources versus rights under investment contracts: 
which one prevails?‘(2008) Transnational Dispute Management Vol 5 Issue 2 1 (hereafter Vielleville D E & 
Vasani B S 2008). 
139
  Gault J et al (1999) 137. 
140
  See chapter 1 section 1.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
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The above discussion indicates that the legal status of OPEC production quotas is 
questionable. The production quotas are a result of Conference resolutions. These 
resolutions are arbitrary and in some cases undermine the sovereign rights of states 
to regulate their oil resources. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that 
production quotas under the OPEC Statute are legally binding. 
4.4.2 Oil Consumption Subsidies 
The definition of fossil fuel subsidies is not clear and there is an ongoing debate on 
the same.141 The G-20 working group on energy and finance failed to agree on a 
definition.142 However, it has been proposed that the G-20 adopt the WTO definition 
which is all inclusive and has been interpreted by the dispute settlement body.143 
This chapter relies on the WTO definition of subsidy. 144  As noted earlier, oil 
consumption subsidies belong to the broad category of fossil fuel subsides.145 Oil 
consumption subsidies are highest in the OPEC member states.146 
The OPEC Statute does not directly provide for the regulation of oil consumption 
subsidies.147 However, Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute can be interpreted as the basis 
for oil consumption subsidies in the OPEC member states.148 The provision states 
that one of the principal aims of the organisation is the determination of the best 
means of safeguarding the members‘ interests individually and collectively.149  
Oil consumption subsidies can be used to maintain political control in oil exporting 
countries.150 Thus OPEC may ignore oil consumption subsidies in the member states 
                                                 
141
  Lang K (2011) 10. 
142
  Lang K (2011) 10. 
143
  Lang K Defining Fossil-Fuel Subsidies for the G-20: Which Approach is Best? (2010) Policy Brief The 
Global Subsidies Initiative 3 (hereafter Lang K 2010). 
144
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for a detailed discussion. 
145
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
146
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. Petroleum prices at the pump in OPEC countries are significantly lower than 
prices in non OPEC member states. See also Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a) 2. 
147
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 and chapter 4 Section 4.1. 
148
  See Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
149
  See Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
150
  IEA et al (2010b) 42. See also Hochman G & Zilberman D (2011a) 2. 
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where it is in the best interest of the states‘ political agenda. 151  Additionally, 
subsidies can also be used to support the poor.152 This argument is subject to debate; 
counter arguments have been made which strongly support the view that oil 
consumption subsidies mainly benefit the rich and middle class who consume more 
oil.153 Nonetheless, the above reason can be used to justify the provision of oil 
consumption subsidies in OPEC member states. It can be argued that the above 
reasons represent the members‘ individual interests and are within the broad 
framework of Art 2 of the OPEC Statute.154 
However, oil consumption subsidies are a burden to the global economy and 
aggravate oil price volatility.155 The high demand for oil in the first half of 2008 
despite high price increases has been attributed to countries subsidising oil 
consumption. 156  Related to this argument, oil consumption subsidies encourage 
smuggling.157 This is due to the fact that fuel is easy to store, which makes it easy to 
transport to other states that have high fuel prices.158 Individual domestic interests 
and political concerns are not sufficient to justify oil consumption subsidies. The 
market distortions created by the subsidies have global consequences.159 
Additionally, oil consumption subsidies affect domestic oil refining. 160  Oil rich 
countries such as Angola, Iran and Nigeria, which are OPEC member states, are 
faced with artificially high oil demand due to oil consumption subsidies and rely on 
imported refined oil products.161  Consequently, these countries cannot afford to 
invest in expanding their refining capacity.162 To this end, protecting individual state 
                                                 
151
  The use of subsidies to maintain low oil prices has negative consequences in the long run. When subsidising 
countries seek to increase oil prices, they usually face resistance from the NGOs and the people. See Bacon 
R & Kojima M (2006) 2. 
152
  It has been noted that subsides are an imperfect tool for alleviating poverty. See Lang K (2011) 10. See also 
IEA et al (2010b) 13. 
153
  IEA et al (2010b) 13. See also Bacon R & Kojima M (2006) 2. 
154
  See Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute. 
155
  IEA et al (2010b) 10.  
156
  IEA et al (2010b) 11. 
157
  Nigeria, Iraq and Venezuela are some of the OPEC member states that have experienced smuggling of oil 
from their territories. See Bacon R & Kojima M (2006) 2. 
158
  Bacon R & Kojima M (2006) 2. 
159
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3 on the effects of oil consumption subsidies. 
160
  IEA et al (2010b) 12. 
161
  IEA et al (2010b) 12. 
162
  IEA et al (2010b) 12. 
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interests as provided in the OPEC Statute is not a sufficient reason to provide oil 
consumption subsidies as they affect the domestic oil industry in the long run. 
The gradual reduction of oil consumption subsidies is necessary and highlights the 
benefits of comparative advantage. In 2010 United Arab Emirates started reducing 
its oil consumption subsidies.163 The price of gasoline went up by 26 percent.164 This 
improved the profits of retail oil traders and also pushed up oil sales in neighboring 
Oman.165 This indicates that the provision of oil consumption subsidies is not the 
most appropriate method of protecting individual state interests.  
Although Ghana is not an OPEC member and was not an oil producer in 2005, the 
country managed to reduce oil consumption subsidies through a transparent process 
that involved the provision of cheap education as a trade-off.166 Other countries can 
learn from this creative example. Ghana reduced its subsidies after realising that 
global petroleum prices were increasing and it could not sustain its petroleum 
subsidy programme.167 That said, the country is yet to achieve substantial success in 
the elimination of its oil subsidy program.168 
The OPEC Statute does not expressly regulate oil consumption subsidies. However, 
the broad nature of Art 2 of the OPEC Statute provides a strong basis for the 
provision of these subsidies. Although it can be argued that oil consumption 
subsidies are consistent with the OPEC Statute, these subsidies have many negative 
economic consequences. However, despite the negative effects of these subsidies, it 
is difficult to prove that they are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.169 
                                                 
163
  IEA et al (2010b) 25. 
164
  IEA et al (2010b) 25. 
165
  IEA et al (2010b) 25. 
166
  Bacon R & Kojima M (2006) 4. 
167
  Bacon R & Kojima M (2006) 4. 
168
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
169
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
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4.4.3 Corruption 
The discussion of corruption in this chapter is much broader than the discussion of 
the same in chapter three. 170  However, the definition of corruption adopted in 
chapter three applies to this discussion. 171  The OPEC Statute does not have 
mechanisms to control corruption. As noted above, corruption in the OPEC member 
states is a serious issue.172 As discussed in chapter three, the incidence of corruption 
in the OPEC member states has been attributed to the high level of government 
involvement in the oil sector.173 Nonetheless, some authors have noted that there is 
no relationship between oil dominant economies and corruption.174 This is not true 
for OPEC member states. Be that as it may, OPEC is currently involved in 
partnerships with other international energy organisations to encourage 
transparency in international oil markets.175 
‗Looking ahead, there is evidently much for the producers and consumers to talk 
about and cooperate on. The focus should be on finding common ground, looking for 
shared solutions, where and when appropriate, developing an environment that is 
conducive to reaching constructive end results, and having input from each and 
every stakeholder. The IEF‘s informal producer-consumer dialogue is an essential 
ingredient in this as we look to advance market stability, improve transparency and 
provide greater predictability.‘176 
The above statement indicates a strong commitment from OPEC to tackle corruption 
and transparency related to oil markets. This is in line with OPEC‘s broad mandate 
in Art 2 of the OPEC Statute.177 The above partnerships are a good foundation for 
OPEC‘s review of its policies and regulations on corruption and transparency in the 
                                                 
170
  The discussion of corruption under the WTO legal framework is limited to government procurement. See 
chapter 3 section 3.4.4.  
171
  Transparency International has defined corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. See 
chapter 3 section 3.4.4 for a detailed discussion. 
172
  See chapter 4 section 4.1. 
173
  Montinola G & Jackman R W (2002) 158. 
174
  Pleskov I ‗Determinants of Corruption in OPEC and Eurozone Countries: Does Religion Make a Difference? 
(2009)‘ available at http://business.pages.tcnj.edu/files/2011/07/Pleskov.thesis.pdf (23 July 2012).  
175
  Salem E A OPEC‘s Perspective on the Producer-Consumer Dialogue (2012) The Global Energy Dialogue 
13
th
 International Energy Forum 22 (hereafter Salem E A 2012). 
176
  The statement was made by the Secretary General of OPEC. See Salem E A (2012) 22. 
177
  See Art 2 (a) of the OPEC Statute. The Organisation is charged with the determination of the best means for 
safeguarding members interests, individually and collectively. 
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member states. This section indicates that OPEC‘s legal framework on corruption 
and transparency is almost non-existent. This creates conditions in which corruption 
can flourish in the member states. OPEC‘s current partnerships with other 
international energy organisations to eliminate corruption in the oil sector is a 
positive indication of its commitment to improving transparency and controlling 
corruption. Due to the weak legal framework on production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and corruption in the OPEC member states, alternatives for the regulation 
of these key areas are discussed in the next section. 
4.5 Alternatives to OPEC Regulation 
This section discusses non-WTO alternatives to OPEC regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption.178 The section discusses other 
interventions that have an effect on the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and corruption in the OPEC member countries. This section 
commences by examining over-regulation at the international level, particularly with 
regard to corruption and finally addresses domestic interventions for regulation of 
the above key areas, as alternatives to OPEC regulation. The discussion of domestic 
regulation relies on Nigeria and Angola as examples. 
Production quotas and oil consumption subsidies are regulated by the WTO 
although they are not expressly regulated by OPEC. 179  However, the domestic 
interventions regulating these two key areas in OPEC member countries will be 
discussed at a later point in this section of the thesis.180 Related to that, corruption on 
the other hand, although not expressly regulated by OPEC, is to some extent 
regulated by the WTO GPA.181 Nonetheless, there are various international and 
regional interventions which also help control this practice.182 These international 
                                                 
178
  WTO regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption is discussed in chapter 3 of 
the thesis. 
179
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. 
180
  These two key areas will be discussed with reference to Nigeria and Angola, which are members of both 
OPEC and the WTO. 
181
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
182
  Although the Dodd-Frank Act of the United States of America also promotes transparency in the oil sector, 
as oil companies have to disclose payments made to foreign governments, it is a domestic law and it is 
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and regional instruments and interventions on corruption are discussed in the next 
section. 
A) International and Regional Instruments and Interventions 
The international and regional instruments and interventions include: the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),183 the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC),184 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions 185  and the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.186 These instruments create 
alternatives to regulating corruption in the oil sector in OPEC member countries.  
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore not discussed in this section. See Revenue Watch Institute ‗Dodd-Frank‘ available at 
http://www.revenuewatch.org/issues/dodd-frank (accessed 10 April 2013). 
183
  The EITI principles underscore the importance of transparency, accountability and transparency of payments 
made in the natural resources sector. This is a strong intervention against corruption. See EITI ‗The EITI 
Rules 2011‘ available at http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01_2011_EITI_RULES.pdf (accessed 10 April 2013). 
184
  The purpose of this convention is to combat corruption efficiently and effectively. It is also meant to 
facilitate international cooperation against corruption. See UN General Assembly ‗United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption A/58/422‘ available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/437 
4b9524.html (accessed 10 April 2013). UNCAC has various provisions on the prevention of corruption in 
the public and private sector. It also provides for the criminal prosecution of corrupt practices. See generally 
Argandoña A The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on International 
Companies (2006) ―la Caixa‖ Chair of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance Working 
Paper No. 656 (hereafter Argandoña A 2006). Even though there are various provisions in the UNCAC 
aimed at prevention of corruption, its main contribution is the prosecution of corrupt practices in the oil 
sector. It is respectfully submitted that prosecution of corrupt practices in Africa is not always the best way 
to prevent corruption in the oil sector. Corruption in the oil sector is in most cases undertaken by highly 
placed government officials, who are protected from prosecution. Thus the most appropriate method of 
corruption control in the oil sector is sufficient regulations and monitoring mechanisms. See generally 
Søreide T Corruption in Petroleum –Within and Beyond the Sector (2011) Impact of corruption on the 
environment and the United Nations Convention against Corruption as a tool to address it, fourth Conference 
of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereafter Søreide T 2011). 
185
  This Convention is extra-territorial and criminalises bribes provided by foreign public officials. See OECD 
‗Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20‘ available at http://www.oecd.org/ investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/38028044.pdf (accessed 10 April 2013). This Convention is limited in application and 
membership due to its focus on the supply side of corrupt transactions, that is, officials who offer the bribes. 
Although this Convention is important it cannot effectively regulate the supply side and demand side of 
corrupt practices in the oil transactions in Africa. See OECD ‗Bribery and Corruption‘ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (accessed 03 May 2013). 
186
  See the African Union ‗African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption‘ available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493fe36a2.html (accessed 10 April 2013). This Convention like the 
UNCAC focuses on prosecution of persons involved in corrupt practices. Prosecution is not the most 
appropriate form of controlling corruption in the oil sector. Additionally, some African oil producing 
countries have not signed or ratified the Convention. See African Union ‗List of Countries Which Have 
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption‘ available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption.pdf (accessed 03 May 2013). 
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However, the prevalence of various international instruments also highlights the 
challenge of over-regulation and the effect it might have on the private oil 
companies involved in oil production and trade in Africa.187 While the foregoing 
argument has been noted, the thesis mainly seeks to protect the interests of the 
citizens of countries involved in the international trade in oil. To this end, the 
various regulatory instruments may be useful in ensuring that countries‘ oil 
revenues are not misappropriated. The EITI is further discussed with reference to 
Nigeria and Angola.  
Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971188 and later also joined the WTO in 1995.189 Angola has 
recently joined OPEC190 but has been a member of the WTO since 1996.191 The other 
international instruments although relevant, do not particularly address the oil 
industry.192 The above observation does not allow a detailed discussion of the other 
international and regional instruments elaborated above.193  
                                                 
187
 It has been argued that over-regulation can affect the competiveness of the oil industry in the long run. These 
arguments have been made in the area of environmental regulations, which sometimes are too expensive to 
implement and in some cases render oil production from mature fields unprofitable. However, proponents of 
this argument concede that tight environmental regulations have made the industry cleaner. The same 
argument can be made for regulations on corruption in the oil sector. It may be argued that the cost of 
implementing various regulations on corruption may turn away some prospective investors in the oil sector. 
Nevertheless, if the citizens of the oil producing countries are to benefit from their oil resources, corruption 
has to be curbed at all costs. What should be discouraged is overlapping regulations on corruption from 
various organs. Thus it may be appropriate for the OPEC member countries to rely on existing initiatives 
such as EITI as opposed to OPEC developing rules on corruption. Regulations should be few but stringent. 
See Harris A & Khare A ‗Sustainable development issues and strategies for Alberta‘s oil industry‘ (2002) 
Technovation 22 577 (hereafter Harris A & Khare A 2002).  
188
 See OPEC ‗Nigeria Facts and Figures‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_ web/en/about _us/ 167.htm 
(accessed 25 April 2013). 
189
 See WTO ‗Nigeria and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e /nig eria 
_e.htm (accessed 25 April 2013). 
190
 Angola joined OPEC in 2007. See OPEC ‗Angola Facts and Figures‘ available at http://www.opec. 
org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm (accessed 25 April 2013). 
191
 See WTO ‗Angola and the WTO‘ available at https://www.wto.org/ english//thewto_e /countries 
_e/angola_e.htm (accessed 25 April 2013). 
192
 The Articles of Association of the EITI Association expressly indicate that the objective of the Association is 
to make the EITI principles and criteria, the internationally acceptable standard for transparency in the oil, 
gas and mining sectors. See EITI ‗EITI Rules 2011 Edition, Articles of Association Article 2 (2)‘ available 
at http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01_2011_EITI_RULES.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
193
 The other international and regional instruments discussed above include: the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC), the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption. 
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Nigeria is reported to be an EITI compliant country.194 That is in terms of publishing 
all payments made by the oil companies to the government. 195  The figures for 
government revenues and company payments tally.196 However, do the EITI reports 
on government revenues and company payments cover all aspects of transparency? 
It is argued that although the EITI system of reporting payments and revenues is a 
great innovation for monitoring transparency in the oil sector, it is not fool proof.197 
Nevertheless, unlike other EITI implementing countries, Nigeria‘s laws on 
implementation of the EITI cover expenditure transparency in addition to revenue 
transparency.198 However, the lack of mechanisms to monitor contracts transparency 
is an avenue for corruption. On the other hand corruption and bribery have been 
reported in the Angolan oil sector. In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
reported that about US $ 32 billion was unaccounted for from the sale of crude oil in 
Angola.199 Even then, as of April 2013, Angola was not EITI compliant.200 Thus EITI 
interventions cannot be applied to the Angolan government. 
B) Domestic Legislation 
Similar to the discussion of the international instruments and interventions, the 
discourse on domestic legislation is analysed within the framework of the Nigerian 
and Angolan legislation. The section does not attempt to discuss all relevant laws 
and only discusses those laws that substantially affect production quotas, oil 
                                                 
194
  See EITI ‗Nigeria‘ available at http://eiti.org/Nigeria (accessed 11 April 2013). 
195
  See EITI ‗Nigeria‘ available at http://eiti.org/Nigeria (accessed 11 April 2013). 
196
  See EITI ‗Nigeria‘ available at http://eiti.org/Nigeria (accessed 11 April 2013). 
197
  It has been noted by some authors that transparency in the extractive sector involves contracts transparency, 
revenue transparency and expenditure transparency. The EITI has been criticised for focusing only on 
revenue transparency. However, some commentators have lauded the initiative for its strict mandate. 
Nonetheless, the concentration on only revenue still creates room for corruption at the stages of awarding 
contracts and spending revenue from the oil sector. See Uziogwe U M Exploring Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiatives for Natural Resource Governance the Example of the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) (2012) (unpublished PHD thesis University of Birmingham) 67. (hereafter 
Uziogwe U M 2012). See also Rosenblum P & Maples S Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the 
Extractive Industries (2009) Revenue Watch Institute 16 (hereafter Rosenblum P & Maples S 2009). 
198
  Uziogwe U M (2012) 74. It should be noted that expenditure transparency is not the major focus of the EITI 
in Nigeria even if it is provided in the EITI framework in Nigeria. See McNeil M & Malena C (eds) 
Demanding Good Governance Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa (2010) World Bank 
152 (hereafter McNeil M & Malena C (eds) 2010). 
199
  Revenue Watch Institute Reporting on In-kind Revenue through the EITI (2012) Background paper to the 
EITI Working Group 2 (hereafter Revenue Watch Institute 2012). 
200
  See Revenue Watch Institute ‗Angola-Transparency Snapshot‘ available at http://www.revenu e watch.org 
/countries/africa/angola/transparency-snapshot (accessed 11 April 2013). 
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consumption subsidies and corruption. It is worth noting that since the two 
countries are OPEC members, production quotas are regulated within the OPEC 
framework discussed above.201 Domestic legislation only compliments the OPEC 
regulation of production quotas. 
In Nigeria, the Petroleum Act of 1969 permits the minister of petroleum resources to 
make regulations for the conservation of oil resources.202 Pursuant to the above 
provisions of the Petroleum Act 1969, the minister enacted the Petroleum (Drilling 
and Production) Regulations of 1969. However, the regulations are not clear on the 
mandate of the minister and other government officials to issue directions on 
production quotas. That having been said, the Petroleum Act of 1969 provides 
powers to the minister to regulate petroleum production. 203  This may involve 
restricting petroleum production to conserve the environment.204 It is interesting to 
note that although the Petroleum Act of 1969 was enacted before Nigeria joined 
OPEC, it created space for the restriction of oil production, albeit for conservation 
purposes. It can be argued that it was easy to rely on the same law to maintain OPEC 
quotas after the country joined OPEC. 
Similarly, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act of 1977 provides for the 
regulation of oil production.205 It provides for the creation of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation.206 One of the functions of the corporation is to engage in oil 
production.207 The Act also provides for the creation of the petroleum inspectorate 
department which regulates the production of oil in Nigeria. 208  However, the 
petroleum inspectorate was merged with the ministry of petroleum resources and no 
longer exists as a regulatory body.209 Regulation of the oil industry in Nigeria is 
                                                 
201
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
202
  See section 9 (1) (b) (ii) of the Petroleum Act Chapter 350 No 51 of 1969. Currently the oil sector is 
regulated by the ministry of petroleum resources.  
203
  See section 9 (1) (b) (ii) of the Petroleum Act Chapter 350 No 51 of 1969. 
204
  See section 9 (1) (b) (ii) of the Petroleum Act Chapter 350 No 51 of 1969. 
205
  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter 320 of 1977. 
206
  See section 1 (1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter 320 of 1977. 
207
  See section 5 (1) (a) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter 320 of 1977. 
208
  See section 10 (2) (a) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter 320 of 1977. 
209
  See Department of Petroleum Resources ‗Historical Background‘ available at http:// www.dprnigeria. com/ 
aboutus.html (accessed 25 April 2013). 
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currently undertaken by the department of petroleum resources.210 The Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation Act of 1977 entrenches production quotas as it 
appears to provide powers to the regulatory authority to restrict petroleum 
production. These powers are not expressly provided but are implied. Since the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act of 1977 was enacted after the country 
joined OPEC, it is not naïve to argue that the Act was adopted with OPEC oil 
production restrictions in mind. 
It can therefore be argued that Nigeria‘s domestic laws on production quotas cannot 
strictly be interpreted as alternatives to OPEC regulation. Even though Nigeria may 
not comply with its OPEC quotas at all times, the domestic laws reinforce its OPEC 
obligations. Lastly, although the Petroleum Act only provides for regulation of oil 
resources for conservation purposes, Nigeria‘s membership of OPEC implicitly 
extends the regulation of oil production beyond conservation to restrict oil 
production for price stability. Nigeria‘s oil legislation is under review and a bill on 
the regulation of the upstream and downstream activities in the oil sector is 
currently before the National Assembly.211 
With regard to Angola, the government supervises and monitors development and 
production of oil resources. Oil production plans are approved by the government 
and production is also monitored.212 Protection of the environment is one of the 
issues that have to be considered by licensees and concessioners in oil production.213 
Additionally, licensees and concessioners have to produce oil in a rational manner 
and also comply with international standards in the oil sector.214 This creates an 
amiable framework for the imposition of OPEC production quotas. Angola is similar 
to the Nigerian example; the laws that regulate oil production are not really 
alternatives to OPEC regulation as the country is a member of OPEC. Accordingly, it 
                                                 
210
  See Department of Petroleum Resources ‗Historical Background‘ available at http://www.dprnige ria.com/ 
aboutus.html (accessed 25 April 2013). 
211
  The Petroleum Industry Bill may cure some of the organisational challenges of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation and the Petroleum Inspectorate Department. See Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation Processing & Monitoring of Nigerian Crude/Gas Production and Proper Accounting of Sales 
(2011) 93 (hereafter Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2011). 
212
  See sections 7(2), 21, 64(6), 65 (1), 70, 71 and 76 of the Petroleum Activities Law 10/04 of 2004. 
213
  See Section 7(2) of the Petroleum Activities Law 10/04 of 2004. 
214
  See Section 21 (1) of the Petroleum Activities Law 10/04 of 2004. 
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has to comply with OPEC production allocations. Like Nigeria, Angola‘s current 
petroleum legislation was enacted before the country joined OPEC. However, since 
the regulations create space for the restriction of petroleum production for purposes 
of protection of the environment among others, it can be argued that these 
regulations can also be applied for the restriction of oil production to comply with 
OPEC obligations. 
Both countries provide oil consumption subsidies. Nigeria established a Petroleum 
Products Pricing Regulatory Agency.215 One of the main functions of this body is to 
determine the pricing policy on petroleum products.216 In determining the pricing 
policy for various oil products, certain products are subsidised and they are mainly 
utilised by certain industries such as the transport sector.217 The Petroleum Products 
Pricing Regulatory Agency relies on the petroleum support fund to provide 
subsidies.218 However, in 2011, the petroleum support fund did not have resources 
to support the oil consumption subsidy program and funding for the subsidies was 
provided through the excess crude account.219 Nigeria has currently phased out 
subsidies for diesel but maintains subsidies for kerosene and gasoline.220  
Additionally, oil consumption subsidies in Nigeria have encouraged smuggling of 
oil to Cameroon.221 Therefore it may be argued that oil consumption subsidies in 
Nigeria affect the domestic industry of another WTO member. In 2011, oil 
consumption subsidies in Nigeria cost 4.7 per cent of GDP.222 Efforts to eliminate oil 
                                                 
215
  See section 1 of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency Act No. 8 of 2003. See also Adelabu N 
S ‗The political economy of oil deregulation in Nigeria‘s fourth republic: prospects and challenges‘ (2012) 
Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies 3(3) 195-196 (hereafter Adelabu N 
S 2012). 
216
  See section 7 of the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency Act No. 8 of 2003. 
217
  See Adenikinju A ‗Energy Pricing and Subsidy Reform in Nigeria‘ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/envtrade/42987402.pdf (accessed 12 April 2013). See also Adelabu N S (2012) 196. 
218
  See International Monetary Fund ‗Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications‘ 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
219
  See International Monetary Fund ‗Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications‘ 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
220
  See International Monetary Fund ‗Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications‘ 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
221
  See Business Day ‗Subsidy Removal Cripples Fuel Smuggling Across Nigerian Borders‘ available at 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/31798-subsidy-removal-cripples-fuel-
smuggling-across-nigerian-bordersm (accessed 27 April 2013). 
222
 See International Monetary Fund ‗Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications‘ 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
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consumption subsidies in Nigeria have not been successful.223 It is clear that Nigeria, 
an OPEC member state maintains an oil consumption subsidy program which has 
caused domestic and extraterritorial challenges. The domestic legislation in Nigeria 
facilitates the provision of oil consumption subsidies.224 It is worth noting that OPEC 
has not played a key role in eliminating oil consumption subsidies in Nigeria. 
Angola also provides oil consumption subsidies.225 It provides about US $ 1 billion in 
oil consumption subsidies annually.226 The average subsidisation rate for fuel in 
Angola is estimated to be 26.8 percent.227 It has also been noted that oil consumption 
subsidies in Angola are mainly applied to transportation fuels. These include diesel 
and petroleum.228 This indicates that the subsidies are mainly utilised by a specific 
sector. Even though the subsidies may be provided to all, they are utilised by a select 
sector. As of April 2013, the Angolan state oil company, is both an oil concessioner 
and the regulator of exploration and production.229 However, its mandate does not 
extend to regulating oil pricing. Oil prices in Angola are regulated by the ministry of 
finance.230 It was not possible to access the legal framework used to provide oil 
consumption subsidies for transportation fuels in Angola.  
                                                 
223
  See International Monetary Fund ‗Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications‘ 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813a.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013). 
224
  It can be argued that since the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency Act of 2003 was enacted after 
Nigeria had joined OPEC, the regulations reflect the organisation‘s stance towards the imposition of oil 
consumption subsidies. 
225
  See Institute for Energy Research ‗Developing Countries Subsidise Fossil Fuels, Artificially Lowering 
Prices‘ available at http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/01/03/developing-countries-subsidize-
fossil-fuel-consumption-creating-artificially-lower-prices/ (accessed 12 April 2013). 
226
  See Institute for Energy Research ‗Developing Countries Subsidise Fossil Fuels, Artificially Lowering 
Prices‘ available at http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/01/03/developing-countries-subsidize-
fossil-fuel-consumption-creating-artificially-lower-prices/ (accessed 12 April 2013). 
227
  See IEA ‗Fossil-Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates as a Proportion of the Full Cost of Supply, 2011‘ available 
at http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html (accessed 12 April 2013). 
228
  See US Energy Administration Information ‗Angola‘ available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab. 
cfm?fips=AO (accessed 12 April 2013). 
229
  See Sonangol ‗Sonangol E &P‘ available at http://www.sonangol.co.ao/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8x 
LLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hDl5AQUzN_QwMDwyBTA09DR2djAy8XYwNXU6B8JLJ8gIUbUN4_MMDHx
9XQwNyUIt1mBHSHg1yLU7-7uxFeeQNzcwLypgTkzSDyBjiAo4G-n0d-bqp-QW5ohEGmZ5aJo6IiAF-
PPjI!/dl2/d1/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnB3LzZfMURUVDU2TzEwMFA4RjBJMU9RUExMRTEwVjY!/ 
(accessed 12 April 2013). 
230
  See Ministry of Finance ‗Oil and Diamonds‘ available at http://translate.google.co.za/translate?hl= 
en&sl=pt&u=http://www.minfin.gv.ao/&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dministry%2Bof%2Bfinance% 
2Bangola%26hl%3Den%26biw%3D1366%26bih%3D622&sa=X&ei=ZRFoUa-
SCImyhAfzhIDoDw&sqi=2&ved=0CDMQ7gEwAA (accessed 12 April 2013). 
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Information on the legal framework regulating Angola‘s oil subsidy program is not 
readily available. The validity of the available information has also been 
questioned. 231  It is also worth noting that the available information is usually 
published in Portuguese. This was challenging to the author who is not fluent in 
Portuguese. Nonetheless, Angola is an OPEC member state and it provides oil 
consumption subsidies. However, for the above reasons, the author was not able to 
examine the domestic legal framework against which these subsidies are provided. 
The final part of this section discusses the domestic regulation of corruption in the 
oil sector in both Nigeria and Angola. The discussion builds on the international and 
regional alternatives for the regulation of corruption in OPEC member countries 
discussed above.  
In Nigeria, the Petroleum Act of 1969 does not provide for penal provisions against 
corruption in the oil sector.232 It is therefore not surprising that the country has been 
dogged by several corruption related practices in its oil sector. 233  Against this 
background, the minister of petroleum resources established a petroleum revenue 
special task force.234 The body was mainly charged with enhancing accountability in 
petroleum operations.235 The petroleum revenue task force has recommended that 
an oil sector transparency law should be enacted.236 Laws against corruption do not 
always translate into reduced incidences of corruption; however, the laws set a 
foundation for identifying and prosecuting persons involved in corrupt practices.237 
                                                 
231
  Open Societies Initiative for Southern Africa ‗Oil Revenues in Angola: Much more information but not 
enough transparency‘ available at http://www.osisa.org/other/economic-justice/angola/oil-revenues-angola-
much-more-information-not-enough-transparency (accessed 12 April 2013). 
232
  See the Petroleum Act Chapter 350 No 51 of 1969. 
233
  Ribadu N who conducted investigations into corruption in Nigeria‘s oil sector reported that in the last 10 
years, Nigeria lost US $ 35 billion to corruption. See Guardian Africa Network ‗Nigeria: How to Lose $ 35 
bn‘ available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/13/nigeria-oil-corruption-ridabu (accessed 25 
April 2013). Oil trade is one of the biggest sources of government revenue in Nigeria. The national budget of 
Nigeria is greatly supported by oil production and trade. Accordingly most of the funds that are 
misappropriated by the government officials are part of the oil revenue. See Ngonzi O ‗Overview of the 
2013 Budget‘ available at http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/bof_2013-update /CME_Budget_Speech1.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2013). 
234
  Ribadu M N & Shasore O Final Report of the Petroleum Revenue Task Force (2012) 6 (hereafter Ribadu M 
N & Shasore O 2012). 
235
  Ribadu M N & Shasore O (2012) 6. 
236
  Ribadu M N & Shasore O (2012) 117. 
237
  Some empirical studies have suggested that competition is a more effective tool for control of corruption, 
especially in countries where the laws and the judicial system are not well developed. See Ades A & Di 
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Despite the fact that a general legal framework to tackle corruption in Nigeria was 
enacted in 2000,238 it has been argued by some commentators that the law in isolation 
cannot curb corruption in Nigeria.239 The foregoing argument is credible given the 
fact that after the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act of 2000 was 
enacted, corruption in the oil sector continued unabated.240 Nonetheless, the lack of 
express regulations on corruption in the OPEC Statute, coupled with the lack of 
sufficient domestic laws against corruption, may have contributed to the high 
incidence of corruption in Nigeria‘s oil sector. 
Angola‘s oil sector has not been free of corruption related scandals.241 Related to that, 
the lack of transparency in reporting oil revenues has continued to taint the 
reputation of the country.242 Some commentators note that between 1997 and 2002, 
the oil sector in Angola generated revenue of up to US $ 17.8 billion.243 However, 
there are no reports indicating how this revenue was expended. 244  The lack of 
transparency has been compounded by the State Secrecy Act enacted in 2002,245 
which criminalises the disclosure of state financial information.246 This environment 
is a perfect breeding ground for corruption. Nonetheless, Angola has laws against 
corruption. One of the most important laws on corruption is the Law of the High 
Authority against Corruption 1996.247 The law creates a body to control corruption in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Tella R ‗The new economics of corruption: a survey and some new results‘ (1997) Political Studies XLV 
514 (hereafter Ades A & Di Tella R 1997). 
238
  See the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act No. 5 of 2000. 
239
  See generally Ocheje P D ‗Law and social change: a socio-legal analysis of Nigeria‘s corrupt practices and 
other related offences act, 2000‘ (2001) Journal of African Law 45 2 (hereafter Ocheje P D 2001). 
240
  See Guardian Africa Network ‗Nigeria: How to Lose $ 35 bn‘ available at http://www.guardian.co. uk/world 
/2012/nov/13/nigeria-oil-corruption-ridabu (accessed 25 April 2013). 
241
  See Global Witness ‗Angola‘ available at http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/corruption/oil-gas-and-
mining/angola (accessed 25 April 2013). See also Soares De Oliveira R ‗Business success, Angola-style: 
postcolonial politics and the rise and rise of Sonangol‘ (2007) J. of Modern African Studies, 45, 4 608 
(hereafter Soares De Oliveira R 2007). The most recent scandal is the involvement of senior officials of 
Sonangol and government in the private oil companies in Angola. Basically officials are allocating their 
companies blocks for oil production. See Ramos M L Angola‘s Oil Industry Operation (2012) Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa 7 (hereafter Ramos M L 2012). 
242
  Davis G A ‗Book Reviews-Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State 2 ed by Tony Hodges‘ (2005) The Energy 
Journal Vol 26 Issue 4 130 (hereafter Davis G A 2005). 
243
  Meredith M The State of Africa A History of the Continent since Independence (2011) 615 (hereafter 
Meredith M 2011). 
244
  Meredith M (2011) 615. 
245
  State Secrecy Act No. 10 of 2002. 
246
  Meredith M (2011) 615. 
247
  Law of the High Authority against Corruption No. 3 of 1996. 
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Angola.248 Despite the fact that this law came into force in 1996, it has been reported 
that the body is not operational.249 This demonstrates the lack of political will to 
actually tackle corruption in the oil sector in Angola.  
Other laws such as the Penal Code250 and the Laws of Crimes against the Economy 
of 1999 251 are also part of the legal framework against corruption in Angola. Angola 
has laws against corruption but lacks the political will to utilise the laws for the 
control of corruption in the oil sector. It should be noted that like in the Nigerian 
case, these laws are not specifically meant to tackle corruption in the oil sector. 
Angola joined OPEC with laws against corruption. Thus it cannot be argued that the 
absence of regulations on corruption in the OPEC statute affected the regulation of 
corrupt practices in Angola‘s oil sector. This distinguishes Angola from Nigeria. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 OPEC is an international organisation and its major mandate is price stabilisation. 
The Conference which is the supreme organ of the organisation does not implement 
its decisions. This role is left to the Secretariat and to some extent the Board and 
other subsidiary bodies. The institutions of the organisation implement resolutions 
of the Conference. However, the legal status of these resolutions, mainly due to their 
arbitrary nature, is questionable. The institutions also face challenges in 
implementation due to the fact that the organisation has weak enforcement 
mechanisms and does not have a formal dispute settlement procedure. Nonetheless, 
the institutions entrench practices that maintain oil production quotas. The 
institutions are largely silent on the regulation of oil consumption subsidies and the 
control of corruption. Accordingly, the OPEC institutions are not sufficient for the 
regulation of international trade in oil. 
                                                 
248
  See Art 1 of the Law of the High Authority against Corruption No. 3 of 1996. 
249
  Ramos M L (2012) 18. 
250
  Penal Code of 1886. 
251
  This law holds real potential for the fight against corruption in Angola. It provides for forfeiture and seizure 
of goods that are obtained illegally and also criminalises corrupt practices. See Laws of Crimes against the 
Economy No. 6 of 1999. 
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The OPEC Statute is mainly procedural and does not explicitly provide the core 
areas that are regulated by the organisation. Thus the legal framework of the 
organisation is difficult to examine. Nevertheless, Art 2 of the Statute gives the 
organisation a broad mandate. Production quotas are regulated on the basis of Art 2 
of the OPEC Statute. On the other hand, oil consumption subsidies and corruption 
are also not expressly regulated by the OPEC Statute. Nonetheless, oil consumption 
subsidies can be supported under the broad language of Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. 
The regulatory framework for corruption and transparency is weak. The legal 
framework for the regulation of production quotas and oil consumption subsidies is 
not strong enough to support these market distorting policies. Further, there is a 
need for the legal framework to regulate corruption in OPEC member states. On the 
basis of the discussion in this chapter, it can be argued that the OPEC legal 
framework is not sufficient to regulate international trade in oil. 
OPEC member countries like Nigeria and Angola can rely on other interventions 
such as EITI to control corruption in the oil sector. This can be supplemented by 
their domestic legal regimes which have not been effective. Nigeria and Angola also 
have domestic laws that appear to support OPEC production quotas. This is also 
true for oil consumption subsidies especially in the case of Nigeria. The next chapter 
examines the relationship between the WTO and OPEC in terms of the institutional 
and legal frameworks.  
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION (WTO) AND THE ORGANISATION OF 
PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC) 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four examined the role of OPEC in the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies, and corruption. The analysis in chapter four, built on the 
discussion in chapter three which employed a similar structure to discuss the above 
key areas in the context of the WTO. Both these chapters have relied on African 
examples to contextualise the debate and keep the theme of the discussion focused 
on Africa. 
Chapter five provides a comparative synthesis of the debates arising in chapters 
three and four. The chapter examines the institutional structures of the WTO and 
OPEC.1 The chapter also highlights and discusses the similarities and differences 
that exist in the legal frameworks of the two organisations. Like previous chapters, 
the term ‗international trade in oil‘, is used to refer to the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies and control of corruption. It should be noted that 
a limited part of the comparison between the two organisations was undertaken in 
chapter three. 2  This was mainly done to illustrate the application of WTO 
agreements and provisions that relate to international trade in oil. 
It is worth noting that although the title of this chapter indicates that the study is a 
comparative analysis, the comparison undertaken in the chapter is in some ways 
distinct from the traditional understanding of a comparative legal analysis in the 
                                                 
1
  The WTO and OPEC are both international organisations and are treated as such in this chapter. 
See chapter 1 section 1.3.1, chapter 2 section 2.3 and chapter 4 section 4.2.1. 
2
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.  
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strict sense.3 The analysis in the chapter follows the broad framework established in 
chapters three and four. As noted in chapter one, OPEC and the WTO are the most 
relevant organisations in the regulation of international trade in oil. 4  This also 
applies to Africa where some of the largest African oil producing countries are 
members of both the WTO and OPEC. 5  Thus the comparison in this chapter 
occasionally draws from African examples to keep the focus of the discussion on 
Africa.  
The author is also aware of the challenges involved in comparing the roles of two 
organisations that have different theoretical backgrounds.6 However, as noted in the 
previous chapters, both the WTO and OPEC have a central role to play in the 
regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and the control of 
corruption. Accordingly, a comparison of the institutions involved, and the legal 
framework of the two organisations is indeed feasible. 
The first section analyses the institutions of both organisations and how these relate 
to the regulation of the international trade in oil. The decision making processes in 
both organisations and how these affect the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies, and the control of corruption are also discussed.7 Ample 
                                                 
3
  Comparative legal studies ensure that problems in one legal system are addressed in an identical fashion in 
another legal system. However, in the present case, both systems have shortcomings and challenges. 
Although one system may appear to be more appropriate than the other, the challenges in the weaker system 
cannot be solved by directly applying the framework of one to the other. Additionally, while the WTO has 
agreements on the regulation of subsidies and corruption in government procurement, OPEC does not have 
such express agreements and provisions. Nonetheless, one of the objectives of comparative legal studies is 
international harmonisation and unification of laws. To this end, this chapter seeks to argue for the 
harmonisation with modification, of the laws regulating production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and 
control of corruption in oil producing countries. See Morosini F ‗Globalisation & law: beyond traditional 
methodology of comparative legal studies and the example from private international law‘ (2005) 13 
Cardozo J Int’l & Comp. L. 541 and 543 (hereafter Morosini F 2005). See also Okeke C N (2012) 7. See 
also chapter 1 section 1.11. 
4
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
5
  Angola and Nigeria are members of both the WTO and OPEC. See Worika I L (2010) 89. 
6
  See chapter 2 sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 for a detailed discussion. See also Hrbatá V ‗No international 
organisation is an island...the WTO‘s relationship with the WIPO: a model for the governance of trade 
linkage areas?‘ (2010) Journal of World Trade 44, No.1 1-2 (hereafter Hrbatá V 2010). 
7
  Decision making in this context is limited to its effects on the regulation of the key areas that are the subject 
of this study. Nonetheless, great insights and proposals on decision making especially at the WTO have been 
made by various authors. For a detailed account on some of these proposals see Elsig M & Cottier T 
‗Reforming the WTO: the decision-making triangle revisited‘ Cottier T & Elsig M (eds) Governing the 
World Trade Organization Past, Present and Beyond Doha (2011) 289 (hereafter Elsig M & Cottier T 2011). 
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attention is also given to the discussion of dispute settlement procedures in both 
organisations and how this affects international trade in oil. 
The second section narrows the discussion to the legal framework and the challenges 
and strengths in both the WTO agreements and the OPEC Statute. The discussion is 
focused on the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and the 
control of corruption. This section of the thesis also provides a comparative 
summary for the chapter. The analysis from the second section and to a small extent 
the other section of the chapter, are then applied to the case study, Ghana in chapter 
six.  
The WTO has its origins in the adoption of the GATT in 1947.8 On the other hand, 
OPEC was created in 1960.9 The geopolitical climate at the time may also explain the 
differences in the negotiations and the content of the WTO agreements and the 
OPEC Statute. The GATT and the ITO Charter were negotiated after the Second 
World War, distrust still reigned at the time and this may have affected the adoption 
of the charter establishing the ITO. 10  The GATT 1947 may have been adopted 
because it primarily focused on the reduction of tariffs and did not appear to affect 
the sovereignty of states in determining their trade regulations like the ITO charter. 
Conversely, the OPEC Statute was negotiated during the cold war.11 It is therefore 
not surprising that the oil producing countries got together to protect their resources. 
Although literature indicates that the cold war started around 1945, it did not affect 
the GATT 1947, which was key in reducing tariffs across the board.12 Despite the fact 
that both organisations were formed during the cold war, GATT which later gave 
birth to the WTO was formed at the beginning of the cold war while OPEC was 
formed during the cold war. This may explain the liberalisation agenda of the former 
and the trade restrictive leaning of the latter. 
                                                 
8
  See chapter 1 section 1.3. 
9
  See chapter 1 section 1.2. 
10
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 78. 
11
  Lafeber W America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-2002 9 ed (2004) 33 (hereafter Lafeber W 2004). See 
also Leffler M P The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (1996) Sixth Alois Mertes 
Memorial Lecture 12-13 (hereafter Leffler M P 1996). 
12
  Lafeber W (2004) 33. See also Leffler M P (1996) 12-13. 
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5.2 Institutional Framework for both the WTO and OPEC 
The discussion of the institutional framework of the above organisations is pivotal to 
the discussion of the legal framework and the implementation and regulation of 
production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and control of corruption. The 
discussion of the institutional framework is divided into three parts. That is, the top-
level organs, the mid-level organs and the subsidiary organs. 13  Implicit in the 
discussion of these organs, the section also addresses the decision making 
procedures and powers of both organisations. The first part of this section examines 
and compares the top-level organs of both organisations. 
5.2.1 Top-Level Organs 
The section discusses the composition of the top level organs, their schedule of 
meetings and the powers or roles of the organs in the regulation of international 
trade in oil. The organs that are discussed in this section are the Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO and the OPEC Conference. 
5.2.1.1 Composition and Schedule of Meetings 
At the highest level, both organisations are guided by ministerial-level organs.14 The 
Ministerial Conference is the top most organ of the WTO, while the Conference is the 
top most organ of OPEC.15 The implication of the above observation is that the 
members of both organs have responsibilities outside the organisations, that is, 
domestic obligations as members of the executive branch in their respective 
countries. Second, the above composition requirement reveals that the members of 
both organs may not be technocrats. Usually, ministerial appointments are not based 
on technical expertise but rather are based on political considerations. This to some 
                                                 
13
  There are several institutions in the two organisations. It is therefore necessary to categorise the institutions 
to provide a comprehensible analysis. Accordingly, the top most organs are classified as top-level, the organs 
that implement the decisions of the top-level are classified as mid-level organs, and the organs that are 
supervised by the mid-level organs and have specific mandates are classified as subsidiary organs. 
14
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and chapter 4 section 4.3.1. In both organisations the representatives are usually 
at ministerial level. 
15
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
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extent affects the deliberations of both organs. It also attracts additional costs as the 
members require a host of advisors to guide them during discussions in the above 
organs.  
Nonetheless, with respect to the political character of the members of these organs, 
ministerial-level representatives are necessary and give the organisations legitimacy. 
Additionally, the political character emphasises the sovereignty of the member 
states. The implementation of International law and treaties in particular largely 
depends on good faith.16 Accordingly, obligations under treaties require political 
will. Thus the membership of the top-level organs of both organisations strive to 
build political will. The membership of the top organs provide legitimacy to the 
organisations and the decisions made by the organs. 
The schedule of top-level organ meetings is another issue that merits discussion. The 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO meets at least once every two years, while the 
OPEC Conference meets twice every year.17 It is apparent from the foregoing that 
Ministerial Conference meetings occur less frequently compared to OPEC 
Conference meetings. This distinction may not explain any substantial differences in 
the roles of the two organs. However, the infrequent meetings of the WTO may 
affect the momentum of the organisation. Although the General Council exercises 
powers of the Ministerial Conference when the latter is not in session, the 
composition of the General Council lacks the clout and political credibility possessed 
by the Ministerial Conference.18 This may affect decision making at the WTO. The 
frequent meetings of ministerial-level representatives at OPEC ensure that decisions 
are made promptly. 
5.2.1.2 Decision Making 
Decision making at the Ministerial Conference is done through consensus, while 
decision making at the OPEC Conference is through voting and unanimous 
                                                 
16
  See discussion on pacta sunt servanda in chapter 2 section 2.4.1. 
17
  See Art IV (I) of the Marrakesh Agreement and OPEC Statute Art 12. 
18
  See Art IV (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
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agreement of all full members.19 The WTO only reverts to voting in the event that 
decision making cannot be achieved through consensus. 20  Before discussing the 
differences or similarities between consensus and unanimous methods of decision 
making, it should be noted that the unanimous agreement required under the OPEC 
Conference only applies to full members.21  
Decision making through consensus at the Ministerial Conference is deemed to have 
been achieved if there are no objections by any of the members present, to decisions 
made at a meeting.22 As noted previously, OPEC has no formal dispute settlement 
mechanism, accordingly, provisions in the OPEC Statute have not been subjected to 
interpretation.23 Further, the OPEC Statute is thin on detail and the provision on 
unanimous agreement is not explained in the statute. A dictionary meaning of the 
term ‗unanimous‘ is therefore the first point of reference. The Oxford online 
dictionary defines ‗unanimous‘ as two or more people being in agreement.24 In light 
of the above definition, it is clear that the two methods of decision making are 
similar; both envisage situations where all parties are in agreement.25 This implies 
that there are no objections. It appears that voting at the OPEC Conference only 
applies to procedural matters.26 
However, with due regard to the foregoing similarity, it is clear that decision making 
at the OPEC Conference is not as inclusive as the Ministerial Conference.27 This 
creates a subtle difference in the decision making processes of the organs. This is 
                                                 
19
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
20
  See Art IX (I) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
21
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1 for a detailed discussion of the nature of OPEC Conference decisions. 
22
  See footnote 1 to Art IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
23
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
24
  See Oxford Dictionaries ‗Unanimous‘ available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ 
unanimous?q=unanimous (accessed 26 September 2012). See also chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
25
  A note of caution is required in light of the above observation. Unanimity and consensus may differ since 
unanimity requires the participation of all members, while consensus applies to the members present. See 
Jackson J H (1997) 65. 
26
  See Art 11 (c) of the OPEC Statute. 
27
  See chapter 4 sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 on the discriminatory nature of OPEC decision making that excludes 
associate members. 
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bound to affect the coherence and harmony of OPEC as it grows to include associate 
members.28  
5.2.1.3 Powers of the Top-Level Organs 
The Ministerial Conference has powers to adopt authoritative interpretations of the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the other covered agreements. 29  Subsequently all 
decisions of the other WTO organs such as the DSB, which purport to interpret the 
WTO agreements, are subject to interpretation by the Ministerial Conference. 30 
Practically, this mandate of the Ministerial Conference allows the body to exercise an 
oversight function over other bodies of the organisation. Second, it ensures that 
interpretation of the Marrakesh Agreement is provided by the specific 
representatives of the members and not technocrats. It can therefore be argued that 
this power entrenches decision making through consensus by WTO members 
through their representatives.  
Conversely, the OPEC Conference is vested with powers to approve amendments to 
the OPEC Statute.31 The powers to approve amendments are specific and although 
interpretation and amendment may be closely related, the powers are distinct.32 Be 
that as it may, the OPEC Conference is vested with very wide powers under the 
Statute. Article 16 provides a catch-all clause which enjoins the Conference to 
exercise all powers that are not expressly assigned to any other OPEC organ.33 
Accordingly, due to the fact that powers to interpret the OPEC Statute are not 
assigned to any organ in the statute, it can be argued that the powers may be 
exercised by the Conference. 
The powers of the Ministerial Conference to interpret WTO agreements have not 
been exercised with regard to production quotas (Art XI of the GATT) and oil 
                                                 
28
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
29
  See Art IX (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
30
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 for a detailed discussion. 
31
  See Art 15(9) of the OPEC Statute. 
32
  See Arts IX (2) and X of the Marrakesh Agreement. Interpretation should not be done in a manner that 
undermines the amendment provided in Art X. 
33
  See Art 16 of the OPEC Statute. 
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consumption subsidies (Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement).  Although this power 
is available to the Ministerial Conference, it has not been used to interpret provisions 
that affect international trade in oil. Nonetheless, the above position is better than 
the OPEC Statute which does not expressly provide for the power. Article 16 of the 
OPEC Statute is a very broad provision and it might be difficult for the OPEC 
Conference to engage in interpretation in the absence of a specific power to do so. 
The power to interpret provisions of the OPEC Statute, especially Arts 2 and 15 
which provide the broad mandate of the Organisation and the Conference, is 
fundamental to the regulation of international trade in oil.34 It can be argued that the 
above provisions impose an obligation on the Conference to deal with production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption.35 Although these areas are not 
specifically provided for in the OPEC Statute, they are practices that are prominent 
in the OPEC member countries.36 The Conference is enjoined to formulate general 
policy for the organisation.37  Thus Arts 2 and 15 should be interpreted by the 
Conference to include the above areas and regulate the same. 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion, that although the power to interpret the 
respective agreements is necessary, in some cases, it has not been exercised and in 
other cases, the power is not expressly conferred. This makes it difficult to rely on 
this power to advocate reform in the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and the control of corruption. Accordingly, the power of 
amendment which is clear and available in both the Marrakesh Agreement and the 
OPEC Statute, and which is exercised by the top-level organs, can be used to ensure 
that production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption are sufficiently 
regulated. This especially applies to OPEC which does not have express regulations 
on production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption. 
                                                 
34
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.1 on the powers of the OPEC Conference. 
35
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
36
  See chapter 1 section 1.2 and chapter 4 section 4.4. 
37
  See Art 15 (1) of the OPEC Statute. 
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The other power which is relevant to this discussion is the power to waive 
obligations under the WTO agreements. 38  In practice, decisions to grant such 
waivers are made through consensus of the members.39 Waivers are instrumental in 
accommodating the special needs of African countries. The waiver on MFN 
treatment and trade in blood diamonds and the waiver granted to the EC to provide 
preferential treatment to goods from Africa are relevant to international trade in 
oil.40 The waiver that was granted to facilitate the Kimberly process prevents trade 
rules from enabling human rights and other related violations.41 The above waiver is 
different from the waiver granted to the EC which is meant to increase market access 
for goods from Africa.42  
Both types of waivers are relevant to international trade in oil, which should not 
facilitate conflict in Africa. Thus the Ministerial Conference can exercise its powers to 
limit the application of the MFN principle to oil from conflict areas. On the other 
hand, currently market access for oil from Africa is not a challenge.43 However, in 
the event that market access for oil presents challenges in Africa, mechanisms exist 
under the WTO regime to grant preferential treatment to African oil producing 
countries. 
The OPEC Statute does not provide for powers to waive obligations under the 
Agreement. However, as noted above, Art 16 is broad and vests the OPEC 
Conference with wide powers.44 It follows that Art 16 can be interpreted to include 
the power to waive OPEC obligations. A critical review of such an interpretation of 
Art 16 reveals that the provision has to be applied cautiously. It presents real 
potential such as waiving quota requirements for African oil producing countries, to 
increase production and finance development projects. The power can also be used 
to waive obligations regulating oil consumption subsidies in the event that the OPEC 
Statute is amended to expressly regulate these subsidies. 
                                                 
38
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and Art IX (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
39
  Van den Bossche P (2008) 148. 
40
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 for a detailed discussion. 
41
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
42
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
43
  See chapter 2 sections 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.3.2. 
44
  See Art 16 of the OPEC Statute. 
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The WTO top-level organ has express powers to ensure smooth regulation of 
international trade in oil. Although the OPEC Statute provides wide powers to its 
top-level organ, it does not provide specific powers to provide authoritative 
interpretations of the OPEC Statute and to waive obligations thereunder. The top-
level organs work closely with mid-level organs which organs are more permanent 
and have a presence of technical personnel. The next section identifies and examines 
the roles of mid-level organs in both organisations. The discussion is focused on the 
powers of these organs and their involvement in international trade in oil.  
5.2.2 Mid-Level Organs 
The term ‗mid-level‘ organs in this context refers to those organs that are composed 
of high-level representatives, are de facto the managerial organs of the organisations 
and have a permanent status.45 Accordingly, the mid-level organs discussed in this 
section are divided into the organs with such characteristics at the WTO and similar 
organs under OPEC. Such organs at the WTO include the General Council and all its 
alter egos, that is, the DSB and the TPRB. 46  Relevant organs under the OPEC 
structure include the Board of Governors and the Secretariat.47 It can be deduced 
from this paragraph, that the mid-level organs are composed of various organs at 
both the WTO and OPEC. This presents a more complex task in terms of the 
organisation of the section and the analysis required.  
The section commences with an evaluation of the composition of these organs, and 
their schedule of meetings, the section then delves into the decision making roles of 
these organs and other powers that are instrumental in the regulation of 
international trade in oil, finally, the section examines the dispute settlement role of 
these organs. Dispute settlement may be interpreted as one of the general roles of the 
mid-level organs. The role is important in ensuring the seamless regulation of 
                                                 
45
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2 and chapter 4 sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. See also Art IV (2), (3) and (4) of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. See also Arts 17, 18, and 25 of the OPEC Statute. See also Stoehr L (1979) 97. See 
also Themaat V V (1981) 116. 
46
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. 
47
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
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international trade in oil and the relations between members of both organisations.48 
To this end, the role deserves special attention. 
Mid-level organs perform most of the functions that should ordinarily be performed 
by the top-level organs.49 The above observation implies that the discussion in this 
section is to some extent more demanding than the previous section. To limit the 
scope of the section, some of the issues that are discussed in the foregoing section 
will not be dealt with in detail. Nevertheless, the section also highlights the linkages 
between the top-level and mid-level organs.  
5.2.2.1 Composition and Schedule of Meetings 
Unlike top-level organs which are composed of ministerial-level representatives, the 
members of the mid-level organs are merely high-level representatives.50 While it 
can be argued that mid-level organ representatives are also political appointees and 
that they are not any different from the representatives in the top-level organs, the 
representatives at the mid-level organs are usually technocrats and are more 
permanent. 51  The mid-level organs are the managerial structures of the 
organisations. 52  The permanent status of the mid-level organs makes them 
particularly relevant. 
The OPEC Board of Governors is composed of technocrats. Although this is not 
explicitly indicated in the OPEC Statute, a review of the governors indicates that 
                                                 
48
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1 and chapter 4 section 4.3.4.2. OPEC does not have a formal dispute settlement 
mechanism; the Ministerial Monitoring sub-committee is not a dispute settlement body. See also Themaat V 
V (1981) 116. Further, Art 16 of the OPEC Statute provides that all powers that are not expressly assigned to 
other organs shall be exercised by the Conference. Accordingly, the foregoing provision makes the OPEC 
Conference the Dispute Settlement Body of the Organisation. It should be noted that such an interpretation 
presents practical problems. The composition of the Conference and the infrequent meetings of the body 
render it a poor choice for a dispute settlement body. On the other hand, the Board of Governors which 
meets more frequently, is more permanent and also has high level representatives is a more ideal choice for a 
dispute settlement body. 
49
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2 and chapter 4 sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
50
  See chapter 5 section 5.2.1. 
51
  See OPEC Statute Art 28 on the qualifications required for a Secretary General. See also Stoehr L (1979) 97. 
See also Themaat V V (1981) 116. See list and qualifications of OPEC Secretaries General- (1961-2008). 
All Secretaries General exhibit a wealth of technical qualifications and vast experience in the oil sector. See 
OPEC ‗Secretaries General of OPEC‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opecweb/staticfiles project/ media/ 
downloads/50
th
anniversary/Secretaries General.pdf (accessed 8 October 2012). 
52
  Stoehr L (1979) 97. See also Themaat V V (1981) 116. 
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they have the technical competence to deal with OPEC issues and international trade 
in oil.53 The depth of technical expertise is also reflected in the office of the Secretary 
General.54 This is also true for the WTO General Council. The General Council is 
made up of ambassador-level representatives.55  The representatives at this level 
unlike the Ministerial Conference usually have technical expertise.56 Although this is 
not a requirement under WTO law, it is common practice. The practice of appointing 
technical representatives in both organisations serves to illustrate the administrative 
and managerial obligations of these bodies. 
The OPEC Secretariat is the administrative hub of the organisation.57 It is involved in 
the day to day management of the organisation.58 Although the OPEC Board of 
Governors is not really an administrative body, it is charged with implementing 
decisions of the Conference, this is puts the body within close proximity to an 
administrative body.59 This also applies to the General Council, which together with 
other subsidiary organs, is involved in directing affairs at the WTO.60 Accordingly, 
due to the administrative role of the mid-level organs, these bodies have a 
                                                 
53
  Dr Majid Al Moneef who was appointed alternate chairman of the board of governors for 2012, has a 
doctorate and was previously professor of Economics. See OPEC Bulletin Spirit of the Union UAE 
Celebrates (2012) 160
th
 OPEC Conference Report 14 (hereafter OPEC Bulletin 2012). See also KAPSARC 
‗Majid Al Moneef‘ available at http://www.kapsarc.org/kapsarc/IACMembers/MajidAl Moneef (accessed 08 
October 2012). The Chairman of the OPEC Board of Governors, Mr. Issa Shahin Al Ghanim is the Director, 
Strategic Planning & Policy Directorate Qatar Petroleum. Both the Angolan and Nigerian OPEC governors 
work with their respective petroleum ministries. See OPEC ‗OPEC Governors 2012‘ available at 
http://www.opec.org/opecweb/staticfilesproject/media/downloads/ general /OPECGovernors.pdf (accessed 
08 October 2012). 
54
  See OPEC ‗Secretaries General‘ available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/ 
downloads/50th_anniversary/Secretaries_General.pdf (accessed 8 October 2012). 
55
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. 
56
  The current chairperson of the General Council, Ambassador Elin Johansen from Norway, was formerly 
head of the Dispute Settlement Body. See Third World Network ‗WTO General Council Elects its Chair, 
Approves Two Waivers‘ available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2012/ twninfo120210.htm 
(accessed 08 October 2012). The permanent representative of Angola at the WTO General Council 
Ambassador Arcanjo Maria Do Nascimento is a lawyer and has substantial legal experience. See OHCHR 
‗Officers of the Human Rights Council‘s Fifth Cycle (2010 - 2011)‘ available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Bureau5thCycle.aspx (accessed 08 October 2012). Dr. 
Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi, the permanent representative of Nigeria has a doctorate in international 
relations and has substantial experience in international relations. See United Nations ‗Biographical Note on 
Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi President of Human Rights Council for 2008-2009‘ available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view 01/F7CFA04CCD1554A9C1257 
46E00560AC5?opendocument (accessed 08 October 2012). 
57
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3 and Art 25 of the OPEC Statute. 
58
  See Art 25 of the OPEC Statute. 
59
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.2. 
60
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. 
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prominent role in the regulation of international trade in oil. The mid-level organs in 
most cases deal with the member states and are at the forefront of identifying the 
challenges that have to be resolved by the member states. The technical expertise of 
the representatives at this level lends credence to the above argument. 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the mid-level organs have a permanent 
status. The status of these organs is considered permanent as the representatives are 
in most cases permanent.61 In comparison to the top-level organs, the mid-level 
organs also meet more frequently than the top-level organs.62 The composition of 
mid-level organ representatives is more stable than the top-level organ 
representatives.63 The description of the mid-level organs as permanent is set within 
the above parameters. Likewise, the above observation demonstrates that the mid-
level organs should have a substantial impact on the regulation of international 
trade in oil due to the fact that they engage with the member states and their 
international trade obligations more frequently than the top-level organs. It can be 
argued that the General Council of the WTO, and its sister organs, that is, the DSB 
                                                 
61
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. See also chapter 4 section 4.3.2 and chapter 4 section 4.3.3. The WTO General 
Council usually meets once every two months. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. See also Rule 1 Rules of 
Procedure for Meetings of the General Council WT/L/161. The OPEC Board of Governors meets twice a 
year but can also hold extra ordinary meetings. See OPEC Statute Art 18 (A) and (B). The OPEC Secretariat 
carries out executive functions. To this end it is a permanent body. In most cases, the representatives of the 
member states at the WTO have permanent missions. The representatives of some African oil producing 
countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Angola at the WTO all have permanent missions in Geneva. See 
OHCHR ‗Officers of the Human Rights Council‘s Fifth Cycle (2010 - 2011)‘ available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Bureau5thCyc le.aspx (accessed 08 October 2012). See 
also United Nations ‗Biographical Note on Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi President of Human Rights Council 
for 2008-2009‘ available at http://www.unhchr. ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/F7CFA04CCD 
1554A9C125746E00560AC5?opendocument (accessed 08 October 2012). See also Ghana Mission ‗Ghana 
Permanent Mission Geneva‘ available at http://www. ghanamission.ch/mission2.html (accessed 08 October 
2012). 
62
  The WTO General Council usually meets once every two months. See Van den Bossche P (2008) 114. See 
also Rule 1 Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the General Council WT/L/161. The OPEC Board of 
Governors meets twice a year but can also hold extra ordinary meetings. See OPEC Statute Art 18 (A) and 
(B). 
63
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and chapter 4 section 4.3.1. The top-level organs are composed of ministerial-
level representatives. These have domestic political obligations and may not always be available. This 
affects the consistency of country positions as ministers especially in Africa are reshuffled frequently. See 
Bratton M & Van De Walle N ‗Popular protest and political reform in Africa‘ (1992) Comparative Politics 
Vol. 24 No. 4 427 (hereafter Bratton M & Van De Walle N 1992). See also Ngomane T et al ‗Public sector 
agricultural extension system in the Northern province of South Africa: A system undergoing 
transformation‘ (2002) Journal of International Agricultural and Extension Education Vol 9. No. 3 32 
(hereafter Ngomane T et al 2002). See also Tripp A M ‗The changing face of authoritarianism in Africa: the 
case of Uganda‘ (2004) Africa Today Vol 50 No.3 16 (hereafter Tripp A M 2004). 
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and the TPRB are permanent organs. Similarly, the OPEC Secretariat and to a lesser 
extent the Board of Governors are both permanent organs.  
The WTO also has a Secretariat whose functions are similar to the OPEC Secretariat. 
However, the WTO Secretariat lives in the shadow of the General Council and 
performs an advisory and administrative support role,64 unlike OPEC where the day 
to day running of the organisation is left to the Secretariat and in some cases, the 
Board of Governors. At the WTO, the Secretariat, although larger than the OPEC 
Secretariat, has a limited role.65 The above reason limits the potential of the WTO 
Secretariat in taking on a prominent role in the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and control of corruption. Accordingly, a detailed discussion 
of the WTO Secretariat is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It has been noted in the foregoing discussion that the meetings of the mid-level 
organs are more frequent than the meetings of the top-level organs.66 The frequency 
of the meetings of the mid-level organs makes them a viable forum for the regulation 
of international trade in oil. Unlike the top-level organs, where the OPEC Conference 
meets more frequently than the WTO Ministerial Conference, at the mid-level organs, 
both organisations have the potential to meet frequently.67 The presence of technical 
representatives at the mid-level organs, and the frequency of meetings make the 
organs a vital factor in the regulation of international trade in oil. However, the lack 
of political clout similar to that exhibited in the top-level organs, may hinder quick 
                                                 
64
  See Art VI of the Marrakesh Agreement. The WTO secretariat is headed by the Director General. The 
Secretariat is made up of staff appointed by the Director General. The Secretariat is not influenced by the 
members of the WTO. See also Desta M G (2003) 525. The learned author argues that the secretariats of 
both the WTO and OPEC are similar. This is only true to the extent that the institutions perform 
administrative functions. The OPEC Secretariat under the office of the Secretary General is part of the 
governance structure of OPEC and has a much broader mandate than the WTO Secretariat. 
65
  See Art VI (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement. The duties of the Secretariat are determined by regulations 
adopted by the Ministerial Conference. The Secretariat cannot take on duties outside the scope defined by 
these regulations. In comparison see Arts 25-29 of the OPEC Statute. The duties of the Secretariat and the 
Secretary General are spelt out in the Statute. Additionally, unlike the WTO, the OPEC Secretariat is headed 
by the Secretary General. See also Steger D (2009) 17. 
66
  See Art IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. The WTO Ministerial Conference meets at least once every two 
years. In contrast, the General Council meets whenever it is necessary. See Art IV (2) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement. See also Rule 1 Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the General Council WT/L/161. The OPEC 
Conference meets twice a year. See OPEC Statute Art 12. See also chapter 5 section 5.2.1 for a detailed 
discussion of the top-level organs. In comparison, the OPEC Board of Governors meets twice every year but 
also holds extraordinary meetings. This is further supplemented by the meetings of the Secretariat which are 
bound to be frequent due to the fact that the organ is a permanent body. 
67
  See chapter 5 section 5.2.1. 
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decision making in the mid-level organs.68 The next section examines the decision 
making procedures of the mid-level organs. 
5.2.2.2 Decision Making 
Analogous to the decision making processes in the Ministerial Conference of the 
WTO, decisions of the General Council are also made through consensus.69 The 
Marrakesh Agreement describes the consensus decision making process.70 This has 
been the subject of discussion under the top-level organs and will not be 
comprehensively discussed in this section. In the event that decisions cannot be 
reached through consensus, the members may resort to voting through ballot.71 The 
decision making processes of the DSB which is an alter ego of the General Council 
involves a process described as reverse consensus.72 This is different from consensus 
as defined in Art IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, as the consensus in the DSU Art 16 
(4) is couched in the language of a negative obligation.  
The decision making processes of the Board of Governors are quite different from 
the OPEC Conference.73  Although voting at the OPEC Conference is limited to 
procedural matters, at the Board of Governors meetings, it is the only method of 
decision making.74 Unlike decision making at the Conference, the OPEC Statute does 
not make a distinction between full and associate members at the Board of 
Governors.75 Although the OPEC Statute provides that the term ‗members‘ refers to 
                                                 
68
  See chapter 5 section 5.2.1.2. 
69
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. See also Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the General Council 
WT/L/161. 
70
  See Art IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also chapter 5 section 5.2.1.2 for a detailed discussion. See also 
chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
71
  See Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the General Council WT/L/161. See also Art IX (1) 
of the Marrakesh Agreement. Voting as a decision making process is hardly used at the WTO. See Third 
World Network ‗Why the WTO Decision-Making System of Consensus Works Against the South‘ available 
at www.twnside.org.sg/title/bgl3-cn.htm (accessed 09 September 2012). Voting has not been relied on 
extensively at the WTO. One of the rare occasions it was relied on, was the accession of Ecuador in 1995. 
See Steger D & Shpilkovskaya N ‗Internal Management of the WTO: Room for Improvement‘ Steger D P 
(ed) Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century (2009) 113 (hereafter Steger D 
& Shpilkovskaya N 2009). 
72
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1. See also Art 16 (4) of the DSU. 
73
  See OPEC Statute Art 11 (c). See also chapter 5 section 5.2.1.2 and chapter 4 section 4.3.1 for a detailed 
discussion of the decision making processes of the OPEC Conference. 
74
  See OPEC Statute Art 17 (D). See also chapter 4 section 4.3.2. 
75
  See OPEC Statute Arts 11 (c) and 17.  
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full members, this is not clear for all provisions that may affect associate members.76 
Subsequently, it is reasonable to conclude that all OPEC members including 
associate members are free to appoint governors, further that these governors can be 
involved in decision making at this level. The above conclusion renders Art 17 of the 
OPEC Statute irreconcilable with Art 11 of the same, which permits only full 
members to engage in decision making on non-procedural issues. 77  The OPEC 
Secretariat is a permanent body; however, its schedule of meetings is not indicated 
in the OPEC Statute. This may be explained by the fact that the secretariat meets 
whenever appropriate. 
It is succinctly clear that the mid-level organs of the WTO and OPEC rely on distinct 
methods of decision making. The General Council and the DSB rely on consensus, 
while the OPEC Board of Governors relies on voting to reach decisions. Decision 
making through consensus although inclusive, is slow.78 This is bound to affect 
decision making at the General Council. Decision making through voting at the 
Board of Governors may deliver quick decisions, but some members do not always 
agree with decisions and this may lead to member states failing to implement Board 
decisions. 79  The above challenge at OPEC together with a weak enforcement 
mechanism and the lack of a formal dispute settlement process, affect the strength of 
decisions of the OPEC Board of Governors. Decision making processes are pivotal in 
exercising the powers of the mid-level organs that are relevant in the regulation of 
international trade in oil. The next section analyses the powers of the mid-level 
organs of both the WTO and OPEC. 
                                                 
76
  See OPEC Statute Art 7 (F). See also Art 7 (D) of the OPEC Statute which permits associate members to 
attend and engage in the deliberations of the OPEC Conference and the Board of Governors. It is 
inconceivable how a country (associate member) that does not have similar interests to those of the members 
can participate in the meetings of the Organisation. See OPEC Statute Art 7 (C). This inconsistency requires 
that the Statute explicitly identifies the members that are permitted to appoint governors. 
77
  See OPEC Statute Arts 11 and 17.  
78
  See Wold C et al ‗Leveraging climate change benefits through the World Trade Organi[s]ation: Are fossil 
fuel subsidies actionable?‘(2012) Georgetown Journal of International Law Vol 43 No. 3 639 on the slow 
progress of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations due to lack of consensus.  
79
  OPEC members cheat on production quotas. See Griffin J M & Xiong W (1997) 289.  
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5.2.2.3 Powers of the Mid-Level Organs 
The discussion of the powers of the mid-level organs for both organisations draws 
from the powers of the General Council and its alter egos in chapter three and the 
powers of the OPEC Board of Governors and the OPEC Secretariat in chapter four. 
The powers are discussed in the context of the international trade in oil. African 
examples are relied upon where possible to maintain the focus of the study on Africa. 
Where African examples are not provided, examples from other countries are relied 
upon to inform regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
control of corruption in African oil producing countries. 
The powers to grant waivers, adopt authoritative interpretations of the Marrakesh 
Agreement and the multilateral agreements, and to appoint the Director General are 
exercised by both the WTO General Council and the Ministerial Conference.80 The 
power to provide waivers and adopt authoritative interpretations of the WTO 
agreements has been discussed under the top-level organs and will not be discussed 
in this section.81 In the same light, the power to appoint the Director General which 
is vested in the Ministerial Conference has in the past been exercised by the General 
Council.82 However such powers are not explicitly vested in the General Council and 
as such are not discussed in detail.83  
In light of the above discussion, this section focuses on the specific powers of the 
General Council. The section concentrates on powers that are exclusively exercised 
by the organ and are relevant to the regulation of international trade in oil. The most 
relevant power in this regard is facilitation of effective cooperation with other 
intergovernmental organisations. 84  This provision is particularly relevant as it 
establishes linkages with other organisations that are involved in the regulation of 
the international trade of oil.85 In 2003 OPEC applied for observer status at the 
                                                 
80
  See chapter 3 sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
81
  See chapter 5 section 5.2.1.3. 
82
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. See also Art VI of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
83
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.  
84
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2. See also Art V of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
85
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion. 
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WTO.86 However, OPEC is yet to be accorded such status.87 The above state of affairs 
might imply that the WTO does not consider OPEC to have responsibilities similar 
to those of the WTO.88 Second, the delay in granting OPEC observer status might be 
confirmation that OPEC production quotas are inconsistent with the WTO 
obligations.89  
The OPEC mid-level organs do not have powers to facilitate cooperation with other 
intergovernmental organisations. However, the organisation has endeavored to 
cooperate with organisations such as the IEA.90 This power is not expressly provided 
anywhere in the OPEC Statute. In such cases, the OPEC Statute provides that the 
Conference is the appropriate organ to exercise such powers.91 The lack of express 
powers to enhance cooperation with intergovernmental organisations affects OPEC‘s 
capacity to work closely with other similar organisations such as the WTO. Failure to 
grant OPEC observer status indicates that the WTO and OPEC do not share a 
harmonious relationship. This is a challenge to oil producing countries generally and 
African oil producing countries that are yet to join OPEC. 
                                                 
86
  The Secretary General informed the ministerial meeting of the need to engage with the WTO although the 
statement was made in the context of trade in energy services. The author respectfully submits that the 
proposed terms of engagement are too restrictive. International trade in oil encompasses a broad range of 
issues such as production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and control of corruption. OPEC does not 
regulate services related to oil production but regulates the actual activity of oil production. See OPEC 
‗Statement by OPEC Secretary General to the Arab Ministerial Meeting‘ available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/917.htm (accessed 10 October 2012). OPEC was only 
granted observer status at the fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun. See WTO Ministerial 
Conference Fifth Session Cancun Provisional List of Participants (2003) WT/MIN(03)/ INF/5 3.  
87
  See WTO ‗Intergovernmental Organisations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (accessed 10 October 2012). See also Lautenberg F R 
(2004) 7. 
88
  OPEC had applied for observer status on the Committee on Trade and Development. The issue was not fully 
resolved at this meeting. However, the discussions indicate that some countries such as the United States 
have reservations with regard to OPEC‘s observer status in the WTO. This might indicate that some 
members do not feel that OPEC has responsibilities similar to those of the WTO. See WTO Committee on 
Trade and Development Twenty-Ninth Session Note on the Meeting of 28 June and 10 July 2000 (2000) 
WT/COMTD/M/29 2. See also Art 5 Marrakesh Agreement. See also WTO Guidelines for Observer Status 
for International Intergovernmental Organi[s]ations in the WTO Annex 3 WT/L/161. Rule 2 provides that 
only those intergovernmental organisations that have competence and a direct interest in trade policy matters 
shall be considered. Thus the refusal or delay to grant OPEC observer status may indicate that it has no 
competence to deal with trade policy matters. The author is of the opinion that refusal to grant OPEC 
observer status on that ground is unreasonable. The WTO is abdicating from its role of dealing with OPEC 
to manage the GATT inconsistent practices of OPEC. 
89
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
90
  See OPEC ‗Cooperation Between Producers & Consumers: an OPEC View‘ available at http://www. 
opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/915.htm (accessed 13 May 2013). 
91
  See Article 16 of the OPEC statute. 
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The DSB of the WTO is the General Council in a modified form.92 The DSB is 
charged with the establishment of WTO panels, appointment of appellate bodies and 
the adoption of panel and appellate reports and implementation of rulings.93 OPEC 
does not have a similar institution and a formal dispute settlement process is non-
existent.94 The above status of OPEC presents challenges to African oil producing 
members. As noted above such conditions encourage violence and aggression.95 The 
lack of a formal dispute settlement process under OPEC structures strengthens the 
argument for WTO regulation of international trade in oil. 
The TPRB is also an alter ego of the General Council.96 Basically, the organ ensures 
that members adhere to WTO rules.97 The organ also encourages transparency in the 
conduct of international trade.98 The organ conducts reviews of the trade practices of 
the member states. 99  Subsequently countries are advised on international trade 
trends. The OPEC Secretariat has divisions that perform roles that are similar to the 
mandate of the TPRB.100  These include the division for research and the public 
relations and information department.101 These organs are charged with conducting 
research and disseminating news and information on oil and energy to the OPEC 
member states.102 The research and advisory function of the above mid-level organs 
is relevant to international trade in oil. African oil producing countries require 
technical assistance to appreciate the complexities of international trade in oil.103 
                                                 
92
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1 for a detailed discussion. 
93
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1 for a detailed discussion. 
94
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.4.2. A detailed discussion of the implications of the dispute settlement processes or 
lack thereof is discussed later in this chapter. It can be argued that OPEC has an informal dispute resolution 
process. However, this is not indicated in the OPEC Statute. 
95
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1. See also Euclid A (2004) 424. 
96
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.2. 
97
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.2. 
98
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.2. 
99
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.2. 
100
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3.  
101
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3. 
102
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3. 
103
  Generally technical assistance to African Countries is important for the realisation of the benefits of 
international trade in Africa. Organisations such as the International Trade Centre, United States Agency for 
International Development, World Customs Organisation and several others have been involved in providing 
technical assistance to boost international trade in Africa. This also applies to trade in oil. African oil 
producing countries can benefit from the research on their trade policies that affect international trade in oil. 
See USAID ‗USAID – World Customs Organization Trade Facilitation Conference‘ available at 
http://sa.usaid.gov/southern_africa/content/usaid-%E2%80%93-world-customs-organization-trade-
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From an OPEC perspective, the Board of Governors implements decisions of the 
Conference.104 The body also draws the agenda for Conference meetings.105 These 
are very important roles.106 This makes the organs instrumental in dictating policy 
and discussions at the Conference. Likewise, at the WTO, decisions of the Ministerial 
Conference are implemented by the General Council and other subsidiary organs.107 
The agenda for Ministerial Conference meetings is drawn by the WTO Secretariat 
which is a non-executive body.108 In both cases, the mid-level organs perform a 
critical role in implementing and directing decisions and activities of the top-level 
organs. The bottom-up approach, where the technocrats direct policies at the highest 
level, is bound to improve international trade in oil.109 It is important that African 
countries build technical capacity such that the interests of African oil producing 
countries are actively pursued in both organisations. 
The OPEC Secretariat exercises the executive functions of the organisation.110 Unlike 
the WTO Secretariat, which does not exercise executive powers, 111  the OPEC 
Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General and the organ has executive powers.112 
The organ also performs administrative functions for the organisation.113 The mid-
level organs for both organisations have the potential to perform the biggest role in 
                                                                                                                                                        
facilitation-conference (accessed 13 May 2013). See also WTO ‗The WTO and the International Trade 
Centre (ITC)‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto _e/coher_e/wto_itc_e.htm (accessed 13 May 
2013). 
104
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.2. 
105
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.2. 
106
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.2 for a detailed analysis. 
107
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.3. The Councils of the WTO implement the specific multilateral and plurilateral 
agreements. To this end, decisions made concerning these agreements have to be implemented by the 
Councils. However, although the Councils are independent, they are supervised by the General Council.  
108
  The provisional agenda for the meetings of the Ministerial Conference is drawn by the WTO Secretariat. 
WTO Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council 
(1996) WT/L/161 Rule 3.  
109
  See chapter 5 section 5.2.2.1 on the composition of the mid-level organs. The organs are mainly composed 
of technocrats. 
110
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3. 
111
  The role of the WTO secretariat is limited in terms of governance of the organisation. This has been 
attributed to the member-driven nature of the WTO. The foregoing observations were also noted in the 
Sutherland Report. See Elsig M ‗WTO Decision-Making: Can We Get a Little Help from the Secretariat and 
the Critical Mass?‘ Steger D P (ed) Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century 
(2009) 63 (hereafter Elsig M 2009). 
112
  The WTO Secretariat is considered non-executive, as it is not part of the executive structure of the WTO 
elaborated in Art IV of the Marrakesh Agreement. On the other hand, the Secretary General is the head of 
the OPEC Secretariat and is part of the executive structure of the organisation. Article 25 of the OPEC 
Statute clearly indicates that the organ has executive powers.  
113
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.3. 
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regulating the international trade in oil. The above organs are assisted by subsidiary 
organs in the execution of their enormous tasks. However, as noted above, one of the 
most prominent roles of the mid-level organs is and should be dispute settlement. In 
light of this observation, the next section examines the dispute settlement role or the 
lack thereof and its implication for international trade in oil in Africa. 
5.2.2.4 Dispute Settlement 
Dispute settlement is pivotal to maintaining a sustainable international trade regime. 
Despite this fact, international trade in oil has been closed out of the dispute 
settlement process of the WTO. Further, OPEC which has a strong hold on 
international trade in oil, especially the determination of production quotas, has no 
formal dispute settlement process.114  This state of affairs is bound to affect the 
regulation of international trade in oil. From an African perspective, disputes over 
oil exploration and production acreage continue to affect the oil sector. This section 
highlights the disputes affecting the oil sector in Africa, it argues that a dispute 
settlement process will improve the regulation of the oil sector in Africa.115 The 
discussion of dispute settlement is undertaken in relation to the mid-level organs 
because these organs have the technical capacity to handle the dispute settlement 
process. The capacity of the WTO dispute settlement system to handle these disputes 
is also discussed.116 
Currently, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are feuding over oil 
exploration and production acreage.117  It has been argued that Angola‘s rise to 
                                                 
114
  It may be argued that OPEC has an informal dispute settlement process. This can be inferred from the 
language of Art 3 of the OPEC Statute. The provision provides that obligations under the Statute shall be 
observed through good faith. Against this background, it can be argued that disputes arising out of the non-
observance of such obligations can be resolved informally. However, this argument does not hold as member 
states have continued cheating on the production quotas and OPEC has not been able to resolve oil related 
disputes in some of the member states. 
115
  One of the goals of international dispute settlement is the control of armed conflict. Thus in this regard, the 
WTO can be a helpful forum for resolving disputes over oil in Africa, which in some cases have escalated 
into armed conflicts. See Jackson J H (2006) 147. 
116
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.2.1. 
117
  Blocks 14 and 15 located in the Atlantic Ocean Coastline are currently controlled by Angola. These blocks 
are the subject of a dispute between Angola and the DRC. The DRC claims that the blocks are located in its 
Exclusive Economic Zone. An Exclusive Economic Zone is an area where coastal states have sovereign 
rights to exploit natural resources. See International Crisis Group Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to 
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second position on the list of African oil producing countries is attributed to the 
production of oil from DRC territory.118  Efforts have been made to resolve the 
conflict through regional and international interventions.119 However, as of 2012, the 
conflict was yet to be resolved. It should be noted that both Angola and the DRC are 
susceptible to aggression and are recovering from years of civil war.120 Angola is a 
member of both the WTO and OPEC.121 The DRC is not a member of OPEC but is a 
WTO member.122  
This dispute has not been brought before the WTO because of the organisation‘s 
position on the regulation of oil trade and also the fact that the dispute is related to 
border conflicts.123 On the other hand, the parties cannot rely on OPEC to settle the 
dispute because the organisation lacks a dispute settlement process. This is 
compounded by the fact that DRC is not an OPEC member. Although the above 
example does not affect the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsides and corruption, it illustrates the deficiency of the WTO dispute settlement 
framework and the effect of the lack of an OPEC dispute settlement framework. 
Another oil related conflict in Africa is the impending war between Sudan and South 
Sudan over the oil fields in South Sudan. 124  The conflict is to a large extent 
                                                                                                                                                        
Stability or Development Opportunity? (2012) Africa Report No. 188 2-3 (hereafter International Crisis 
Group 2012). See also Vines A & Weimer M A Report of the CSIS Africa Program Angola Assessing the 
Risks to Stability (2011) Centre for Strategic and International Studies 17 (hereafter Vines A & Weimer M 
A 2011). 
118
  International Crisis Group (2012) 3. 
119
  The DRC and Angola signed an Agreement which created a common interest zone. However, the Agreement 
has been rejected by the DRC. Further the DRC commenced proceedings against Angola at the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The interventions are yet to yield any tangible results. 
See International Crisis Group (2012) 3. 
120
  See International Crisis Group ‗DR Congo Conflict History‘ available at http://www.crisisgroup. org/fr/ 
publication-type/key-issues/Research%20Resources/Conflict%20Histories/DR%20Congo%20Confli 
ct%20History.aspx (accessed 14 May 2013). See also Malaquias A ‗Ethnicity and Conflict in Angola: 
Prospects for Reconciliation‘ available at http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/Books/Angola/6Malaquias.pdf (ac 
cessed on 14 May 2013). 
121
  See WTO ‗Angola and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/ang 
ola_e.htm (accessed 14 October 2012). See also OPEC ‗Angola Facts and Figures‘ available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm (accessed 14 October 2012). 
122
  See WTO ‗Democratic Republic of the Congo and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/countries_e/democratic_republique_congo_e.htm (accessed 14 May 2013). 
123
  See chapter 3 section 3.2 for a detailed discussion on oil regulation by the WTO. 
124
  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has not been successful in averting conflict between the two states. 
South Sudan claims that the Agreement is not transparent and that Sudan is not distributing the oil wealth 
equitably. South Sudan has therefore stopped the export of oil from the oil wells located near the border of 
the two countries. See Global Witness ‗South Sudan and Sudan‘ available at http://www. 
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precipitated by the failure to share revenue in a transparent manner.125 South Sudan 
is neither a member of the WTO nor OPEC.126 On the other hand, Sudan is in the 
process of accession to the WTO.127 The country is also not a member of OPEC.128 
The lack of a comprehensive dispute settlement process to adjudicate over oil related 
disputes may disrupt oil trade in Africa. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the above disputes mainly relate to 
territory and the location of the oil fields. The WTO dispute settlement process only 
applies to the WTO agreements. Border and territory disputes are outside the 
mandate of the dispute settlement process. This presents a challenge in relying on 
the WTO dispute settlement process to settle oil related disputes in Africa. However, 
the dispute settlement process exists and if the WTO is amenable to actively 
engaging with international trade in oil, rules on the same can be developed. In the 
same light, OPEC has the option of developing a dispute settlement process to deal 
with oil related disputes. However, the membership requirements present 
challenges as the organisation is open to only a select number of countries. The next 
section examines the subsidiary-level organs of both the WTO and OPEC. The 
subsidiary organs have very specific mandates and are supervised by the mid-level 
organs. 
                                                                                                                                                        
globalwitness.org/campaigns/corruption/oil-gas-and-mining/sudan-and-south-sudan (accessed 14 October 
2012). See also United States Institute of Peace ‗Sudan, South Sudan Strike Oil Deal‘ available at 
http://www.usip.org/publications/sudan-south-sudan-strike-oil-deal (accessed 14 October 2012). Currently, 
the two countries appear to have reached an agreement on the fees to be paid by South Sudan to transport oil 
through the territory of Sudan. However, some issues such as the location of the Abeyi oil fields are still 
outstanding and are yet to be resolved. The African Union was instrumental in finding solutions to the above 
impasse. 
125
  See Global Witness ‗South Sudan and Sudan‘ available at http://www. globalwitness.org/campaigns/ 
corruption/oil-gas-and-mining/sudan-and-south-sudan (accessed 14 October 2012). 
126
  See Yee A ‗Accession to OPEC Possible for South Sudan‘ available at http://www.thenational.ae/ 
business/energy/accession-to-opec-possible-for-south-sudan (accessed 14 October 2012). 
127
  See WTO ‗Accession Sudan‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_soudan_e.htm 
(accessed 14 October 2012). The country is currently an observer at the WTO. See WTO ‗Groups in the 
WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf (accessed 14 
October 2012). 
128
  See Siona C ‗Angola, Sudan ask for OPEC Membership‘ available at http://www.chron. com/business/ 
energy/article/Angola-Sudan-to-ask-for-OPEC-membership-158214 9.php (accessed 14 October 2012).  
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5.2.3 Subsidiary Organs  
The subsidiary organs are supervised by the mid-level organs and have very specific 
mandates. These organs implement specific tasks in both the WTO agreements and 
the OPEC Statute. Accordingly, the organs that are treated as such in this section are: 
the OPEC Economic Commission, 129  the OPEC Ministerial Monitoring sub-
committee,130 the WTO Council for Trade in Goods,131 the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures132 and the Committee on Government procurement.133 
All the above subsidiary organs operate within the framework of the mid-level 
organs. The OPEC Statute is very clear and provides that the specialised organs 
operate under the Secretariat.134 Similarly, at the WTO, the above organs are all 
supervised by the General Council which is a mid-level organ.135  
The mandate of the OPEC subsidiary organs entrenches oil production quotas; they 
monitor oil prices and ensure that member states comply with quota allocations.136 
The above mandate entrenches a GATT inconsistent practice. On the other hand, the 
WTO subsidiary organs that are discussed in this section have specific mandates that 
relate to, among other areas, oil production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
corruption in government procurement.137  
The WTO top-level, mid-level and subsidiary organs are appropriate institutions for 
the regulation of international trade of oil. The organs have specific mandates and 
the mid-level organs have a dispute settlement process which is crucial to the 
regulation of international trade in oil. The OPEC organs especially the mid-level 
organs are also active. However, OPEC organs appear to entrench practices such as 
production quotas which are inconsistent with the GATT. It should also be noted 
that the mandate and the potential of the WTO organs to regulate international trade 
                                                 
129
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.4.1. 
130
  See chapter 4 section 4.3.4.2. 
131
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.3.1.  
132
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.3.2. 
133
  See chapter 3 section 3.3.3.3. 
134
  See OPEC Statute Art 36 (B). See also chapter 4 section 4.3.4. 
135
  See Art IV (5) of the Marrakesh Agreement. See also chapter 3 section 3.3.3. 
136
  See chapter 4 sections 4.3.4.1 and 4.3.4.2. 
137
  See chapter 3 sections 3.3.3.1, 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.3.3. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: A Comparative Analysis 
 
208 
 
in oil can only be nurtured if the WTO agreements are expanded to specifically 
address international trade in oil. This is particularly true for oil consumption 
subsidies and corruption. 
5.3  Examining the Duality of Legal Regimes: the WTO and OPEC 
Perspectives 
This section of the chapter examines the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies, and corruption in oil producing countries. The section relies 
on the arguments developed in chapters three and four to develop a comparison 
between the OPEC Statute and the WTO agreements in the regulation of the above 
areas. The section commences with a discussion on production quotas, proceeds to 
oil consumption subsidies and concludes with the discussion of corruption. The 
discussion focuses on African oil producing countries. 
5.3.1 Production Quotas 
Article XI (I) of the GATT prohibits the institution of export restrictions on products 
destined for the territory of another member state.138 As noted in chapter three, the 
OPEC production quota affects the amount of oil available for export. 139 
Additionally, prohibited restrictions under Art XI (I) can be either of a de facto or de 
jure nature.140 It is also worth noting that the provision applies to all restrictions, 
irrespective of the fact that the restrictions are based on laws or legal mandatory 
obligations.141 The provision applies to broad measures.  
Article 2 (B) of the OPEC Statute provides the broad framework for the institution of 
oil production quotas. 142  The clause provides price stabilisation as one of the 
mandates of the organisation.143 OPEC relies on oil production quotas to stabilise 
                                                 
138
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
139
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
140
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
141
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
142
  See Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
143
  See Art 2 of the OPEC Statute. 
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prices.144 It is clear that these quotas are inconsistent with Art XI (1) of the GATT 
discussed above. Oil production quotas are set through production agreements that 
restrict the amount of oil that can be produced by the OPEC member states.145 
The GATT provides exceptions to the obligations created in Art XI (I). However, the 
exceptions are not sufficient to allow the nature of production quotas that are 
maintained under the OPEC Statute.146 The exceptions under Art XX (g) provide for 
conservation of natural resources.147 The production quotas maintained under the 
OPEC Statute are meant to stabilise oil prices and not to conserve exhaustible natural 
resources. It may be argued that the price stabilisation is related to conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. However, OPEC production quotas do not pass the 
three pillar test or the contents of the chapeau necessary to establish compliance with 
the exception in Art XX (g) of the GATT.148  
Similarly, Art XX (h) of the GATT 1994 provides an exception to the obligations in 
Art XI (I). 149  However, the clause provides for intergovernmental commodity 
organisations notified to the WTO. 150  Although OPEC may be regarded as an 
intergovernmental commodity agreement it has not been notified to the WTO.151 
Accordingly, Art 2 (B) of the OPEC Statute which forms the foundation of 
production quotas is based on a Statute which has not been notified to the WTO as 
an intergovernmental agreement.  
Related to the above arguments, OPEC oil production quotas also have internal 
deficiencies. 152  African oil producing countries that are members of both 
organisations have to comply with obligations under Art XI (I) of the GATT. The 
WTO has been slow to fully integrate and accommodate the international trade in oil 
                                                 
144
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
145
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
146
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
147
  See Art XX (g) of the GATT. 
148
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
149
  See Art XX (h) of the GATT. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
150
  See Art XX (h) of the GATT. 
151
  See chapter 4 section 4.2. The argument that OPEC is an intergovernmental commodity organisation is not 
tenable. 
152
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.1 for a detailed discussion. 
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in the implementation of international trade obligations.153 However, if the political 
consensus is achieved, international trade in oil will be subjected to GATT regulation 
and countries with dual membership will be affected. As noted in chapter four, the 
domestic laws of Nigeria and Angola entrench oil production quotas.154 This may be 
attributed to the fact that they are members of OPEC.155 These countries may be 
found to be in violation of their GATT obligations.  
5.3.2 Oil Consumption Subsidies 
Articles 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement apply to subsidies that are maintained on the 
basis of laws and those that are provided as a matter of fact.156 Prohibited subsidies 
under Art 3 of the SCM Agreement do not need to be specific.157 On the other hand, 
actionable subsidies that are specific to a particular industry are considered to be 
inconsistent with WTO obligations.158  Further, such actionable subsidies have to 
create adverse effects on the economy of another WTO member.159 It has been noted 
that oil consumption subsidies encourage smuggling.160 This affects the domestic oil 
industries of other countries.161 Additionally, these subsidies are usually utilised by 
particular industries such as the transport industry and domestic oil producers.162 To 
this end, it can be argued that these subsidies are specific in terms of de facto 
specificity.163 However, there are challenges in making this argument. The transport 
sector provides a service and as such is not regulated under the SCM Agreement.164 
                                                 
153
  See chapter 3 section 3.2. 
154
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
155
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
156
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
157
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
158
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
159
  See Art 5 of the SCM Agreement. 
160
  See chapter 4 sections 4.4.2 and 4.5. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
161
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. The removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria has 
crippled the smuggling business. Smuggling of fuel to Cameroon has decreased. See Business Day ‗Subsidy 
Removal Cripples Fuel Smuggling Across Nigerian Borders‘ available at http://www. 
businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/31798-subsidy-removal-cripples-fuel-smuggling-
across-nigerian-borders (accessed 14 May 2013). 
162
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
163
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
164
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
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Similarly, the effect of smuggling and the export of subsidised oil products to other 
African countries are difficult to determine due to lack of data.165  
This is the case with the oil subsidy program in Nigeria; it is difficult to determine 
the specificity of the subsidy and also to determine whether it affects the domestic 
industry of another WTO member, Cameroon.166 In the same light, in Nigeria, it 
cannot be proven that oil consumption subsidies induce consumers to buy 
domestically produced oil over imported oil, and that therefore such subsidies are in 
contravention of Art 3 of the SCM Agreement.167 Thus although oil consumption 
subsidies maintained by OPEC members, may be treated as financial contributions 
under Art 1 of the SCM Agreement, in practice, proving that these subsidies are 
inconsistent with Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement  may present challenges.168 
Oil consumption subsidies under the OPEC Statute are not expressly stipulated.169 
However, Art 2 (A) of the OPEC Statute provides that the organisation shall 
determine the best means of safeguarding members‘ interests, individually and 
collectively.170 Accordingly, it can be argued that oil consumption subsidies which 
are in most cases instituted to build political capital may be classified as individual 
interests of the member countries.171 Nevertheless, such a provision in the OPEC 
Statute does not render the subsidies inconsistent with Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM 
Agreement.172 
5.3.3 Corruption and Government Procurement 
It has been noted that in OPEC member states, the government has an 
unprecedented level of involvement in the acquisition and disposal of revenue.173 
Despite this observation, the OPEC Statute does not expressly provide for the control 
                                                 
165
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
166
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
167
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
168
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
169
  See chapter 4section 4.4.2. 
170
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
171
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
172
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
173
  Montinola G & Jackman R W (2002) 158. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.3. 
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of corruption.174  This creates suitable ground for corruption. The GPA seeks to 
control corruption and encourage transparency in government procurement in some 
WTO member states.175 It is clear that due to the unrestricted involvement of the 
government in the oil sector in the OPEC member states, a mechanism to regulate 
government procurement is crucial for the control of corruption. 
The GPA which provides for uniform tendering and qualification procedures may 
help in monitoring the disposal of government revenue.176 Additionally, due to the 
fact that the GPA is an international agreement, an environment of peer review is 
created. However, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement and only applies to a few 
countries.177 The GPA has not been very successful due to its limited application.178 
Procurement related corruption in Africa is common in the oil sector. The oil sectors 
in Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria and Angola have been dogged by corruption related 
scandals.179 The OPEC Statute does not provide for the regulation of corruption. 
However, international interventions have been undertaken by the organisation to 
combat the growing incidence of corruption.180 In terms of African OPEC members 
such as Nigeria and Angola, the domestic laws on corruption have not been 
successful in controlling corruption in their oil sectors.181 In this case, both the WTO 
and OPEC have very weak laws to control corruption in the oil sector. 
The legal framework of both the WTO and OPEC reveals a challenge in the 
regulation of international trade in oil. The WTO legal framework on quantitative 
restrictions is to a large extent sufficient for the regulation of oil production quotas. 
On the other hand, the OPEC Statute does not have express provisions on 
                                                 
174
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.3. 
175
  See Arts 7 and 8 of the GPA. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
176
  See Arts 7 and 8 of the GPA. 
177
  See also chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
178
  See also chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
179
  See Butty J ‗Watchdog Group Warns of Oil Corruption in Liberia‘ available at http://apperi.org/2011 
/09/27/watchdog-group-warns-of-oil-corruption-in-liberia/ (accessed 16 October 2012). See also Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal ‗Public Procurement and Contracting‘ available at http://www. Business-anti-
corruption.org/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/angola/corruption-levels/public-procurement-and-
contracting/ (accessed 16 October 2012). See also Izama A ‗Uganda: Oil, Corruption and Entitlement‘ 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/africa-blog/2012/oct/01/ uganda-oil (accessed 16 October 
2012). See also Smith P ‗Nigeria: The Great $6.8bn Oil Scandal‘ available at 
http://apperi.org/2012/07/30/nigeria-the-great-6-8bn-oil-scandal/ (accessed 16 October 2012). 
180
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.3. 
181
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
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production quotas; however, its mandate is premised on the stabilisation of crude oil 
prices and it relies on production quotas to stabilise oil prices. The SCM Agreement 
has challenges with regard to determination of specificity and injury to the domestic 
industry of another member. This affects the regulation of prohibited and actionable 
oil consumption subsidies. The OPEC Statute has no express provisions on oil 
consumption subsidies. Finally, both organisations have insufficient rules for the 
control of corruption in the oil sector. The next section provides a comparative 
summary of the two organisations. The section is limited to the institutional and 
legal frameworks for both OPEC and the WTO. The section is intended to guide the 
discussion in chapter six on Ghana and chapter seven on the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
5.4. A Comparative Summary 
The section highlights some of the similarities and differences between the WTO and 
OPEC. The summary focuses on production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
corruption. 
In terms of the institutional structure of the two organisations, the composition of 
the top-level organs is instrumental in legitimizing the high-level decisions of both 
organisations. It is important to understand that decisions on international trade in 
oil require political will. The top-level organs are an important platform for building 
political acceptance of the organisations‘ decisions. The powers of the WTO top-level 
organs are more specific than those of the OPEC top-level organs. 
In both cases, the mid-level organs are comprised of representatives with technical 
knowledge. Additionally, the mid-level organs perform the bulk of the roles of both 
organisations. This makes the mid-level organs a good entry point for the discussion 
of the regulation of international trade in oil. The mid-level organs are also 
important for enhancing cooperation between organisations that are relevant to the 
regulation of international trade in oil. However, although the WTO mid-level 
organs have specific powers to encourage such cooperation, the WTO has not 
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granted OPEC observer status. On the other hand, OPEC does not have specific 
powers to encourage cooperation with other organisations. 
Dispute settlement is another area where the mid-level organs are relevant in the 
regulation of international trade in oil. The WTO has specific rules and institutions to 
guide dispute settlement. This does not mean that the dispute settlement process has 
been applied to settlement of oil related disputes. Nonetheless, the broad framework 
exists. To the contrary, OPEC does not have formal rules on dispute settlement. This 
affects its regulation of international trade in oil in Africa. 
The subsidiary organs in both organisations have very specific mandates. It is clear 
that these bodies are instrumental in implementation of the policies and rules of both 
organisations. While the WTO subsidiary organs may be relevant in eliminating 
WTO inconsistent practices in international trade in oil, the OPEC subsidiary organs 
entrench the institution of production quotas. 
From a legal perspective, it is clear that OPEC production quotas cannot be 
supported under the WTO legal framework. However, the WTO faces challenges in 
building consensus to accommodate and regulate international trade in oil. This is a 
challenge for the regulation of international trade in oil in Africa. 
It may be argued that oil consumption subsidies are inconsistent with WTO rules on 
subsidies, especially Art 3 of the SCM Agreement. However there are challenges in 
proving that oil consumption subsidies maintained by OPEC member states such as 
Nigeria, encourage the use of domestic over imported oil. Additionally, for 
actionable subsidies, it is difficult to determine specificity of oil consumption 
subsidies in some countries like Nigeria. There is little proof to suggest that these 
subsidies cause injury to the domestic oil industries of other members.  
Finally, government procurement and corruption are related. This is especially true 
in Africa where procurement related scandals have been reported in the oil sector. 
The GPA which would have been a useful tool in combating such corruption is 
limited in application. Although OPEC does not have a mechanism to regulate 
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corruption, the organisation has endeavored to engage in international partnerships 
to reduce the incidence of the same.  
This summary indicates that although the WTO may be a useful forum in 
commencing the active regulation of international trade in oil, the consensus 
requirement is still a major hindrance, especially with regard to the regulation of 
production quotas. Additionally, although there are rules on subsidies it cannot be 
said with certainty that oil consumption subsidies are inconsistent with the SCM 
Agreement. The GPA is also too limited and may not be a suitable framework for the 
control of corruption in African oil producing countries. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The institutions of both organisations have top-level, mid-level and subsidiary 
organs. However, the OPEC Statute does not provide a comprehensive mandate to 
its institutions. To the contrary, the WTO agreements are comprehensive and 
elaborately provide specific powers to the institutions. That said, the dispute 
settlement process of the WTO may be of limited application to oil related disputes 
since most of the disputes involve disputes over territory and acreage. 
The WTO legal framework has provisions on the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies, and corruption in government procurement. On the face of it, 
it might appear to be sufficient; however, there are serious challenges with regard to 
oil consumption subsidies and corruption. The OPEC legal framework which 
entrenches practices that are harmful to the oil sector is weak and can be challenged. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the WTO system is a more conducive regime for 
the regulation of international trade in oil in Africa, as it has effective institutions 
and a more comprehensive legal framework. The next chapter applies the issues 
identified in chapter five to Ghana an emerging African oil producing country. 
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CHAPTER 6 
OIL PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN GHANA 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the similarities and differences between the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The chapter highlighted the challenges that are implicit in the regulation of 
production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption in both systems. The 
author endeavored to relate the discussion to Africa and African examples were 
relied upon. However, it is necessary to further relate and ground the analysis in 
Africa. To this end, the discussion here is focused on Ghana. The Ghanaian example 
provides a deeper analysis of the above areas. Although, the Ghanaian example may 
not apply to all African countries, the discussion in this chapter will guide the 
regulation of international trade in oil in Africa from a Ghanaian perspective.  
Ghana is currently a member of the WTO and it has indicated that it might join 
OPEC after it stabilises its oil production. 1  Even then, appetite for OPEC 
membership is low.2 This observation at first sight seems to make Ghana an unlikely 
candidate for the case study as it is not a member of both organisations. However, it 
provides an additional perspective to the study, that is, the standpoint of an 
emerging African oil producing country, and how it will handle its WTO obligations 
if it chooses to join OPEC. Additionally, the choice of Ghana as a case study will 
                                                 
1
  See Ghana Oil and Gas ‗Ghana Unlikely to Join OPEC on Commencement of Production‘ available at 
http://ghanaoilonline.org/2011/01/ghana-unlikely-to-join-opec-on-commencement-of-production/ (accessed 
10 December 2012). See also Government of Ghana Official Website ‗Ghana not in Haste to Join OPEC‘ 
available at http: //www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/general-news/3313-ghana-not-in-haste-to-join-opec 
(accessed 10 December 2012). See also WTO ‗Ghana and the WTO‘ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/ghana_e.htm (accessed 02 May 2013). 
2
  Discussions with various officials in Ghana‘s oil sector revealed that they are not keen on joining OPEC. It 
is respectfully submitted that the decision to join OPEC should take into consideration Ghana‘s WTO 
obligations. Notes of discussions with Ghana oil sector officials are on file with the author. Between 2010 
and 2011, Ghana produced about 26 million barrels of oil from the jubilee oil field. It is expected that 
production in 2013 will increase considerably to about 120 000 barrels per day. See Ministry of Finance 
2012 Annual Report on Petroleum Funds (2013) 15 (hereafter Ministry of Finance 2013). 
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inform other emerging African oil producing countries on their decisions to join 
OPEC and whether the same would improve their regulatory framework without 
compromising their obligations under the WTO agreements.  
The first section of the chapter provides a brief background to oil production and 
trade in Ghana. The section also discusses the geographic location of Ghana. 
Additionally, the location of the oil fields in Ghana is illustrated. This discussion is 
crucial to understanding oil production in Ghana. The section also provides a 
synopsis of the historical context, which includes the history of oil production in 
Ghana and its experience with the WTO. Secondly, the chapter provides a discussion 
of the policy and legal framework for crude oil production and trade in Ghana. The 
chapter examines the domestic policy and legal instruments regulating production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and the laws on corruption in the oil sector.  
6.1.1 Geographic Location of Ghana and the Offshore Oil Fields 
The discussion of the geographic location of Ghana and its oil fields is only meant to 
provide context to the subsequent discourse on the regulation of international trade 
in oil in Ghana. In light of the above, the discussion is limited in scope. Ghana is 
located off the coast of the Atlantic Ocean.3 The country shares borders with Togo to 
the East, Burkina Faso to the North, and, Côte d'Ivoire to the West.4 Ghana‘s recent 
oil discoveries and production can be attributed to its location and proximity to the 
Atlantic Ocean. 5  A number of countries on the African West Coast have 
commercially viable deposits of crude oil.6 
                                                 
3
  Clarke D (2010) 335-336. 
4
  Clarke D (2010) 335-336. See also chapter 6 figure 6.1 below. 
5
  Most of Ghana‘s major oil and gas finds are located in the Atlantic Ocean. See chapter 6 figure 6.2 below. 
The Atlantic Ocean has been the source of various deep sea oil discoveries as well as enormous discoveries 
in Brazil. The discoveries in the Atlantic Ocean have been attributed to the geographic makeup of the ocean 
floor. See World Ocean Review ‗Energy‘ available at http://worldoceanrevie w.com/en/energy/fossil-fuels/ 
(accessed 04 December 2012). For a contrary opinion on the formation of crude oil, the abiotic process 
posits that crude oil is produced in the mantle of the earth and seeps through bedrocks to deposit in the 
sedimentary rocks. See Corsi J R ‗Discovery backs Theory Oil not Fossil Fuel‘ available at 
http://www.wnd.com/2008/02/45838/ (accessed 04 December 2012).  
6
  African Development Bank Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production in Africa and the Global Market Situation 
(2010) Commodities Brief Volume 1, Issue 4 1 (hereafter African Development Bank 2010). 
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In 2007, Ghana celebrated its Golden Jubilee.7 The country also discovered sizeable 
deposits of crude oil.8 The location of the discovery is currently referred to as the 
Jubilee oil fields. The Jubilee oil fields are located between the deepwater Tano block 
and the Cape Three Points block.9 Although there are other oil fields in the various 
blocks on Ghana‘s continental shelf, the discovery in the Jubilee field is by far, the 
largest.10 
The geographic location of the Jubilee oil fields, and the proximity of the fields to 
Takoradi,11 where gas can be stored on land, and the refinery at Tema,12 which is 
further up along the coast of Ghana make oil production economically viable. From 
                                                 
7
  See Left S ‗The Guardian Pride, Poverty and Promise: Ghana's Golden Jubilee‘ (2007) available at 
http://www. guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/06/sarahleft (accessed 05 December 2012). 
8
  See Kosmos Energy ‗Ghana-Oil and Gas Development‘ available at http://www.Kosmos 
energy.com/operations-ghana.php (accessed 03 December 2012). The capacity of the jubilee oil fields is 
estimated to hold 800 million barrels of recoverable light crude and to have a potential of about 3 billion 
barrels. See Zaney G D ‗Ghana‘s Petroleum Revenue Management Bill (2011)‘ available at 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/5860--ghanas-petroleum-revenue-management-bill 
(accessed 02 May 2013). 
9
  See Tullow Oil Ghana ‗Jubilee Field‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com/ghana/index. asp?pageid=11 
(accessed 03 December 2012). The oil fields are located 60 kilometers from Efasu and 135 Kilometers from 
Takoradi. See Zaney G D ‗Ghana‘s Petroleum Revenue Management Bill (2011)‘ available at 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/5860--ghanas-petroleum-revenue-management-bill 
(accessed 02 May 2013). 
10
  See Tullow Oil Ghana ‗Key Facts‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com/ghana/index.asp?pageid=30 
(accessed 03 December 2012). Other oil blocks include the offshore Keta Basin and the offshore Saltpond 
Basin. See Ghana Oil Info ‗Exploration Upstream Sector‘ available at http://www. 
ghanaoilinfo.com/?page=exploration&factid=957 (accessed 04 December 2012). 
11
  The Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation (BOST) Company of Ghana is in advanced stages of constructing a 
gas and petroleum terminal and storage facility in Pumpuni near Takoradi. See BOST ‗BOST Gears Up for 
Gas Storage Facility‘ available at http://www.bost.com.gh/?cat=5 (accessed 04 December 2012). Oil 
production in the Jubilee oil fields is undertaken on a Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) 
vessel located near the oil field. Gas from the oil field will be transported to Takoradi which is about 6 hours 
from the FPSO. See also African Development Bank Ghana Jubilee Field Project Summary of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (2009) 6 (hereafter African Development Bank 2009). The Tema 
Oil Refinery has experienced some technical challenges in the past. However, plans are underway to expand 
the refinery and to increase its capacity. See Ministry of Energy Energy Update Energy for a Better Ghana 
Developments in the Energy Sector 2009-2012 (2012) 13 (hereafter Ministry of Energy 2012). Officials in 
charge of the Tema Oil Refinery are optimistic that after expansion it will meet a substantial portion of 
domestic oil products demand. See Notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil sector on file with the 
author. 
12
  It has been reported that the Tema Oil Refinery is not configured to refine crude oil from the Jubilee oil 
fields. Further, that the Jubilee oil fields produce sweet light oil. However, the Tema Refinery is also 
configured to refine light and sweet crudes such as Brass River, Forcados, and Palanca blend. Also the API 
for oil from the Jubilee oil fields appears to fall within the range of oil refined at Tema Oil Refinery. See The 
Chronicle ‗Tema Oil Refinery cannot refine Jubilee Oil –Tullow‘ available at http://ghanaian-
chronicle.com/tema-oil-refinery-cannot-refine-jubilee-oil-tullow/ (accessed 04 December 2012). See also 
Energy World Africa ‗Tema Oil Refinery‘ available at http://www.energyworldafrica. com/pdf/ 
Tema%20Oil%20Refinary.pdf (accessed 02 May 2013). 
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a trade perspective, the proximity of the Jubilee oil fields to onshore storage facilities 
and the refinery make production and trade profitable.13 
There are subsisting arguments on the proposal to refine crude oil from the Jubilee 
oil fields at the Tema Refinery.14 The arguments against the proposal appear to be 
motivated by several considerations including commerce and economic benefit for 
the country. 15 Conversely, it can be argued that refining oil in Tema also has benefits. 
Unlike crude oil, the various refined products may provide a wide revenue base for 
the country.16 The author submits that resolution of the above issue should be based 
on economic considerations; the option that provides more revenue to the country 
should be preferred. It has been argued by some government officials in the Ghana 
oil sector that the decision to refine oil from the Jubilee oil fields at the Tema Oil 
Refinery should be implemented only after the oil has attained a technical value.17 
This can only happen after the oil has been exported to various refineries around the 
world. This argument is persuasive and justifies the delay in refining oil from the 
Jubilee oil fields at the Tema Oil Refinery. 
                                                 
13
  Commentators have noted that geographical location has an impact on international trade and transport. 
Countries with ports and access to international sea routes trade more than landlocked countries. See Behar 
A & Venables A J Transport Costs and International Trade (2010) University of Oxford Department Of 
Economics Discussion Paper Series 4 (hereafter Behar A & Venables A J 2010). 
14
  See The Chronicle ‗Tema Oil Refinery cannot refine Jubilee Oil –Tullow‘ available at http://ghanaian-
chronicle.com/tema-oil-refinery-cannot-refine-jubilee-oil-tullow/ (accessed 04 December 2012). Some 
government officials in the oil sector have noted that Tema Oil Refinery does not have the capacity to refine 
the Ghana government portion of crude lifted from the Jubilee oil field. They further note that Tema Oil 
Refinery may not have the financial capacity to meet the requirements for purchasers of oil from Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation which markets the government‘s portion of oil from the Jubilee oil field. 
See Notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil sector on file with the author. 
15
  It has been noted that the market for crude is quite similar to the market for refined petroleum. However, the 
market for light crude is higher than the market for heavy crude because it is easier to refine light crude. 
Moreover, the refining capacity for heavy crude is quite limited. See Grant K et al Understanding Today‘s 
Crude Oil and Product Markets (2006) A Policy Analysis Study Lexecon 19-20 (hereafter Grant K et al 
2006). Thus Ghana may derive more economic benefit from exporting its crude as opposed to refining.  
16
  See Highbeam Business ‗Petroleum Refining‘ available at http://business.highbeam.com/industry-rep 
orts/chemicals/petroleum-refining (accessed 05 December 2012). 
17
  See Notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil sector on file with the author. The technical value is 
sometimes referred to as the refining value. This refers to the value a refiner expects for products from a 
particular type of crude oil less operating costs. Crude oil less the refining value provides the estimated profit 
margin from a particular type of crude oil. See Oil and Gas Journal ‗Achieving Maximum Crude Oil Value 
Depends on Accurate Evaluation‘ available at http://www. ogj.com/articles/print/volume-100/issue-
2/processing/achieving-maximum-crude-oil-value-depends-on-accurate-evaluation.html (accessed 02 May 
2013). 
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Another issue that arises out of the discussion of the geographic location of the 
Jubilee oil fields is conflicts over maritime borders with neighboring Côte d'Ivoire.18 
The jubilee oil fields are located close to the border of the two countries. Currently, 
the issue is under control although it might be a source of unrest in the future and 
may affect oil production and trade.19  
Finally, due to the geographic location of Ghana and the oil fields, transportation of 
oil to the international markets is cheap.20 On the downside, the location of the 
offshore fields and production facilities in the Atlantic Ocean, have implications for 
control of disposal of hazardous waste and prevention of pollution.21 This is bound 
to have an effect on the cost of oil production and trade in the offshore fields in 
Ghana. 
The geographic location of oil fields has an effect on oil trade and production. The 
figures below, figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide an illustration of the location of Ghana and 
the offshore oil fields. The next section briefly discusses the historic context of Ghana. 
Like the geographic location, this too has an effect on oil trade and production in 
Ghana. 
                                                 
18
  See Africa and the World ‗A Dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast over Ghana's Oil Wealth‘ available at 
http://www.africaw.com/forum/f17/a-dispute-between-ghana-and-ivory-coast-over-t2210/ (accessed 05 
December 2012).  
19
  Ghana is confident the dispute will not escalate due to good relations with the neighboring states. Even so, 
this issue might affect oil production in the future. See Addo N A Governance and Economic Trends in 
Africa: Lessons from Ghana (2012) Meeting Summary Chatham House 4 (hereafter Addo N A 2012). 
20
  The fluids containing oil from the subsea oil field are processed on board the FPSO. The export tankers that 
transport the oil to various international destinations moor next to the FPSO. This eliminates the high 
transport costs associated with onshore oil fields where oil from the wells has to be transported to storage 
facilities and then transported for export. See Tullow Oil Ghana ‗FPSO Progress‘ available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/ghana/index.asp?pageid=41 (accessed 02 May 2013). 
21
  See generally Tullow Oil Ghana Jubilee Field Phase 1 Development DRAFT Non-Technical Executive 
Summary of Environmental Impact Statement (2009) (hereafter Tullow Oil 2009). See also generally 
African Development Bank 2009. 
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FIGURE 6.1 MAP OF GHANA 
 
Source: UNDP ‗Map of Ghana‘ available at http://www.undp-gha.org/design/presscenter 
/news&event.php?id=249 (accessed 03 December 2012). 
 
FIGURE 6.2 MAP OF GHANA SHOWING THE OFFSHORE OIL ACREAGE 
 
Source: OXFAM ‗Ghana's Offshore Oil Fields‘ available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/the-coming-
oil-boom-in-ghana (accessed 03 December 2012). 
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6.1.2 Historical Context of Ghana’s Oil Production and Trade 
This section provides a basic discussion of Ghana‘s colonial and post-colonial history. 
The pre-colonial era is only referred to where necessary. A detailed discussion of 
that period is beyond the scope of the thesis.22 The general historical context sets the 
tone for the discussion of the history of oil production and trade in Ghana. The 
section also relies on the trade policy reviews to offer insights on Ghana‘s 
performance within the WTO framework. It should be noted that the section does 
not attempt to provide a comprehensive discussion of the history of Ghana. 
The section is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the general history of 
Ghana. The second part discusses the history of oil production and trade in Ghana. 
Finally, the section reflects on Ghana‘s membership of the WTO and the impact it 
has had on international trade in the country. The analysis arising out of this section 
sets a background for a more elaborate discussion of the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and the control of corruption in the contemporary 
era of Ghanaian oil production and trade. 
A) General History of Ghana 
In 1957, Ghana gained independence from Britain.23 The boundaries of the new 
country were created along the frontiers that had marked the colonial territory 
referred to as the Gold Coast and some territory from present day Togo.24 Ghana 
was politically organised at the time and was the first African country to be granted 
independence.25 Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was the first prime minister and he led the 
                                                 
22
  For a detailed discussion of the pre-colonial era, see generally Kimble D A Political History of Ghana The 
Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism 1850-1928 (1963) (hereafter Kimble D 1963). See also Mokhtar G (ed) 
General History of Africa II Ancient Civilizations of Africa (1990) 330-331 (hereafter Mokhtar G (ed) 1990). 
23
  Meredith M (2011) 25. 
24
  The name ‗Gold Coast‘ initially only referred to the coastal area. Later the whole colony created under the 
Imperial Orders in Council of 1901, was referred to as the Gold Coast including the Kingdom of Ashanti and 
other inland territory. The Orders in Council only came into effect in 1902. Togo was formerly under 
German rule but after 1919, it was administered by Britain and France. The modern state of Ghana is named 
after the African empire of Ghana that ceased to exist in about the 13
th
 Century. See Fage J D Ghana A 
Historical Interpretation (1961) 3-4 and 65 (hereafter Fage J D 1961). See also Kimble D (1963) xv. See 
also Mckenna A (ed) The History of Western Africa (2011) 124 and 207 (hereafter Mckenna A (ed) 2011).  
25
  It has been reported that Ghana had an able civil service, an effective parliament, organised political parties, 
an impartial judiciary and an able prime minister. The opposition and government both had able politicians. 
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country to independence.26 At the time Ghana was granted independence, it had 
flourishing trade in cocoa, gold, timber, and bauxite.27 Moreover, by 1907 efficient 
trade routes had been established and internal barriers to trade were being 
removed.28 It is also worth noting that by the time Ghana gained independence, the 
country had a deep-water port at Takoradi.29 This may be attributed to the trade 
mentioned above. 
In February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown and the country went through 
a succession of military regimes.30 In 1992, Ghana returned to normalcy and the first 
presidential elections were held.31 In 2001, the country had a transfer of power to 
another political party and currently enjoys a fair level of democracy and 
transparency.32 
The general colonial and post-colonial history of Ghana is one of promise, failure, 
and resurrection, in that order. This kind of environment was the broad context in 
which Ghana‘s oil production and trade developed. Nevertheless, a more specific 
                                                                                                                                                        
See Meredith M (2011) 18-27. During the colonial era, there were African representatives on both the 
legislative and executive councils. See Fage J D (1961) 76-81.  
26
  The prominent political parties at the time of independence were the United Gold Coast Convention and the 
Convention People‘s Party which led Ghana to independence. See Fage J D (1961) 84-85.  
27
  Trade in gold existed prior to the colonial era. Foreign companies only took on gold mining on a permanent 
basis in the late nineteenth century. The Portuguese were involved in trade and had built forts on the coast. 
Although the author is also aware of slave trade and how it shaped the creation of country, the discussion on 
the same is too extensive and is beyond the scope of the thesis. See Meredith M (2011) 27. See also Fage J D 
(1961) 44-45 and 65. See also Kimble D (1963) 15.  
28
  Roads and a railway system were constructed. A telegraph system was also put in place. See Kimble D 
(1963) 25-33.  
29
  At the time the proposal to build the harbour was made there was some opposition from some 
representatives on the legislative committee but this did not stop the project. See Fage J D (1961) 79. See 
also Kimble D (1963) 57.  
30
  Between 1966 and1992, Ghana was largely dominated by military regimes. However, there were some 
civilian governments between 1969-1972, and 1979-1981. See Mckenna A (ed) (2011) 133. See also 
Abdulai A G Political Context Study-Ghana (2009) Human rights, Power and Civic Action research project, 
Universities of Oslo, Leeds and Ghana 2 (hereafter Abdulai A G 2009).  
31
  In 1992 a new Constitution was enacted and a multi-party democracy established in 1993. See Mckenna A 
(ed) (2011) 133. See also Abdulai A G (2009) 1.  
32
  President Jerry Rawlings was in power between 1992 and 2001. The transition to another political party in 
2001 was thus an important milestone in Ghana. See Mckenna A (ed) (2011) 133. See also Haynes J 
‗'Limited' democracy in Ghana and Uganda. What is most important to international actors: stability or 
political freedom?‘ (2010) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19:2, 192-195 (hereafter Haynes J 
2010). See also generally Crawford G ‗‗Making democracy a reality‘? The politics of decentralisation and 
the limits to local democracy in Ghana‘ (2009) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27:1 57-83 
(hereafter Crawford G 2009). 
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historical discussion of oil production and trade is necessary to fully understand the 
oil sector of Ghana. 
B) History of Oil Production and Trade in Ghana 
It has been noted that oil wells were drilled in Western Ghana as far back as 1896.33 
However, oil production only commenced between 1978 and 1985 in the Saltpond 
field.34 The Saltpond field was discovered in 1970 by Signal/ Amoco,35 and between 
1978 and 1985, a total of about 3.47 million barrels of oil were produced from the 
oilfield.36 Apart from the Saltpond discovery, a number of oil discoveries were made 
between 1970 and 1980.37 These included: Volta Tano 1X in offshore Tano well, and 
discoveries by Phillips in North and South Tano in 1978-1980.38  
It is surprising to note that the above oil discoveries and the production of oil from 
the Saltpond field were made during an era dominated by military regimes and 
                                                 
33
  Oil wells were drilled in Half Asini as a result of oil seeps discovered in the Tano basin. See GNPC 
‗Activities: Exploration and Production‘ available at http://www.gnpcghana. com/activities /exploration 
Intro.asp (accessed 07 December 2012). See also Oil and Gas Financial Journal ‗Ghana‘ available at 
http://www.ogfj.com/articles/2010/10/ghana.html (accessed 07 December 2012). Prior to the 1970 oil 
discoveries, the West African Oil and Fuel Co. Ltd was prominent in exploration efforts in Ghana. See also 
Sutherland R ‗Exploration History and Regional Geology‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com/ files/ 
pdf/ghana/exploration-history-and-regional-geology.pdf (accessed 07 December 2012). See also Banful A J 
‗The legal regime of Ghana‘s upstream petroleum industry and the role of GNPC as player and regulator‘ 
(2010) Ghana Policy Journal Vol 4 Special Issue 69 (hereafter Banful A J 2010). See also Adjaye J A ‗Oil 
production and Ghana‘s economy: what can we expect?‘(2010) Ghana Policy Journal Vol 4 Special Issue 
36 (hereafter Adjaye J A 2010). The author of the foregoing article notes that oil in Ghana was discovered in 
1970. However, this article does not take note of earlier oil discoveries. It is respectfully submitted that the 
above position is inaccurate. 
34
  See GNPC ‗Activities: Exploration and Production‘ available at http://www.gnpcghana.com/ 
activities/explorationIntro.asp (accessed 07 December 2012). See also Tullow Oil Ghana ‗Introduction to 
Ghana-Hydrocarbon Exploration in Ghana‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com/ ghana/index.asp? 
pageid=27 (accessed 07 December 2012). 
35
  Some commentators have noted that the Saltpond discovery was made by US firm AgriPetco; however, this 
is inaccurate as the discovery was attributed to a consortium of Signal/Amoco. In 1970 Signal/ Amoco 
discovered oil in the Saltpond field although the field was later developed by AgriPetco in 1978. See 
Saltpond Offshore Producing Company Limited ‗Ghana Government to Revamp Saltpond Oil Project‘ 
available at http://www.saltpondoffshore.com/newsreleases2.html (accessed 07 December 2012). See also 
GNPC ‗Saltpond Field‘ available at http://www.gnpcghana.com/_upload/general/ saltpondfield_sopcl.pdf 
(accessed 07 December 2012). For a contrary opinion see Adjaye J A (2010) 36. 
36
  See Tullow Oil Ghana ‗Introduction to Ghana-Hydrocarbon Exploration in Ghana‘ available at http:// 
www.tullowoil.com/ghana/index.asp?pageid=27 (accessed 07 December 2012). 
37
  See Sutherland R ‗Exploration History and Regional Geology‘ available at http://www.tullowoil. 
com/files/pdf/ghana/exploration-history-and-regional-geology.pdf (accessed 07 December 2012). 
38
  See Sutherland R ‗Exploration History and Regional Geology‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com 
/files/pdf/ghana/exploration-history-and-regional-geology.pdf (accessed 07 December 2012). See also 
Banful A J (2010) 69-70. 
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coup d‘états, with limited civilian government between 1979 and 1981.39 Accordingly, 
although discoveries were made during the period of political instability, it can be 
argued that Ghana‘s oil potential was not fully exploited during this era due to the 
prevailing instability. Another question that arises from the foregoing discussion is 
why the other oil discoveries, such as the Volta Tano 1X and the North and South 
Tano discoveries were never developed for production? The answer seems to lie in 
the fact that in some instances heavy oil and gas were discovered; this was true for 
the onshore Tano area where the African and Eastern Trade Company encountered 
heavy oil.40 This may have discouraged production due to the lack of technical 
capacity required to produce heavy oil. Additionally, it has been noted that oil 
exploration that was being undertaken under the Ghana-Soviet friendship pact, in 
the Volta basin was interrupted by the 1966 coup d‘état.41 However, the discovery in 
the Volta basin was made in 1970 and failure to develop the oil field cannot be 
attributed to the 1966 coup coup d‘état.42 Although it cannot be said with certainty, 
the political instability in Ghana that defined the period between 1970 and 1980 may 
have affected oil production.43 
In 1985, the Saltpond field was closed and it was only reopened in 2000 when the 
Saltpond Offshore Producing Company Limited took over.44 Production of oil from 
this field has been affected by complaints about its productivity45 and the poor 
infrastructure.46 
                                                 
39
  Abdulai A G (2009) Appendix 1 33. See also Banful A J (2010) 70. 
40
  Banful A J (2010) 69. 
41
  Banful A J (2010) 70. See also Ghana Oil and Gas ‗Extent of Oil and Gas Deposits in Ghana and 
Environmental and Strategic Concerns‘ available at http://www.ghanaoilandgasonline.com/index _051.htm 
(accessed 07 December 2012).  
42
  See Sutherland R ‗Exploration History and Regional Geology‘ available at http://www.tullowoil.com/ 
files/pdf/ghana/exploration-history-and-regional-geology.pdf (accessed 07 December 2012). 
43
  Abdulai A G (2009) Appendix 1 33. 
44
  See Saltpond Offshore Producing Company Limited ‗Background‘ available at http://www. Saltpondoff 
shore.com/presentstatus.html (accessed 07 December 2012). 
45
  See also Oil and Gas Financial Journal ‗Ghana‘ available at http://www.ogfj.com/articles /2010/ 
10/ghana.html (accessed 07 December 2012). 
46
  See Saltpond Offshore Producing Company Limited ‗SOPCL to Increase Production‘ available at 
http://www.saltpondoffshore.com/newsreleases1.html (accessed 07 December 2012). 
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Although data for oil exports from Ghana for the period 1978 to 2010 is not available, 
in 2011, the country earned about US $ 1.97 billion from crude oil export.47 The 
Jubilee oil fields produced about 23 million barrels of crude oil in 2011. 48  The 
Saltpond field produced an average of 700 barrels of crude oil per day.49 It is evident 
from the above brief discussion that Ghana is currently an oil producing and 
exporting state.50 It is therefore necessary to examine the history of the general 
international trade framework in Ghana. The analysis is mainly based on the two 
trade policy reviews that have been conducted by the WTO.  
C) Ghana and the WTO 
Ghana joined the WTO in 1995 and has been an active member compared to other 
African countries.51 Ghana was a third party in the European Communities — Regime 
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas WTO dispute.52  Currently, no 
African country has participated in the WTO dispute settlement as a complainant.53 
As such, participation in the dispute settlement process as a third party is 
commendable for an African state. 54  Also, Ghana‘s former trade minister was 
                                                 
47
  See World Economic Outlook data, IMF ‗Ghana‘ available at http://www.econstats.com/weo/ CGHA.htm 
(accessed 07 December 2012). See also Open Oil ‗Ghana Oil Almanac‘ available at 
http://openoil.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Ghaha-Almanac-PDF.pdf (accessed 07 December 2012). 
Data on oil production during that period is scanty and unreliable.   
48
  It should also be noted that the Jubilee oil field is performing below the projected capacity of 120 000 barrels 
per day. This has been attributed to poor well design among other factors. See Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee Report on Petroleum Revenue Management for 2011 Annual Report (2011) 8 
(hereafter Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2011). See also Bernstein Liebhard LLP ‗Bernstein 
Liebhard LLP announces that a Securities Class Action Lawsuit has been Filed against Kosmos Energy, Ltd‘ 
available at http://www.bernlieb.com/kosmos-energy-ltd-securities-class-action (accessed 03 May 2013). See 
also Ministry of Finance (2012) 5. 
49
  Public Interest and Accountability Committee (2011) 1. 
50
  Clarke D (2010) 183 and 157. 
51
  See WTO ‗Ghana and the WTO‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countries e/ghana _e.htm 
(accessed 10 December 2012). 
52
  It should be noted that in addition to Ghana; Chad, Senegal, Côte d‘Ivoire and Madagascar were also third 
parties in this dispute. See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (Appellate Body Report) [1997] WT/DS27/AB/R 3.  
53
  Madolo N & Nakawaga J ‗Introduction The Importance of An African Voice in ―Global‖ International 
Economic Law‘ Madolo N (ed) International Economic Law The Voices of Africa (2012) 8 (hereafter 
Madolo N & Nakawaga J 2012). Although there are no disputes by African complainants under the WTO, it 
has been noted that the GATT had two such disputes. These were: US-Subsidy on Unmanufactured Tobacco 
(Working Party Report) [1967] BISD 15S/116. In this dispute Malawi was the complainant. See also 
Canada-Measures Affecting Sale of Gold Coins (Panel Report) [1985] L/5863 (unadopted). In this matter 
South Africa was the complainant. 
54
  See Madolo N & Nakawaga J (2012) 8. In addition to the European Communities — Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas WTO dispute discussed above, there are only ten other 
disputes where African countries have been third parties in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
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seconded by the African Union for the position of Director General of the WTO.55 
Additionally, Ghana has been transparent in notifying its obligations as required 
under the WTO agreements.56 It is also worth noting that Ghana‘s participation in 
the African Group has helped African countries advocate trade regulatory reform 
that is alive to the challenges in Africa. 57  The above examples are evidence of 
Ghana‘s active role in the WTO. The trade review reports offer more insight into 
Ghana‘s international trade and the WTO framework. 
In the 2001 trade review report of Ghana by the WTO Secretariat, it was noted that 
Ghana had made extensive reforms since the 1990s.58 These reforms included trade 
and investment liberalisation aimed at making Ghana the main trading point in 
West Africa.59 The fragile economy that characterised the 1990s was tackled through 
controlling inflation and increasing the tax base by re-introducing VAT.60 The late 
1990s also witnessed an increase in exports, mainly primary commodities and 
imports as a share of GDP.61 The state of the economy in the 1990s may be explained 
by the fact that the country was recovering from a long period of political and 
economic instability. 
                                                 
55
  See African News ‗Ghana‘s Alan Kyerematen Readies for WTO Top Job‘ available at http://www. 
africanews.com/site/Ghanas_Alan_Kyerematen_readies_for_WTO_top_job/list_messages/42277 (accessed 
10 December 2012). He was subsequently dropped from the list of candidates. See also Ghana Web ‗Alan 
Kyerematen Loses Out in his Quest to Become Next WTO Boss‘ available at 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=270777 (accessed 03 May 2013). 
56
  Ghana notified the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on its lack of an institution to 
monitor subsidies and undertake countervailing actions. See WTO Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Notification Under Arts 25.11 and 25.12 of the [SCM] Agreement Ghana (2011) 
G/SCM/N/202/GHA. Ghana has also notified the Committee on Import Licensing on the status of import 
licensing systems in Ghana. See WTO Committee on Import Licensing Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures Notification Under Articles 7.3, 1.4(a) and 8.2(b) of the Agreement (2009) G/LIC/N/3/GHA/4. 
57
  WTO African Union Conference of Ministers of Trade 7th Ordinary Session (2011) Accra-Ghana 
WT/MIN(11)/9. 
58
  See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Body: Ghana Report by the Secretariat- Summary Observations‘ available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp157_e.htm (accessed 10 December 2012). The 1990s were a 
period of economic reform. However, the strong reliance on foreign aid also commenced in this period. See 
Whitfield L & Jones E Ghana-The Political Dimensions of Aid Dependence (2008) Global Economic 
Governance Working Paper 2007/32 7-8 (hereafter Whitfield L & Jones E 2008).  
59
  See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Body: Ghana Report by the Secretariat- Summary Observations‘ available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp157_e.htm (accessed 10 December 2012). 
60
  See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Body: Ghana Report by the Secretariat- Summary Observations‘ available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp157_e.htm (accessed 10 December 2012). 
61
  See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Body: Ghana Report by the Secretariat- Summary Observations‘ available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp157_e.htm (accessed 10 December 2012). 
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The 2001 trade review report also revealed that Ghana maintained very few export 
restrictions.62 The export restrictions identified were on logs, parrots and bamboo.63 
Additionally, at the time of the Report, Ghana was considering stronger laws on 
government procurement.64 Government procurement was not sufficiently regulated 
and this might have created avenues for corruption.65 The Report also revealed that 
until 1996, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) the state oil company 
had a monopoly on the importation of oil and was heavily indebted. 66  The 
development of the monopoly might have been aided by the lack of sufficient laws 
on government procurement.67 Although Ghana reported that it did not provide 
subsidies to aid export, the Report indicated that government provided tax rebates 
to exporters and that might have amounted to subsidies for exporters.68 The Report 
did not examine oil production quotas; this might be attributed to the limited oil 
production at the time. Oil consumption subsidies were also not discussed in the 
Report. However, the Report highlights the need for laws on government 
procurement in the oil sector.  
The above discussion indicates that the 1990s were an era of extensive reforms and 
reconstruction of the economy. Ghana adopted a positive stance towards trade 
liberalisation. This enabled the country recover from the dark era that had taken 
hold of the country‘s economy. It should be noted that although oil had been 
                                                 
62
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList= 
81179%2c65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
63
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=81 
179%2c65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
64
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=811 
79%2c65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
65
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=81179%2c
65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
66
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=81179%2c
65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
67
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=81179%2c
65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
68
 See WTO ‗Trade Policy Review Ghana Report by the Secretariat WT/TPR/S/81‘ available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S0091.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=81179%2c
65371%2c20713&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextSearch= (accessed 03 May 2013). 
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discovered prior to the 1990s, there was little or no domestic production during this 
period due to the closure of the Saltpond field. 69  Thus the Report does not 
extensively discuss Ghana‘s oil production and trade. 
After 2001, Ghana continued to implement its trade liberalisation strategy although 
at a much slower pace compared to the 1990s.70 State owned enterprises continued to 
play a significant role in the oil sector. 71  Further, a new law on government 
procurement and transparency was enacted in 2003; however, Ghana was not a 
signatory or observer to the GPA and that status is still the same as of 2013.72  
At the time of the 2008 trade policy review report, it was also noted that Ghana did 
not apply any export restrictions or quotas. 73  Ghana also noted that it did not 
provide any form of subsidies or price support; however, the 2008 trade policy 
review report revealed that a number of export promotion activities were 
maintained by the government.74 Related to the foregoing, it was also noted that 
Ghana maintained fuel subsidies as a tool for income redistribution and price 
stabilisation.75 Due to the fact that at the time of the 2008 trade policy review report, 
oil production and trade from the Jubilee oil fields had not yet commenced, the 
review is limited in scope on the regulation of international trade in oil in Ghana. 
The information presented in the review on the oil sector is not detailed. However, 
the Report indicates that subsidies indeed existed in the oil sector and the issue of 
government procurement and transparency was being considered by the 
government. The Report did not address oil production quotas.  
                                                 
69
  Domestic production in this regard refers to extraction of crude oil from oil fields in Ghana. On the other 
hand, Oil refining was taking place. The Tema Refinery increased its capacity in 1997. See Saltpond 
Offshore Producing Company Limited ‗Background‘ available at  http://www.saltpond 
offshore.com/presentstatus.html (accessed 07 December 2012). See Tema Oil Refinery ‗History‘ available at 
http://www2.torghana.com/index.php/about-us/history (accessed 10 December 2012). 
70
  WTO Trade Policy Review Ghana Trade Policies and Practices by Measure (2008) WT/TPR/S/194 22 
(hereafter WTO Trade Policy Review 2008a). 
71
  WTO Trade Policy Review (2008a) 22. 
72
  WTO Trade Policy Review (2008a) 22 and 37-38. The government procurement laws of Ghana are further 
discussed in the next section of the chapter. See chapter 6 section 6.2. 
73
  WTO Trade Policy Review (2008a) 34. 
74
  WTO Trade Policy Review (2008a) 36. 
75
  WTO Trade Policy Review Ghana Trade Policies by Sector (2008) WT/TPR/S/194 54 (hereafter WTO 
Trade Policy Review 2008b). 
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The above discussion on the history of Ghana and its oil sector as well as the 
relationship of Ghana and the WTO provide a background to the analysis of the 
policy and legal framework on international trade in oil in Ghana. The discussion 
commences with the policy framework and then examines the legal framework. The 
main focus of the analysis is the regulation of oil production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and the control of corruption in the oil sector. 
6.2  The Broad Policy and Legal Framework on International Trade 
in Oil in Ghana 
6.2.1 The Fundamental Petroleum Policy 2009 
The main goal of the Fundamental Petroleum Policy (Policy) is twofold; first, the 
Policy is aimed at making the country a net exporter of oil and gas.76 Second, the 
Policy aspires to making Ghana a major player in the oil and gas industry.77 The 
Policy also highlights the recognition of Ghana‘s sovereignty over its natural 
resources and the protection of the rights of all stakeholders in the oil sector.78 The 
Policy is meant to guide all legal and fiscal regimes affecting the oil sector in 
Ghana.79  
One of the major guiding principles in the Policy is the recognition of the fact that oil 
is an exhaustible resource and production has to be managed in a sustainable 
manner.80 This is to some extent countered by the fact that the Policy also provides 
for optimisation of production.81 The two issues seem to be contradictory; however, 
the wording of the principle in the Policy qualifies optimisation of production, by 
providing for sustainability. Based on the above Policy objectives, it can be argued 
that the Policy provides for control of oil production for the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource. From an international trade perspective, such 
                                                 
76
  Ministry of Energy Fundamental Petroleum Policy (2009) 2 (hereafter Ministry of Energy 2009). 
77
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 2. 
78
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 5. 
79
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 5. 
80
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 8. 
81
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 8. 
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restriction or control does not fall foul of GATT provisions on export restrictions.82 
Article XX (g) of the GATT justifies and allows such production restrictions.83 
Although all forms of production restriction may ultimately encourage the violation 
of Art XI (I) of the GATT, the restriction envisaged in the Policy unlike OPEC 
production quotas, is consistent with GATT obligations.84 
Further, the Policy also indicates that the government will establish a transparent 
fiscal regime for the collection and management of oil revenue.85 This is an efficient 
way of reducing corruption in the oil sector in Ghana. Eliminating corruption in the 
oil sector in Ghana will remain a challenge due to the great involvement of the state 
in the upstream and downstream sectors of the oil industry in Ghana. 86  Thus 
transparent mechanisms for collection and disbursement of revenue from the oil 
sector will discourage the political elite and government technocrats from 
misappropriating oil revenue.  
Finally, although the Policy provides for the need to regulate the downstream oil 
sector especially the sale and pricing of oil, and setting of pricing regulations, these 
are not exhaustively discussed.87 The above provisions in the Policy are related to the 
provision of oil consumption subsidies, which may be maintained through price 
support. As noted in previous chapters oil consumption subsidies may in some cases 
violate Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement.88 
6.2.2 The Energy Policy of Ghana 2010 
The Energy Policy (Policy) provides for three major issues that affect the oil sector. 
These include revenue management, production management and provision of 
subsidies. The Policy encourages transparency in the collection and management of 
                                                 
82
  It is argued in this thesis that oil production restrictions directly affect export and therefore amount to export 
restrictions. 
83
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
84
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1. See also chapter 4 section 4.4.1. 
85
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 8. 
86
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
87
  Ministry of Energy (2009) 15. 
88
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3.  
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oil revenues in Ghana.89 Similar to the Fundamental Petroleum Policy, the emphasis 
on transparency will discourage corruption.  
Second, the Policy also alludes to the sustainable management of oil reserves and 
production in Ghana.90 This Policy is similar to the Fundamental Petroleum Policy 
which provides for regulation of oil production as a means of conserving an 
exhaustible natural resource.91 Both these issues are related and are protected under 
Art XX (g) of the GATT.92 They do not constitute a violation of obligations under Art 
XI (1) of the GATT.93 
Finally, the Policy provides for the provision of cross-subsidies between oil 
products.94 The subsidies are meant to achieve national development objectives.95 
The Policy does not provide detailed information on these subsidies. Accordingly an 
objective analysis of the proposed subsidies and whether they are consistent with 
WTO obligations is not possible at this stage. However, further discussion of cross 
subsidisation in the oil sector in Ghana is undertaken in the next section on the legal 
framework. 
6.2.3 An Overview of the Policy Framework 
Related to the above Policies, Ghana also has a Policy on Local Content and Local 
Participation (Policy) in the oil sector. 96  However, this does not directly affect 
production quotas and oil consumption subsidies. The Policy provides for the 
participation of Ghanaian citizens in the oil and gas sector.97 It further provides that 
such participants shall be selected in a transparent manner. 98  Although such 
provisions encourage transparency, local content rules can serve as a breeding 
                                                 
89
  Ministry of Energy The Energy Policy of Ghana (2010) 16 (hereafter Ministry of Energy 2010). 
90
  Ministry of Energy (2010) 16. 
91
  Ministry of Energy (2010) 16. 
92
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2 for a detailed discussion. 
93
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
94
  Ministry of Energy (2010) 19. 
95
  Ministry of Energy (2010) 19. 
96
  Ministry of Energy Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum Activities – Policy Framework (2011) 
(hereafter Ministry of Energy 2011). 
97
  Ministry of Energy (2011) 11. 
98
  Ministry of Energy (2011) 11. 
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ground for nepotism and also encourage politics of patronage. These conditions may 
encourage corruption in the oil sector. 
The above Policies are related and are consistent on the regulation of international 
trade in oil in Ghana. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the provisions in the 
Policies are thin on detail and this does not permit a detailed analysis of the key 
areas. This shortcoming may be attributed to the fact that the above policy 
framework is only meant to guide legislation on the oil sector and that the various 
laws ought to provide detailed provisions on international trade in oil. 
In sum, the policy framework for Ghana‘s oil sector is in some cases in line with 
Ghana‘s obligations under the WTO agreements. For example, the regulation of 
production for the protection of an exhaustible natural resource is consistent with 
WTO obligations. However, this may change if Ghana joins OPEC, where 
production is regulated for other reasons, such as price stabilisation, which is not 
part of the exceptions provided in Art XX of the GATT. The policy framework on oil 
subsidies is insufficient and does not reveal whether the proposed subsidies are oil 
consumption subsidies. However, the policy framework leans towards the provision 
of subsidies for oil products. If these subsidies are specific or directed at a particular 
industry or meant to encourage the consumption of local products they may violate 
obligations under Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement.  
Finally, the Policies emphasise transparency in the oil sector. This may help Ghana 
combat corruption in the oil sector. Nevertheless, the Policy on local content may 
present problems which might encourage corruption. Although the policy 
framework is meant to guide the legal framework, the policies are quite recent as 
compared to the laws regulating oil production and trade in Ghana. Thus there 
might be some differences between the Policies and the laws. The next section 
discusses the legal framework. 
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6.2.4 The Legal Framework 
The structure of this section is thematic as opposed to a separate discussion of each 
of the laws that regulate oil production and trade. There are numerous laws 
regulating the oil sector in Ghana; a discussion of each of these laws and their 
relationship to international trade in oil is unnecessary as some of the laws are not 
directly related to production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption.99 In 
addition to the above key areas also pertinent to international trade in oil, the section 
also discusses provisions on state sovereignty over natural resources in Ghana. This 
sets a background for discussion of the key areas. 
A) State Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
The Constitution of Ghana is the first point of call in examining the legal framework 
for oil production and trade. That Constitution provides that all minerals in the 
natural state are the property of the Republic of Ghana and are vested in the 
President who holds them on behalf of the people of Ghana.100 Ordinarily, the term 
‗minerals‘101 excludes natural resources in a liquid state, and it can therefore be 
argued that Art 257 (6) of the Constitution does not cover oil. This lacuna has been 
noted and an amendment to the provision has been suggested.102 The amendment 
refers to extractive natural resources, as opposed to minerals in the natural state.103 
The proposed amendment will clear all doubt regarding the interpretation of the 
above provision.  
                                                 
99
  For example the Petroleum Income Tax Law, PNDC Law 188 of 1987, is not part of the analysis in this 
section. Also some provisions in the relevant laws are not discussed. The analysis in this section is limited to 
the relevant provisions and laws. 
100
  See Art 257 (6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992.  
101
  See Oxford Dictionaries ‗Mineral‘ available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/mineral 
(accessed 04 May 2013). It can be argued that oil does not always exist in a liquid state. This may be true for 
oil sands and oil shale. However, the oil sands are composed of sand, clay, water and bitumen. Thus are 
largely liquid. Oil shale is a sedimentary rock containing Kerogen which is used to make shale oil. However 
shale oil is not crude oil although it is a hydrocarbon. See Oil Sands Today ‗What are Oil Sands?‘ available 
at http://www.oilsandstoday.ca/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 04 May 2013). See also Oil Shale and Tar 
Sands Programmatic EIS ‗About Oil Shale‘ available at http://ostseis.anl.gov /guide/oilshale/ (accessed 04 
May 2013). 
102
  The Institute of Economic Affairs Natural Resource Management in Ghana: A Case for Constitutional 
Amendment (2010) Constitutional Review Series 8 12 (hereafter The Institute of Economic Affairs 2010). 
103
  The Institute of Economic Affairs (2010) 13. 
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Section 2 of the GNPC Act is consistent with the principle of state ownership of 
natural resources in Ghana, elaborated in the Constitution.104 The section provides 
that one of the objects of GNPC is to ensure that the Republic of Ghana benefits from 
its oil resources.105 The foregoing provision and other clauses under section 2, all 
indicate that oil resources in the natural state are owned by the Republic of Ghana. 
GNPC merely pursues the commercial aspects of Ghana‘s broad interest in the oil 
sector. 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 is also instructive on this 
issue. Section 1 (1) of this law provides that oil in the natural state is owned by the 
Republic of Ghana.106 However, unlike the Constitution, the ownership rights are 
vested in the Provisional National Defence Council.107 Of course, this provision has 
long been overtaken by events; with the enactment of the Constitution in 1992, 
Ghana is now a democracy. This inconsistency with the Constitution is rectified by 
the supremacy of the Constitution over all other laws.108 This conclusion is made on 
the presumption that the term ‗minerals‘ as used in the Constitution also includes oil. 
The Petroleum Commission Act also indicates that petroleum resources are owned 
by the Republic of Ghana.109 Similarly, although the Maritime Zones (Delimitation) 
law, 1984, 110 is not explicit, it too supports the view that natural resources in Ghana 
are owned by the Republic. The Act extends Ghana‘s sovereignty to the territorial 
sea..111 It can therefore be argued that natural resources located within the territorial 
waters of Ghana belong to the Republic. In terms of ownership of Ghana‘s oil 
resources, it is clear that the resources are owned by the Republic of Ghana this has 
various implications for international trade.  
                                                 
104
  Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 1 P.N.D.C.L. 64. 
105
  See Section 2 (2) (b) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 1 P.N.D.C.L. 64. 
106
  The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 P.N.D.C.L. 84. 
107
  See Section 1 (1) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 P.N.D.C.L. 84. 
108
  See Art 1 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992.  
109
  See Art 3 (1) of the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 Act 821. 
110
  Maritime Zones (Delimitation) law, 1984 1 P.N.D.C.L. 159. 
111
  See Section 2 of the Maritime Zones (Delimitation) law, 1984 1 P.N.D.C.L. 159. 
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The most prominent issue appears to be the need for consent from the Republic, 
through the national legislative body, when dealing with oil resources.112 Parliament 
has to be consulted and without parliamentary devolution of powers as in the case 
of GNPC,113 transactions regarding oil resources that are made in the absence of such 
consent may be null and void.114 It can also be argued that all matters relating to the 
management of Ghana‘s oil resources have to be handled in the best interests of the 
citizens. The issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a common 
attribute of all the above provisions. However, as noted previously, sovereignty over 
natural resources does not imply that crude oil should not be subject to international 
trade obligations.115 Suffice it to note that if Ghana voluntarily joined the WTO, its 
domestic laws should be consistent with its WTO obligations. 
B) Production Quotas 
The policy framework indicates that it is in the best interests of the people of Ghana 
to control production.116 The restriction of production is meant to conserve crude oil 
since it is a finite resource.117 Even so, the policy framework also advocates optimum 
production.118 These issues are reconcilable and are not inconsistent.119 Section 2 of 
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act is in line with the policy framework 
discussed above. The provision states that one of the objectives of GNPC is to ensure 
that petroleum operations are conducted in such a manner as to prevent adverse 
effects on the environment, resources, and the people of Ghana.120 Section 10 (4) of 
the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) law also provides that production may 
be restricted to prevent the depletion of oil resources.121 These provisions indicate 
                                                 
112
 See Art 268 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992. 
113
 Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 1 P.N.D.C.L. 64. 
114
 Parliament may vote to dispense with the ratification of an oil related transaction. See Art 268 (2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992. 
115
 See chapter 1 section 1.4.1. 
116
 See chapter 6 sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
117
 See chapter 6 sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
118
 See chapter 6 sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
119
 See chapter 6 sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
120
 See Section 2 (e) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 1 P.N.D.C.L. 64. 
121
 See Section 10 (4) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 P.N.D.C.L. 84. 
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that production of oil in Ghana may be restricted for two major reasons, to protect 
the environment, and to prevent the depletion of oil resources.122  
Ghana as a member of the WTO is bound by obligations arising out of Art XI (1) of 
the GATT.123 This provision prohibits restrictions on exports. As argued previously, 
restrictions on production have the effect of restricting exports.124 This affects the 
imposition of quotas on oil production. However, Art XX (g) makes provision for 
such restrictions if the quotas are adopted to conserve an exhaustible natural 
resource and are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.125For production restrictions to pass the test established 
in the exceptions listed under Art XX (g), it has been held that the restriction has to 
be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.126 It is 
quite clear that restriction of oil production in Ghana is primarily aimed at 
conservation of oil resources and protection of the environment.127  
Second, the restriction has to be intended for the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource. The appellate body has interpreted this requirement taking into 
account the broad context of the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, which 
alludes to protection of the environment.128 The term exhaustible natural resource 
refers to exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources as well as living 
natural resources.129 Oil is an exhaustible natural resource and qualifies as such for 
purposes of Art XX (g). Accordingly, the restriction of oil production in Ghana for 
                                                 
122
  The terms production restrictions and production quotas have the same meaning and they are used 
interchangeably in the chapter. 
123
  See Art XI (1) of GATT. 
124
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
125
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
126
  See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Panel Report) [1988] 
(L/6268 - 35S/98) 12. 
127
  See chapter 6 sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. See also Section 2 (e) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
Act, 1983 1 P.N.D.C.L. 64. 
128
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 48. 
129
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 48. 
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purposes of protecting oil reserves and conserving the environment is consistent 
with WTO obligations.130 
Third, Art XX (g) requires that restrictions on exports and imports be made in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. This has been 
interpreted to refer to even-handedness in the treatment of locally produced goods 
and imported goods.131 The restriction of oil production in Ghana appears to apply 
to oil for domestic use and oil for export. There is nothing in the laws to suggest that 
the restriction of production for environmental purposes is meant to apply to only 
oil for export. The restriction is therefore even-handed. The appellate body has also 
stated that the clause means that restrictions on exports must work together with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.132 Accordingly, it can be argued 
that Ghana‘s restrictions on oil production which apply to both oil for export and oil 
for domestic consumption are consistent with the requirements under Art XX (g). 
Finally, the provisions in the chapeau are also part of the requirements that have to 
be established for a measure to satisfy the requirements in Art XX of the GATT.133 
The chapeau provides that measures should not be used as a means of unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.134 The appellate body has held that the purpose of 
the chapeau is to ensure that the GATT is applied in good faith.135 Further, that the 
limited exceptions under Art XX should not be abused.136 The chapeau establishes 
three requirements in dealing with measures under Art XX. The measure must result 
in discrimination,137 that is, arbitrary or unjustified discrimination.138 Thus the first 
                                                 
130
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
131
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 21. 
132
  See China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body Report) [2011] 
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R 142. 
133
  For a detailed discussion of the two tier test for measures under Article XX, see United States - Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] WT/DS2/AB /R 22. 
134
  See Art XX of the GATT. 
135
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 61. 
136
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 44. 
137
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 44. 
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two requirements are dealt with together. It has been held that the discrimination 
envisaged under the chapeau is distinct from the discrimination in Arts I and III of 
the GATT.139 The appellate body noted that if the same standard for discrimination 
in other parts of the GATT is applied to the chapeau, it would render the exceptions 
meaningless and have the retrospective effect of questioning whether there was 
discrimination in the substantive rules.140  
Article XX proceeds on the premise that discrimination in the substantive rules 
occurred, but there is justification for such discrimination. Accordingly, the 
standards of discrimination in the chapeau are different from the standards in the 
substantive rules. Discrimination in this regard refers to discrimination between 
importing members and exporting members and also between different exporting 
members of the WTO.141 It is also worth mentioning that unjustifiable discrimination 
has been interpreted to include measures that have the intention of coercing other 
members to make certain policy decisions in total disregard of the different 
conditions of the other member states.142 The restriction of oil production in Ghana is 
not discriminatory. There is nothing to suggest that Ghana prohibits export of oil to 
countries that do not conserve their oil in a similar manner or restricts exports to 
other oil exporting countries that conserve their environment using alternative 
methods. Thus Ghana‘s production restrictions pass the first and second 
requirements for the test under the chapeau.  
The third requirement of the test is whether the measure constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade.143 The appellate body has noted that the concept of 
disguised restriction is related to unjustified and arbitrary discrimination. 144 
                                                                                                                                                        
138
  See Article XX of the GATT. 
139
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 23. 
140
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 23 
141
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 24. 
142
  See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) 
[1998] WT/DS58/AB/R 44. 
143
  See chapeau of Article XX of GATT. 
144
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 25. 
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Disguised restrictions may include unjustified and arbitrary discrimination meant to 
make a measure compliant with the exceptions under Art XX of GATT.145 There is 
nothing to indicate that Ghana‘s oil production restrictions are discriminatory, 
accordingly, these restrictions cannot be interpreted as disguised restrictions on 
international trade. 
Currently, there are indications that Ghana will directly limit export of oil from the 
Jubilee fields. This limitation is meant to cater for domestic consumption.146 This 
type of export restriction may be found to be inconsistent with Art XI (I) of the 
GATT. It might be difficult to argue that the measure satisfies the first requirement 
under Art XX (g) of the GATT, which requires that the restriction should be 
primarily intended for the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. 147  It 
might be argued that export restriction to provide for domestic needs is closely 
related to conserving the oil resources in Ghana. However, in that case conservation 
of oil resources would be only a secondary consideration. Ghana also imposes export 
taxes on certain hydrocarbon products.148 Similarly, it might be argued that such 
restrictions are consistent with Art XX (i) of the GATT. However, restriction to meet 
domestic needs only applies to those periods when the domestic price is below the 
world price.149 Accordingly such export restrictions on oil may violate Art XI (I) of 
the GATT. Although these concerns are legitimate, they are beyond the scope of the 
thesis as the restrictions are not production restrictions but rather direct export 
restrictions. 
Currently, the production restrictions provided in Ghana‘s legal framework are 
compliant with WTO obligations. However, this may change if Ghana joins OPEC. 
                                                 
145
  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (Appellate Body Report) [1996] 
WT/DS2/AB/R 25. 
146
  Oil from Jubilee held by GNPC may be sold to the Tema Refinery to meet domestic needs as opposed to 
export. See Adam B ‗TOR can Refine Jubilee Oil, but...‘ available at http://www.thebftonline.com/ news/top-
stories/2617 (accessed 13 December 2012). See also GNPC Model Petroleum Agreement of Ghana (2000) 
Article 15 (2). 
147
  See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Panel Report) [1988] 
(L/6268 - 35S/98) 12. 
148
  Kim J Recent Trends in Export Restrictions (2010) OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 101 30 (hereafter Kim J 
2010). See also Karapinar B Export Restrictions on Natural Resources: Policy Options and Opportunities for 
Africa (2010) World Trade Institute, University of Bern 10 (hereafter Karapinar B 2010). 
149
  See Art XX (i) of the GATT. 
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The production restrictions maintained by OPEC are inconsistent with WTO 
obligations under Art XI (I) of GATT.150 Moreover, OPEC production restrictions 
cannot be justified under Art XX (g) of the GATT.151 
C) Oil Consumption Subsidies 
Section 2 of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005, provides the functions of 
the National Petroleum Authority of Ghana (the Authority). The provision enjoins 
the Authority to monitor the price ceiling of petroleum products in Ghana.152 Besides 
the foregoing mandate, the Authority is also charged with protecting the interests of 
petroleum consumers in Ghana.153 These clauses are the basis for the provision of oil 
consumption subsidies in Ghana. The Authority relies on a petroleum pricing 
formula.154 This formula offers favourable oil prices to domestic consumers. The 
petroleum pricing formula was adopted in 2001, before the National Petroleum 
Authority Act was enacted. 155  Implicit in the formula is cross subsidisation of 
petroleum products which include kerosene and gas oil.156  
Basically, cross subsidisation in Ghana is maintained through increasing the ex- 
refinery price of petroleum,157 due to the fact that petroleum is mainly consumed by 
the wealthy sections of society.158 The increase of ex-refinery petroleum prices keeps 
the ex-pump prices of kerosene and gas oil low. 159  The justification for the 
subsidisation of kerosene is that it is mainly consumed by the poor sections of 
                                                 
150
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
151
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
152
  See Section 2 (a) of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 691.  
153
  See Section 2 (e) of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 691. 
154
  See Section 2 (a) of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 691. 
155
  Centre for Policy Analysis Pricing Petroleum Products in Ghana —The Automatic Formula (2003) Ghana 
Selected Economic Issues No 5 1 (hereafter Centre for Policy Analysis 2003). See also Nnadikwe K High 
Oil Dependence in Ghana: to what Extent is Ghana Vulnerable to Oil Price Shock? (2010) Centre for Energy 
Petroleum, Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP), University of Dundee 5 for a detailed description of the 
formula (hereafter Nnadikwe K 2010). 
156
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 2-3. 
157
  See section 81 of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 691. ‗Ex-refinery price means the amount 
of money equivalent to the actual cost of importing finished petroleum products and not exceeding the 
import parity price.‘ 
158
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. 
159
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. See also section 81 of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 
691. ‗Ex-pump price means the price at which a given quantity of a petroleum product is sold at a retail 
station dispensing pump.‘ 
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society.160 Subsidisation of gas oil is also meant to benefit the poor as it runs the 
commercial transport system. 161  The wealthy sections of society depend on 
petroleum powered vehicles as opposed to gas oil. 162  The cross subsidisation 
program was meant to be self-financing; the taxation of other petroleum products 
was meant to fund the subsidies.163  However, this system did not produce the 
desired results and the government only incurred more debt maintaining the 
subsidy program.164  
Besides the cross subsidisation program, Ghana‘s petroleum pricing formula also 
provides subsidies for oil price stabilisation.165 Ultimately, the beneficiaries of these 
subsidies are the consumers who enjoy low ex-pump prices. In 2012, Ghana‘s budget 
indicated that ex-pump petroleum prices for 2011 had to be subsidised by GH¢ 267 
million.166 Further, it has also been reported that government is encumbered with an 
outstanding debt of US $ 80 million that accrued out of subsidising petroleum 
products in Ghana.167 Ghana has in the past attempted to remove fuel subsidies but 
has not been successful.168 
                                                 
160
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. 
161
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. 
162
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. 
163
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 7. See also German Technical Corporation International Fuel Prices 
Ghana (2009) 77 (hereafter German Technical Corporation 2009). 
164
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 4. Officials in Ghana‘s oil sector have indicated that they are in the final 
stages of phasing out the cross subsidisation program. Notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil 
sector are on file with the author. 
165
  The second petroleum subsidy is maintained through the unified petroleum price fund. Sometimes 
government has to finance this margin that is built into the petroleum price. See National Petroleum 
Authority Pricing Petroleum Products in Ghana (2011) Oil for Development Workshop 9 (hereafter National 
Petroleum Authority 2011). Officials in Ghana‘s oil sector confirmed the above pricing formula and the 
price support by government. Notes of discussions with officials in Ghana‘s oil sector are on file with the 
author. 
166
  Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Ghana Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the 
Government for 2012 (2011) 48. See also Ministry of Energy ‗Ghana Government spends GH¢ 760 million 
on Petroleum Subsidies Annually‘ available at http://www.energymin.gov.gh/?p=398 (accessed 14 
December 2012). It has been reported that currently the government requires about GH¢ 760 million 
annually to maintain the fuel subsidy program. 
167
  See Ministry of Energy ‗Ghana Government spends GH¢ 760 million on Petroleum Subsidies Annually‘ 
available at http://www.energymin.gov.gh/?p=398 (accessed 14 December 2012). 
168
  See Ghana Oil Watch ‗ISODEC Welcomes Government Decision to Maintain Fuel Subsidy but Wants 
Further Debate on the Issue (2012)‘ available at http://ghanaoilwatch.org/index.php/ghana-oil-and-gas-
news/2733-isodec-welcomes-government-decision-to-maintain-fuel-subsidy-but-wants-further-debate-on-
the-issue (accessed 14 December 2012). See also Singh S ‗Removing fuel subsidy: Easier Said Than Done‘ 
available at http://www.mid-day.com/columnists/2012/sep/040912-Removing-fuel-subsidy-Easier-said-than-
done.htm (accessed 14 December 2012). 
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Ghana‘s cross subsidisation program may be inconsistent with the country‘s 
obligations under the SCM Agreement. Articles 1, 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement are 
particularly important to the discussion. Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines a 
subsidy as a financial contribution by the government or public body, within the 
territory of a member through various means. 169  The most relevant financial 
contributions for purposes of this discussion include: government revenue that is 
otherwise due being foregone or not collected,170 potential direct transfer of funds,171 
and government making payments to a funding mechanism to carry out one of the 
functions indicated in subparagraphs (a) (1) (i) to (iii) of Art 1 of the SCM 
Agreement.172  These financial contributions may be treated as subsidies if they 
confer a benefit to a particular industry or group of people in the country.173 
It is therefore important to further examine each of the above provisions. In US-
Export Restraints, the panel noted that the term financial contribution was included 
in Art 1 of the SCM Agreement to protect formal government measures from 
countervailing duty.174 It was argued that not all government measures that provide 
financial contribution should be interpreted as subsidies.175 The term was meant to 
prohibit direct transfers of economic resources from government to private entities, 
or indirect transfers from government through private entities to other private 
entities.176 Accordingly, the list of financial contributions that may be considered as 
subsidies, are clearly enumerated in Art 1 of the SCM Agreement. It follows that one 
cannot conclude that simply because the government of Ghana ensures that ex-
pump prices for kerosene and gas oil are cheap, a subsidy in terms of the SCM 
Agreement has been established. The inquiry has to take into account the specific 
                                                 
169
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) of the SCM Agreement. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for a discussion of subsidies 
under the SCM Agreement. 
170
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) (ii) of the SCM Agreement. 
171
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) (i) of the SCM Agreement. 
172
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) (iv) of the SCM Agreement.  
173
  See Art 1 (1.1) (b) of the SCM Agreement. 
174
  See United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (Panel Report) [2001] WT/DS 194/R 
94. 
175
  See United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (Panel Report) [2001] WT/DS 194/R 
94. 
176
  See United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (Panel Report) [2001] WT/DS 194/R 
94. 
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financial contributions under subparagraph (a) (1) and (a) (2) of Art 1 of the SCM 
Agreement. 
One of the types of financial contributions listed in Art 1 of the SCM Agreement is 
government revenue that is otherwise foregone or not collected. The appellate body 
has interpreted this provision and established guiding principles on the same.177 A 
financial contribution for purposes of this provision will not arise only on account of 
government choosing not to raise revenue from a particular source.178 Second, the 
term ‗otherwise due‘ has been interpreted to refer to a defined comparative 
standard.179  
In line with the foregoing discussion, Ghana‘s choice not to tax kerosene and gas oil 
in the same manner as petroleum cannot be interpreted as a subsidy simply because 
the government of Ghana chooses not to raise revenue from kerosene and gas oil. In 
terms of a comparative standard, the tax legal regime for petroleum products in 
Ghana can be relied upon as a comparative standard to examine revenue otherwise 
due. The Customs and Excise (Petroleum Taxes and Petroleum Related Levies) Act, 
2005 clearly does not provide for a cross subsidy levy on kerosene and gas oil in the 
same manner as that imposed on petroleum.180 The levy is charged on ex-refinery 
premium petroleum.181 Thus based on the tax laws, it cannot be argued that failure 
to impose a similar levy on kerosene and gas oil amounts to revenue foregone, the 
revenue in any case is captured by the levy on ex-refinery premium petroleum.  
On the other hand, it can be argued that due to the fact that the government of 
Ghana is incurring loans to finance the failed cross subsidisation program,182 its 
actions constitute a potential direct transfer of funds to consumers of kerosene and 
                                                 
177
  See United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" (Appellate Body Report) [2001] 
WT/DS108/AB/R 31. 
178
  See United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" (Appellate Body Report) [2001] 
WT/DS108/AB/R 31. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
179
  See United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" (Appellate Body Report) [2001] 
WT/DS108/AB/R 31. 
180
  See Section 6 of the Customs and Excise (Petroleum Taxes and Petroleum Related Levies) Act, 2005 Act 
685. 
181
  German Technical Corporation (2009) 76-77. 
182
  See Ministry of Energy ‗Ghana Government spends GH¢ 760 million on Petroleum Subsidies Annually‘ 
available at http://www.energymin.gov.gh/?p=398 (accessed 14 December 2012). 
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gas oil.183 In Brazil-Aircraft, the panel held that a potential direct transfer of funds 
occurs when an action gives rise to a benefit without taking into account the 
payment that is meant to finance that benefit.184 In the present case, the government 
of Ghana has ensured that the National Petroleum Authority maintains the cross 
subsidy for kerosene and gas oil. The decision to maintain the subsidy is based on 
the government‘s promises to pay the money for the subsidy. The cross 
subsidisation program has been maintained through government taking on loans 
from the Tema Oil Refinery among others. These loans are yet to be paid and 
therefore cannot be regarded as a direct transfer of funds but they are a potential 
direct transfer.185 
In terms of the other form of financial contribution, that is government making 
payments to a funding mechanism, the provision has been interpreted by the panel 
in US — Export Restraints. 186  It was noted that government effecting payments 
through a funding mechanism to achieve the other forms of financial contribution in 
Art 1 of the SCM Agreement, may amount to a financial contribution.187 Ghana‘s 
second subsidy program, that which is financed through the unified petroleum price 
fund of the National Petroleum Fund, may be considered a financial contribution 
under Art 1 of the SCM Agreement.188 It can be argued that this payment through 
the unified petroleum price fund is meant to further the objective of making a 
potential direct transfer of funds.  
Subsequent to establishing that a financial contribution by the government has been 
made, the second stage of establishing a subsidy under Art 1 of the SCM Agreement 
is proving that a benefit has been conferred. The appellate body has interpreted 
                                                 
183
  See Art 1 (1.1) (a) (1) (i) of the SCM Agreement. 
184
  See Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Panel Report) [1999] WT/DS46/R 83. See also 
Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Appellate Body Report) [1999] WT/DS46/AB/R 45-46. 
The appellate body disagreed with the panel decision. Nevertheless, the panel decision provides insight on 
the interpretation of potential direct transfer of funds. 
185
 Centre for Policy Analysis Ghana: The Dawn of the Oil Economy, 2009-2012 (2011) CEPA Issues Paper No. 
23 25 (hereafter Center for Policy Analysis 2011). Although some of the debts have been paid many are still 
outstanding. 
186
  See United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies (Panel Report) [2001] WT/DS 194/R 
79. 
187
  See United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies (Panel Report) [2001] WT/DS 194/R 
81. 
188
  National Petroleum Authority (2011) 2 and 8. 
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‗benefit‘ to mean an advantageous position than would have been available to the 
recipients of the financial contribution based on market conditions.189 It is clear that 
without the cross subsidy for kerosene and gas oil, the consumers would have paid 
higher ex-pump prices for the products. The same is also true for the subsidy 
granted through the unified petroleum price fund. When Ghana attempted to 
remove the cross subsidy, the price of petroleum products went up by about 15 to 30 
percent.190 This indicates that the cross subsidy and the unified petroleum price fund 
provide favourable oil prices to consumers.  
It may also be argued that domestic gas oil producers benefit from the oil 
consumption subsidies. Gas oil is one of the subsidised oil products and oil 
consumption data indicates that a high percentage of the gas oil is domestically 
produced.191 Thus the domestic gas oil producers enjoy a high market share in 
Ghana due to demand for cheap subsidised gas oil. 
It should also be noted that for a subsidy to be subjected to the remedies provided in 
parts II and III of the SCM Agreement, such a subsidy has to be specific.192 The 
foregoing notwithstanding, it should further be noted that the requirement of 
specificity does not apply to Art 3 of the SCM Agreement. 193  Article 2 of the 
Agreement provides for specificity. Specificity can be divided into two broad 
categories. First, where the granting authority explicitly limits the subsidy to certain 
enterprises either directly or through establishing criteria which limits the subsidy to 
certain enterprises, and where it is shown that the subsidy although open to all is 
predominantly used by certain enterprises.194 The panel in US — Softwood Lumber IV 
                                                 
189
  See Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Appellate Body Report) [1999] 
WT/DS70/AB/R 40. 
190
  West Africa Insight Fuel Subsidy: Building Hardship on Citizens-Government Trust? (2012) 1 (hereafter 
West Africa Insight 2012). See also Sweet Crude Reports ‗A Review of the Nigerian Energy Industry Fuel 
Prices Rise in Ghana as Govt Cuts Subsidies‘ available at http://sweetcrudereports.com/ 2011/12/30/fuel-
prices-rise-in-ghana-as-govt-cuts-subsidies/ (accessed 15 December 2012). 
191
  National Petroleum Authority indicates that in 2012, gas oil imports amounted to 290 845 tonnes. On the 
other hand, domestic consumption of gas oil amounted to 1 326 126 tonnes. See National Petroleum 
Authority ‗Downloads Petroleum Products Import Volumes and National Domestic Supply 2012‘ available 
at http://www.npa.gov.gh/npa_new/Downloads.php (accessed 06 May 2013). 
192
  See Art 1 (1.2) of the SCM Agreement. 
193
  See Art 2 (2.3) of the SCM Agreement. 
194
  See Art 2 (2.1) (a) to (c) of the SCM Agreement. 
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the panel confirmed the above position. De facto specificity can be relied upon to 
establish the requirements under Art 2 of the SCM Agreement.195 
The cross subsidy in Ghana applies to kerosene and gas oil. The subsidy supported 
under the unified petroleum prices fund applies to all petroleum products. These 
subsidies apply to all consumers. However, the justification for the subsidy for gas 
oil clearly indicates that it is meant to benefit the commercial transport sector. 196 It 
can therefore be argued that the subsidy is predominantly used by the commercial 
transport sector and that de facto specificity has been established. If that is the case 
then with regard to specificity, the cross subsidy program and the subsidy under the 
unified petroleum prices fund cannot be considered specific under the SCM 
Agreement. The transport sector is a services sector and is not subject to the SCM 
Agreement. Related to the above, producers of gas oil indirectly benefit from the 
subsidies to enjoy a high market share relative to imported gas oil. It can be argued 
that de facto specificity exists for domestic producers of gas oil in Ghana. Although 
the subsidies may apply to all consumers, they predominantly apply to the domestic 
producers of gas oil. 
As noted previously, subsidies under Art 3 of the SCM Agreement are deemed to be 
specific. Thus one does not have to prove specificity in this case. Article 3 (3.1) (b) of 
the SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods. The provision has been interpreted to refer to de jure contingency 
and de facto contingency.197 De facto contingency has been interpreted to refer to a 
subsidy that is in fact tied to actual or anticipated use of a domestic good as opposed 
to an imported good. 198 There is nothing in the literature on Ghana‘s oil prices to 
suggest that domestically produced gas oil is cheaper than imported gas oil. 
                                                 
195
  See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (Panel Report) [2003] WT/DS257/R 105. The decision was subject to an appeal. However, the 
panel decision on de facto specificity still applies. See United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (Appellate Body Report) [2004] 
WT/DS257/AB/R. 
196
  Centre for Policy Analysis (2003) 3. 
197
 See Canada – Certain Measures Affecting The Automotive Industry (Appellate Body Report) [2000] 
WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R 32. 
198
  The above interpretation was made in terms of Art 3 (3.1) (a) of the SCM Agreement. However, the terms 
‗contingent‘ in Art 3.1 (a) and 3.1 (b) are similar. See Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (Appellate Body Report) [2000] WT/DS139/AB/R WT/DS142/AB/R 47. 
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Although domestic producers of gas oil have a large market share, the prices for 
imported gas oil and domestically produced gas oil are the same.199 Accordingly, it 
cannot be argued that the subsidy for gas oil and the subsidy under the unified 
petroleum prices fund is intended to encourage the use of domestically produced 
gas oil. Thus the oil consumption subsidy program is not a prohibited subsidy for 
purposes of the SCM Agreement. 
Actionable subsidies are regulated under Art 5 of the SCM Agreement. Subsidies 
maintained or granted under this provision have to be specific.200 As noted above, 
the oil consumption subsidies in Ghana may not be specific. However, in the event 
that specificity is established, then a determination may be made with regard to 
compliance with Art 5 of the SCM Agreement. Consequently, it would be important 
to determine whether the subsidies cause injury to the domestic industry of another 
member. 201  Additionally, a determination would have to be made on whether 
Ghana‘s oil consumption subsidies nullify or impair benefits accruing under the 
GATT.202 In the same light, it would also be necessary to determine whether the 
subsidies cause serious prejudice to the interests of other members.203  
However, it is important to note at this stage that Ghana‘s exports of gas oil are quite 
small.204 It is estimated that in 2012, the country imported about 200 000 tonnes of 
gas oil per year and it consumed between 1 600 000 and 1 700 000 tonnes of locally 
produced gas oil.205 Thus the volume of subsidised gas oil that would be exported is 
so small; this renders a detailed examination of the requirements for injury to the 
domestic industry of another member, under part V of the SCM Agreement 
redundant. The foregoing reason also makes a detailed examination of whether the 
                                                 
199
  There is no distinction in the prices of imported and domestically produced gas oil. See National Petroleum 
Authority ‗Downloads Historical Trend of Petroleum Prices in Ghana‘ available at 
http://www.npa.gov.gh/npa_new/Downloads.php (accessed 06 May 2013). 
200
  See Art 2 (2.3) of the SCM Agreement. 
201
  See Art 5 (a) of the SCM Agreement. Injury under the SCM Agreement refers to material injury to a 
domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the 
establishment of such an industry. See Footnote 45 of the SCM Agreement. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
202
 See Art 5 (b) of the SCM and Article XXIII of the GATT. 
203
  See Art 5 (c) of the SCM Agreement. See also chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
204
  Ghana exported about 1800 barrels per day of refined oil in 2008. This includes gas oil and fuel oils. See 
Index Mundi ‗Ghana Distillate Fuel Oil Exports by Year‘ available at http://www.indexmundi.com/ 
energy.aspx?country=gh&product=fuel-oil&graph=exports (accessed 06 May 2013). 
205
  Energy Commission, Ghana 2012 Energy (Supply and Demand) Outlook for Ghana (2012) iii.  
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subsidy program causes nullification and impairment of benefits to other members 
and serious prejudice to the interests of other members unnecessary. This position 
may change as the volume of petroleum production in Ghana increases. Ghana‘s oil 
consumption subsidies at this stage are not actionable under the SCM Agreement. 
As the volume of oil production in Ghana increases, and in the event that the 
subsidy program is maintained, if the country joins OPEC, subsidisation may 
increase and may reach a level that may be interpreted as actionable under Art 5 of 
the SCM Agreement. Nonetheless, the specificity requirement under Art 2 of the 
SCM Agreement will have to be proven. At the moment it is difficult to determine 
whether oil consumption subsidies in some African countries are specific.206 OPEC 
has not discouraged the use of oil subsidies and this may affect Ghana‘s obligations 
under the SCM Agreement.207 
D) Corruption and Government Procurement 
The involvement of the government in the oil industry in Ghana is prevalent in all 
sectors of oil production. GNPC is prominent in the upstream sector and generally 
government in the downstream sector as the sole shareholder in the Tema Oil 
Refinery.208 The foregoing situation creates a basis for corruption. Needless to say 
that oil revenue, which currently accounts for a large portion of government revenue, 
puts the government at the center of collection and disposal of oil revenues.209 
Disposal of natural resources and revenue is closely related to government 
procurement.210 
                                                 
206
 See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
207
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
208
  Section 2 (2) (a) and (3) (b) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 P.N.D.C.L.64. See also 
Mbendi ‗Tema Refinery‘ available at http://www.mbendi.com/reth.htm (accessed 16 December 2012). 
Although it has been reported that GNPC is the sole shareholder in the Tema Refinery, it is respectfully 
submitted that this is not accurate. Tema Refinery is not listed as one of the subsidiaries of GNPC. The 
government is indicated as the sole shareholder in the Refinery. See Tema Oil Refinery ‗Corporate Profile‘ 
available at http://www2.torghana.comm /index.php/corporate-profile (accessed 16 December 2012). See 
also GNPC ‗Subsidiaries‘ available at http://www.gnpcghana.com/subsi diaries/ (accessed 16 December 
2012).  
209
  See Bloomberg ‗Ghana‘s Oil Revenue Rises 29% in Nine Months on Jubilee Output‘ available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-25/ghana-s-oil-revenue-rises-29-in-nine-months-on-jubilee-
output.html (accessed 16 December 2012). 
210
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
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The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984, provides that only GNPC is 
allowed to conduct oil exploration and production.211 Other players in the upstream 
sector can only participate through agreements between such third parties, the 
government and GNPC.212 This makes the government and GNPC the major players 
in the disposal of oil resources before exploration. Despite the presence of such a 
mandate there is nothing in the Act to control or regulate corruption or encourage 
transparency. It is therefore not surprising that the allocation of the blocks where the 
jubilee oil fields are located has been the source of various criticisms, which mainly 
point to corruption and a fiscal regime which unfairly benefited some parties.213 
Similarly, the GNPC Act, 1983, states that GNPC may engage in petroleum 
operations and enter into petroleum exploration and production agreements. 214 
Despite such a mandate, there are no provisions in the Act to control and discourage 
corrupt practices. It might be argued that GNPC is a corporate entity with a board of 
directors. However, the directors are appointed by the president on the advice of the 
Minister of Energy.215 This may encourage the selection of loyal political allies as 
opposed to technocrats. Suffice it to note that Ghana does not have a specific 
corporate governance framework for state owned enterprises to encourage 
transparency in such entities.216  This lacuna is remedied at least to a limited extent, 
by Art 268 of the Constitution which provides for parliamentary ratification of all 
natural resources transactions in Ghana. 217  This provision enjoins Parliament to 
ratify all transactions involving exploitation of natural resources. 
In 2011, Ghana enacted the Petroleum Revenue Management Act. The Act provides 
that the management of petroleum revenue and savings should be transparent.218 
                                                 
211
  See Section 2 (1) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 P. N. D. C. L84. 
212
  See Section 2 (1) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984 P. N. D. C. L84. 
213
  See Upstream ‗Jubilee Partner in Ghana Legal Probe‘ available at http://www.upstreamonline.com/ 
hardcopy/news/article1184639.ece (accessed 06 May 2013). See also Global Witness ‗Ghana Controversy 
Shows Need to Shine a Light on Oil Deals‘ available at http://www.globalwitness.org/ library/ghana-
controversy-shows-need-shine-light-oil-deals (accessed 16 December 2012). 
214
  See Section 2 (3) (b) and (c) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 P.N.D.C.L.64. 
215
  See Section 5 (1) (c) of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 P.N.D.C.L.64. 
216
  See generally Prempeh H K Reforming Corporate Governance in Ghana Part 2: The Public Sector (2002) 
Ghana Center for Democratic Development Briefing Paper Vol 3 No. 5 (hereafter Prempeh H K 2002). 
217
  See Art 268 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992 as amended. 
218
  See Section 49 (1) and (2) of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 Act 815. 
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Further, the Act provides for the disclosure of information regarding the 
management of petroleum revenue and establishes a Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee (Committee).219 In 2011, the Committee issued its first 
report and pointed out key concerns such as the difference between projected 
petroleum revenue and the actual revenue collected in 2011.220 This was attributed to 
provisions in the Petroleum Income Tax Law which provides for capital cost 
recovery.221 It also established that GNPC followed the public procurement law in 
identifying a marketing contractor for Ghana‘s share of oil from the Jubilee field.222 It 
can be concluded in this regard, that the Act and the Committee will to some extent 
control corruption in the oil sector in Ghana.223 
Finally, the Public Procurement Act, 2003, provides procurement rules for the 
government of Ghana.224 The Act also provides for methods of procurement such as 
tendering, which encourage transparency. 225  The Act regulates the disposal of 
government property and creates offences to discourage corruption in government 
procurement.226 The anomalies that have been reported concerning the disposal of 
oil acreage in the early stages of oil exploration in the jubilee fields seem to have 
been contained.227 As noted, GNPC is currently adhering to the procurement laws.228 
At the outset, oil production in Ghana was beset by corrupt practices. However, the 
legal regime on corruption and government procurement appears to be guiding the 
oil sector in the right direction. Ghana is not a signatory to the WTO GPA.229 
However, this has not stopped the country from establishing a legal framework that 
                                                 
219
  See Sections 50, 51, and 52 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 Act 815. 
220
  Public Interest and Accountability Committee Report on Petroleum Revenue Management for 2011 Annual 
Report (2012) 39 (hereafter the Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2011). 
221
  Public Interest and Accountability Committee (2012) 39. 
222
  Public Interest and Accountability Committee (2012) 40. 
223
  It has been noted that the Public Interest and Accountability Committee may be faced with challenges in the 
implementation of its mandate and recommendations. This is a challenge that the body will have to 
overcome. See Prempeh H K & Krooon C The Political Economy Analysis of the Oil & Gas Sector in Ghana: 
Summary of Issues (2012) Star-Ghana 8 (hereafter Prempeh H K & Krooon C 2012).  
224
  Part III of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 Act 663. 
225
  See Sections 44 and 45 of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 Act 663. 
226
  See Section 92 of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 Act 663. 
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  See Upstream ‗Jubilee Partner in Ghana Legal Probe‘ available at http://www.upstreamonline.com/ 
hardcopy/news/article1184639.ece (accessed 06 May 2013). 
228
  Public Interest and Accountability Committee (2012) 40. 
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  See WTO ‗Government Procurement Parties and Observers‘ available at http://www.wto.org/english/t 
ratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 06 May 2013). 
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encourages transparency. The main concern with regard to public procurement is 
liberalisation of procurement in the oil sector, especially due to the prominence of 
local content policies.230 Corruption in the OPEC member states is quite high and 
there is no formal framework to control the same.231 Thus Ghana‘s decision to join 
OPEC may impede efforts to actively control corruption in the oil sector. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Ghana‘s policy framework for oil production and trade is in line with its obligations 
under the WTO. Restriction of oil production is meant to protect the environment 
and to conserve an exhaustible natural resource; this is in line with Art XX (g) of the 
GATT. This position may change if Ghana joins OPEC where restrictions on oil 
production are meant to stabilise oil prices. 
Second, Ghana maintains an oil consumption subsidy program for kerosene and gas 
oil, through the cross subsidisation mechanism. It also has a subsidy program under 
the unified petroleum prices fund. Despite the fact that these subsidies are financial 
contributions and they benefit certain sectors such as the commercial transport 
sector and the domestic oil producers, the subsidies are not prohibited or actionable 
under Arts 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement. To this end, Ghana‘s oil consumption 
subsidies are consistent with Ghana‘s obligations under the WTO. Like the above 
conclusion on production quotas, an increase in the volume of oil production 
complemented by OPEC membership, may increase the level of subsidisation 
making the subsidies actionable. Even then, specificity of the oil consumption 
subsidies will have to be established. 
Finally, Ghana has enacted laws to regulate the management of oil revenues and 
supplies. Currently, the laws appear to be successful and the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee is performing its role of ensuring that the laws are 
implemented and the oil revenue is managed in a transparent manner. Similarly, the 
laws on government procurement also encourage transparency in government 
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procurement. However, Ghana is not a party to the GPA; this may affect the 
liberalisation of government procurement especially due to Ghana‘s focus on local 
content in the oil sector. However, the GPA is not an appropriate tool for the control 
of corruption in the oil sector.232 OPEC does not have a formal framework to control 
corruption, thus OPEC membership will not control corruption in Ghana.233 The next 
chapter provides a summary of the conclusions and recommendations for the thesis. 
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  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
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  See chapter 4 section 4.4.3. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The thesis sought to examine the regulation of international trade in oil from an 
African perspective. The previous chapters examined the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and control of corruption under both the WTO 
and OPEC legal regimes. African examples, such as, Nigeria, in some cases Angola, 
and Ghana as a main case study, were relied upon. On the whole, the thesis reveals 
that the WTO has a strong institutional capacity to regulate international trade in oil. 
However, apart from Art XI of the GATT on the regulation of production quotas, the 
WTO rules on subsidies and corruption have challenges in the regulation of 
international trade in oil. Conversely, OPEC has a weak institutional and legal 
framework for the regulation of international trade in oil.  
This chapter provides a summary of the conclusions and the recommendations of 
the thesis. The first section of the chapter discusses the conclusions to the thesis and 
the second section provides practical recommendations for the regulation of 
international trade in oil. Finally, concluding remarks for the chapter are provided.  
7.2 A Summary of the Conclusions 
This summary of conclusions collates all the conclusions arising from the research 
questions and the objectives of the thesis. These questions are answered in detail in 
the previous chapters. The intention of this section is to bring all these conclusions 
together, to provide a basis for the recommendations that are made in next section of 
this chapter. The summary of conclusions addresses the duality of legal regimes 
presented by OPEC and WTO regulations, the effect of such a duality on the 
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regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and the control of 
corruption, whether the duality affects the full liberalisation of international trade in 
oil, whether the WTO institutional and legal framework is sufficient for the 
regulation of international trade in oil, whether the OPEC institutional and legal 
framework is sufficient for the regulation of international trade in oil, and finally 
examines the legal regime for the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and corruption in Ghana. 
Chapters three, four, and five indicate that there is a duality of legal regimes 
presented by OPEC and the WTO in the regulation of international trade in oil.1 The 
two organisations provide for regulations on production quotas, oil consumption 
subsidies, and the control of corruption.2 However, although the WTO has express 
regulations for these key areas, OPEC regulations are not expressly provided in the 
OPEC Statute. Nonetheless, a broad interpretation of the Statute reveals that the 
organisation has the powers to regulate these key areas. Additionally, de facto, 
OPEC appears to have acquiesced to the use of oil consumption subsidies in its 
member states, as the incidence of these subsidies in the OPEC countries is high.3 It 
should be noted that this duality of legal regimes affects the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and corruption.4 Additionally, due to the fact the 
organisations have different theoretical backgrounds, the regulations of the two 
organisations are not compatible.5 While the WTO generally aspires to encouraging 
liberalisation in international trade, OPEC is founded on production restriction to 
ensure profitable returns from oil trade.6  
With regard to the institutional and legal frameworks of both the WTO and OPEC, 
the institutional framework of the WTO provides a better option for the regulation of 
international trade in oil.7 The various top-level, mid-level and subsidiary organs can 
                                                 
1
  See chapter 3 sections 3.3 and 3.4. See also chapter 4 sections 4.3 and 4.4. See also chapter 5 sections 5.2 
and 5.3. 
2
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4. See also chapter 4 sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3. 
3
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.2. 
4
  See chapter 5 sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
5
  See chapter 2 generally. 
6
  See chapter 1 sections 1.2 and 1.3. See also chapter 2 generally. 
7
  See chapter 3 section 3.3 and chapter 5 section 5.2. 
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transform the regulation of international trade in oil. However, the WTO legal 
framework has to be interpreted and in some cases amended to provide for 
international trade in oil. This is especially true for WTO rules on subsidies, 
corruption and government procurement.8 For example, the application of the oil 
consumption subsidy program in Nigeria to the SCM Agreement revealed that it is 
difficult to determine whether the subsidy is specific.9 Also, the GPA is a plurilateral 
agreement with limited application and currently none of the African WTO 
members are parties to the Agreement.10 The OPEC institutional framework is weak 
and mainly entrenches the GATT inconsistent practice of production quotas.11 The 
OPEC legal framework is insufficient and the OPEC Statute does not provide 
express regulations for production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and 
corruption in African oil producing countries.12 Nonetheless, the broad powers in 
the OPEC Statute can be interpreted to cover the regulation of production quotas, oil 
consumption subsidies and the control of corruption in African oil producing 
countries.13 It was also noted, especially, for Nigeria and Angola, that the domestic 
legal regimes entrench OPEC production quotas. 14  Further, oil consumption 
subsidies and corruption were prevalent in these two African oil producing OPEC 
member states.15 
Currently, the Ghanaian perspective indicates that its oil production management 
regulations and its oil consumption subsidy programs are not in contravention of 
WTO obligations under the GATT and the SCM Agreement.16 Ghana is not a party to 
the GPA, however, its Petroleum Revenue Management Act and its public 
procurement laws have helped control corruption in its oil sector.17 This observation 
is made on the basis of the oil related scandals that were prevalent in Ghana before 
                                                 
8
  See chapter 3 sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. 
9
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.3. 
10
  See chapter 3 section 3.4.4. 
11
  See chapter 4 section 4.3. 
12
  See chapter 4 section 4.4. 
13
  See chapter 4 section 4.4. 
14
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
15
  See chapter 4 section 4.5. 
16
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
17
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
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the Act was enacted.18 Presently, the oil production capacity in Ghana is still low and 
there is also very little incentive to join OPEC. In the event that Ghana chooses to 
join OPEC, especially after its volume of oil production has increased, then its 
production management regulations may be motivated by profit maximisation and 
not conservation of a finite natural resource.19 This may violate Art XI of the GATT. 
Similarly, due to the fact that most OPEC countries maintain oil consumption 
subsidy programs, Ghana may follow the practices of other OPEC member states, 
and continue its oil consumption subsidy program. OPEC does not have a coherent 
framework for the control of corruption in its member states.20 This may undermine 
Ghana‘s efforts to curb corruption in its oil sector, as other OPEC member states 
have not been successful in controlling corruption in their oil sectors. 
7.3 Recommendations 
It can be noted from the discussion in section 7.2 above, that although the WTO has a 
strong institutional framework, its legal framework especially on the regulation of 
oil consumption subsidies and corruption is insufficient. This section provides 
recommendations on the regulation of production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, 
and corruption in Africa. The section also provides some general recommendations 
before the concluding remarks for the chapter are made. 
7.3.1 Production Quotas 
Article XI of the GATT on the regulation of quantitative restrictions can be 
interpreted to regulate production quotas. Moreover, the GATT in Art XX provides 
for general exceptions that can be used to override the obligations under Art XI; this 
caters for special circumstances. Thus the GATT and the WTO are the appropriate 
forums for the regulation of production quotas. WTO African oil producing 
countries that are also OPEC members have to ensure that they comply with their 
                                                 
18
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
19
  See chapter 6 section 6.2.4. 
20
  See chapter 4 section 4.4.3. 
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GATT obligations. This might require relinquishing OPEC membership. The efficient 
regulation of production quotas will also require that WTO members provide for a 
GATT consistent method to address oil price volatility and to ensure oil price 
stability. That said, it is proposed that the term ‗other measures‘ in Art XI be 
expressly provided in the GATT to avoid ambiguity. In light of the discussion in the 
previous chapters, ‗other measures‘ can be defined to include production restriction 
that has a direct effect on the volume of exports. Nonetheless, amendment of this 
clause in the GATT may be too broad, and inapplicable to other goods, such as, 
agricultural commodities, where for food security and other related concerns, 
production restriction may be necessary over a long period of time. Thus this 
proposal should be captured in a specific WTO energy trade treaty. 
7.3.2 Oil Consumption Subsidies 
Articles 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement provide for the regulation of prohibited and 
actionable subsidies. However, as noted in chapter three, it is difficult to determine 
whether oil consumption subsidies in countries like Nigeria, cause material injury to 
the domestic oil industries of other WTO members. This affects the determination of 
actionable subsidies under Art 5 of the SCM. It is important that African countries 
adopt a reporting mechanism on volumes of subsidized oil imported into their 
jurisdictions as well as creative methods of monitoring oil smuggled into various 
countries. Material injury under Art 15 of the SCM on the determination of injury in 
its present form does not cover smuggled oil. This is because subsidised oil 
encourages smuggling; this does not go through the formal import processes. A 
concerted effort between subsidizing countries and neighboring countries can be 
undertaken to produce credible data on smuggled oil. Similar multilateral processes 
have been undertaken in the reporting and monitoring of trade in ‗blood diamonds.‘ 
Further, with regard to specificity, and the determination of whether oil 
consumption subsidies are actionable in terms of Art 5 of the SCM, it is important 
that the definition of the term ‗specificity‘ expressly provide for the service sector. 
Again, this requires a specific WTO energy treaty. The current SCM does not apply 
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to services, yet some of these subsidies are predominantly utilised by the services 
sector, such as, transport services. 
With regard to Art 3 of the SCM, it is challenging to prove that oil consumption 
subsidies encourage the use of domestic oil over imported oil. In most African 
countries, domestic oil reserves are not sufficient to cater for domestic needs. Thus 
for countries, such as, Nigeria and Ghana, it cannot be said that their oil 
consumption subsidies encourage the use of domestic over imported oil. This makes 
it impossible to describe oil consumption subsidies as prohibited. It is proposed that 
the definition of prohibited subsidies be amended to cover subsidies that encourage 
substantial smuggling of oil to other oil producing countries. This will require a 
definition of the term ‗substantial.‘ The foregoing term could be defined to refer to 
smuggling that negatively affects oil production and trade in other countries. 
7.3.3 Corruption 
The GPA has the potential of encouraging transparency in the oil sectors of African 
oil producing countries. However, the Agreement is plurilateral and countries may 
choose to apply it to selected industries. This limitation and the fact that no African 
country is a party to the Agreement render it inappropriate for the control of 
corruption in the oil sector. However, the rules of the GPA can guide the WTO in the 
creation of rules to regulate corruption in the oil sector. It is proposed that the WTO 
energy treaty include MFN and national treatment provisions on tendering 
processes for oil production and trade. This will make these processes more 
transparent and help curb corruption. 
7.3.4 General Recommendations 
It is evident from the discussion in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 7.3.3, that the WTO has 
the potential to regulate production quotas, oil consumption subsidies, and 
corruption. However, this requires either an amendment of the existing rules, or the 
negotiation of a new agreement to cover trade in energy. The WTO has previously 
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amended some agreements like the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the GPA. On the other hand, negotiating a new 
agreement on trade in energy will involve a lengthy process and may be difficult to 
conclude. This conclusion is plausible in light of the Doha round of negotiation 
which is yet to be concluded. Even then, amending the GATT, SCM Agreement, and 
the GPA to provide for comprehensive rules on the regulation of international trade 
in oil may be difficult. Thus a coherent agreement that addresses the peculiarities of 
trade in energy and trade in oil is the most appropriate avenue. This Agreement 
should be negotiated under the WTO framework. The ECT can be used as a guide 
for the WTO energy treaty. 
Second, it is proposed that the WTO energy treaty cover the entire upstream, 
downstream and all related processes of oil production and trade. This will give the 
WTO dispute settlement process the mandate to handle oil disputes that may arise at 
any stage of oil production and trade. 
Finally, the WTO should embark on a detailed study of the regulation of production 
quotas, oil consumption subsidies and corruption. These areas affect free trade in oil. 
Such a study will also highlight key provisions that will be necessary for the 
regulation of international trade in oil. These provisions can form the basis for a 
draft WTO energy treaty. 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
The chapter has discussed albeit briefly, the summary of conclusions of the thesis on 
the role of the WTO and OPEC in the regulation of international trade in oil, 
especially with regard to production quotas, oil consumption subsidies and 
corruption. That said, the recommendations provided in this chapter are mainly 
based on African examples and may therefore be limited in application. 
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